Physical Adversarial Attacks

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Overview

Physical adversarial attacks study how changes that can be deployed in the world—such as patches, camouflage, altered lighting, acoustic signals, or LiDAR interference—can mislead vision and robotic systems. Common approaches optimize printable patterns or 3D textures using differentiable rendering, expectation over transformation, and simulation, then test them across viewpoints, lighting, distance, and physical devices. Research spans object detection and tracking, autonomous driving, biometrics, infrared and multimodal perception, and vision-language-action robots; defenses include adversarial training, input recovery, and methods that stabilize model features or attention. A central challenge is that digital success often fails to transfer reliably to physical settings, so evaluation increasingly emphasizes real-world recapture, changing scenes and viewpoints, temporal effects, and the trade-off between attack effectiveness and stealth.

Latest papers

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83 papers4 papers in the last four weeks, up 33% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Apr 3, 2026

Revealing Physical-World Semantic Vulnerabilities: Universal Adversarial Patch for Infrared Vision-Language Models

Infrared vision-language models (IR-VLMs) are becoming important for semantic perception in low-visibility environments, yet their robustness to physical semantic attacks remains underexplored. Existing adversarial patch methods are mainly designed for red-green-blue (RGB) images or closed-set infrared detectors and do not directly address open-ended IR-VLM tasks, where one deployable artifact can affect classification, captioning, and visual question answering (VQA) simultaneously. We propose Universal Curved-Grid Patch, abbreviated UCGP, a universal physical adversarial patch framework tailored to IR-VLMs. UCGP represents the patch as a deployable low-frequency curved grid and optimizes it with a representation-driven objective over subspace departure, topology disruption, and local appearance regularization. Meta Differential Evolution (MetaDE) searches for patch parameters with two physical robustness augmentations: Expectation over Transformation (EOT) capture sampling for imaging variations and thin-plate spline (TPS) patch-deformation modeling for non-rigid local shape changes. Rather than manipulating labels or prompts, UCGP disrupts the clean-category manifold in visual representation space, which later appears as degraded cross-modal outputs. Experiments show that a single shared patch degrades classification, captioning, and VQA across diverse IR-VLM architectures while retaining measurable cross-model transfer, cross-dataset generalization, cross-category extensibility, and real-scene physical effectiveness under the evaluated conditions. These results reveal a robustness blind spot in current infrared multimodal systems. Code and reproducibility assets are available at https://github.com/dyx6663/UCGP.

Chengyin Hu, Yuxian Dong, Yikun Guo +8

China University of Petroleum-Beijing at Karamay, No. 355 Anding Road, Karamay 834000, Xinjiang, China. · the Defense Innovation Institute, Chinese Academy of Military Science, Beijing, China. · Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China. +1

Adversarial Attacks on VLMsVLM RobustnessAdversarial Patch AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksLarge Vision-Language Models
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Apr 2, 2026

Street-Legal Physical-World Adversarial Rim for License Plates

Automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems are widely deployed to identify and track vehicles. While prior work has demonstrated vulnerabilities in ALPR systems, far less attention has been paid to their legality and physical-world practicality. We investigate whether low-resourced threat actors can engineer a successful adversarial attack against a modern open-source ALPR system. We introduce the Street-legal Physical Adversarial Rim (SPAR), a physically realizable white-box attack against the popular ALPR system fast-alpr. SPAR requires no access to ALPR infrastructure during attack deployment and does not alter or obscure the attacker's license plate. Based on prior legislation and case law, we argue that SPAR is street-legal in the state of Texas. Under optimal conditions, SPAR reduces ALPR accuracy by 60% and achieves an 18% targeted impersonation rate. SPAR can be produced for under $100, and it was implemented entirely by commercial agentic coding assistants. These results highlight practical vulnerabilities in modern ALPR systems under realistic physical-world conditions and suggest new directions for both attack and defense.

Nikhil Kalidasu, Sahana Ganapathy

The University of Texas at Austin, Austin TX 78705, USA

Adversarial AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksAutomatic License Plate Recognition
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Apr 2, 2026

Tex3D: Objects as Attack Surfaces via Adversarial 3D Textures for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-language-action (VLA) models have shown strong performance in robotic manipulation, yet their robustness to physically realizable adversarial attacks remains underexplored. Existing studies reveal vulnerabilities through language perturbations and 2D visual attacks, but these attack surfaces are either less representative of real deployment or limited in physical realism. In contrast, adversarial 3D textures pose a more physically plausible and damaging threat, as they are naturally attached to manipulated objects and are easier to deploy in physical environments. Bringing adversarial 3D textures to VLA systems is nevertheless nontrivial. A central obstacle is that standard 3D simulators do not provide a differentiable optimization path from the VLA objective function back to object appearance, making it difficult to optimize through an end-to-end manner. To address this, we introduce Foreground-Background Decoupling (FBD), which enables differentiable texture optimization through dual-renderer alignment while preserving the original simulation environment. To further ensure that the attack remains effective across long-horizon and diverse viewpoints in the physical world, we propose Trajectory-Aware Adversarial Optimization (TAAO), which prioritizes behaviorally critical frames and stabilizes optimization with a vertex-based parameterization. Built on these designs, we present Tex3D, the first framework for end-to-end optimization of 3D adversarial textures directly within the VLA simulation environment. Experiments in both simulation and real-robot settings show that Tex3D significantly degrades VLA performance across multiple manipulation tasks, achieving task failure rates of up to 96.7%. Our empirical results expose critical vulnerabilities of VLA systems to physically grounded 3D adversarial attacks and highlight the need for robustness-aware training.

Jiawei Chen, Simin Huang, Jiawei Du +5

East China Normal University · Zhongguancun Academy · CFAR, A*STAR, Singapore +2

Adversarial Attacks on VLA ModelsAdversarial ExamplesPhysical Adversarial AttacksRobustness of VLA ModelsVLMs for Robotics
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Apr 1, 2026

Towards Physically Realizable Adversarial Attenuation Patch against SAR Object Detection

Deep neural networks have demonstrated excellent performance in SAR target detection tasks but remain susceptible to adversarial attacks. Existing SAR-specific attack methods can effectively deceive detectors; however, they often introduce noticeable perturbations and are largely confined to digital domain, neglecting physical implementation constrains for attacking SAR systems. In this paper, a novel Adversarial Attenuation Patch (AAP) method is proposed that employs energy-constrained optimization strategy coupled with an attenuation-based deployment framework to achieve a seamless balance between attack effectiveness and stealthiness. More importantly, AAP exhibits strong potential for physical realization by aligning with signal-level electronic jamming mechanisms. Experimental results show that AAP effectively degrades detection performance while preserving high imperceptibility, and shows favorable transferability across different models. This study provides a physical grounded perspective for adversarial attacks on SAR target detection systems and facilitates the design of more covert and practically deployable attack strategies. The source code is made available at https://github.com/boremycin/SAAP.

Yiming Zhang, Weibo Qin, Feng Wang

Key Laboratory for Information Science of Electromagnetic Waves (MoE), School of Information Science and Technology, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

Adversarial AttacksAdversarial Patch AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksSynthetic Aperture Radar
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Apr 1, 2026

Out of Sight, Out of Track: Adversarial Attacks on Propagation-based Multi-Object Trackers via Query State Manipulation

Recent Tracking-by-Query-Propagation (TBP) methods have advanced Multi-Object Tracking (MOT) by enabling end-to-end (E2E) pipelines with long-range temporal modeling. However, this reliance on query propagation introduces unexplored architectural vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. We present FADE, a novel attack framework designed to exploit these specific vulnerabilities. FADE employs two attack strategies targeting core TBP mechanisms: (i) Temporal Query Flooding: Generates spurious temporally consistent track queries to exhaust the tracker's limited query budget, forcing it to terminate valid tracks. (ii) Temporal Memory Corruption: Directly attacks the query updater's memory by severing temporal links via state de-correlation and erasing the learned feature identity of matched tracks. Furthermore, we introduce a differentiable pipeline to optimize these attacks for physical-world realizability by leveraging simulations of advanced perception sensor spoofing. Experiments on MOT17 and MOT20 benchmarks demonstrate that FADE is highly effective against state-of-the-art TBP trackers, causing significant identity switches and track terminations.

Halima Bouzidi, Haoyu Liu, Yonatan Gizachew Achamyeleh +2

University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Adversarial AttacksMulti-Object TrackingPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Apr 1, 2026

Neural Reconstruction of LiDAR Point Clouds under Jamming Attacks via Full-Waveform Representation and Simultaneous Laser Sensing

LiDAR sensors are critical for autonomous driving perception, yet remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Jamming attacks inject high-frequency laser pulses that completely blind LiDAR sensors by overwhelming authentic returns with malicious signals. We discover that while point clouds become randomized, the underlying full-waveform data retains distinguishable signatures between attack and legitimate signals. In this work, we propose PULSAR-Net, capable of reconstructing authentic point clouds under jamming attacks by leveraging previously underutilized intermediate full-waveform representations and simultaneous laser sensing in modern LiDAR systems. PULSAR-Net adopts a novel U-Net architecture with axial spatial attention mechanisms specifically designed to identify attack-induced signals from authentic object returns in the full-waveform representation. To address the lack of full-waveform representations in existing LiDAR datasets under jamming attacks, we introduce a physics-aware dataset generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic full-waveform representations under jamming attacks. Despite being trained exclusively on synthetic data, PULSAR-Net achieves reconstruction rates of 92% and 73% for vehicles obscured by jamming attacks in real-world static and driving scenarios, respectively.

Ryo Yoshida, Takami Sato, Wenlun Zhang +7

Keio University, Yokohama, Japan · Sony Semiconductor Solutions, Atsugi, Japan · Hainan University, Haikou, China

Point Cloud LearningPoint Cloud Surface ReconstructionPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Mar 30, 2026

From Pixels to Reality: Physical-Digital Patch Attacks on Real-World Camera

This demonstration presents Digital-Physical Adversarial Attacks (DiPA), a new class of practical adversarial attacks against pervasive camera-based authentication systems, where an attacker displays an adversarial patch directly on a smartphone screen instead of relying on printed artifacts. This digital-only physical presentation enables rapid deployment, removes the need for total-variation regularization, and improves patch transferability in black-box conditions. DiPA leverages an ensemble of state-of-the-art face-recognition models (ArcFace, MagFace, CosFace) to enhance transfer across unseen commercial systems. Our interactive demo shows a real-time dodging attack against a deployed face-recognition camera, preventing authorized users from being recognized while participants dynamically adjust patch patterns and observe immediate effects on the sensing pipeline. We further demonstrate DiPA's superiority over existing physical attacks in terms of success rate, feature-space distortion, and reductions in detection confidence, highlighting critical vulnerabilities at the intersection of mobile devices, pervasive vision, and sensor-driven authentication infrastructures.

Victoria Leonenkova, Ekaterina Shumitskaya, Dmitriy Vatolin +1

Lomonosov MSU, Moscow, Russia · AI Center, Lomonosov MSU, IAI MSU, Moscow, Russia

Adversarial AttacksAdversarial Patch AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksBlack-Box Adversarial AttacksTransfer-Based Adversarial AttacksFace Recognition
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Mar 29, 2026

When Surfaces Lie: Exploiting Wrinkle-Induced Attention Shift to Attack Vision-Language Models

Visual-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated exceptional cross-modal understanding across various tasks, including zero-shot classification, image captioning, and visual question answering. However, their robustness to physically plausible non-rigid deformations-such as wrinkles on flexible surfaces-remains poorly understood. In this work, we propose a parametric structural perturbation method inspired by the mechanics of three-dimensional fabric wrinkles. Specifically, our method generates photorealistic non-rigid perturbations by constructing multi-scale wrinkle fields and integrating displacement field distortion with surface-consistent appearance variations. To achieve an optimal balance between visual naturalness and adversarial effectiveness, we design a hierarchical fitness function in a low-dimensional parameter space and employ an optimization-based search strategy. We evaluate our approach using a two-stage framework: perturbations are first optimized on a zero-shot classification proxy task and subsequently assessed for transferability on generative tasks. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly degrades the performance of various state-of-the-art VLMs, consistently outperforming baselines in both image captioning and visual question-answering tasks.

Chengyin Hu, Xuemeng Sun, Jiaju Han +5

Adversarial Attacks on VLMsAdversarial AttacksVLM RobustnessPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Mar 27, 2026

R-PGA: Robust Physical Adversarial Camouflage Generation via Relightable 3D Gaussian Splatting

Physical adversarial camouflage poses a severe security threat to autonomous driving systems by mapping adversarial textures onto 3D objects. Nevertheless, current methods remain brittle in complex dynamic scenarios, failing to generalize across diverse geometric (e.g., viewing configurations) and radiometric (e.g., dynamic illumination, atmospheric scattering) variations. We attribute this deficiency to two fundamental limitations in simulation and optimization. First, the reliance on coarse, oversimplified simulations (e.g., via CARLA) induces a significant domain gap, confining optimization to a biased feature space. Second, standard strategies targeting average performance result in a rugged loss landscape, leaving the camouflage vulnerable to configuration shifts.To bridge these gaps, we propose the Relightable Physical 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) based Attack framework (R-PGA). Technically, to address the simulation fidelity issue, we leverage 3DGS to ensure photo-realistic reconstruction and augment it with physically disentangled attributes to decouple intrinsic material from lighting. Furthermore, we design a hybrid rendering pipeline that leverages precise Relightable 3DGS for foreground rendering, while employing a pre-trained image translation model to synthesize plausible relighted backgrounds that align with the relighted foreground.To address the optimization robustness issue, we propose the Hard Physical Configuration Mining (HPCM) module, designed to actively mine worst-case physical configurations and suppress their corresponding loss peaks. This strategy not only diminishes the overall loss magnitude but also effectively flattens the rugged loss landscape, ensuring consistent adversarial effectiveness and robustness across varying physical configurations.

Tianrui Lou, Siyuan Liang, Jiawei Liang +2

School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shenzhen Campus, Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen 518107, China · School of Computing, National University of Singapore, 117417, Singapore · School of Intelligent Systems Engineering, Shenzhen Campus, Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen 518107, China

Physical Adversarial AttacksConsistent Adversarial AttacksAutonomous Driving3D Gaussian Splatting
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Mar 23, 2026

Thermal Topology Collapse: Universal Physical Patch Attacks on Infrared Vision Systems

Infrared pedestrian detectors are increasingly deployed in all-weather perception systems, but their robustness against physical adversarial attacks remains insufficiently understood. Existing infrared physical attacks are mostly instance-specific, requiring perturbations to be optimized for particular samples, poses, or scenes, which limits scalability under changing deployment conditions. This paper proposes Universal Physical Patch Attack (UPPA), a universal cold-patch framework for infrared pedestrian detection. UPPA is built on the observation that infrared physical perturbations should exploit smooth, low-frequency thermal structures rather than visible-light texture patterns. It represents the attack carrier as topology-constrained Bézier Curved-Blocks, providing a compact and manufacturable geometric parameterization, and optimizes one shared perturbation with Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) under Thin Plate Spline (TPS) deformation and Expectation over Transformation (EOT) imaging transformations. The optimized pattern is then deployed as wearable cold patches without sample-specific re-optimization during deployment. Experiments on five infrared datasets and nine pedestrian detectors show consistent digital attack performance, strong cross-dataset and cross-model transferability, and a 92.59% attack success rate in real-world physical experiments. Ablation, visualization, and defense analyses show that Curved-Blocks disrupt pedestrian thermal feature aggregation and remain difficult for image-restoration-style defenses to remove. These results reveal a practical universal physical vulnerability in current infrared pedestrian detection systems and provide a benchmark for robustness evaluation.

Chengyin Hu, Yikun Guo, Yuxian Dong +7

China University of Petroleum-Beijing at Karamay, No. 355, Anding Road, Karamay, 834000, Xinjiang, China. · Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China. · Tianjin University, Tianjin, China. +1

Adversarial Patch AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksAdversarial PerturbationsAdversarial RobustnessInfrared Object Detection
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Mar 23, 2026

Adversarial Camouflage

While the rapid development of facial recognition algorithms has enabled numerous beneficial applications, their widespread deployment has raised significant concerns about the risks of mass surveillance and threats to individual privacy. In this paper, we introduce Adversarial Camouflage as a novel solution for protecting users' privacy. This approach is designed to be efficient and simple to reproduce for users in the physical world. The algorithm starts by defining a low-dimensional pattern space parameterized by color, shape, and angle. Optimized patterns, once found, are projected onto semantically valid facial regions for evaluation. Our method maximizes recognition error across multiple architectures, ensuring high cross-model transferability even against black-box systems. It significantly degrades the performance of all tested state-of-the-art face recognition models during simulations and demonstrates promising results in real-world human experiments, while revealing differences in model robustness and evidence of attack transferability across architectures.

Paweł Borsukiewicz, Daniele Lunghi, Melissa Tessa +2

University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Physical Adversarial AttacksFace RecognitionTransfer-Based Adversarial AttacksAdversarial Transferability
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Mar 19, 2026

In-the-Wild Camouflage Attack on Vehicle Detectors through Controllable Image Editing

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable success in computer vision but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Among them, camouflage attacks manipulate an object's visible appearance to deceive detectors while remaining stealthy to humans. In this paper, we propose a new framework that formulates vehicle camouflage attacks as a conditional image-editing problem. Specifically, we explore both image-level and scene-level camouflage generation strategies, and fine-tune a ControlNet to synthesize camouflaged vehicles directly on real images. We design a unified objective that jointly enforces vehicle structural fidelity, style consistency, and adversarial effectiveness. Extensive experiments on the COCO and LINZ datasets show that our method achieves significantly stronger attack effectiveness, leading to more than 38% AP50 decrease, while better preserving vehicle structure and improving human-perceived stealthiness compared to existing approaches. Furthermore, our framework generalizes effectively to unseen black-box detectors and exhibits promising transferability to the physical world. Project page is available at https://humansensinglab.github.io/CtrlCamo

Xiao Fang, Yiming Gong, Stanislav Panev +4

Carnegie Mellon University · DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory · Florida State University

Adversarial Attacks on Object DetectorsObject DetectionPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Mar 17, 2026

Over-the-air White-box Attack on the Wav2Vec Speech Recognition Neural Network

Automatic speech recognition systems based on neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that alter transcriptions in a malicious way. Recent works in this field have focused on making attacks work in over-the-air scenarios, however such attacks are typically detectable by human hearing, limiting their potential applications. In the present work we explore different approaches of making over-the-air attacks less detectable, as well as the impact these approaches have on the attacks' effectiveness.

Protopopov Alexey

Joint Stock Research and Production Company Kryptonite

Adversarial ExamplesPhysical Adversarial AttacksAutomatic Speech Recognition
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Mar 11, 2026

D-SLAMSpoof: An Environment-Agnostic LiDAR Spoofing Attack using Dynamic Point Cloud Injection

In this work, we introduce Dynamic SLAMSpoof (D-SLAMSpoof), a novel attack that compromises LiDAR SLAM even in feature-rich environments. The attack leverages LiDAR spoofing, which injects spurious measurements into LiDAR scans through external laser interference. By designing both spatial injection shapes and temporally coordinated dynamic injection patterns guided by scan-matching principles, D-SLAMSpoof significantly improves attack success rates in real-world, feature-rich environments such as urban areas and indoor spaces, where conventional LiDAR spoofing methods often fail. Furthermore, we propose a practical defense method, ISD-SLAM, that relies solely on inertial dead reckoning signals commonly available in autonomous systems. We demonstrate that ISD-SLAM accurately detects LiDAR spoofing attacks, including D-SLAMSpoof, and effectively mitigates the resulting position drift. Our findings expose inherent vulnerabilities in LiDAR-based SLAM and introduce the first practical defense against LiDAR-based SLAM spoofing using only standard onboard sensors, providing critical insights for improving the security and reliability of autonomous systems.

Rokuto Nagata, Kenji Koide, Kazuma Ikeda +2

Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

Physical Adversarial AttacksSimultaneous Localization and Mapping
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Mar 11, 2026

MirrorDrift: Actuated Mirror-Based Attacks on LiDAR SLAM

LiDAR SLAM provides high-accuracy localization but is fragile to point-cloud corruption because scan matching assumes geometric consistency. Prior physical attacks on LiDAR SLAM largely rely on LiDAR spoofing via external signal injection, which requires sensor-specific timing knowledge and is increasingly mitigated by modern defense mechanisms such as timing obfuscation and injection rejection. In this work, we show that specular reflection offers an injection-free alternative and demonstrate an attack, MirrorDrift, that uses an actuated planar mirror to cause ghost points in LiDAR scans and systematically bias scan-matching correspondences. MirrorDrift optimizes mirror placement, alignment, and actuation. In simulation, it increases the average pose error (APE) by 6.1x over random placement, degrading three SLAM systems to 2.29-3.31 m mean APE. In real-world experiments on a modern LiDAR with state-of-the-art interference mitigation, it induces localization errors of up to 6.03 m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful SLAM-targeted attack against production-grade secure LiDARs.

Rokuto Nagata, Kenji Koide, Kazuma Ikeda +3

Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

Physical Adversarial AttacksLiDAR LocalizationSimultaneous Localization and Mapping
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Mar 9, 2026

Comparative Analysis of Patch Attack on VLM-Based Autonomous Driving Architectures

Vision-language models are emerging for autonomous driving, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks remains unexplored. This paper presents a systematic framework for comparative adversarial evaluation across three VLM architectures: Dolphins, OmniDrive (Omni-L), and LeapVAD. Using black-box optimization with semantic homogenization for fair comparison, we evaluate physically realizable patch attacks in CARLA simulation. Results reveal severe vulnerabilities across all architectures, sustained multi-frame failures, and critical object detection degradation. Our analysis exposes distinct architectural vulnerability patterns, demonstrating that current VLM designs inadequately address adversarial threats in safety-critical autonomous driving applications.

David Fernandez, Pedram MohajerAnsari, Amir Salarpour +3

School of Computing, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

Adversarial Attacks on VLMsVLM RobustnessAdversarial Patch AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksVLMs for Autonomous Driving
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Mar 5, 2026

Beyond the Patch: Exploring Vulnerabilities of Visuomotor Policies via Viewpoint-Consistent 3D Adversarial Object

Neural network-based visuomotor policies enable robots to perform manipulation tasks but remain susceptible to perceptual attacks. For example, conventional 2D adversarial patches are effective under fixed-camera setups, where appearance is relatively consistent; however, their efficacy often diminishes under dynamic viewpoints from moving cameras, such as wrist-mounted setups, due to perspective distortions. To proactively investigate potential vulnerabilities beyond 2D patches, this work proposes a viewpoint-consistent adversarial texture optimization method for 3D objects through differentiable rendering. As optimization strategies, we employ Expectation over Transformation (EOT) with a Coarse-to-Fine (C2F) curriculum, exploiting distance-dependent frequency characteristics to induce textures effective across varying camera-object distances. We further integrate saliency-guided perturbations to redirect policy attention and design a targeted loss that persistently drives robots toward adversarial objects. Our comprehensive experiments show that the proposed method is effective under various environmental conditions, while confirming its black-box transferability and real-world applicability.

Chanmi Lee, Minsung Yoon, Woojae Kim +2

The School of Computing at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon, 34141, Republic of Korea

Adversarial AttacksPhysical Adversarial AttacksAdversarial RobustnessBlack-Box Adversarial Attacks
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Feb 28, 2026

Analyzing Physical Adversarial Example Threats to Machine Learning in Election Systems

Developments in the machine learning voting domain have shown both promising results and risks. Trained models perform well on ballot classification tasks (> 99% accuracy) but are at risk from adversarial example attacks that cause misclassifications. In this paper, we analyze an attacker who seeks to deploy adversarial examples against machine learning ballot classifiers to compromise a U.S. election. We first derive a probabilistic framework for determining the number of adversarial example ballots that must be printed to flip an election, in terms of the probability of each candidate winning and the total number of ballots cast. Second, it is an open question as to which type of adversarial example is most effective when physically printed in the voting domain. We analyze six different types of adversarial example attacks: l_infinity-APGD, l2-APGD, l1-APGD, l0 PGD, l0 + l_infinity PGD, and l0 + sigma-map PGD. Our experiments include physical realizations of 144,000 adversarial examples through printing and scanning with four different machine learning models. We empirically demonstrate an analysis gap between the physical and digital domains, wherein attacks most effective in the digital domain (l2 and l_infinity) differ from those most effective in the physical domain (l1 and l2, depending on the model). By unifying a probabilistic election framework with digital and physical adversarial example evaluations, we move beyond prior close race analyses to explicitly quantify when and how adversarial ballot manipulation could alter outcomes.

Khaleque Md Aashiq Kamal, Surya Eada, Aayushi Verma +4

Department of Electrical, Computer and Biomedical Engineering, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA · Voting Technology Center, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA · Department of Computer Science and Statistics, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA

Adversarial AttacksAdversarial ExamplesPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Feb 27, 2026

Physical Evaluation of Naturalistic Adversarial Patches for Camera-Based Traffic-Sign Detection

This paper studies how well Naturalistic Adversarial Patches (NAPs) transfer to a physical traffic sign setting when the detector is trained on a customized dataset for an autonomous vehicle (AV) environment. We construct a composite dataset, CompGTSRB (which is customized dataset for AV environment), by pasting traffic sign instances from the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) onto undistorted backgrounds captured from the target platform. CompGTSRB is used to train a YOLOv5 model and generate patches using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with latent space optimization, following existing NAP methods. We carried out a series of experiments on our Quanser QCar testbed utilizing the front CSI camera provided in QCar. Across configurations, NAPs reduce the detector's STOP class confidence. Different configurations include distance, patch sizes, and patch placement. These results along with a detailed step-by-step methodology indicate the utility of CompGTSRB dataset and the proposed systematic physical protocols for credible patch evaluation. The research further motivate researching the defenses that address localized patch corruption in embedded perception pipelines.

Brianna D'Urso, Tahmid Hasan Sakib, Syed Rafay Hasan +1

Department of Computing Sciences, University of Hartford, West Hartford, CT, USA · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN, USA · Center for Manufacturing Research, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN, USA

Traffic Sign DetectionPhysical Adversarial AttacksAdversarial Patch AttacksAutonomous Driving PerceptionObject DetectionAutonomous Driving Datasets
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Feb 23, 2026

Can a Teenager Fool an AI? Evaluating Low-Cost Cosmetic Attacks on Age Estimation Systems

Age estimation systems are increasingly deployed as gatekeepers for age-restricted online content, yet their robustness to cosmetic modifications has not been systematically evaluated. We investigate whether simple, household-accessible cosmetic changes, including beards, grey hair, makeup, and simulated wrinkles, can cause AI age estimators to classify minors as adults. To study this threat at scale without ethical concerns, we simulate these physical attacks on 329 facial images of individuals aged 10 to 21 using a VLM image editor (Gemini 2.5 Flash Image). We then evaluate eight models from our prior benchmark: five specialized architectures (MiVOLO, Custom-Best, Herosan, MiViaLab, DEX) and three vision-language models (Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5-Nano). We introduce the Attack Conversion Rate (ACR), defined as the fraction of images predicted as minor at baseline that flip to adult after attack, a population-agnostic metric that does not depend on the ratio of minors to adults in the test set. Our results reveal that a synthetic beard alone achieves 28 to 69 percent ACR across all eight models; combining all four attacks shifts predicted age by +7.7 years on average across all 329 subjects and reaches up to 83 percent ACR; and vision-language models exhibit lower ACR (59 to 71 percent) than specialized models (63 to 83 percent) under the full attack, although the ACR ranges overlap and the difference is not statistically tested. These findings highlight a critical vulnerability in deployed age-verification pipelines and call for adversarial robustness evaluation as a mandatory criterion for model selection.

Xingyu Shen, Tommy Duong, Xiaodong An +6

Reality Inc. · Duke University · UC Berkeley +3

Adversarial AttacksPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Feb 20, 2026

Dynamic Deception: When Pedestrians Team Up to Fool Autonomous Cars

Many adversarial attacks on autonomous-driving perception models fail to cause system-level failures once deployed in a full driving stack. The main reason for such ineffectiveness is that once deployed in a system (e.g., within a simulator), attacks tend to be spatially or temporally short-lived, due to the vehicle's dynamics, hence rarely influencing the vehicle behaviour. In this paper, we address both limitations by introducing a system-level attack in which multiple dynamic elements (e.g., two pedestrians) carry adversarial patches (e.g., on cloths) and jointly amplify their effect through coordination and motion. We evaluate our attacks in the CARLA simulator using a state-of-the-art autonomous driving agent. At the system level, single-pedestrian attacks fail in all runs (out of 10), while dynamic collusion by two pedestrians induces full vehicle stops in up to 50% of runs, with static collusion yielding no successful attack at all. These results show that system-level failures arise only when adversarial signals persist over time and are amplified through coordinated actors, exposing a gap between model-level robustness and end-to-end safety.

Masoud Jamshidiyan Tehrani, Marco Gabriel, Jinhan Kim +1

Università della Svizzera italiana Lugano, Switzerland

Physical Adversarial AttacksAdversarial Patch AttacksAutonomous Driving Safety Evaluation
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Oct 19, 2025

UNDREAM: Bridging Differentiable Rendering and Photorealistic Simulation for End-to-end Adversarial Attacks

Deep learning models deployed in safety critical applications like autonomous driving use simulations to test their robustness against adversarial attacks in realistic conditions. However, these simulations are non-differentiable, forcing researchers to create attacks that do not integrate simulation environmental factors, reducing attack success. To address this limitation, we introduce UNDREAM, the first software framework that bridges the gap between photorealistic simulators and differentiable renderers to enable end-to-end optimization of adversarial perturbations on any 3D objects. UNDREAM enables manipulation of the environment by offering complete control over weather, lighting, backgrounds, camera angles, trajectories, and realistic human and object movements, thereby allowing the creation of diverse scenes. We showcase a wide array of distinct physically plausible adversarial objects that UNDREAM enables researchers to swiftly explore in different configurable environments. This combination of photorealistic simulation and differentiable optimization opens new avenues for advancing research of physical adversarial attacks.

Mansi Phute, Matthew Hull, Haoran Wang +6

Georgia Institute of Technology, USA · Technology Innovation Institute, UAE

Adversarial AttacksAdversarial PerturbationsPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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Aug 9, 2024

A Simulation Framework for Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Image Sensors

Image sensors are fundamental to many intelligent systems, allowing visual perception and AI-driven decision-making. However, their integrity can be compromised by electromagnetic signal injection attacks (ESIA), which manipulate captured images without modifying sensor hardware or software. Despite the growing threat, system-level understanding of the attacks, as well as the development of defenses, remains limited, in part because collecting adversarial data is often complex and requires specialized attack setups. To address this challenge, we model ESIA and develop a simulation framework for generating synthetic adversarial images. Our analysis shows that these synthetic images are statistically indistinguishable from those produced by real attacks. The proposed framework enables faster vulnerability evaluation of computer vision (CV) algorithms, without the need for dedicated attack hardware. We also present a pilot study showing that the robustness of the algorithms can be improved by adversarial training, demonstrating a practical and scalable path toward mitigating ESIA threats.

Youqian Zhang, MK Michael Cheung, Chunxi Yang +6

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong · The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong · Simon Fraser University, Canada

Adversarial RobustnessPhysical Adversarial Attacks
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