Logical Fallacies

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is widely used to adapt large language models to downstream tasks. Crowdsourcing user conversations is an established approach to collecting SFT data at scale while reducing the need for costly manual annotation. However, it also allows untrusted users to contribute data to the fine-tuning pipeline. We investigate an underexplored privacy risk arising from this setting: can a malicious user poison a small fraction of the crowdsourced data to amplify extraction of previously unseen instructions contributed by other users? We show that this is possible using only black-box, output-only access to the deployed model. Experiments across four models and two datasets demonstrate substantial increases in training-data extraction: with only 50 poisoned examples, near-verbatim extraction reaches $3.71\times$ the rate without poisoning for Qwen2.5-14B on OpenMathInstruct and $3.08\times$ for Llama-3.1-8B on AceReason. Data filtering also proves largely ineffective in detecting poisoned samples: even the best-performing method achieves only 0.378 in F-1 score, leaving the majority of poisoned samples undetected. These findings demonstrate that seemingly benign crowdsourced contributions can amplify leakage of other records while remaining difficult to identify through data filtering.

Fallacy-detection benchmarks pair fallacy classes with a single "valid" or "none" class that takes everything data collection did not label as a fallacy. A detector has two jobs, deciding whether an argument is fallacious and naming which fallacy it commits, and the false-positive rate is meant to measure the first. We show that what these benchmarks actually score is scheme recognition, the ability behind the second job. Their own test sets already show it: when a classifier misses a fallacy, the error lands on "none" rather than on another fallacy type, so detection is failing while classification holds. The reason is what the valid class lacks. The negatives that separate the two jobs are correct arguments using the same argumentation scheme as a fallacy, and they are scarce: nearly absent from the four benchmarks we examined, and rare even under deliberate search. A detector is therefore never tested where recognizing a scheme and judging its use come apart, and can pass on recognition alone. We construct the missing arguments, together with a control condition from the same pipeline that differs only in scheme, so whatever generation contributes, it contributes to both. The classifier labels the scheme-matched negatives as the source fallacy, and labels the wrong-scheme negatives as the scheme they actually use 85.9% of the time and as the source type 0.4%. The classifier has learned which scheme an argument uses, not whether it uses it correctly. The over-flagging follows: a model that scores 16.6% on CoCoLoFa's own valid class flags 58.9% of the constructed arguments. The same dissociation appears in three zero-shot LLM detectors that never saw these benchmarks. We release the items as Scheme Foils. A reported false-positive rate should not be trusted as a measure of detection until the valid class has been audited for scheme-matched coverage.

Large language models (LLMs) are commonly associated with the distributional hypothesis, according to which (1) semantic meaning is grounded in distributional patterns of linguistic context, and (2) knowledge of cross-linguistic distributional correspondences allows for successful translation. This paper rejects the first claim as a causal inversion: linguistic distributions reflect patterns arising from meaning-making practices rather than constituting their source. At the same time, it accepts the second claim, arguing that translation -human or machine - can succeed without requiring access to meaning or reference. Knowledge of interlingual distributional correspondence and their inferential organization may be sufficient for translation. The paper develops an ecological-enactivist perspective, according to which reference and meaning are grounded in agent-environment interaction and stabilized through action-grounded concepts, forms of world-involving cognition that current LLMs do not possess.

In recent years, the term voiceprint has regained attention, particularly in technological applications and policy-making contexts, often carrying the assumption that a person's voice constitutes a stable and unique biometric trace analogous to a fingerprint. Yet this conception has been repeatedly criticized and rejected by forensic voice experts throughout the decades since its introduction. Although voices undoubtedly contain speaker-related information, this simplified conception obscures the highly dynamic and context-dependent nature of speech. This article revisits the voiceprint fallacy and reconsiders what can count as evidence of speaker identity by reviewing the historical development of voiceprint identification, evidence on human voice variability, developments in forensic voice comparison, research on human and automatic speaker recognition, and the recent challenge posed by deepfake speech to speaker identity. We point out that the voiceprint metaphor and its underlying implications are scientifically misleading because they transform a probabilistic source of speaker information into an imagined stable object of identity. To avoid treating voices as imprint-like traces, we recommend that voice evidence be interpreted through validated and calibrated probabilistic frameworks that explicitly account for variability, uncertainty, and alternative explanations.

Multi-provider LLM gateways reverse proxies that route, load-balance, and rate-limit requests across foundation-model APIs have become critical production infrastructure. Yet the failure modes specific to this architectural layer remain undocumented, scattered across issue trackers and post-mortems with no unifying framework. We introduce \fa{}, a two-axis taxonomy that classifies failures by their \emph{origin layer} (Network/Transport, Streaming/Protocol, State/Session, ModelBehavior, Governance/Cost) and their \emph{detectability} (Loud vs.\ Silent). We populate this taxonomy with five verified catalog entries sourced from public bug reports and first-hand stress testing, each accompanied by a mechanistic root-cause analysis. Three entries include standalone reproduction scripts. Our principal finding is that the most operationally severe failures are \emph{silent}: they return HTTP200, pass every standard health check, and corrupt application state in ways that require semantic-level observability to detect. Two such silent failures a concurrency race condition causing history loss and a streaming index collision corrupting tool-call payloads were discovered first-hand during \cb{} evaluation campaigns.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong semantic capabilities, yet their resilience to manipulative linguistic patterns such as logical fallacies remains underexplored. Prior work has primarily examined whether LLMs can identify or classify fallacies, leaving their robustness against fallacious persuasion insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we introduce LoFa (Logical Fallacy), a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM robustness against fallacies. LoFa is constructed through a multi-agent pipeline that pairs factual questions with fallacious arguments, and is accompanied by a multi-round debate framework for assessing model resilience under sustained adversarial persuasion. To disentangle fallacy robustness from a model's inherent knowledge limitations, we further propose Logical Fallacy Resistance at k (LFR@k), a metric that quantifies resistance to fallacious attacks. Experiments show that LLMs exhibit varying levels of robustness across different fallacy types, revealing distinct vulnerability profiles among models.

In today's fast-paced information era, logical fallacies, defined as defective patterns of reasoning, inevitably contribute to the growth of information disorder. However, often fallacies appear in nuanced forms that complicate automated classification. In this study, we investigate whether merging abstract logical structures with context-level linguistic cues proves beneficial for fallacy classification, developing a framework that inductively extracts such patterns from fallacious examples and their explanations using Large Language Models (LLMs). We evaluate the impact of these patterns across different LLMs and experimental zero- and one-shot configurations, showing statistically significant improvements over zero-shot baselines and outperforming competing approaches. Cross-dataset experiments validate generalization, establishing data-driven pattern extraction as an effective method for generating logical representations.

Current evaluations of Large Language Models (LLMs) on logical fallacy detection focus on predicted labels, but do not establish whether those labels are supported by the reasoning the models provide. We propose ForEx (Formal Verification for Explainable Reasoning), a framework that translates LLM-generated explanations into Lean4 and verifies whether the translated rationale is derivable under encoded premises, not the logical validity of the original natural language argument. To distinguish prediction outcomes from the formal status of the supporting reasoning, we introduce the LLM Argument Verification Matrix, which separates label consistency from formal verification status. Experiments on LOGIC-Climate show that over 90% of LLM outputs can be translated into formal reasoning chains that pass verification, while agreement with human annotations remains around 20%. These results expose a systematic gap between formal derivability and label agreement, a distinction invisible to prediction-based metrics. ForEx moves LLM evaluation beyond label correctness toward machine-checkable analysis of formalized reasoning chains.

Learner agency and autonomy are foundational to personal development, yet a pervasive "jingle-jangle" fallacy (i.e. identical terms denoting different constructs, distinct terms denoting identical ones) has substantially hindered cumulative knowledge. Treating meaning as a phenomenon constituted through use in linguistic practice, we extracted 8,954 definitions and 2,700 scale items from over 14,000 publications, to investigate how researchers actually used learner agency and autonomy with a semantic analysis pipeline. The definitional landscape of two constructs resolves into three dimensions: regulation and control of learning (task), intrinsic motivation and internal decision-making (person), and social-relational action (sociocultural), thereby empirically quantifying the jingle-jangle fallacy. Existing scales, however, systematically underrepresent the sociocultural dimension. Critically, current generative AI research in education concentrates on learning regulation and control, narrowing the behavioral repertoire that AI-mediated learning environments are designed to cultivate. Beyond conceptual clarification, this work carries direct implications for conceptualization, measurement, and practice towards supporting the multidimensional learner agency and autonomy.

Diffusion-based Vision-Language-Action policies achieve remarkable success in robotic manipulation, yet commit a fundamental geometric error we term the $\textbf{Euclidean Fallacy}$: representing SE(3) poses as flat $\mathbb{R}^{12}$ vectors. This approximation induces (1) manifold drift violating SO(3) constraints, (2) broken equivariance under coordinate transformations, and (3) non-geodesic trajectories with excessive kinematic cost. We introduce $\textbf{Lie Diffuser Actor (LDA)}$, a diffusion framework operating intrinsically on SE(3). Our method injects noise through left-invariant SDEs, predicts scores in the tangent space, and retracts samples via the exponential map. This formulation eliminates manifold drift by construction while guaranteeing coordinate-frame equivariance and geodesic optimality. On CALVIN ABC$\rightarrow$D, LDA improves average task length from $3.27$ to $3.51$ ($+7.3\%$). We further validate our method on real robot and the results show that our methodology outperforms the baseline on majority tasks.

Identifying logical fallacies in everyday discourse is challenging for many people. This challenge is amplified in the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), where malicious agents can deploy fallacious arguments to disseminate misinformation at scale. In this work, we explore the potential of LLMs as part of the solution. We introduce LFTutor, an intelligent tutoring system which uses LLMs to tutor laypeople and help them learn about logical fallacies. LFTutor integrates intent-driven Socratic questioning and critical argumentation principles to actively engage learners to reflect on their reasoning. Through both automatic and human evaluations, we demonstrate that LFTutor significantly outperforms baseline LLMs lacking these pedagogical strategies. This work highlights the promise of combining LLMs with pedagogical scaffolding to foster critical thinking and argument literacy in the age of AI.

As AI-generated and AI-assisted content floods online spaces, source labels attached to such content can distort human reasoning judgments, with downstream consequences for moderation, evaluation, and decision-making. Whether LLMs share this vulnerability, or offer more source-agnostic evaluation, remains an open question with direct implications for human-AI collaboration. We examine this issue using logical fallacies as a controlled setting to isolate source-label effects on reasoning quality, independent of domain knowledge. We conduct an online study (N=505) where participants are assigned to a source condition (human, AI, human with AI assistance, AI with human assistance, or no disclosure) and evaluate comments containing logical fallacies, comparing their judgments with those of LLMs (GPT-5.2, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5), who were evaluated across the same source conditions. Human evaluators were significantly more susceptible to fallacies labeled as written by human or human with AI assistance and assigned higher trust and evaluation ratings in these conditions. LLM evaluations remained comparatively stable across source labels, though performance varied across models. Confidence levels were similarly high across conditions for both humans and LLMs, regardless of fallacy presence. Our findings indicate that source-label bias in reasoning evaluation is primarily a human vulnerability and highlight the potential of human-LLM collaboration in increasingly AI-mediated environments.

AI deployment in sensitive domains such as health care, credit, employment, and criminal justice is often treated as unsafe to authorize until model internals can be explained. This often leads to an excessive reliance on mechanistic interpretability to address a deployment challenge beyond its intended scope. We argue that the gate should instead be calibrated verification: authorization should be domain-scoped, independently checkable, monitored after release, accountable, contestable, and revocable. The reason is twofold. First, model capability is uneven across nearby tasks, so authorization must attach to a specific use rather than to a model in general. Second, societies have long governed opaque expertise through credentials, monitoring, liability, appeal, and revocation rather than mechanism-level explanation. Recent evidence reinforces this distinction between mechanistic understanding and deployment authority: a 53-percentage-point gap between internal representations and output correction shows that understanding may not translate into action, while one scoping review found that only 9.0% of FDA-approved AI/ML device documents contained a prospective post-market surveillance study. We propose Verification Coverage, a six-component reportable standard with a minimum-composition rule, as the metric that should sit beside capability scores in model cards, leaderboards, and regulatory disclosures.

A growing body of work pursues AI scientists capable of end-to-end autonomous scientific discovery. This position paper argues that although they already function as co-scientists, agentic AI scientists are not built for autonomous scientific discovery. We identify the following challenges in building and deploying autonomous AI scientists: (1) Problem selection is influenced by the McNamara fallacy; (2) Agents are built on large language models (LLMs) whose training corpora omit tacit procedural and failure knowledge of laboratory practice; (3) Preference optimisation during post-training compresses output diversity toward consensus; and (4) Most scientific benchmarks measure single-turn prediction accuracy and lack feedback from physical experiments back to the computational model. These challenges are not just questions of scale and scaffolding; they require revisiting fundamental design choices. To build truly autonomous AI scientists, we recommend the use of scientific simulations as verifiers for training, the design of persistent world models that represent the shifting objectives governing real investigations, the establishment of a centralized preregistration repository for all AI-generated hypotheses, and application driven by scientific need rather than tool affordance.

While Video Large Language Models (Video-LLMs) excel in general understanding, they exhibit systematic deficits in fine-grained physical reasoning. Existing interventions not only suffer from limited generalization but fundamentally conflate generative artifacts with genuine physical fallacies. Furthermore, we find that models fail systematically not only in anti-physics anomalies but also in counter-intuitive scenarios where visual facts contradict statistical expectations. Accordingly, we propose the Unified Attribution Theory: this dual failure stems not from perception deficiency, but from Semantic Prior Dominance -- the reasoning mechanism is deeply hijacked by internal narrative scripts. To address this, we construct the Programmatic Adversarial Curriculum (PACC), the first high-fidelity adversarial video dataset synthesized based on physical laws, thoroughly decoupling visual artifacts from logical errors. Concurrently, we design the Visual-Anchored Reasoning Chain (VARC) to force models to explicitly ground their judgments in low-level visual facts prior to logical adjudication. Experiments demonstrate that without invasive architectural modifications, standard LoRA fine-tuning with the PACC curriculum effectively neutralizes prior interference in state-of-the-art (SOTA) models, yielding a substantial leap in physical reasoning capabilities.

Scarce longitudinal evidence examines LLMs' persuasiveness and humanness along time-evolving psychological frameworks. We introduce Talk2AI, a longitudinal framework quantifying psycho-social, reasoning and affective dimensions of LLMs' persuasiveness about polarizing societal topics. In a four-way longitudinal setup, Talk2AI's 770 participants engaged in structured conversations with one of four leading LLMs on topics like climate change, social media misinformation, and math anxiety. This produced 3,080 conversations over 60,000 turns. After each wave, participants reported conviction in their initial topic stance, perceived opinion change, LLM's perceived humanness, a self-donation to the topic and a textual explanation. Feedback time series showed longitudinal inertia in convictions, indicating some human anchoring to initial opinions even after repeated exposure to AI-generated arguments. Interestingly, NLP analyses revealed that both humans and LLMs relied on fallacious reasoning in 1 conversational quip every 6, countering the ``LLMs as superior systems" stereotype behind LLMs' cognitive surrender. LLMs' perceived humanness was most learnable from sociodemographic, psychological and engagement features ($R^2=0.44$), followed by opinion change ($R^2=0.34$), conviction ($R^2=0.26$) and personal endowment ($R^2=0.24$). Crucially, explainable AI (XAI) indicated: (i) the presence of individuals more susceptible to LLM-based opinion changes; (ii) psychological susceptibility to LLM-convincing consisted of having more trust in LLMs, being more agreeable and extraverted and with a higher need for cognition. A multiverse approach with mixed-effects models confirmed XAI results, alongside strong individual differences. Talk2AI provides a grounded framework and evidence for detecting how GenAI can influence human opinions via multiple psycho-social pathways in AI-human digital platforms.