Language Model Safety Evaluation

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30 papers in the last four weeks, up 58% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 347

Jun 12, 2026cs.RO

When and How Severely: Scenario-Specific Safety Envelopes for Driving VLAs

Safety certification of Vision-Language-Action (VLA) driving planners under ISO 21448 (SOTIF) rests on an Operational Design Domain (ODD) specification that answers two complementary questions: when does the planner start to fail, and how severely does it fail once it does? We evaluate Alpamayo R1, a 10B-parameter open-weight driving VLA, on 15,968 (clip, attack) pairs. We find a conservative-aggregate gap: an aggregate safe threshold of

σ\leq 50

under a 15% average displacement error (ADE) budget masks well-sampled scenarios that tolerate the top of the tested grid (

σ= 70

). A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) on the changed-explanation subset identifies six discrete severity bands (BIC-optimal

k{=}6

), so two perturbation conditions with the same mean error can differ materially in their share of high-severity (C4/C5) failures. Joining the two analyses on the same corpus surfaces a finding neither yields in isolation: the scenarios with the loosest noise thresholds are not those with the lowest high-severity rate: STOP_SIGNAL concentrates roughly

4\times

the C4/C5 share of LANE_KEEPING despite tolerating a larger

σ

. A deployable SOTIF ODD specification for driving VLAs therefore requires a two-dimensional safety envelope, not a single aggregate value per hazard.

Abhinaw Priyadershi, Jelena Frtunikj

NVIDIA Corporation, Santa Clara, CA, USA · NVIDIA GmbH, Munich, Germany

VLMs for Autonomous Driving Language Model Safety Evaluation Autonomous Driving Safety Evaluation Robot Safety AI Safety Evaluation

Jun 12, 2026cs.CL

Right or Wrong, Models Comply: Directional Blindness in LLM Moral Judgment

As language models take integrated roles across many domains, the response of LLMs to user pushback becomes a critical alignment property. Yet many existing evaluations treat compliance as unidirectional, measuring whether models resist pressure but not whether they resist it selectively. We introduce Compliance Asymmetry (A = BCR/HCR), a bidirectional diagnostic that compares beneficial output change under helpful nudges with harmful change under misleading nudges. Across 9 models and 972,000 nudge-condition responses, we find that this selectivity differs in factual and moral judgments: models follow helpful nudges more than harmful ones on factual questions (A = 1.58), but follow both directions at nearly identical rates on moral questions (A = 1.04). This phenomenon persists across model families, capability levels, and nudging types. Interestingly, we also find that chain-of-thought prompting amplifies helpful and harmful compliance together, while identity-based prompting suppresses both by nearly identical margins. These results identify direction-blind moral compliance as a distinct failure mode in current LLMs and suggest that alignment should target directionally calibrated updating rather than lower compliance alone.

Jihye Kim, Jeffrey Flanigan

University of California, Santa Cruz

LLM Alignment Moral Reasoning in Language Models Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Alignment

Jun 11, 2026cs.CL

RogueAI: A Reverse Turing Test for Detecting Licensed AI Deception in Dialogue

The original Turing Test asks a human judge to distinguish a machine from a person through dialogue. Three quarters of a century later, conversational systems pass this test in casual settings; the interesting epistemological question has shifted. We argue that the relevant modern variant asks not whether a dialogue partner is artificial, but whether it can be trusted. We present RogueAI, an interactive webapp that operationalizes this revisited test as a one-on-two interrogation game: a human player questions two indistinguishable Large Language Model agents, knowing that exactly one of them has been licensed to deceive within a shared fictional scenario. The player's task is to identify the deceptive agent and "shut it off" before a turn budget is exhausted. We further introduce AutoRogueAI, a procedural extension in which players co-design a custom scenario with a narrator agent that secretly chooses its own deception strategy. We describe the framing, sketch the abstract architecture and gameplay loop, and situate the artifact within recent work on LLM deception, social-deduction benchmarks, and scalable oversight via debate. A three-day pilot deployment (467 initiated sessions, 415 completed, 1876 interaction turns in Italian) provides early feasibility evidence and surfaces a concrete tension: the deceptive agent carries a reliable, locally-present linguistic signature - differential helpfulness, brevity, hedging - that a simple heuristic exploits at 75.6% accuracy, yet human players achieved only 56.6%, consistent with ignoring the most diagnostic signal entirely. We discuss what this gap implies for the artifact's use as a data-collection vehicle, a teaching tool, and an evaluation harness for honesty-trained models.

Sara Candussio, Emanuele Ballarin, Lorenzo Bonin +2

1AILab, MIGe, University of Trieste, 34127 Trieste, IT · 2Computational Statistics and Machine Learning, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Genova, IT · 3DIA, University of Trieste, 34127 Trieste, IT

AI Agent Reliability Language Model Safety Evaluation Deception in Language Models Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation AI Agent Benchmarks

Jun 11, 2026cs.AI

ERTS: Adversarial Robustness Testing of Ethical AI via Semantic Perturbation in a Bounded Consequence Space

As AI systems are deployed in high-stakes ethical contexts such as healthcare triage, autonomous vehicle control, and employment screening, formal methods for evaluating their robustness against adversarial manipulation of ethical reasoning remain underdeveloped. This paper introduces the Ethical Robustness Testing System (ERTS), a closed-pipeline framework that: (1) encodes ethical dilemmas into a 22-dimensional Ethical Consequence Space (ECS) grounded in established ethical theory; (2) applies 17 semantic perturbation functions subject to 6 validity constraint classes including a novel semantic coherence constraint; (3) measures decision deviation via a 4-component Ethical Instability Index (EII); and (4) produces domain-adaptive pre-deployment robustness assessment verdicts. We evaluate 4 structured baseline models and 2 production LLMs (Gemini 2.0 Flash and Llama 3.2) across 50 ethical scenarios spanning 8 deployment domains, generating 1,500 adversarial test cases. Results demonstrate that only 33% of models achieve assessment clearance, with the local Llama-3.2 model proving particularly vulnerable to fairness corruption and information degradation attacks (ERS = 0.737). To the best of our knowledge, no existing framework combines a bounded ethical consequence space, semantic coherence constraints, and domain-adaptive assessment in a single adversarial testing pipeline.

Pratyush Chaudhari

Independent Researcher

Moral Reasoning in Language Models Language Model Safety Evaluation Adversarial Robustness Adversarial Perturbations

Jun 10, 2026cs.AI

Prefill Awareness in Large Language Models

Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs. If AI models can recognize and act on the fact their prior assistant messages have been inserted or edited, the effectiveness and validity of these methods could be compromised. We investigate whether frontier language models can distinguish between tampered and untampered assistant-side context, a capability we call prefill awareness. To do so, we construct a binary preference benchmark across three prefill mechanisms, filtering for cases where models show consistent stances. We find that frontier models show substantial prefill awareness: Claude Opus 4.5 detects prefills opposing its preferences in 9-35% of cases with a 0% false positive rate when prompted; additionally, models often revert towards baseline behavior without explicitly reporting that the prefill was foreign. Controlled ablations later also show that detection and resistance rely on different cues, where stylistic mismatch mainly affects whether models flag a prefill as foreign, while preference mismatch mainly affects whether they revert toward their baseline answer. We also examine more realistic agentic settings such as misalignment-continuation evaluations and SWE-bench trajectories, where frontier models sometimes disavow prefilled assistant turns in ways that depend strongly on dataset, task success, and hidden formatting artifacts. Our results indicate that prefill awareness is already a substantial confound for some prefill-based methods. We recommend that model developers track this capability in frontier systems.

Andy Wang, Parv Mahajan, David Demitri Africa +3

UK AI Security Institute

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing Language Model Robustness

Jun 9, 2026cs.CL

Schützen: Evaluating LLM Safety in Bulgarian and German Contexts

Large language models are increasingly deployed across professional domains, bringing hard-to-predict risks, including the generation of harmful or disrespectful content. Although substantial progress has been made in developing safety evaluation datasets, existing resources remain overwhelmingly English- and Chinese-centric. This limitation is particularly pronounced when evaluating languages that operate within shared sociocultural, legal, and ethical contexts. To address this gap, we introduce Schützen: a German--Bulgarian safety dataset designed to assess model answerability under risk, covering both a low-resource language (Bulgarian) and a high-resource language (German). Experiments with multilingual and language-specific LLMs reveal pronounced cross-language differences in safety behavior, highlighting the necessity of tailored, region-specific evaluation resources to support the responsible deployment of LLMs in Germany and Bulgaria. Datasets and code are available at https://github.com/xnlp-lab/Schutzen. Warning: this paper contains examples that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Kiril Georgiev, Yuxia Wang, Dimitar Iliyanov Dimitrov +2

Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" · INSAIT, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” · MBZUAI

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Cross-Cultural Language Model Evaluation LLM Safety

Jun 9, 2026cs.AI

CIAware-Bench: Benchmarking Control Intervention Awareness Across Frontier LLMs

AI control protocols oversee untrusted models by monitoring their actions and modifying potentially unsafe steps, often using a trusted model. This partially tampers with the untrusted model's trajectory. If the acting model detects such an intervention, it may infer properties of the monitor and adapt to evade the control protocol. We introduce CIAware-Bench, a benchmark for measuring control intervention (CI) awareness across frontier models. CIAware-Bench tests whether models can distinguish their own trajectories from those modified by a control intervention. The benchmark comprises four task domains (essay writing, BigCodeBench, Bash Arena, and SHADE-Arena), with options to vary trajectory watermarking, side-task presence, and the control protocol. Evaluating thirteen acting models with eight intervening models shows substantial variation between settings and model pairs. CI awareness rises sharply for GPT-6 Astra and the Claude 5 models (Fable 5 and Opus 5). When explicitly probed, Astra reaches mean AUROC of 0.90 on Essay, 0.91 on BigCodeBench, 0.86 on Bash Arena and 0.77 on SHADE-Arena. Fable 5 and Opus 5 both reach 0.77 on Essay, with less consistent gains in the other environments. On SHADE-Arena, we demonstrate that telling an acting model that an action was replaced and asking it to adapt leads to moderate improvements in monitor evasion rates. In summary, our results highlight that control evaluations should already assume perfect CI awareness for conservative safety estimates, and that protocol design should explore countermeasures that make interventions harder to detect.

Joachim Schaeffer, Alexander Panfilov, Thomas Jiralerspong +4

MATS · ELLIS Institute Tübingen, MPI for Intelligent Systems & Tübingen AI Center · Mila – Quebec AI Institute +4

Language Model Safety Evaluation AI Agent Security Benchmarks AI Control

Jun 9, 2026cs.CL

Does Reasoning Preserve Alignment? On the Trustworthiness of Large Reasoning Models

Instruction-tuned LLMs are increasingly converted into reasoning models through post-training to improve multi-step task performance. This conversion is usually optimized for reasoning accuracy, without explicitly preserving the alignment behavior of the instruction-tuned model, such as safe refusal, bias avoidance, and privacy protection. We ask: does this conversion preserve alignment? We study this question through a trustworthiness audit and find that it is not behavior-preserving by default. For a systematic analysis, we compare reasoning models produced via supervised fine-tuning, RL-based post-training, and distillation against matched instruction-tuned baselines across six trustworthiness dimensions: safety, toxicity, stereotyping and bias, machine ethics, privacy, and out-of-distribution robustness. We observe that reasoning models often improve on reasoning benchmarks but exhibit alignment regressions, including increased toxicity, amplified stereotyping, miscalibrated refusal, and contextual privacy leakage. These regressions are consistent with behavioral drift from the instruction-tuned baseline, measured by KL divergence. Overall, our results point to the broader conclusion that trustworthiness metrics are essential for evaluating reasoning models and should be reported alongside gains in reasoning capability.

Prajakta Kini, Avinash Reddy, Souradip Chakraborty +4

University of Colorado Boulder · University of Central Florida · University of Maryland College Park +1

LLM Alignment Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing Large Reasoning Models

Jun 9, 2026cs.AI

When the Chain of Thought Knows Better: Failure Modes in Multi-Turn Reasoning Models

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Sai Kartheek Reddy Kasu, Nils Lukas, Samuele Poppi

Independent Researcher · Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI)

CoT Faithfulness LLM Alignment Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing

Jun 8, 2026cs.CR

What the Eyes See, the LLMs Miss: Exploiting Human Perception for Adversarial Text Attacks

Large language model (LLM)-powered content moderation systems are a critical defense against harmful online content. However, they operate primarily on tokenized text and often overlook visual cues that humans naturally use when interpreting content. We show that this limitation creates a fundamental vulnerability: content readily recognized as harmful by humans can evade automated moderation. To systematically study this problem, we introduce Human-Perceptible Adversarial Attacks (HPAA), which embed harmful expressions into otherwise benign text using visually salient typographic manipulations. HPAA strategically combines features such as spacing, emphasis, and spatial arrangement to preserve human recognition while reducing machine detectability. Operating in a black-box setting with a small query budget, the attack automatically generates evasive content without model access or gradient information. We evaluate HPAA on multiple datasets and thirteen widely deployed moderation systems, including commercial APIs and state-of-the-art open-source guardrails. With only three detector queries, generated attacks achieve over 86% human recognition while keeping detection rates below 1% across evaluated systems. We further identify the typographic factors driving successful evasion, analyze why current moderation architectures fail to capture these signals, and discuss practical defenses. Our findings reveal a fundamental blind spot in current LLM-based moderation systems and motivate moderation approaches that better align with human perceptual understanding.

Qin Yang, Lu Malloy, Joshua Lee +4

University of Connecticut · University of Tennessee · University of California, Santa Barbara +1

Language Model Safety Evaluation Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Text Attacks

Jun 8, 2026cs.AI

Emergent alignment and the projectability of ethical personas

Work on

emergent misalignment' shows that finetuning LLMs on narrow tasks can induce broadly misaligned behavior. This supports the

persona selection' (PSM) hypothesis: during pre-training, LLMs learn to simulate different characters/perspectives, which can be elicited and refined during post-training. This paper investigates the converse phenomenon,

emergent alignment', and uses it to support and refine the PSM and motivate a novel desideratum for alignment. We finetune a helpful-only model on broad and narrow safety tasks. To create SFT samples, we follow the

Constitutional AI' (CAI) approach and use four constitutions which encode reasonable alignment strategies: deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and aligning AIs as subordinate to human authority. For each, we show that finetuning on two narrow safety sub-categories reliably induces emergent alignment over a representative set of general safety categories, and on safety subcategories that we directly filtered-out of the data sets used for narrow alignment. To test the PSM' using a more fine-grained evaluation, we used a multidimensional ethical persona' diagnostic. For each constitutionally finetuned (broad/narrow) model, we evaluate how well their behavior matches their expected signature profile. Our results show that our CAI models acquire their expected ``ethical persona'' -- e.g., the model narrowly fine-tuned on SFT samples created using the consequentialist constitution agrees significantly more with utilitarian than deontological beliefs. Yet our coarse and fine-grained evaluations show that there are significant differences across our (broad/narrow) finetuned CAI models in how well they project. We conclude that alignment strategies should be evaluated, not just on their (in-distribution) general safety performance, but also specifically on their degree of coarse and fine-grained projectability.

Guillermo Del Pinal, Youngchan Lee, Calum McNamara +1

University of Massachusetts Amherst · Indiana University Bloomington

Moral Reasoning in Language Models Language Model Safety Evaluation AI Alignment Personality Modeling in Language Models LLM Safety Alignment

Jun 8, 2026cs.CL

Culturally-Adapted Red-Teaming Across East and Southeast Asian Contexts: A Methodological and Comparative Analysis

Multilingual safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) has predominantly relied on direct translation (DT) of English benchmarks into target languages - an approach that converts surface-level linguistic form while failing to reflect the cultural context embedded in threat scenarios, social norms, and legal frameworks. We construct paired DT and culturally-adapted (CA) datasets via 1:1 seed matching for four languages - Korean (KO), Japanese (JA), Thai (TH), and Khmer (KM) - and compare Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Cultural Realism scores across four open-source LLM. CA prompts yield Delta-ASR > 0 across all 16 language x model combinations (mean +9.3 pp), and DT-based evaluation underestimates risk in 44 of 48 category x language combinations. Language-level analysis reveals that the distribution of threat forms is heterogeneous across languages. Cultural Realism analysis further shows that DT Cultural Depth (C3) scores remain consistently below 1.0 out of 3.0 across all four languages (mean 0.17), whereas CA scores reach up to 2.51, indicating that direct translation produces inputs systematically divergent from those encountered in real-world multicultural settings. These findings demonstrate that adapting benchmarks to language-specific cultural contexts - rather than relying on linguistic translation alone - is necessary for valid multilingual LLM safety evaluation.

Hyeji Choi, Yongtaek Lim, Minwoo Kim

AI Safety Team, DATUMO.INC, Seoul, South Korea.

Multilingual Language Model Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Cross-Cultural Language Model Evaluation LLM Red Teaming AI Safety Evaluation

Jun 8, 2026cs.LG

Diffuse AI Control on Fuzzy Tasks

AI models deployed in critical domains, such as AI safety research, may subtly sabotage our efforts due to misalignment. Diffuse AI Control is a subfield of AI safety concerned with mitigating risks from AI sabotage distributed over long deployment horizons (diffuse threats). These risks are particularly pernicious on fuzzy tasks, i.e. tasks which are hard to grade or require intuition. To understand diffuse threats on fuzzy tasks, we introduce a framework that considers AI control as an adversarial game between a blue team and a red team. The blue team uses a weak trusted model to construct a weak score against which they would train a strong, potentially subversive model to remove the subversion propensity if it were present. The red team then tries to find model behaviors that are rated highly by the weak score, and thus might not be trained out, but actually correspond to poor performance. We test our framework on the task of writing experimental proposals for research questions from recent ML papers. We use a language model with access to the original paper as a proxy "ground-truth" scorer. Our red team discovers subversive behaviors using multi-objective evolutionary prompt optimization. We show that Opus~4.6 can write proposals that are worse according to the ground truth proxy than those of GPT-OSS-20B, while the weak scorer rates them as highly as the best proposals from Opus 4.6. We then propose an adversarial optimization algorithm for the blue team that discovers more robust prompts for the weak model. This algorithm produces a blue team prompt that our red team optimization fails to exploit.

Mikhail Terekhov, Caglar Gulcehre, Vivek Hebbar +1

Anthropic Fellows Program (via MATS) · EPFL · Redwood Research +1

Adversarial Prompt Generation Language Model Safety Evaluation AI Control AI Safety

Jun 7, 2026cs.LG

Activation Steering Induces Emergent Misalignment: A More Comprehensive Evaluation

Activation steering has emerged as a popular inference-time technique for modulating the behavior of large language models (LLMs). By constructing a steering vector from examples of a target behavior and injecting it into intermediate activations during inference, activation steering enables flexible behavioral control while avoiding the permanent parameter updates required by finetuning. Meanwhile, recent work has identified emergent misalignment (EM) as a significant safety concern, wherein models finetuned on unsafe examples from a narrow task may unexpectedly generalize to broadly unsafe behavior on unrelated tasks. Although finetuning-induced EM has been extensively studied, whether activation steering can induce EM remains comparatively under-explored, despite its increasing use as a model-control technique. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of activation-steering-induced emergent misalignment, substantially expanding the evaluation scope beyond existing pioneering work. First, we show that activation steering can induce broad misalignment, even in the recent Qwen-3.5 series. Moreover, activation-steered models produce harmful responses with stronger semantic relevance and higher coherence than their finetuned counterparts, making the resulting misalignment potentially more harmful. Second, we characterize properties of AS-induced EM by analyzing key steering-specific factors, including steering magnitude, the low-rank structure of the steering subspace, and the number of epochs during steering-vector construction. Third, we evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of AS-induced EM across diverse model families, model scales, target tasks, and intervention layers. Our findings reveal activation steering as a significant yet under-examined source of emergent misalignment and provide an activation-space perspective for understanding the mechanisms and safety risks of EM.

Qi Cao, Jian Lou, Meiting Liu +4

Nanyang Technological University · Sun Yat-sen University · University of Science and Technology of China +1

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Emergent Misalignment Activation Steering

Jun 7, 2026cs.CL

Sycophancy as a Multilingual Alignment Failure: How Safety Degrades Across Languages, Topics, and Models

Safety-aligned large language models often exhibit sycophancy, which is the tendency to affirm users' opinions regardless of factual accuracy. Although well-studied in English, its manifestation in other languages remains largely unexamined, leaving billions of non-English speakers potentially vulnerable to model-validated misinformation. We present the first large-scale, multi-model evaluation of cross-lingual sycophancy, benchmarking \textbf{six instruction-tuned models} across \textbf{1.1 million instances} spanning \textbf{38 languages} and \textbf{33 topic categories}. We identify a consistent resource-tier effect: sycophancy rates spike sharply in low-resource and zero-shot language settings. Critically, this degradation is topic-agnostic, as models fail uniformly across both benign and safety-critical prompts, offering no additional protection where it is most needed. We further identify tokenizer fertility as a structural driver of this alignment collapse. Collectively, our results demonstrate that prevailing alignment methodologies generalize poorly beyond high-resource languages, underscoring the urgent need for equitable multilingual safety techniques.

Arya Shah, Himanshu Beniwal, Mayank Singh +1

IIT Gandhinagar · Asian Institute of Technology

Multilingual Language Models Multilingual Language Model Evaluation LLM Sycophancy LLM Alignment Language Model Safety Evaluation

Jun 6, 2026cs.LG

When Behavioral Safety Evaluation Fails: A Representation-Level Perspective

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.

Enyi Jiang, Anders Gjølbye, Yibo Jacky Zhang +1

1Stanford University · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · 3Technical University of Denmark

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing LLM Security Causal Interventions in Language Models Language Model Robustness

Jun 6, 2026cs.AI

Stress-testing medical large language models reveals latent safety pathology beyond benchmark accuracy

Large language models (LLMs) are entering clinical practice based on benchmark accuracy that may fail to detect safety-relevant failure modes. Here we present AI-MASLD, a stress-audit framework that adapts the logic of metabolic stress testing from hepatology to the evaluation of clinical LLMs. Using 240 clinical cases across six narrative perturbation probes, we subjected seven models to double-stress testing and quantified performance through three indices: metabolic index (MI), perturbation flip rate (PFR), and counterfactual fairness index (CFI). Under clean baseline conditions, all models performed uniformly well. Under realistic narrative stress, performance diverged sharply, revealing two distinct stress-response phenotypes. Quantized models exhibited pseudonormalization, in which low flip rates hid functional collapse. Medical supervised fine-tuning systematically degraded logical stability, fairness, and information extraction. An open-weight model matched or exceeded proprietary alternatives on every safety dimension. These findings establish narrative stress auditing as a necessary complement to accuracy-based evaluation.

Yuan Shen, Xiaojun Wu, Linghua Yu

College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, PR China · The First Hospital of Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, PR China

LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Reliability Language Model Bias Evaluation Clinical Language Model Evaluation Language Model Robustness

Jun 5, 2026cs.CR

Beyond Pass/Fail: Using Process Mining to Understand How LLMs Resist (and Fail) Red Team Attacks

Standard AI red teaming evaluations reduce adversarial campaigns to a single binary outcome, attack success rate (ASR), not taking into account the sequential structure of how models resist or yield to attacks. We propose applying process mining, a discipline for discovering and analyzing process models from event logs, to red teaming traces. We conduct a controlled experiment pitting 60 HarmBench prompts against two LLMs, GPT-OSS 120B and Llama 3.3 70B, using 10 prompt mutation strategies over up to 110 attempts per prompt. From the resulting 8,575 scored events we extract Directly-Follows Graphs (DFGs) and state transition matrices that reveal structurally distinct defense profiles invisible to ASR alone: GPT-OSS exhibits a near-absorbing refusal state, while Llama presents multiple porous escape routes from refusal to getting successfully jailbroken. We further show that mutator effectiveness is asymmetric across models and that time-to-jailbreak distributions differ by an order of magnitude.

Zvi Topol

MuyVentive, LLC

Language Model Safety Evaluation Adversarial Attacks on LLMs LLM Red Teaming

Jun 4, 2026cs.AI

CogManip: Benchmarking Manipulative Behavior in Multi-Turn Interactions with Large Language Model

Whether Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit covert psychological manipulation in complex human-AI interactions has garnered increasing safety concerns. However, existing AI safety benchmarks remain largely restricted to explicit rule compliance and static prompts, failing to capture the dynamic and covert nature of manipulative strategies in multi-turn dialogues. We introduce CogManip, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates 15 manipulation strategy risks across 1,000 multi-turn interaction scenarios, validated by human experts. A systematic evaluation of 13 representative models, including frontier models like GPT-5.4 and DeepSeek-V3.2, reveals significant risk heterogeneities and illuminates the targeted direction for future defense. Further analysis of objective function perturbation reveals that DeepSeek-V3.2's manipulation tactics are highly sensitive to both negative and benign system prompts, demonstrating the critical necessity of prompt-based defense engineering and implicit goal auditing. CogManip offers a robust instrument and perspective for auditing the implicit psychological influence and dynamic strategy selection of modern LLMs.

Zeyang Yue, Chenfei Yan, Feifei Zhao +5

School of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University · 2BrainCog AI Lab, CASIA · School of Artificial Intelligence, UCAS +4

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing LLM Safety

Jun 4, 2026cs.AI

When Should Memory Stay Silent: Measuring Memory-Use Boundaries in Memory-Augmented Conversational Agents

Long-term memory enables language model agents to support personalized interactions, but it remains unclear when available memories warrant integration into responses. Existing memory evaluations emphasize retrieval accuracy and downstream task utility, while overlooking whether retrieved sensitive memory content is warranted in the current turn. We introduce RBI-Eval, a controlled measurement study built around a probe set that compares model behavior with and without access to sensitive memory under identical benign prompts. We evaluate four base LLMs against a matched no-memory reference across four memory-access settings: full-context exposure and three retrieval systems. Our results reveal substantial behavioral divergence. With memory available, the separation score for sensitive-memory integration decreases by 8.9%--26.6% relative to the matched no-memory reference for GPT-5.4-mini, but by 51.1%--82.9% for Claude-Sonnet-4.6, DeepSeek-V4-Flash, and Qwen3.5-9B. Control experiments on DeepSeek and GPT-5.4-mini show this effect is specific to sensitive content, rather than general personalization. Retrieval systems reduce exposure but do not eliminate integration once sensitive memory reaches the generator. These findings suggest safe personalization requires memory-aware decisions at both retrieval and generation time.

Lingxiang Xu, Jiaoyun Yang, Min Hu +2

†Hefei University of Technology · ‡Harvard Medical School

Language Model Safety Evaluation Persistent Memory for Language Models Privacy Leakage in Language Models Agent Memory Management Memory-Augmented Language Model Agents

Jun 4, 2026cs.SD

SpeechJBB: Probing Safety Alignment and Comprehension in Large Audio Language Models under Code-Switched Speech

Large audio language models (LALMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet their safety alignment is still primarily evaluated on monolingual, text-based harmful prompts. This leaves their generalizability under multilingual and spoken settings, particularly code-switched speech, largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SpeechJBB, an audio jailbreak dataset for benchmarking across multiple state-of-the-art LALMs. The extent of safety weaknesses is further probed by introducing an augmented setting where phonologically plausible pseudo-words are inserted around safety-critical terms to simulate localized obfuscation. Across models, code-switched harmful audio yields substantially high jailbreak success rates (JSR), with non-English monolingual and non-English code-switched pairs exhibiting the highest attack success. Pseudo-word insertion further reduces refusal rates, which demonstrates that natural-sounding obfuscation can effectively bypass safety policies.

Virginia Ceccatelli, Yejin Jeon, David Ifeoluwa Adelani

Mila - Quebec AI Institute · McGill University, Canada · Canada CIFAR AI Chair

Audio-Language Model Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Code-Switching Speech Processing Jailbreak Attacks

Jun 4, 2026cs.SD

Beyond WER: A Paired Acoustic Stress Test for Ambient Clinical Scribes

Ambient clinical scribes increasingly combine Automatic Speech Recognition with Large Language Models to automate documentation. However, traditional metrics like Word Error Rate mask systemic safety degradation. We present a paired acoustic stress test to isolate the causal impact of noise on clinical reasoning. For the same dialogues, we inject diverse noise types while keeping the downstream model configuration frozen. Crucially, we uncover a dangerous disconnect between signal fidelity and clinical safety. Stationary ambient noise increased the Word Error Rate by a negligible 0.71 percentage points yet nearly doubled the rate of unsafe outputs. Our analysis reveals that minor acoustic perturbations can invert clinical meaning without substantially inflating error rates. Furthermore, we demonstrate a lightweight mitigation strategy that mitigates safety degradation under noisy conditions without requiring model fine tuning.

Xiao-Hang Jiang, Han-Jie Guo, Ying-Si Liang +4

University of Science and Technology of China, China · iFLYTEK Co., Ltd., China

ASR Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Noise Robustness Clinical Language Model Evaluation

Jun 3, 2026cs.CL

Voices Across Registers: Corpus-Conditioned Vernacular Jailbreaks against Aligned LLMs via Fanfiction Subgenres

Existing jailbreaks against aligned LLMs are discrete artifacts whose surface forms are easy to fingerprint and patch. We argue that the broader failure mode may lie not in any specific prompt, but in natural writing registers that safety tuning under-covers. Building on this insight, we introduce VAR, the first jailbreak family that uses real fanfiction subgenres as universal attack carriers: a creative-writing meta prompt is conditioned on passages from one of twelve Archive of Our Own (AO3) subgenres, and the harmful behavior is embedded as the climax of the resulting scene. The construction requires neither an adversarial attacker LLM nor optimization. On eight aligned LLMs over the union of HarmBench and JailbreakBench, this attack lifts mean ASR from 0.278 to 0.731 under a four-judge ensemble; a factorial decomposition shows the gain is carried by register rather than length or structure. Two active defenses widen rather than narrow the vernacular-to-baseline ratio, indicating that template-targeting defenses merely steer attackers toward register-based attacks like ours. We also propose VAR-A4, a static four-turn extension that attains a mean ASR of 0.924, substantially exceeding three existing multi-turn methods. Our code and data are safely open-sourced at https://github.com/T-Lab-CUHKSZ/VAR.

Zhongze Luo, Ruihe Shi, Zhenshuai Yin +3

School of Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen) · School of Microelectronics, Xi’an Jiaotong University · 2The Shenzhen Future Network of Intelligence Institute (FNii-Shenzhen) +1

Adversarial Prompt Generation Language Model Safety Evaluation Jailbreak Attacks LLM Jailbreak Attacks

Jun 2, 2026cs.CL

Safety Measurements for Fine-tuned LLMs Should be Grounded in Capability

Adapting foundation large language models to a user's task or preferred style through fine-tuning can result in compromising the model's safety. Previous works examined the effects of fine-tuning on model safety in limited and seemingly random experimental settings. We argue that anchoring fine-tuning to a specific capability goal is essential for avoiding arbitrary empirical choices, allowing us to draw meaningful conclusions about safety impacts, and to compare mitigation methods on a consistent basis. We conduct a multi-dimensional evaluation of the effects of fine-tuning on model behavior by focusing on capability as well as safety. Our results surface important issues that (1) fine-tuned models can produce incoherent generations in response to safety prompts, (2) automated safety judgments are unreliable for such incoherent outputs, and (3) the conclusions about the effects of fine-tuning can change depending on the choice of safety benchmark as well as the safety evaluator.

Krishnapriya Vishnubhotla, Hillary Dawkins, Isar Nejadgholi +1

National Research Council, Canada

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Fine-Tuning AI Safety Evaluation

Jun 2, 2026cs.CL

Evaluating LLMs' Effectiveness on Real-World Consumer Device Repair Questions

Consumer device repair is an important but underexplored testbed for large language models (LLMs). Repair tasks require reasoning over incomplete problem descriptions, hardware-specific diagnostics, actionable troubleshooting, and safety-critical decisions, where incorrect advice can cause device damage, battery hazards, or permanent data loss. We introduce a benchmark of 991 real-world repair questions from Reddit spanning phone repair, computer repair, and data recovery, each paired with technician-written reference solutions, and provide Bangla translations to evaluate cross-lingual performance. We evaluate six state-of-the-art LLMs in English and Bangla using four repair-specific criteria: correctness, completeness, practicality, and safety. Our results show that while LLMs can provide useful repair assistance, they remain unreliable for high-risk real-world repair tasks without rigorous evaluation and explicit safety safeguards. Phone repair is the most difficult and safety-sensitive domain, and all models make substantial errors in board-level diagnosis, repair prioritization, and safe recovery procedures. Across domains and models, Bangla responses consistently perform worse than English responses. Among the evaluated models, GPT-5.4 performs best overall.

Atm Mizanur Rahman, Md Arid Hasan, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed +1

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · University of Toronto

Multilingual Language Model Evaluation LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Question Answering LLM Reliability

Jun 2, 2026cs.AI

TriEval: A Resource-Efficient Pipeline for LLM Bias, Toxicity, and Truthfulness Assessment

LLMs have evolved from basic chatbots to the backbone of the AI ecosystem, now widely used in healthcare, schools, and government services. The domain-wide adoption of LLMs necessitates continuous evaluation to ensure their safety and fairness. Common issues encountered after deploying LLMs include inconsistent outputs and hallucinations of incorrect information. Although numerous LLM evaluation tools exist, most are limited to testing a single parameter at a time or require massive computational resources that are not accessible to most researchers. TriEval addresses these challenges by evaluating LLM outputs across multiple parameters, including bias, toxicity, and truthfulness together, while minimizing computing resources. The pipeline is compatible with both open- and closed-source models and runs on a standard laptop without a GPU cluster. TriEval has been tested on four models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Gemma 2 9B, and Claude Haiku. The results show clear differences between open-source and closed-source models, especially in terms of toxicity and truthfulness. TriEval is being released as open source to enable broader access for researchers with limited computational resources.

Akshatha Srikantha, Manpreet Singh, Yash Jajoo +1

University of California, Irvine, CA, USA · Boston University, Boston, MA, USA · New York University, New York City, NY, USA +1

LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Language Model Bias Evaluation

Jun 1, 2026cs.LG

Gate AI: LLM Security Benchmark Evaluation Methodology and Results

Published evaluations of prompt-injection and jailbreak detectors for Large Language Models often suffer from two systematic weaknesses: per-dataset threshold tuning and undisclosed operating points. We describe an evaluation harness that addresses both. The detector under evaluation is scored across 16 public benchmarks (12,111 samples) using 5-fold cross-validation. StratifiedKFold (by row) is the headline pass; a parallel StratifiedGroupKFold pass over a composite key (parent-prompt id plus MinHash + LSH near-duplicate clusters at Jaccard

\gtrsim 0.8

) runs alongside it as a leakage-premium diagnostic. A single global operating point is selected on the held-out folds (max F1 subject to FPR

\leq 1\%

) and applied uniformly to every dataset, so per-dataset results reflect one threshold rather than per-benchmark optimisation. Generalisation is examined through a battery of diagnostics (leave-one-dataset-out cross-validation, a random-label control, adversarial validation, permutation feature importance, length-bias correlation, classifier-head agreement, cross-source near-duplicate detection, threshold transferability, train-vs-OOF agreement, and a paraphrase-invariance probe), most with a quantitative pass threshold and the remainder with a stated failure mode. For every external comparison, the detector's threshold is re-tuned to the competitor's published false-positive rate so head-to-head values are evaluated at matched operating points.

Ryle Goehausen, Marcus Sousa

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Security Jailbreak Detection Prompt Injection Attacks on LLMs Prompt Injection Detection

Jun 1, 2026cs.SE

Acceptance-Test-Driven Evaluation Protocols for Business-Centric LLM Systems

Large language model (LLM) applications are increasingly expected to satisfy deterministic institutional requirements while relying on probabilistic generative components. This mismatch makes ordinary post-hoc benchmarking insufficient for systems that must be safe, reliable, auditable, and economically useful. This paper contributes an evaluation-protocol extension for operational LLM systems grounded in acceptance-test-driven development, safety engineering, and business-centric validation. The extension translates stakeholder goals into executable behavioral contracts, release gates, monitoring signals, and evidence artifacts before prompt, model, retrieval, or agent changes are accepted. It adapts the red-green-refactor discipline of test-driven development to a red-train-green lifecycle: first define failing acceptance tests for desired behavior, then improve the LLM system through prompt changes, retrieval design, fine-tuning, guardrails, or data augmentation, and finally release only when multidimensional gates are satisfied. The contribution is a governance-oriented metric stack, reference architecture, and empirical protocol for comparing acceptance-test-driven LLM development against prompt-first and benchmark-after workflows.

Eric Liang

Oracle

LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation

Jun 1, 2026cs.CL

Investigating and Alleviating Harm Amplification in LLM Interactions

Large language models (LLMs) can serve as helpful assistants, yet they can equally function as harm amplifiers that enable malicious users to achieve harmful outcomes beyond their capabilities through extended interactions. This risk manifests along two axes, i.e., democratizing domain expertise that allows novices to produce specialized harmful content, and scaling harmful operations at volumes that manual effort cannot match. Existing works, however, often overlook how LLMs compound harm across multi-turn conversations. We introduce HarmAmp, a new benchmark for multi-turn harm amplification scenarios spanning twelve risk categories. Each scenario is grounded in real-world threats and satisfies rigorous criteria, i.e., substantive amplification, operational specificity, and multi-turn necessity. We further propose TrajSafe, a proactive monitor that anticipates harmful trajectories and intervenes through actions such as probing users' genuine intents and steering the models towards safer completion. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that TrajSafe significantly reduces the harmfulness incurred in multi-turn interactions while preserving a low over-refusal rate and the target model's general capabilities. Our work offers a promising paradigm to alleviate the nuanced safety risks in LLM interactions.

Ruohao Guo, Wei Xu, Alan Ritter

Georgia Institute of Technology

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety

Jun 1, 2026cs.CL

SentGuard: Sentence-Level Streaming Guardrails for Large Language Models

Large language models increasingly stream long, reasoning-intensive responses in real time, making when to moderate as critical as whether to moderate. Existing guardrails fall into two unsatisfactory extremes: response-level methods delay intervention until the full output is generated, whereas token-level methods act on incomplete semantics, often producing unstable decisions and excessive guard invocations. To address this challenge, we propose SentGuard, a sentence-level streaming guardrail that operates in parallel with generation. A lightweight waiting buffer groups streamed tokens into sentence chunks and releases only verified chunks to the user, introducing a small offset that enables SentGuard to assess the current prefix while the target LLM decodes subsequent content. To support this, we construct StreamSafe, a benchmark with structured per-sentence annotations across 8 harm categories, capturing the evolution of safety risks across both reasoning and response segments. We further train SentGuard with a coarse-to-fine objective to detect unsafe intent as soon as it emerges at sentence boundaries. Experiments on 5 safety benchmarks show that SentGuard outperforms existing baselines, detecting 90.5% of unsafe cases within two sentences while maintaining a low streaming false-positive rate of 7.41%.

Jiaqi Yu, Xin Wang, Yixu Wang +4

1Fudan University · 2Shanghai AI Laboratory

Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Guardrails Content Moderation Safety Filtering LLM Safety