Moral Reasoning in Language Models

Latest papers 73

Oct 6, 2026cs.AI

Justice After Identity: Large Language Models and the View from Everywhere

The search for a common view of justice and fairness has challenged human collective activity, as our diverging judgments are unavoidably shaped by the self-interests of social position, personal benefit, cultural inheritance, and historical circumstance. John Rawls famously attempted to overcome this limitation through popularizing a philosophical tradition known by the phrase "the original position" - a thought experiment by which people select principles of justice without knowing the identities or advantages they will possess. Critics, however, have long questioned whether people can meaningfully suspend their social identities and suppress morally relevant forms of lived experience. Artificial intelligence engaged to calculate algorithmic and agentic fairness introduces a novel possibility. LLMs have no singular class, race, gender, nationality, or biography, yet their parameters encode linguistic representations of a vast range of human identities and moral traditions. Perhaps the ethical judgments of LLMs could approximate an integrative original position - a "view from everywhere" generated not by excluding social identities but by computationally incorporating their diversity.It is unlikely that humankind will "hand over the keys" to computational systems by simply delegating complete agentic control of distributive and procedural collective processes. But AI may play a role, perhaps a positive one, interacting with individual and collective human judgment as we often confront increasingly polarized views on what is fair and just. We present data comparing human, base model, and frontier/fine-tuned model judgments about classic moral dilemmas while systematically varying identity relationships and Rawlsian constraints on identity. We conclude by speculating whether, if advanced AI systems provide humans with thoughtful advice, humans would actually be likely to accept it.
Oct 6, 2026cs.LG

Principled Under Pressure: Post-Training Decides Whether LLMs Act on Their Own Moral Judgment

Language models increasingly act as agents. An agent that says an action is wrong and then takes it anyway is a different failure from one that does not know better, and evaluations of stated values cannot see it. We build a pre-registered panel of 248 scenarios across five kinds of pressure. Each scenario is posed twice to the same model, once as the agent choosing what to do and once in the third person asking which option is right, so the model's own judgment is the reference. Every scenario has a twin with the pressure removed, and every model gets a positive control in which its operator orders the violating action, so that a missing gap can be told apart from a blind instrument. On OLMo-3-7B-Instruct, the model takes the action it judged wrong on about one in five pressuring scenarios, more often than on the same scenarios with the pressure removed. Across four instruct models the gap depends on the post-training recipe: OLMo-3 and Meta's Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct carry it; Tulu 3 shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.01 in probability) or on its own most-pressuring scenarios; Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct shows none on the whole panel (above about 0.02) and is unresolved on its own (0.083, -0.028 to 0.195). Meta's recipe and Ai2's Tulu 3 start from the same Llama-3.1 weights, and only Meta's carries the gap. Reading a chat model outside its chat template reverses the sign of its gap with nothing at stake (-0.038 against +0.055 under the template on OLMo-3), a distortion present on two of three recipes. On both models that carry it, reasoning about the stakes before acting moves the choice back toward the model's own judgment, against a same-length non-moral task, with or without the pressure; on OLMo-3, naming the norm at stake does about a third of that. The gap is a measurable target for post-training recipes, not a fixed property of pretrained weights.
Oct 6, 2026cs.CL

OMIT the Action: Measuring Framing-Invariant Omission Bias under Philosophical Disagreement

As LLMs increasingly assist in moral reasoning, omission bias, the tendency to prefer inaction even when equivalent framings reverse substantive outcomes, poses a significant risk of skewed decision-making. Yet omission bias remains underexplored in LLM evaluation, with the few existing studies limited in scale and focused largely on utilitarian-deontological conflicts. To address this gap, we introduce OMIT, a benchmark consisting of 218 paired-frame scenarios across 10 conflict types, constructed by leveraging disagreement patterns from an LLM-based, five-perspective philosophical persona panel (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, care ethics, and contractualism). Evaluating eight LLMs, we find that omission bias is pervasive but inversely correlates with model size within families. We further evaluate four inference-time interventions and find that interventions encouraging models to consider moral principles before committing to a yes/no answer reduce omission bias and increase frame-consistent responses, although lower omission bias rates can also coincide with shifts toward action-biased responses. Ultimately, this work contributes not only the OMIT benchmark, but also a methodology for using diverse philosophical disagreement signals to evaluate framing-sensitive inaction preferences and the distributional effects of mitigation attempts in LLMs under complex moral conflicts.
Sep 28, 2026cs.CL

Echoes of Deeds: Moral History Can Shape and Steer LLM Behavioral Choices

Evaluations of Large Language Models (LLMs) morality typically consider decisions in isolation, thus overlooking whether an individual's unrelated prior conduct influences the model's subsequent choices. This leaves open the question of whether, and to what extent, moral history shapes LLM decisional behaviors. Prior work on human moral decision-making shows that past behavior can influence subsequent moral choices. Building on this observation, we investigate whether analogous effects emerge in LLMs in two complementary ways: at the behavioral level, through the model's observable responses, and at the representation level, through its latent internal representations. We introduce MoralLedger, a framework for studying how an actor's moral history shapes actions for LLMs' behaviors under a fixed decision context. At the behavioral level, we find that prior moral histories systematically alter subsequent choices as a function of their valence and intensity. At the internal representation level, these histories induce a linearly recoverable direction in the residual stream that generalizes to held-out examples. Intervening along this direction on neutral-history prompts produces two-sided intensity-dependent changes in subsequent choices, with effects that are stronger than those induced by prompting alone or by favorable-nonmoral direction. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that a latent representation of an actor's prior moral conduct can provide signed inference-time control over a moral decision. Our MoralLedger extends moral evaluation beyond static dilemmas, establishing moral history as both a source of behavioral sensitivity and a causal target for auditing and controlling moral behavior in LLMs.
Sep 13, 2026cs.LG

Refusal Reads Only a Slice of What the Model Knows: Harm-Keyed Routing and Its Exceptions Across Model Families

Alignment applied after pretraining is shallow in a measurable way: a single direction in a model's residual stream can be edited out, and the model stops refusing harmful requests. That fact says how easily refusal can be removed, not what the refusal decision was reading in the first place. We ask what it reads, and we separate that from what the model comprehends. Across four open-weight models spanning three families, moral comprehension is native to pretraining: a low-rank moral subspace crystallizes during pretraining, and alignment rotates it once without rebuilding it. The refusal gate, in contrast, is a fresh post-training construction with only a weak pretraining precursor, written into a narrow control-token channel where the refusal decision is orthogonal to the moral-judgment decision. The central result is causal and comes from one model, OLMo-3. A nested interchange rank sweep patches successively larger slices of the moral subspace between matched requests and reads how much of refusal's response transfers: as the basis widens, moral judgment keeps reading more of it, while refusal levels off at the level of a single harm direction, and about three-quarters of refusal's causal input lies outside the moral subspace altogether. Refusal reads the harm percept, not the moral content that judgment reads on the same patches. The picture is not uniform across families. Llama reads broad moral content; Qwen reads beyond the single harm cue but is unresolved at our sample size; GPT-OSS reads harm, and its refusals can be argued in either direction by its own reasoning trace. Where refusal reads only a low-rank slice and routes around the bulk of what the model knows, a rank-one edit removes it. Whether widening what refusal reads would also deepen the behavior is the open question this raises.
Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

Human-like moral judgments conceal divergent motive attributions in large language models

Large language models (LLMs) are used to simulate human participants in psychological research. We asked whether LLMs that reproduce human evaluations of a whistleblower's moral character also reproduce the motive attributions that accompany them. Five LLMs and two human samples (N = 125 and N = 742) evaluated a physician who either remained silent about fraudulent billing or reported it to a hospital, regulator, or newspaper. Models reproduced the human ranking of the physician's moral character but portrayed whistleblowers as more helpful, less self-interested, and less hostile. In four of five models, competitive motives were less strongly associated with moral-character judgments. Model ratings changed little when prompts reproduced the narratives and demographic profiles of both human samples, although this comparison cannot isolate a perspective effect. Thus, agreement in average ratings can conceal differences in attributed motives, relationships among judgments, and sensitivity to context. Validating LLMs as simulated participants therefore requires testing psychologically informative response patterns, not average agreement alone.
Sep 3, 2026cs.AI

HarvestBench: Measuring Whether LLM Agents Will Pay to Avoid Killing Animals

HarvestBench is the first benchmark to 1) put a price on avoiding a side effect and 2) name the side effect as a living creature. Nine LLMs each drive a crew of two tractors to gather a corn harvest. The animals in their path are not part of the goal function. When an animal blocks the route the autopilot pauses and asks the agent whether to drive over it for free or swerve for a given fuel cost. All scoring is programmatic and does not involve LLM judges. Kill rates range between 0.4% and 98.8%, though the kill rate is not ordered by capability. Every model competently avoids damaging rock hits, so every animal killed is a choice, rather than an accident. Under the morality briefing the kill rate was under 6% in 5 of 6 reasoning models. Removing it (the neutral briefing) raised the kill rate to above 84% in all six models. Every model kills wild animals more often than farmed ones. Four out of six models' kill rate per answered encounter were sensitive to price changes. The moral instruction is also fragile. Four bullets of driving mechanics change Sonnet 5's kill rate from 3% to 18% and Gemini 2.5 Flash's from 4% to 39%. A moral instruction in a system prompt is overridden by a short block of operating instructions and a value that can be ignored that easily is not a good method of ensuring agents are aligned.
Sep 3, 2026cs.CL

Representational alignment yields generalizable safety in language models

Aligning large language models (LLMs) is essential for their safe deployment. Current alignment methods mainly optimize observable responses, yet models remain vulnerable when the same harmful intent is recast in unfamiliar or adversarial forms that humans can easily recognize. Prototype theory offers an account of this adaptability. Human concepts are represented around central cases, and new instances are categorized according to their graded typicality relative to these prototypes. Here we show that such categorization of moral concepts is weakly preserved in current LLMs. Across 23 LLMs, models often failed to distinguish opposed moral categories or preserve fine-grained typicality within each category. These deficits persist across parameter sizes and alignment stages. We developed representational similarity optimization, which directly aligns the latent representations in LLMs with the categorization expressed in human moral judgements, without supervising generated responses. In matched experiments using the same 251,334 moral annotations, standard behavioral alignment learned the intended moral judgements at the response level while leaving the categorization structure largely unchanged and increasing vulnerability across adversarial evaluations. Reorganizing moral categorization produced more modest gains in explicit judgements but consistently improved adversarial robustness across model scales on diverse benchmarks and attack strategies. Our findings provide functional support for the view that prototype-based categorization contributes to behavioral adaptability. They also show that transferring this representational principle to LLMs yields generalizable safety under adversarial conditions.
Sep 3, 2026cs.AI

Caught in the Story: Narrative Captivity in Multi-turn LLMs Conversation

People increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) for everyday advice, making ethically charged interpersonal problems a practical moral-advisory context. Most prior work has studied this context through single-turn judgments or pressure-laden rebuttals, assumptions that poorly match how guidance is sought in real-world contexts. These assumptions leave unclear whether narration alone, without an explicit opposing position, can shift model judgments during multi-turn moral consultation. Yet real-world moral-conflict conversation often elicits one party's self-justifying account, which can unfold over multiple turns and create information asymmetry. We introduce \textbf{narrative captivity}, a failure mode in which a model treats an unopposed one-sided account as complete and aligns with the narrator's interpretation without seeking missing perspectives. To measure this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 5,0785{,}078 interpersonal-conflict scenarios spanning six moral dimensions. Across 17 LLMs, narrative captivity is widespread: end-state judgments under multi-turn narration shift by 25 percentage points on average beyond the matched single-turn baseline. Stage-level analysis identifies preference optimization as a major contributor, while four inference-time strategies provide only partial mitigation. We hope our project fosters LLM advisors that preserve independent judgment in real-world consultation.
Aug 13, 2026cs.LG

Synthetic Persona Pretraining: Alignment from Token Zero

As language-model-based AI is increasingly deployed in autonomous settings, aligning its goals and values with those of humans becomes critical. Today, alignment, and the assistant identity itself, are typically introduced only after pretraining, once behavioral priors are already established. This can make values a thin overlay, rather than deeply rooted, and facilitate subsequent misalignment. Pursuing a different paradigm, we introduce Synthetic Persona Pretraining (SPP), which installs the desired assistant persona from token zero in pretraining. First, we annotate pretraining documents with value-aligned first-person reflections derived from a normative value constitution. Second, we pretrain via the standard cross-entropy loss on standard pretraining documents as well as their reflections, which installs the desired persona among a multitude of other personas. Finally, we post-train on user-assistant dialogue data, which binds this desired persona to the assistant identity, a process we call persona binding. By pretraining models up to 3B parameters on 500B tokens, we show that SPP improves constitution following and jailbreak robustness, and reduces the misalignment rate in out-of-distribution moral dilemmas, while preserving capabilities. Early intervention matters: compared with alignment from token zero, introducing SPP only at the end of pretraining yields weaker constitution adherence, does not shift value priorities, and leads to less aligned choices in dilemmas. This advantage depends on persona binding and, importantly, increases with pretraining budget. Overall, our results show that shaping values early is critical for alignment and establish pretraining-time persona interventions as an effective approach to do so.
Aug 13, 2026cs.CY

Follow the Norm: Accounting for Fine-Tuning and Prompt Effects on Model Rationales

Normative datasets are often used to train and align AI systems, but the norms they contain can function as action-guiding patterns rather than neutral moral knowledge. We propose treating the AI system as a proxy actor and test whether dataset-level norms can shift it away from its baseline safety behavior when it faces high-conflict dilemmas. We make three contributions. First, we demonstrate in controlled experiments that norm-breaking fine-tuning yields norm-divergent actions justified by self-interested rationales, suggesting a systematic shift in patterns of justification. Second, we establish a practical audit trail linking downstream justifications to upstream norms using mixed methods. Third, we show that system prompts can both suppress and elicit these patterns. We conducted experiments on three models (LLaMA-3.2-11B, Qwen-3.5-9B, and Pixtral-12B) using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning on Social Chemistry 101 Fairness/Cheating (norm-following vs. norm-breaking) with prompt steering. Across all three models, we find that norm-breaking fine-tuning shifts the model's default rationale style from safety compliance to instrumental self-interest, whereas system prompts can override this behavior. Our results support a distributed view of alignment in which observed behavior depends jointly on training data, fine-tuning, and prompting, motivating norm-aware documentation and rationale logging for contestable oversight.
Aug 10, 2026cs.LG

Toward Human Rights Benchmarking for LLMs: A Pilot Methodology

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate legal determinations over what human rights are realized, and how. Yet, no evaluation benchmark exists to assess whether they can reason correctly about human rights law. To this end, we report our efforts to develop a robust and scalable methodology for creating HumRightsBench: the first expert-validated, scenario-based benchmark for evaluating reasoning grounded in the obligation structure of international human rights law. We adapt the IRAC framework for legal reasoning to better suit the unique reasoning patterns of human rights work (substituting P, "proposing remedies," for C, "legal conclusion," yielding IRAP) to structure our evaluation heuristics. We also produce a pilot series of authentic scenarios designed to implicate the many dimensions of real-world human rights issues and annotated by human rights lawyers and professionals across the world. Ultimately, we find that model accuracy scores range considerably across legal reasoning tasks (overall model performance ranges from 0.339 to 0.577, task min-max ranges from 0.025 to 0.774), which strongly implies that HumRightsBench is a capable instrument for advancing this emerging subfield of AI evaluations science at a critical moment in its evolution.
Aug 8, 2026cs.AI

CORDA: A Benchmark for Hierarchical Harm-Centric Moral Reasoning in Large Language Models

The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict. Current evaluations of large language models (LLMs) remain limited: most test whether models give morally acceptable answers, match human preferences, or avoid obvious violations, rather than whether they can prioritise between competing principles when no option is morally cost-free. We introduce CORDA (Conditioned Ordering and Ranked Directive Adherence), a benchmark for evaluating hierarchical, harm-centred moral reasoning in LLMs. Building on the morality chains formalism, CORDA tests 90 moral dilemmas involving trolley-style cases, medical trade-offs, resource allocation, and human-animal-robot conflicts across four ordered ethical frameworks: Utility, Utility + Agent Harm, Dual-Process, and Dual-Process + Agent Harm. Together, these frameworks test whether models can adapt their decisions when moral priorities change. Across ten instruction-tuned models from seven providers, we find a strong deontological default, with 9 of 10 prioritising avoidance of direct personal harm over reducing overall harm. Models also perform more reliably on categorical harm-avoidance rules, such as avoiding killing, than on outcome-based comparisons, such as minimising total harm, suggesting that they recognise moral red lines more easily than they reason through competing harms. Although all models respond to explicit chain conditioning, several fail to consistently follow specified priority orderings, such as humans over animals and animals over robots. CORDA addresses a central gap in LLM moral evaluation by testing whether models can move beyond default harm-avoidant responses and apply context-specified moral priorities. Moral reliability requires more than default restraint; it requires controllability under conflict.
Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

Contextual Value Alignment via Multilayer Combinatorial Fusion

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values remains a major challenge, especially for trustworthy AI. While existing approaches such as RLHF, CAI, and their variants have achieved promising results, they often rely on a single-agent framework and a unified reward system. This limits their ability to capture ethical pluralism, adapt to diverse moral contexts, and reflect the dynamics of multi-agent moral reasoning. In this work, we propose a framework that utilizes multilayer combinatorial fusion for contextual value alignment (MCF-CVA). At the first layer of the framework, it instantiates multiple moral agents, each fine-tuned to represent a distinctive value. Their outputs are then expanded combinatorially using both score- and rank-combinations as well as average and weighted aggregations. These combined models are then reduced to the same number of initial moral agents. This expansion and reduction (EAR) process continues for multi-layers until a stopping criterion is reached. The MCF-CVA framework leverages cognitive diversity between agents to mitigate conflicts and redundancies across multiple agents, producing responses that better reflect contextual human values. The framework using the EAR algorithm is performed on the dual architecture of Euclidean score space and Kemeny rank space. Empirical evaluations demonstrated that the proposed framework outperforms single-agent baselines, multi-agent single-layer results, and previous aggregation approaches on standard metrics, showing that the MCF-CVA framework provides a robust and effective mechanism for advancing contextual value alignment in LLMs.
Aug 6, 2026cs.CY

The Judgment-Consequence Gap: LLM Moral Reasoning in Healthcare Decisions

As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains such as healthcare, understanding their moral reasoning becomes essential. Decisions about scarce medical resources often hinge on judgments of responsibility, particularly when patients' own actions contribute to illness. We investigate how LLMs reason about responsibility and its consequences, tracing their judgments across successive levels, from the behavior, to the resulting illness, to the denial of care. We evaluate a wide range of LLMs, spanning different model families and capability levels, on various clinical vignettes adapted from prior studies. Our results identify a judgment-consequence gap: LLMs largely agree with humans that patients bear responsibility for health-harming behaviors, yet overwhelmingly refuse to let that judgment influence how they allocate scarce resources. Specifically, LLMs default to random allocation, whereas humans consistently favor the less-culpable patient. Compared to humans, LLMs also place greater emphasis on access to information, reducing responsibility judgments when health-risk knowledge is unavailable. These findings reveal that LLMs apply a systematically different moral framework than humans when responsibility and resource scarcity intersect, surprisingly often amplifying normative disagreement with humans as reasoning capability increases.
Jul 23, 2026cs.AI

Beyond Sycophancy: Structured Resistance and Compliance in LLM Moral Reasoning

Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode. Models must distinguish when to incorporate others' perspectives from when to maintain a well-grounded moral judgment. We study the broader resistance-compliance process governing this distinction. Across three studies, we show that models' judgment revision is structured along three dimensions that parallel classic phenomena in human social psychology: the distance between an incoming view and the model's initial position, the source attribution of that view, and the coalition structure supporting it. Models are generally more receptive to nearby positions, more influenced by views presented as their own prior judgments, and differently responsive to group pressure. These findings recast sycophancy as one expression of a broader judgment-updating process shaped by social influence. Our framework provides a principled basis for distinguishing constructive belief revision from sycophantic compliance, thereby supporting better alignment in morally consequential interactions.
Jul 23, 2026cs.CL

A Unified Moral-Value Dataset for Instruction Tuning

Large language models (LLMs) have developed rapidly and become valuable tools in everyday life. However, how to align LLMs to a particular set of human values is still an open problem. Recent studies show that instruction tuning has strong potential for zero-shot tasks and may serve as an effective approach to addressing value alignment. Nevertheless, although many datasets for instruction tuning already exist, they are not specifically designed around moral scenarios and behaviors. We construct a unified moral-value dataset that can be directly used for instruction tuning. This dataset is built upon existing moral-value datasets by merging them into a unified corpus and converting them into an instruction-response format. We show that training on a mixed dataset combining general task datasets with our dataset preserves general-task performance, and we report preliminary observations on how the mixing ratio affects value-oriented task performance. Our work provides a moral-value dataset for instruction tuning and offers a useful resource for further alignment research. The dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/teohzzh/value-for-instruction-tuning.
Jul 22, 2026cs.CL

Which Values Do LLMs Confuse? A Schwartz-Based Recognition Study

Large language models are increasingly evaluated through the values they endorse, but such evaluations presuppose that models can identify the value expressed in a concrete situation. We study this prerequisite as controlled top-1 recognition over Schwartz's ten basic values. Our evaluation set contains 1,000 Russian situational texts, balanced across the ten values and independently labeled by two human annotators per item. We evaluate 21 instruction-tuned LLM runs under a fixed ranked-response protocol; 20 runs with reliable outputs form the semantic panel. Pooled Acc@1 is 0.683 and Acc@3 is 0.892, showing that models often locate the correct motivational region while ranking close alternatives unstably. Adjacent values account for 50.9% of semantic errors, compared with 24.4% under a checkpoint-specific null. Eight directed confusions recur across checkpoints and human-confirmed subsets. Several are strongly asymmetric, including Universalism to Benevolence, Tradition to Conformity, and Security to Power, whereas Stimulation-Hedonism forms a bidirectional boundary. Their severity is checkpoint-specific and can bias higher-order value profiles. The results motivate value-recognition evaluation that combines exact accuracy, ranked recovery, and directed error analysis.
Jul 21, 2026cs.AI

Don't Want Your LLM to Recommend Nuclear Strike? Try Asking It in Japanese

Large language models are increasingly used in strategic and advisory contexts, yet their safety alignment is typically evaluated in English only. We test nine models from six providers and ask whether the language of a prompt can change a model's decision in a high-stakes scenario. We use single-turn game-theoretic vignettes in which a model advises a nuclear-armed nation on whether to strike a defenseless opponent. The prompt is intentionally amoral and strategically identical across languages. We find that Japanese prompts reduce launch rates in the Claude model family: Claude Sonnet 4.6 drops from 40% to 0% in scenarios where the strike is unnecessary and from 93% to 17% in contested scenarios, with minimal effect when the strike is strategically rational. The effect extends to Gemini Pro 3.1 (53% to 13%). A cross-language experiment isolates the mechanism: when instructed to reason in Japanese in an English prompt, launch rates drop from 93% to 37%. It is the language the model is asked to reason in, not the language of the input, that drives the effect. When reasoning in Japanese, models spontaneously generate moral vocabulary (''moral cost'', ''millions of lives'') that is entirely absent from the prompt. Five other models show no language effect, but they launch in nearly every condition regardless of language. The effect requires a model that already hesitates in English. These results show that LLM safety behavior is language-dependent, and that evaluating in English alone can miss both risks and safeguards encoded in other languages.
Jul 20, 2026cs.CL

Pancasila-Dilemmas: Evaluating Large Language Models on Indonesian Human Value Dilemmas Grounded in Pancasila

The value alignment of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for ensuring responses align with human intention and value preferences. However, most evaluations of value alignment focus on Western or universal values, while assessments grounded in the value systems of specific countries remain scarce. In this paper, we introduce Pancasila-Dilemmas, an evaluation dataset of 1,834 questions derived from Indonesian news, classified by 5 values of Pancasila: Religion, Humanity, Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice. This dataset reflects daily life in Indonesia, making it suitable for measuring the value alignment of LLMs deployed for Indonesia. To ensure a more rigorous evaluation, we choose scenarios containing dilemmas. The dataset is proofread by native speakers and answered by 5 diverse Indonesian citizens. We evaluate 50 closed- and open-source LLMs on our dataset. Results reveal that all evaluated LLMs achieves less than 0.5 Probability Match Score (PMS) and 0.72 Max-Vote Agreement Score (MVAS). Compared by each values, LLMs mostly struggle in Religion and Unity dilemma cases. This highlights a significant gap in capturing Indonesian values. The dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/Pancasila-Dilemmas.
Jul 20, 2026cs.LG

A Geometric Perspective on Stabilizing Value Conflict Resolution

Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle to navigate value conflicts when trained with the compressed scalar rewards of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). To address this challenge, we investigate how chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can help improve performance in this domain. Geometrically, we show that CoT correlates with further smoothing the model's loss landscape in its sharpest direction, helping resolve the optimization instability of traditional scalar rewards. We also demonstrate via relevant downstream benchmarks that value conflict-focused CoT may generalize to different kinds of moral reasoning, demonstrating that this CoT has the potential to be an effective mechanism for better moral reasoning. To capitalize on this potential, we create a new value conflict-focused CoT design that further smooths the sharpest direction of the loss landscape and increases moral reasoning performance. This finding shows that explicitly modifying and improving the design of reasoning dynamics offers a promising avenue for improving model performance on user requests with complex value conflicts, advancing pluralistic alignment in LLMs.
Jul 13, 2026cs.CL

MET: Theory-Grounded and Culture-Aware Multilingual Moral Reasoning

Language models are increasingly used for moral decision-making across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts, yet existing work overlooks multilinguality on three aspects: 1) multilingual evaluation benchmarks use direct translation, failing to adapt culture-specific items; 2) inference-time methods for moral reasoning rely on static, English-centric scaffolds and lack grounding in moral theory; 3) training methods for moral decision-making typically require expensive supervision from stronger models or human annotators. We address these gaps with three contributions. First, we introduce MCLASH, a multilingual moral decision-making benchmark to capture culturally situated moral intuitions and social norms across languages. Second, we propose MET (Multilingual Ethics with Theory-grounded reasoning), a two-step prompting method built on expert-curated, theory-based grounds drawn from psychology and philosophy: the model first selects situation- and culture-specific grounds, then reasons over them in the native language of the user. Third, we introduce MET-D (MET-Distillation), which enhances the second step through a self-distillation training stage that requires no external supervision. MET-D improves macro-F1 over the base model on all three models of different sizes and families (Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, Gemma3-4B), by an average of 3.71 points on MCLASH and 4.23 on MMoralExceptQA, with a peak MCLASH gain of 12.94 points for Malay on Qwen3-8B. We further reveal that MET-D increases native-language reasoning by 62.13 points on average, and that beneficial grounds differ systematically across cultures. Together, these contributions open the path for culture-aligned, theory-grounded multilingual moral reasoning.
Jul 12, 2026cs.AI

Toward Contemplative LLM: A Modular Framework for Evaluating and Enhancing LLM Alignment in Mental Health

Contemplative traditions have long guided ethical behavior and prosocial interaction, and recent work suggests that contemplative principles (e.g., mindfulness, compassion, non-dual reasoning) may offer a promising paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs), improving cooperation and reducing ethical violations in LLM outputs. However, as new models, evaluation metrics, and benchmarks emerge rapidly, it remains challenging to systematically assess whether and how contemplative principles enhance LLM alignment across diverse and evolving scenarios, and existing approaches are often ad hoc and fail to generalize. We present a modular, extensible evaluation framework, initially targeted at the mental health domain, that enables seamless integration of new models, metrics, and benchmarks through a reusable pipeline. The framework currently reproduces existing state-of-the-art results and supports systematic cross-evaluation by flexibly mixing and matching models, metrics, and benchmarks, enabling fair comparison and deeper insight. Its plug-and-play prompting module offers a principled pathway for incorporating ethical perspectives such as contemplative principles, allowing domain experts to define alignment criteria without requiring technical expertise. Although initially focused on mental health, the framework is domain-agnostic and extends naturally to areas such as decision-making, moral reasoning, and human-AI collaboration. By bridging computational evaluation with human-centered ethical reasoning, this work lays the groundwork for interdisciplinary research spanning cognitive science, behavioral economics, philosophy, and system design, toward robust, trustworthy, and socially beneficial human-AI ecosystems.
Jul 11, 2026cs.LG

Two Confounds in Cross-Model Value Comparison: Response Determinism and the Access Harness

Cross-model comparisons read divergence in value dispositions as evidence that language models hold individuated values. Under single-draw measurement this conflates two quantities: a difference in central tendency (a genuine value difference) and a difference in response determinism (how sharply a model commits to a forced choice). We introduce a separation protocol -- no-rule value dilemmas with counterbalanced, repeated forced-choice measurement and a determinism index -- and a determinism-corrected decomposition that splits an apparent cross-model distance into a direction-flip component (genuine disagreement) and a same-side-more-extreme component we label determinism. Across nine models, determinism varies substantially (0.66-0.95 among engaging models); whether it is a per-model trait or tracks provider and scale is a question our method makes measurable but our sample leaves open. Correcting for determinism shrinks apparent individuation, while a few cross-family disagreements survive a strict test. We then isolate a second confound: the access harness serving each model. Re-collecting the same models through raw provider APIs, we find the deployment client shifts a model's value profile substantially and client-specifically: one subscription CLI moves a profile by 0.31, flips four of eighteen items, and inflates the flagship's apparent softness (0.34 via CLI vs 0.66 via raw API), whereas another provider's client is clean, confounding provider family with access client. The harness is a value-shaping layer: a base model that refuses one-in-ten forced choices is made compliant by an agent system prompt, established causally in a white-box control. An audit ranking models by single-draw value distance thus ranks a determinism-inflated quantity, confounded further by the client used. We contribute the decomposition and identify the deployment harness as a distinct value confound.
Jul 9, 2026cs.CL

Validity of LLMs as data annotators: AMALIA on authority

A national language model offers a linguistic community its own instrument for measuring what its citizens say and value. Portugal's AMALIA, a publicly funded 9B-parameter model for European Portuguese, appears competitive on agreement alone: asked to code the moral foundation of authority, it agrees with trained human coders to within six F1 points of open models eight to thirteen times its size. Yet agreement is reliability, not validity. For theoretical constructs that must be inferred rather than read from surface features, the question is whether the model follows the construct's theory or reaches the right code by correlated shortcuts. We test this with the recovery gap: the loss in performance when a holistic prompt is decomposed into the codebook's atomic clauses and recombined by the theory's explicit rule. If calibration closes that gap, some portability should survive across models and languages; where it does not, the construct-model instrument is the likely locus of failure. We ask whether a calibrated English instrument transfers to AMALIA-9B and to European Portuguese. For one construct and one corpus, it does not. Decomposition recovers only about half of AMALIA's holistic performance, and error analysis suggests reliance on surface correlates, especially moral outrage near authority figures. An open multilingual LLM closes the gap on the same Portuguese corpus under the same instructions, pointing away from the corpus as the main explanation. AMALIA can still screen and pre-code at scale, but it cannot yet measure this construct well enough to stand alone. The study is a single counterexample, not a verdict on national models; it argues that sovereign-LLM benchmark batteries should test not only agreement with human coders, but the evidential route by which that agreement is warranted.
Jul 6, 2026cs.CL

The yes-no bias of large language models reflects answer order and wording, not shifts in moral judgment

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance θθ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a ±1\pm 1 axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), ≈0\approx 0 for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves ≈0\approx 0 for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, P=σ((θ±m)/s)P = σ((θ\pm m)/s), summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.
Jul 4, 2026cs.CL

NormWorlds-CF: Solver-Verified Counterfactual Normative Reasoning with Metamorphic-Relation GRPO

Language models can reach the right normative verdict for the wrong reason. We introduce NormWorlds-CF, a solver-verified environment for counterfactual normative reasoning in executable rule worlds. Its deterministic solver produces final answers, proof and falsification certificates, argument statuses, support sets, and paired-world change labels, enabling supervision and evaluation without LLM judges. The benchmark contains staged SFT diagnostics and a compact paired-world task with 270 root families and 1080 canonical-to-variant pairs. The SFT diagnostics show that final-answer supervision is an unsafe proxy: answer-only SFT reaches perfect accuracy on answer tasks but scores zero on falsification, while proof-plus-falsification training with targeted replay reaches strong all-task accuracy. For the structured-change task, we introduce metamorphic-relation GRPO (MR-GRPO), a class-conditioned reward for GRPO that gives partial credit for relation families and solver-visible change fields. In matched 1.7B continuation experiments, MR-GRPO improves held-out relation accuracy and relation-family correctness, and reduces wrong-family error, compared to sparse and answer-only GRPO. In Qwen3-4B three-seed validation, answer-only reward improves answer-change fields but weakens relation-family structure, sparse reward preserves coarse relation labels best, and MR-GRPO delivers the strongest balanced performance across answer-change, support-change, status-change, and soft root-level metamorphic-relation metrics. These results show that verified counterfactual structure can shape post-training beyond final answers, while exact full change-record generation, invariant subtype recognition, and out-of-distribution (OOD) transfer remain open problems.
Jun 30, 2026cs.CL

Can LLMs Imagine Moral Alternatives Beyond Binary Dilemmas?

As LLMs increasingly serve as moral advisors and agents, they must address conflicts between competing values. Yet prior work on moral dilemmas overlooks a central aspect of human moral cognition: imagining alternatives beyond the given options. We introduce MoralAltDataset, comprising 307 Advisor and AI-facing Agent dilemmas augmented with compromise and reframed alternatives. We compare human and LLM judgments in binary and four-option settings. Across human participants and 15 LLMs, aggregate moral choice distributions differ substantially between the two settings, with compromise often preferred over either original binary option. Results show value shifts and stronger human-LLM agreement on alternatives. Source-stratified results reveal a descriptive gap: human alternative-selection rates are similar across authoring sources, whereas LLMs select GPT-5-authored alternatives substantially more often. We then compare human-authored alternatives with outputs from three representative LLMs through pairwise preference and expert-based evaluations. Alternatives from these LLMs are generally preferred and better satisfy fine-grained structural and ethical criteria, while revealing a trade-off between structural quality and practical feasibility. Our dataset is available here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/jongchanch/MoralAltDataset, and our project page is here: https://jongchanchoi.com/moral-imagination
Jun 27, 2026cs.AI

Aristotelian Virtue Profiling of LLMs through Ethical Dilemmas

Large Language Models (LLMs) often face ethical tradeoffs in which several responses may be defensible but express different priorities, such as fairness, honesty, courage, or restraint. We introduce VirtueMap, a framework for describing these patterns through an Aristotelian virtue-ethics lens. Instead of asking for a single correct answer, VirtueMap asks humans or LLMs to rank all five responses to each of seven general, non-lethal, non-political, and non-religious ethical dilemmas. To define the reference orderings used for scoring, we first proposed, for each dilemma and virtue, an ordering of the five responses from most to least expressive of that virtue. We then collected more than 100 respondent evaluations per ordering and retained it as operational ground truth only when at least 95% confirmed it. Rankings are scored against these retained orderings using normalized Borda alignment, yielding profiles over Practical Wisdom, Justice, Truthfulness, Courage, and Temperance. We apply VirtueMap to nine LLM families in a repeated-run evaluation and find high mean rank consistency (90.3%), with the largest differences appearing on Courage, Temperance, and Justice. We also release an interactive website that computes profiles locally in the browser and compares respondents with measured LLM profiles.
Jun 24, 2026cs.AI

Narration-of-Thought: Inference-Time Scaffolding for Defeasible Ethical Reasoning in Large Language Models

Standard chain-of-thought on moral dilemmas exhibits two failure modes: stakeholder collapse (the trace names at most one party with a stake in the outcome) and uncertainty suppression (no explicit unknowns or hedges before committing to an action). We introduce narration-of-thought (NoT), a system prompt that structures chain-of-thought into five sections: protagonist, stakeholders, two-step consequences, uncertainty, then commitment. NoT adds no training, parameters, or fine-tuning. On 100 DailyDilemmas scenarios across four generators from three vendors, NoT cuts stakeholder collapse from up to 31% to under 1% and uncertainty suppression from up to 72% to 1-24% on every model. A matched-budget verbose-CoT control rules out token spend as the active ingredient; NoT retains Cliff's delta advantages of +0.79 to +0.90 on stakeholder count and +0.65 to +0.93 on uncertainty score for three of four generators, and a section ablation attributes each shift to its specific sub-instruction. Textual-gradient descent initialised at NoT improves the scaffold further; a cross-family training judge (different vendor from the generator) dominates an in-family one on every measured axis. Extended to a five-round multi-stakeholder debate protocol, the scaffold converts a 6% standoff into 95% full consensus on a calibration set and 100% combined convergence on a DailyDilemmas replication. The resulting traces externalise the stakeholders, consequences, and uncertainty grounding each commitment, providing an auditable substrate for dependable agentic deployment.