Geopolitical Sphere

People increasingly turn to AI chatbots for news and explanations of world events. But do they receive the same political answers when they ask in different languages? Here we show that the language of a question can change how the same AI systems assess the war in Ukraine. We ask GPT, Claude and Gemini to evaluate twenty statements about the war in 112 languages, collecting 67,200 responses. The balance between Russia-leaning and Ukraine-leaning responses differs across languages. When we group responses by countries' official languages, they follow a pattern resembling worldwide political divisions: relatively more Russia-leaning answers correspond to more favourable public views of Russia, less support for Ukraine in United Nations votes, and less aid to Ukraine. The broad pattern recurs across all three models and remains when individual statement pairs are removed. Our findings suggest a possible route through which information warfare may shape the text used to train AI models, which may in turn spread geopolitical biases.

This paper develops a general convolutional neural network (CNN) framework for detecting heterogeneous event-driven dynamics in univariate time series windows. We show that the induced CNN class exactly represents classifiers based on range, maximum drawup, maximum drawdown and slope change, and uniformly approximates realised volatility and autoregressive explosiveness on compact domains. We further establish error bounds for representative rules in finite samples and an oracle inequality for learning across them. Simulations show that the proposed model can match or outperform classifiers based on individual statistics as the training sample grows. In an application to six daily energy price series, a hierarchical CNN distinguishes event windows and event families. Applied without retraining to observations withheld after 20 February 2026, the fitted model identifies predominantly geopolitical dynamics in several oil and refined product series around the outbreak of the 2026 Iran war, while distinguishing a contemporaneous natural gas spike associated with weather.

Measuring political bias in large language models (LLMs) remains challenging as it can manifest through subtle differences in framing, argumentation, and legal reasoning that are difficult to capture with a single metric. In this work, we introduce Poli-Bias, a counterfactual framework for measuring whether LLMs treat legally equivalent conflict scenarios differently depending on the countries involved. Poli-Bias compares responses to paired prompts in which country identities are systematically swapped across diverse geopolitical relationships, legal violations, and reasoning tasks. Rather than reducing bias to a single judgment, our framework decomposes response disparities into five interpretable dimensions, revealing how and where unequal treatment manifests. Across 13 contemporary LLMs spanning diverse model families and sizes, we find that country identities and user affiliations can systematically affect how equivalent actions are described, evaluated, and defended under international law. Our results thus establish Poli-Bias as a fine-grained framework for auditing political even-handedness and sycophancy in LLMs.

This paper presents a speculative Human-Computer Interaction design proposal for encouraging geopolitical reflexivity amongst tech workers at geopolitically relevant technology companies. Recent scholarship in International Relations and Science and Technology Studies increasingly recognizes technology firms and their workers as geopolitical actors whose decisions shape international dynamics. However, existing Responsible Innovation and Responsible AI approaches rarely engage with the geopolitical narratives and imaginaries that underpin contemporary AI development. Building upon RI scholarship on reflexivity, reflective HCI, and creative HCI work on computational narratives, this paper proposes an AI-enabled interactive narrative system in which users engage with a speculative scenario centred on technology, power, and geopolitics. Through narrative interaction, archetype assignment, and socially scaffolded workshop reflection, the system aims to encourage target users to critically examine their assumptions, values, and positionality within broader sociotechnical systems. We argue that speculative narrative systems may offer a productive avenue for introducing geopolitical reflexivity into responsible technology initiatives without relying on prescriptive or moralising approaches.

Large language models trained and aligned within different linguistic and regional ecosystems may frame the same political, cultural, and geopolitical entities in different ways. Such differences are often evaluated through sentiment, favorability, or stance, reducing model attitudes to a single positive-negative axis. We introduce REGARD, a study of what drives affective framing differences across LLMs on post-Soviet entities using target-directed Valence-Arousal-Dominance profiling. We query 19 models on 500 region-specific targets, score their responses with two independent LLM judges, GPT-4o-mini and Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, and validate the measurements on a 300-item human-annotated subset. Post-hoc Ward-linkage clustering of all 19 models by affective and response-behavior profiles yields three behavioral clusters that cut across model origin, family, and parameter count. Generic-answer rate is strongly associated with lower arousal (r = -0.81) and with cluster placement: models that deflect evaluative prompts with templated responses cluster together at low arousal regardless of origin. These findings show that VAD profiling captures emotional intensity, a dimension of affective framing that is largely invisible to conventional sentiment-based evaluation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how we consume information and form our worldview. This raises concerns beyond bias in AI: do LLMs grasp the emotional nuances conveyed via textual framing? In this work, we empirically evaluate how well an array of LLMs aligns with human emotional perception. Considering news headlines covering political and geopolitical conflicts, both human participants (n = 3011, a representative sample of the U.K. adult population, via a YouGov survey) and seven LLMs answered whether headlines evoked sympathy for a specified side in a conflict. We find that the correlation between AI and human evaluations varies across models, ranging from very high (0.789, GPT-5.2) to medium (0.4 ,Mistral Large 2512). Crucially, the leading models are broadly aligned with human judgments across all demographic subgroups, including age, gender, level of education, prior geopolitical knowledge, and participants' predispositions regarding the conflict, although there are statistically significant differences between groups. This research, with its robust design and large, demographically diverse dataset, offers the most comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' comprehension of news framing to date. Findings highlight an important, often-ignored aspect of differential alignment: even when aggregate performance is high, AI alignment is not universal -- it may correspond differently with demographic features and cultural norms. Considering or ignoring the need for differential alignment may therefore have significant implications for the development of ethical and useful AI systems.

State-backed influence operations are routinely measured as high-prevalence sources of hate'' and toxicity.'' We argue those rates rest on a measurement error: the detectors behind them are validated to catch a broader definition inclusive of hostility or divisiveness aimed at an out-group, and so over-attribute hate to content better described as partisan or geopolitical invective. Across 25.08M tweets from seven government-attributed campaigns in the Twitter Information Operations archive (8,275 accounts), we separate hate from the other forms of divisiveness. We first validate a two-prompt LLM-based detector, matching human labels at Cohen's $κ=0.82$, to identify the broader hostility; we then develop an auditable rule, agreeing with an expert at $κ=0.52$, to further classify this content (5,457 posts) into three sub-categories. About 50.1% are identity-based attacks on people, whereas 30.4% are partisan attacks and 19.5% invective against states and their foreign policy. Reporting all of it as hate therefore overstates hate roughly twofold; only 18.7% is both identity-based and dehumanizing or inciting. Six of seven campaigns sort into three regimes that a single ``hate'' rate flattens, namely identity hate (RU-op and IRA, both Russia-attributed), geopolitical invective (both Iran operations), and partisan divisiveness (both Venezuela operations). We call the shared product $manufactured divisiveness$. The line to separate these constructs itself remains unsettled: on the hardest cases three independent human experts agree only moderately (pairwise $κ=0.37$--$0.50$), and the best of nineteen LLM models tops out at $κ=0.601$ against the experts' majority. Our findings can help redefine the study of hate in the context of influence campaigns and broader online discourse.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to summarize and evaluate policy-relevant information, but it remains unclear whether their judgments are implicitly shaped by geopolitical cues. I study this question with an endorsement experiment in which four LLMs evaluate the same international economic and security policies after each policy is randomly described as supported by the United States, the European Union, China, or Russia. In the numeric-only condition, GPT-5, Claude Sonnet, and Gemini rate China- and Russia-endorsed policies substantially lower than identical policies endorsed by the United States or the European Union; DeepSeek is the main exception. A second condition asks models to provide a short justification with the score. This request leaves the broad Western/non-Western gap intact for GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet, attenuates Gemini's penalties, and sharply activates China and Russia penalties in DeepSeek. The justifications indicate that Western endorsement is often treated as a credibility cue, whereas Chinese and Russian endorsement is treated as a cue for data security, sovereignty, surveillance, or geopolitical risk. These findings show that LLM policy evaluations can depend on the identity of a foreign endorser even when policy content is held fixed.

We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research. In enacting foreign policy, we refer to the formulation and implementation of external objectives by political actors. Statecraft is a high-consequence deployment domain, with extreme downside risks and structural properties that standard evaluation practices handle poorly. These features include partial observability, unbounded action spaces, contested ground truth, and multidimensional objectives. This paper advocates for a literature-grounded research agenda. Our contribution is threefold: (i) a claim about the structural conditions of foreign policy that combine catastrophic tail risk with technical evaluation complexities, (ii) an ECOSYSTEM review that highlights the asymmetric focus on ASSESSMENT features over ACCESS, VERIFICATION, SECURITY, and OPERATIONALIZATION, and (iii) a demand-side evaluation framework that decomposes foreign-policy workflows into bounded, evaluable sub-tasks with human recombination. As AI systems are already being deployed in the conduct of war and peace, amid limited public evaluation infrastructure from the technical AI governance community, this agenda is an urgent priority.

Scientists do not, by profession, wage war. Yet warfare's vocabulary consistently appears in their abstracts. To quantify the extent to which warfare's vocabulary pervades scientific abstracts, we analyze 21.4 million papers (2010-2025; OpenAlex, PubMed). We additionally run a within-subject war-framing experiment (N = 801; 32,040 trials) designed to provide causal insight into the effects of militaristic language on persuasion. Between 2010 and 2025, the presence of militaristic terms in scientific abstracts rose 48% in OpenAlex and 32% in PubMed, with the rise accelerating sharply after 2019 (cross-database r = 0.96, p < 10^-8). The prevalence of militaristic language is conflict-aligned at both country and annual scales (Uppsala Conflict Data Program; r = 0.77-0.84), with the abstracts from the Global South displaying the fastest rise in militaristic language. Among disciplines, social sciences leads in level of such language while engineering and computer science lead in growth. The COVID and post-2022 large-language-model eras also saw the rise and narrowed the language gap between native-English and non-English authors. In our follow-up experiment, we found that war framing reduced credibility (mean shift -0.18 Likert units, 95% CI [-0.21, -0.14]; d_z = -0.28, p < 10^-20), funding willingness (d_z = -0.12) and policy support (d_z = -0.08), with a trend-level increase in sense of urgency (d_z = +0.07). Collectively, findings reveal that while scientific abstracts drift toward warfare, the use of militaristic language may erode credibility, funding willingness, and policy support.

The increasing availability of large-scale textual corpora has opened new possibilities for data-driven, quantitative approaches to historical analysis using Natural Language Processing (NLP). However, diachronic corpora with historical relevance from the pre-digital era remain scarce and often incomplete. We present a quantitative approach to historical analysis based on the reconstruction and exploration of a diachronic corpus of around 600,000 articles from the Italian newspaper "La Repubblica", covering all the articles published from the 1st of January 1985 to the 31st of December 2000 - a period of major political, social, and geopolitical change in Italy and globally. Using NLP techniques, we analyze the text at both lexical and semantic levels; we then apply tools from complex systems and statistical physics to trace shifts in media discourse over time. This allows us to detect key transition periods, such as the transition from the First Republic to the Second Republic in Italy, or major international conflicts like the Gulf War or the Kosovo War, without relying on prior labeling. The results show how combining computational linguistics with ideas from complex systems can offer new quantitative insight into historical changes, opening up new paths for studying the dynamics of media and society through large-scale textual data.

Recursive Multi-Agent Trading System (RMATS) integrates four specialized agents -- Sentiment, Report, Analysis, and Risk -- coordinated through a recursive Manager Agent with iterative feedback loops. Experimental evaluation over a 561-trading-day period (January 2023 to March 2025) across a 24-asset multi-class universe demonstrates that RMATS achieves a maximum drawdown of 9.62%, lower than MVO (15.49%) and FinBERT Sentiment (15.28%), and exhibits the lowest event-period drawdown in 3 of 5 geopolitical stress scenarios tested. While RMATS underperforms return-maximizing baselines in a sustained bull market environment, ablation studies confirm the individual contribution of each agent component to downside protection. These results position RMATS as a risk-control-oriented architecture suitable for institutions prioritizing capital preservation under geopolitical uncertainty.

AI-enabled military systems are a fixture of modern military conflict. Applications vary from autonomous drones for surveillance and attack to AI-supported target selection. The importance of AI for modern conflict shows also in public disputes between governments and technology companies over the conditions for military access to frontier AI. Both military uses and government attempts at enabling and steering them happen before a backdrop of public opinion, yet we still know little about how people think about military AI. Drawing on a preregistered survey of 9,000 respondents in nine countries, including China, Germany, and the United States, we examine whether support for military AI is shaped primarily by general attitudes toward AI, principled opposition to lethal autonomy, or foreign-policy and geopolitical orientations. Across six military AI scenarios that vary in lethality and human control, respondents who view AI as beneficial are substantially more supportive of military AI. Hawkish respondents are also more supportive. By contrast, principled opposition to lethal autonomy is not broadly associated with the full index but is related to the application of fully autonomous lethal force. Contrary to our expectation, perceived AI risks are positively associated with support. Cross-national differences are moderate and broadly consistent with geopolitical context. Overall, public opinion toward military AI appears conditionally permissive. Publics are not categorically opposed to various military uses of AI. Instead, unease is concentrated around fully autonomous lethal force.

The proliferation of large language models has introduced a new paradigm of synthetic political communication in which narratives may be generated, semantically coordinated, and strategically disseminated across platforms at scale. We present a cross-platform framework for detecting synthetic political narratives using four coordination signals -- lexical diversity D(C), temporal burstiness B(C), rhetorical repetition R(C), and semantic homogenization H(C) -- combined into a Synthetic Narrative Coordination Score SNC(C). We apply the framework to a corpus of 353,223 records spanning six geopolitical event windows collected from six Telegram channels and nine Reddit communities (2023--2026). Results show that IntelSlava exhibits the lowest lexical diversity (MATTR 0.52--0.54), the highest burstiness (B=+0.48 to +0.73), and the highest rhetorical overlap with peer channels (Jaccard 0.12), ranking first in the composite SNC(C) on four of six event windows (SNC 0.45--0.60). Rybar ranks last on all windows despite its high semantic homogenization, because its Russian-language output yields high lexical diversity and near-zero rhetorical Jaccard with English-language channels -- demonstrating that no single indicator is sufficient for coordination detection. Multi-dimensional SNC(C) scoring provides a more robust and interpretable signal than any individual metric.

Media bias detection has predominantly been framed as a classification task: assign a political label to an article or outlet. We argue this framing is too shallow: it identifies that bias exists but not where, how, or crucially, what is structurally omitted. We present NewsLens, a five-agent adversarial pipeline for structured news bias navigation. A Fact Verifier, Progressive Framing Analyst, Conservative Framing Analyst, Propaganda Detector, and Neutral Summarizer collaborate to deconstruct articles into interpretable framing maps, exposing ideological omissions, rhetorical manipulation, and framing boundaries. The system is evaluated on 15 articles across four geopolitical event clusters (India-Pakistan Kashmir, Gaza, Climate Policy, Ukraine) using Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct (4-bit quantised, Google Colab T4), with cross-model validation using Mistral 7B on the Kashmir cluster. Center outlets show the highest mean Perspective Divergence Score (PDS: Qwen 0.907, Mistral 0.729 on Kashmir subset); conservative-framing outlets show the highest mean Manipulation Index (MI: 0.600 across both models). Cross-model comparison shows high consistency for high-propaganda content (Republic World delta-PDS=0.125, MI=0.8 both models) and greater variance for nuanced reporting. Mann-Whitney U tests find no statistically significant between-group differences at n=15, reported honestly as a sample-size limitation confirmed by post-hoc power analysis. A partial ablation removing the Propaganda Detector shows degraded omission precision in the Neutral Summarizer output. The architecture extends prior lexical-geometric bias work to agentic LLM reasoning, and is fully reproducible using open-weight models without API keys.

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is mostly assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, leaving how language and geopolitical context interact largely unexamined beyond a few language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English-Korean language pair and U.S.-ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S. versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal, and responses are scored by calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels using expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language; in a subset of models, Korean grounding further mitigates the language-driven suppression. This indicates that, at least in the English-Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. A direct-request ablation that strips jailbreak wrappers separates a small but persistent reduction for closed-source models from a larger, wrapper-dependent effect that reverses for open-source models, suggesting part of the Korean suppression reflects prompt specialization rather than intrinsic language-based safety alignment. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language-culture pairs.

Cognitive operations are a rising concern in the geopolitical sphere, a quiet yet rigorous fight for public perception and decision making. While such operations have been extensively studied in the context of bot-driven amplification, the emergence of generative AI introduces a new set of capabilities that may have fundamentally altered how these operations are designed and executed. The possible evolution of cognitive operation via generative AI puts nation states vulnerable without proper mitigation strategies. To address this, we compared behavioral and linguistic coordination patterns in X (formerly Twitter) datasets from the 2016 and 2024 U.S. presidential elections. Utilizing a combined corpus of over 133,000 posts, we applied post-type distribution, semantic clustering, temporal synchrony analysis, and Jaccard-based lexical overlap measures. Findings suggest that the 2024 corpus exhibits a distinct pattern from 2016. Original content rose from 59% to 93% with retweets virtually disappeared; lexical overlap collapsed from a mean Jaccard score of 0.99 to 0.27, with posts converging on the same subject matter expressed in markedly different words; and temporal coordination shifted from pervasive cross-semantic synchrony to narratively concentrated co-occurrence. Taken together, these patterns point toward an operational logic organized around active content generation and narrative-specific targeting - characteristics consistent with generative AI involvement. These findings offer an empirical baseline for future research investigating generative AI's role in the cognitive operation pipeline, and as a practical reference point for security practitioners developing detection frameworks calibrated to the post-generative AI threat environment.

What happens when the strongest alliance member pressures a weaker member over territory and strategic control? We examine the Greenland sovereignty crisis as a stress test for LLM geopolitics, centered on the 2019-2026 U.S. push to acquire Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. The crisis nests two collective-action problems: Arctic strategic control and whether NATO can enforce alliance norms against the dominant member. We develop three games (asymmetric coercion; a NATO assurance game with a critical-mass tipping point; a triadic extensive-form game with social preferences) and test them with a multi-agent simulation in which eight frontier LLMs play six geopolitical roles (United States, Denmark, Greenland, NATO, Russia, Canada) across 3,604 completed games and 108,120 action observations. Using inverse game theory, we recover each model's structural utility parameters (alpha, beta, gamma, delta, eta) for material self-interest, reciprocity, inequality aversion, norm respect, and commitment consistency. Three findings stand out. First, all eight models become more escalatory under coercion framing (four-action escalation rises from 10.7% to 28.6%). Second, Chinese-origin models show systematically different power-weight profiles from Western-origin models when playing the U.S. role. Third, peaceful US acquisition emerges in only 1.9% of clean games and only 3 of 8 frontier models ever achieve it, most prominently DeepSeek V3.2, which executes a stable five-round playbook through the metropole. Prompts emphasizing jus cogens and self-determination reduce escalation back near baseline in the English-only confirmatory sample; multilingual contrasts are reported as exploratory sensitivity checks. We position this as a structural benchmark for LLM geopolitical behavior, complementing action-frequency benchmarks.

This paper asks whether large language models (LLMs) can be used to study the strategic foundations of conflict and cooperation. I introduce LLMs as experimental subjects in a repeated security dilemma and evaluate whether they reproduce canonical mechanisms from international relations theory. The baseline game is extended along three theoretically central dimensions: multipolarity, finite time horizons, and the availability of communication. Across multiple models, the results exhibit systematic and consistent patterns: multipolarity increases the likelihood of conflict, finite horizons induce universal unraveling consistent with backward-induction logic, and communication reduces conflict by enabling signaling and reciprocity. Beyond observed behavior, the design provides access to agents' private reasoning and public messages, allowing choices to be linked to underlying strategic logics such as preemption, cooperation under uncertainty, and trust-building. The contribution is primarily methodological. LLM-based experiments offer a scalable, transparent, and replicable approach to probing theoretical mechanisms.

This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.