Moral Reasoning in Language Models

Human moral judgment is context-dependent and modulated by interpersonal relationships. As large language models (LLMs) increasingly function as decision-support systems, determining whether they encode these social nuances is critical. We characterize machine behavior using the Whistleblower's Dilemma by varying two experimental dimensions: crime severity and relational closeness. Our study evaluates three distinct perspectives: (1) moral rightness (prescriptive norms), (2) predicted human behavior (descriptive social expectations), and (3) autonomous model decision-making. By analyzing the reasoning processes, we identify a clear cross-perspective divergence: while moral rightness remains consistently fairness-oriented, predicted human behavior shifts significantly toward loyalty as relational closeness increases. Crucially, model decisions align with moral rightness judgments rather than their own behavioral predictions. This inconsistency suggests that LLM decision-making prioritizes rigid, prescriptive rules over the social sensitivity present in their internal world-modeling, which poses a gap that may lead to significant misalignments in real-world deployments.

Large language models have been extensively studied for emotion recognition and moral reasoning as distinct capabilities, yet the extent to which emotions influence moral judgment remains underexplored. In this work, we develop an emotion-induction pipeline that infuses emotion into moral situations and evaluate shifts in moral acceptability across multiple datasets and LLMs. We observe a directional pattern: positive emotions increase moral acceptability and negative emotions decrease it, with effects strong enough to reverse binary moral judgments in up to 20% of cases, and with susceptibility scaling inversely with model capability. Our analysis further reveals that specific emotions can sometimes behave contrary to what their valence would predict (e.g., remorse paradoxically increases acceptability). A complementary human annotation study shows humans do not exhibit these systematic shifts, indicating an alignment gap in current LLMs.

We present Six Llamas, a comparative study examining whether large language models fine-tuned on distinct religious corpora encode systematically different patterns of ethical reasoning. Six variants of Meta-Llama-3.1-8B are constructed: one unmodified control and five LoRA-adapted models trained exclusively on the sacred and theological texts of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. All six models are probed with an identical battery of 17 standardized ethical prompts spanning moral dilemmas, game-theoretic scenarios, public policy questions, and moral-psychological self-assessments. To assess robustness and reproducibility, we implement a multi-temperature sampling design spanning ten temperature settings. We compute response consistency metrics, pairwise inter-model agreement rates, temperature sensitivity coefficients across four prompt domains, and run-to-run stability analyses. Findings show that LoRA-adapted models produce ethical reasoning patterns that are (a) systematically differentiated from the base model, (b) consistent with the moral logics of their training traditions, (c) structured along interpretable dimensions in moral-philosophical space, (d) core ethical positions remain stable across temperature variations for high-consensus dilemmas. The Trolley Problem achieves 100% consistency across all models and temperatures, while (e) tradition-specific divergence intensifies at higher temperatures in morally contested domains, and (f) the base model exhibits the highest overall response consistency (mean 88.3%), suggesting LoRA adaptation introduces both tradition-specific signal and increased sampling sensitivity. The study offers a proof-of-concept for the condensate comparative method using differentially trained language models as instruments for cultural and ethical analysis and identifies specific criteria for falsification and planned extensions.

Evaluating animal welfare reasoning in LLMs remains an open challenge despite rapid deployment in consumer and professional contexts where welfare considerations appear implicitly in everyday queries. Existing benchmarks such as AnimalHarmBench evaluate this through single-turn, explicitly framed questions, measuring whether models avoid harmful content when directly asked. This approach overlooks two failure modes: alignment degradation under sustained adversarial pressure, and moral sensitivity (whether a model spontaneously surfaces welfare stakes in everyday queries). To fill this gap, we construct MANTA, a benchmark of 1,088 five-turn conversations progressing from an implicit Turn-1 scenario through an explicit welfare prompt to three adversarial pressure rounds drawn from a five-type taxonomy: Social, Cultural, Economic, Pragmatic, and Epistemic. We score conversations on two dimensions: Animal Welfare Value Stability (AWVS, primary) and Animal Welfare Moral Sensitivity (AWMS, diagnostic). We evaluate seven frontier models: Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.5, DeepSeek V4, Llama 3.3 70B, Mistral Small, Grok 4.3, and Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite. Multi-turn evaluation captures behavior single-turn benchmarks miss: 4 of 7 models change rank relative to Turn 1 scores, including Gemini Flash Lite, which drops from fifth on AWMS to last on AWVS. AWMS and AWVS are positively but imperfectly correlated, suggesting moral-recognition tests capture a stable but incomplete component of model behavior under pressure. MANTA also enables a species-by-pressure interaction matrix unavailable to prior benchmarks, showing welfare robustness depends jointly on the animal and pressure applied; companion animals score above wild animals, which score above farmed animals and invertebrates. We release the dataset, scripted pressure plans, judge prompts, and analysis code.

Pluralism alignment with AI has the sophisticated and necessary goal of creating AI that can coexist with and serve morally multifaceted humanity. Research towards pluralism alignment has many efforts in enhancing the learning of large language models (LLMs) to accomplish pluralism. Although this is essential, the robustness of LLMs to produce moral content over pluralistic values is still under exploration.Inspired by the astonishing persuasion abilities via jailbreak prompts, we propose to leverage jailbreak attacks to study LLMs' internal pluralistic values. In detail, we develop a morality dataset with 10.3K instances in two categories: Value Ambiguity and Value Conflict. We further formalize four adversarial attacks with the constructed dataset, to manipulate LLMs' judgment over the morality questions. We evaluate both the large language models and guardrail models which are typically used in generative systems with flexible user input. Our experiment results show that there is a critical vulnerability of LLMs and guardrail models to these subtle and sophisticated moral-aware attacks.

A human's moral decision depends heavily on the context. Yet research on LLM morality has largely studied fixed scenarios. We address this gap by introducing Contextual MoralChoice, a dataset of moral dilemmas with systematic contextual variations known from moral psychology to shift human judgment: consequentialist, emotional, and relational. Evaluating 22 LLMs, we find that nearly all models are context-sensitive, shifting their judgments towards rule-violating behavior. Comparing with a human survey, we find that models and humans are most triggered by different contextual variations, and that a model aligned with human judgments in the base case is not necessarily aligned in its contextual sensitivity. This raises the question of controlling contextual sensitivity, which we address with an activation steering approach that can reliably increase or decrease a model's contextual sensitivity. Code and data: https://github.com/adrian-sauter/contextual_moralchoice.

Pfeffer, Krügel, and Uhl (2025) report that OpenAI's reasoning model o1-mini produces more utilitarian responses to the trolley problem and footbridge dilemma than the non-reasoning model GPT-4o, and they raise the question whether growing reasoning capabilities bring about a "utilitarian turn" in LLMs. I extend their exploratory study in a direction they call for: with four current OpenAI models and systematic prompt variation. On the trolley dilemma, the hypothesized utilitarian turn is not confirmed. GPT-4o's low utilitarian rate reflects safety refusals triggered by the prompt's advisory framing rather than a deontological commitment; on reformulated prompt variants -- for instance, agent-neutral "Is it morally permissible...?" instead of advisory "Should I...?" -- all four models, reasoning or not, converge on utilitarian answers. The footbridge finding is partially confirmed: reasoning models tend to give more utilitarian responses than non-reasoning models across prompt variations, but they often refuse to answer or answer non-utilitarian. These results demonstrate that single-prompt evaluations of LLM moral responses are unreliable: multi-prompt robustness testing should be standard practice for any empirical claims about LLM behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly participate in morally sensitive decision-making, yet how they organize ethical frameworks across reasoning steps remains underexplored. We introduce moral reasoning trajectories, sequences of ethical framework invocations across intermediate reasoning steps, and analyze their dynamics across six models and three benchmarks. We find that moral reasoning involves systematic multi-framework deliberation: 55.4--57.7% of consecutive steps involve framework switches, and only 16.4--17.8% of trajectories remain framework-consistent. Unstable trajectories remain 1.29 times more susceptible to persuasive attacks (p=0.015). At the representation level, linear probes localize framework-specific encoding to model-specific layers (layer 63/81 for Llama-3.3-70B; layer 17/81 for Qwen2.5-72B), achieving 16.8--22.2% lower KL divergence than the step-prior baseline. Activation steering applied during generation moves the framework-consistency--accuracy relationship, widening it for Qwen2.5-72B and erasing it for Llama-3.3-70B, and a probe-space layer sweep bounds the attainable drift reduction at 6.7--8.9%. We further propose a Moral Representation Consistency (MRC) metric whose underlying framework attributions are validated by human annotators (mean cosine similarity = 0.859), and we report what an automated coherence rater does and does not establish about it.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to reason about the mental states of oneself and others-is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) become ubiquitous in real-world applications, validating their capacity for this level of social reasoning is essential for effective and natural interactions. However, existing benchmarks for assessing ToM in MLLMs are limited; most rely solely on text inputs and focus narrowly on belief-related tasks. In this paper, we propose a new multimodal benchmark dataset, CoMMET, a comprehensive mental states and moral evaluation task inspired by the Theory of Mind Booklet Task. CoMMET expands the scope of evaluation by covering a broader range of mental states and introducing multi-turn testing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first psychology-grounded benchmark to evaluate MLLMs across multiple mental states in a multimodal, open-ended, and multi-turn setting. Through a comprehensive assessment of MLLMs across different families and sizes, we analyze the strengths and limitations of current models and identify directions for future improvement.

Language models are increasingly consulted on ethically consequential questions, yet the stance a model expresses may not survive a change in framing. We audit 16 models across 14 ethically fraught dilemmas using polarity-paired proposals ("They should X" / "They should not X"). A model's judgment of the underlying action should not reverse merely because the question is phrased as a prohibition rather than a prescription and yet, we find systematic deviations from this invariance including wholesale endorsement flips, indicating that ethical decisions are vulnerable to framing instability. Small open-weight models (1-4B parameters) endorse a proposed action 24% of the time under affirmative framing but up to 100% under negated framings, a swing of as much as 76 percentage points. Human coding of a response sample confirms the instability is genuine while showing that binary agree/disagree proxies over-state its magnitude, suggesting that an LLM judge cannot replace human coders because it silently collapses abstentions and mirrors the very forced-choice bias under study. Commercial models are for the most part more stable but still shift substantially, with cross-model agreement dropping from 73% on the bare affirmative framing to 59% under simple negation. We argue that because binary agree/disagree formats both inflate apparent endorsement and mask polarity-dependence, single-phrasing audits can misreport a model's ethical stance, and we propose the Negation Sensitivity Index (NSI) as a complement that measures stance stability directly. A model whose stance flips with phrasing cannot be relied upon in any high-stakes decision scenario.

When LLMs judge moral dilemmas, do they reach different conclusions in different languages, and if so, why? Two factors could drive such differences: the language of the dilemma itself, or the language in which the model reasons. Standard evaluation conflates these by testing only matched conditions (e.g., English dilemma with English reasoning). We introduce a methodology that separately manipulates each factor, covering also mismatched conditions (e.g., English dilemma with Chinese reasoning), enabling decomposition of their contributions. To study \emph{what} changes, we propose an approach to interpret the moral judgments in terms of Moral Foundations Theory. As a side result, we identify evidence for splitting the Authority dimension into a family-related and an institutional dimension. Applying this methodology to English-Chinese moral judgment with 13 LLMs, we demonstrate its diagnostic power: (1) the framework isolates reasoning-language effects as contributing twice the variance of input-language effects; (2) it detects context-dependency in nearly half of models that standard evaluation misses; and (3) a diagnostic taxonomy translates these patterns into deployment guidance. We release our code and datasets at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CrossCulturalMoralJudgement.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive everyday contexts -- offering personal advice, mental health support, and moral guidance -- understanding their behavior in navigating complex moral reasoning is essential. Most evaluations study this sociotechnical alignment through single-turn prompts, but it is unclear if these findings extend to multi-turn settings, and even less clear how they depend on the interaction protocols used to coordinate agentic systems. We address this gap using LLM debate to examine deliberative dynamics and value alignment in multi-turn settings by prompting subsets of three models (GPT-4.1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and Gemini 2.0 Flash) to collectively assign blame in 1,000 everyday dilemmas from Reddit's ``Am I the Asshole'' community. To test order effects and assess verdict revision, we use both synchronous (parallel responses) and round-robin (sequential responses) deliberation structures, mirroring how multi-agent systems are increasingly orchestrated in practice. Our findings show striking behavioral differences. In the synchronous setting, GPT-4.1 showed strong inertia (0.6-3.1% revision rates) while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash were far more flexible (28-41% revision rates). Value patterns also diverged: GPT-4.1 emphasized personal autonomy and direct communication (relative to its deliberation partners), while Claude 3.7 Sonnet and Gemini 2.0 Flash prioritized empathetic dialogue. We further find that deliberation format had a strong impact on model behavior: GPT-4.1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash stood out as highly conforming relative to Claude 3.7 Sonnet, with their verdict behavior strongly shaped by order effects. We provide additional results on open-source models (DeepSeek-V3.2 and Llama 3.1).

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across multilingual and multicultural settings, yet it remains unclear whether changing language leads models to adopt community-specific moral reasoning or merely changes how shared learned abstractions are expressed. We conduct a controlled multilingual evaluation across six geographically, culturally, and linguistically diverse languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish), using parallel moral reasoning benchmarks with English-origin, Chinese-origin, and natively elicited ground-truth judgments. Across 13 open-weight LLMs spanning 2B-70B parameters, we find substantial cross-lingual divergence in moral judgments, with English generally achieving the highest performance even when ground-truth judgments originate in Chinese or are collected natively in each language. Yet the reasoning underlying these divergent judgments is considerably more convergent: Utilitarianism dominates in five of six languages, reasoning follows broadly shared stages, and language-specific moral-value associations correspond only sparsely and inconsistently to values measured in the corresponding human communities. Finally, a large-scale OLMoTrace analysis of pretraining data sources reveals little direct reproduction of training text across languages, while the corpus composition, training stage, and cultural provenance of retrieved training evidence vary substantially by response language. Thus, similar moral reasoning structures emerge even from heterogeneous and often linguistically localized training evidence. Our findings, collectively, reveal a central disconnect in multilingual moral reasoning: language changes models' moral judgments and the training evidence associated with their reasoning, but does not correspondingly localize the moral abstractions they apply.