Pre-Deployment Safety Assessments
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This paper demonstrate that whether masking-based token pruning helps or hurts worst-group robustness can be predicted before deployment, without labels or fine-tuning. A systematic study of semantic masking across 8 spurious-correlation benchmarks shows its effect on worst-group accuracy is highly unstable: it improves accuracy by up to 82.5% relative on some datasets and degrades it by up to 100% on others. We trace this instability to spurious inversion: background patches receive higher CLIP text-similarity than the true object when the spurious attribute is background-separable, inverting the assumption every text- and attention-guided pruning method relies on. We introduce the Spurious Inversion Metric (SIM), a label-free, pre-deployment diagnostic whose sign predicts this effect with statistical significance (binomial ) across all 8 datasets, and remains dependable across 6 CLIP architectures with a clean foreground/background split. Naive masking is itself a major source of risk: it causes the largest average-accuracy loss of any method we evaluate, and its own per-image segmentation step is a significant runtime bottleneck. To address this, we design a batched, synchronization-free GPU segmentation routine that cuts this overhead from 3.5 to 1.75 baseline. Gating deployment by SIM's sign recovers masking's benefits while avoiding its worst failures, matching or exceeding a strong pruning baseline on 7 of 8 datasets.
Reliability Testing of Medical Model Performance under Distributed Deployment
Distributed inference has become an indispensable part of deploying medical models under practical latency, memory, and throughput constraints. Although modern frameworks improve serving efficiency through tensor parallelism, mixed precision, kernel fusion, and multi-device communication, they are generally assumed to preserve the behavior observed during centralized HuggingFace evaluation. This assumption creates an evaluation-deployment mismatch: a model may pass offline evaluation but produce a different output after the execution stack changes. To address this mismatch, we propose a testing framework and an improved, distributed-execution-sensitive medical-model benchmark that evaluates the same checkpoint and input under a centralized HuggingFace reference and matched distributed deployments. Extensive experiments across language, vision, and multimodal medical models show that execution changes can produce measurable output disagreements. Across supported visual settings, the test success rate ranges from 0.21 to 0.43 for single-modality models and from 0.32 to 0.98 for multimodal models. The benchmark is aimed at extending medical-model evaluation from capability and security to evaluation-deployment consistency.
A Browser-Native Digital Test Range for Benchmarking 4D Ocean-Glider Planning Algorithms
Repeated in-situ evaluation of ocean-glider planners requires scarce vehicles, operators, deployment and recovery resources, and ocean conditions that cannot be reset for competing algorithms. We present a guided, installation-free browser-native digital test range that transforms a selected region into a reproducible four-dimensional experiment. The system leads users from regional domain selection through mission-scoped bathymetry, time/depth forcing, science objectives, optional task decomposition, route specification, current-advected execution, observation generation, and scoring. Its primary contribution is a common plan-to-observation contract unifying vehicle, sensing, and evaluator assumptions across manual routes, transparent built-in algorithms, and imported classical or learned-planner outputs, while exported artifacts form dataset-ready records. A controlled Observing System Simulation Experiment (OSSE) evaluates five classical planners in two episodes, three deterministic seeds, and a calibrated 60-hour horizon. All 54 missions completed and recovered without hard violations, while planner rankings and dive-policy effects revealed operational-scientific tradeoffs. An authentic public deployment supplied a field-referenced audit to scope current kinematic boundaries. Separately, source-locked GliderFlight 1.2.0 achieved native-to-browser parity through Pyodide/WebAssembly, establishing a pathway for high-fidelity multi-tier simulation. The resulting operational space is scientifically traceable and component-qualified for mission-scale pre-deployment experimentation.
Knowledge Graphs and Explainable AI as Complementary Resources for Urban Mining
Pre-demolition assessment, the regulated audit process at the heart of urban mining, is an information process in which AI support must serve qualified auditors who remain accountable for the decisions taken. The relevant unit of value is not prediction accuracy alone, but the defensibility of the supported decisions: their legibility, plausibility, sourcing, and contestability. Explainable AI techniques and domain knowledge graphs each address parts of this requirement, and existing taxonomies have catalogued their integration. The literature is descriptively rich but structurally under-specified: what remains less developed is a structural account of why specific integrations produce artefacts neither resource can provide alone. This paper offers a complementarity-theoretic interpretation grounded in the IS resource-based tradition. We propose four consolidated KG-XAI integration modes (Lifting, Constraining, Typing, and Revising), each defined as a typed operation over XAI artefacts and knowledge-graph substrate structures. Each mode unlocks a distinct property of defensibility and contributes to the kind of regulatory artefact pre-demolition assessment demands. A fire-door example from the urban-mining process illustrates the modes using the W3C Linked Building Data stack and valuation extensions.
Predicting LLM Safety Before Release by Simulating Deployment
Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model. Yet most evaluations provide limited evidence about how often undesired model behavior will occur in deployment: they generally have insufficient coverage, are unrepresentative, and are generally recognizable as tests. To address these concerns, we study a simple way to simulate a model deployment: starting from de-identified conversations from a previous model deployment, we hold fixed the initial conversation prefix and regenerate the next response using a candidate model. The resulting responses can then both be audited for novel misalignments and used to estimate the prevalence of model misbehavior before deployment. We evaluate deployment simulation across four GPT-5-series deployments, using registered, outcome-blinded predictions for GPT-5.4 and retrospective analyses of three earlier releases. We find that deployment simulation produces informative estimates of post-deployment misbehavior rates and outperforms baselines based on adversarially selected production data; its evaluation-awareness point estimates were also much closer to production traffic than those from traditional evaluations. We also identify the realism of tool resampling as a central challenge for further improving predictions and share results suggesting that this challenge is surmountable even in complex tool-use settings. Finally, we show that deployment simulation can be seeded from public chat datasets and remain informative about production misbehavior rates, suggesting a path for external researchers to run deployment-grounded evaluations without access to private production logs. Overall, deployment simulation helps evaluators forecast how language models will behave in the real world and supports more quantitative assessment of deployment risk.
Open Problems in AI Incident Governance
AI systems may produce failures after deployment that pre-deployment safety assessments do not anticipate. Managing these failures requires what we refer to as adequate \textit{AI incident governance}, where having good definitions, taxonomies, monitoring practices, reporting mechanisms, and incident analysis is essential. We examine existing frameworks related to AI incident governance by regulatory bodies and independent efforts, and find that while there are frameworks that describe how individual functions can be performed, there is a lack of consistency within the aspects of definitions, classification, monitoring, and reporting. These inconsistencies apply to the types of incident data that is collected and reported, the ways in which they are categorised, and as a result, the depth, representativeness, and accuracy of analysis that can be performed.
CAGE-1: Control, Assurance, and Governance Evaluation for Enterprise Agentic AI
Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from experimentation into operational workflows. Early programs focused on model access and retrieval-augmented generation, but enterprises are now beginning to deploy agents that plan, retrieve, remember, call tools, update systems, and coordinate work across applications. This changes the evaluation problem. Leaders are no longer asking only whether an answer is accurate or fluent. They need to know who authorized an action, which policy applied, whether evidence was current, whether memory was valid, whether a tool call was permitted, whether the decision can be replayed, and whether the agent can be stopped before it creates business impact. This paper introduces CAGE-1: Control, Assurance, and Governance Evaluation for Enterprise Agentic AI. CAGE-1 is an evaluation framework for deciding whether enterprise agents are ready for deployment. It evaluates authority, policy enforcement, retrieval quality, memory integrity, tool safety, auditability, human oversight, conflict handling, safe failure, Prebind Assurance, operational readiness, and business fitness. CAGE-1 introduces Prebind Assurance to describe the evaluated ability to prove that an agentic action is controlled before it becomes binding, effective, or operationally consequential. The framework tests whether a proposed action is admitted, held, narrowed, refused, escalated, quarantined, or made non-effective before protected consequence forms.
RouterVLA: Turning Smoke Tests into Supervision for Heterogeneous VLA Selection
We study whether pre-deployment evaluation rollouts can be reused to supervise policy selection. Robot teams routinely smoke test candidate vision-language-action (VLA) policies, then compress those trials into a global winner. RouterVLA evaluates this idea with outcome-disjoint cross-fitting: recorded probes build a profile for each frozen expert, and a separate trial scores the selected expert without entering its profile. Across 34,752 LIBERO-Plus rollout records, a transparent probe-success rule raises held-out success from 0.4686 to 0.6149, a +14.64pp gain. Under the scalar-only profiles studied here, learned scorers are statistically indistinguishable from this rule, showing that commissioning carries the routing value while extra scalar scorer capacity does not create it. Reusing the scored trial inflates the measured gain by , so credible ledger routing needs outcome separation; model scaling improves individual policies, while commissioning-aware routing improves the system built from them.
When EER Hides Deployment Failure: Auditing Threshold Transfer and Unlabeled Score Calibration for Speech Deepfake Detectors
Speech deepfake countermeasures (CMs) are compared almost exclusively by equal error rate (EER), a metric computed at an oracle threshold chosen on the labeled test set. Deployed CMs enjoy no such oracle: a threshold must be fixed in advance and applied to unlabeled target data. We audit this gap with a frozen state-of-the-art SSL-AASIST detector trained on ASVspoof 2019 LA. While its in-domain EER is 0.21%, transferring its LA-calibrated threshold to the In-the-Wild corpus yields a half total error rate (HTER) of 39.5%, with 78.7% of bona fide speech rejected, even though the In-the-Wild EER (11.2%) appears moderate. We then test whether popular unlabeled test-time corrections close this gap, and first prove a simple proposition: any strictly increasing score transform, including z-norm, temperature/shift calibration, and embedding mean alignment under a frozen linear head, cannot change EER. An audit of seven corrections on In-the-Wild and ASVspoof 2021 DF confirms the proposition empirically and exposes two further failure modes: AS-norm with an unlabeled target cohort collapses (EER 11.2% to 60.2%), and pseudo-label calibration that reduces HTER by 38% relative on In-the-Wild degenerates to 50% HTER on DF21, whose spoof prior is 96%. No audited correction reduces EER by more than 1% relative. We recommend reporting HTER at a transferred threshold alongside EER.
Frozen Foundation-Model Embeddings Discard Small-Lesion Signal in Chest Radiography: Implications for Pre-Deployment Evaluation
Frozen vision-transformer (ViT) foundation-model embeddings increasingly serve as the substrate for downstream chest-radiography (CXR) pipelines, yet where small-scale, low-contrast signal is retained or lost in the frozen forward pass has not been systematically quantified across architectures, pretraining domains, and objectives. We probed five frozen ViTs (RAD-DINO, DINOv2-B/14, DINOv3 ViT-7B, BiomedCLIP, MedSigLIP) and a frozen DINO-pretrained ResNet-50 architectural control across three large CXR cohorts (NIH-CXR14, MIMIC-CXR, Emory-CXR; aggregate pool n=492,724) and ChestX-Det10 (n=3,543; 1,462 small-lesion bounding boxes across Calcification, Nodule, Mass). Each model was evaluated with a small-scale-perturbation panel and a region-aware bounding-box-stratified probe on real lesions, comparing three pooling modes from the same forward pass: classification token (CLS), patch-mean (mean over all final-layer patch tokens), and bounding-box-restricted patch-local. On the perturbation panel, CLS embeddings sat at the chance floor (area under the ROC curve [AUC] 0.500-0.524); patch-mean was indistinguishable from CLS on iso-blur and reticular-fine cells but rose with CLS on larger directional-blur footprints, while disease AUC on globally decided tasks ranged 0.642-0.913. Patch-local probes recovered AUC ~1.0 from the same forward pass (per-model mean improvement +0.412 to +0.488); the ResNet-50 control reproduced the chance floor. On ChestX-Det10, image-level CLS classification showed within-class small-versus-large stratum gaps up to +0.243 AUC; bounding-box-level patch-local pooling on the same forward pass recovered AUC >= 0.899 on every (model x class) cell. Frozen ViT embeddings silently suppress small-scale signal at the global-aggregation step; the signal is recoverable from patch tokens conditional on a region of interest.
Toward Pre-Deployment Assurance for Enterprise AI Agents: Ontology-Grounded Simulation and Trust Certification
Pre-deployment verification of enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) agents remains a critical gap between large language model (LLM) capability benchmarking and production deployment. Post-deployment monitoring, human-in-the-loop controls, and prompt-level guardrails offer limited assurance once an agent is operating in production. We present an ontology-grounded verification framework -- to our knowledge the first to combine three components: an Agent Operational Envelope formalizing the certification space across permissions, domain constraints, safety properties, governance rules, and autonomy levels; an ontology-to-scenario generation pipeline that derives regulatory, operational, and adversarial test scenarios automatically; and a machine-verifiable Trust Certificate with graduated deployment verdicts. A controlled pilot across four regulated industries (Fintech, Banking, Insurance, Healthcare), instantiated as five industry-by-regulatory-regime cells across the United States and Vietnam (where Vietnam's 2025 AI Law makes such verification legally mandated for financial services), generated 1,800 scenarios evaluated against 125 primary-source regulatory requirements and 25 injected faults. Ontology-grounded generation significantly outperformed the dominant persona-based baseline on regulatory coverage (48.3% versus 33.1%; corrected p_c = .0006) and attained the highest domain specificity (4.77/5.0; p = 2e-6); transparently, its advantage over plain and retrieval-augmented prompting did not survive Bonferroni correction. Cross-validation across three LLM families (Claude Sonnet 4, Qwen 2.5 72B, Gemma 4 26B; 5,400 total scenarios) replicated the persona-versus-ontology pattern. The framework offers a reproducible, regulation-grounded route to pre-deployment assurance for enterprise AI agents, complementing runtime governance with an auditable deployment gate.
Silent Failures in Federated Personalization of Foundation Models
Foundation models are increasingly personalized on decentralized private data through federated learning and are now deployed at scale under growing regulatory requirements for post-market monitoring. We argue that this convergence creates a distinct and under-recognized class of trustworthiness failures, which we term "Silent Failures." These include amplified bias, fairness collapse, and alignment erosion that may remain difficult to detect because federated learning's privacy constraints limit visibility into model behavior. A landscape analysis of existing benchmarks reveals a structural divide. Federated benchmarks evaluate system performance but provide limited insight into model behavior, whereas centralized trustworthiness benchmarks assess behavior but require model access incompatible with federated privacy. We introduce a taxonomy of six silent failure modes arising from the interaction of foundation model personalization, dataset shift, and core federated constraints. Our analysis shows that privacy-preserving training alone is insufficient for trustworthy deployment. We conclude with a research agenda for privacy-preserving behavioral evaluation and propose that silent failures become a standard diagnostic category for trustworthy federated artificial intelligence.
Operational AI Deployment Assurance: Governance-State Orchestration Under Threshold-Sensitive Deployment Conditions -- A Governance Framework for High-Stakes AI Systems
AI governance frameworks increasingly emphasize fairness, transparency, accountability, and lifecycle risk management in high-stakes domains. However, many current approaches remain observational, relying on static metric reporting, post-hoc auditing, and monitoring dashboards without directly governing deployment readiness, remediation progression, escalation states, or assurance-driven deployment control. This paper introduces Operational AI Deployment Assurance (OADA), a governance framework for translating fairness disagreement, subgroup instability, threshold sensitivity, remediation outcomes, and operational uncertainty into deployment-oriented assurance decisions. Building on prior work on the Fairness Disagreement Index (FDI) and FairRisk-FDI, OADA reframes governance uncertainty as an operational concern within AI deployment pipelines rather than a byproduct of metric disagreement. The framework introduces Deployment Assurance Scores, Deployment Readiness Classifications, Threshold Stability Zones, Governance Escalation States, and remediation-aware assurance progression. These constructs support lifecycle-oriented governance decisions across high-stakes settings by connecting evaluation outputs to deployment-state interpretation, reassessment, escalation, and operational control. Through deployment-oriented evaluation across facial recognition systems, with discussion extended to healthcare AI as a representative high-stakes domain, the paper demonstrates how systems may appear acceptable under isolated fairness or performance metrics while still exhibiting instability that affects deployment readiness. The proposed framework positions operational deployment assurance as a governance layer between evaluation and real-world AI deployment.
Deployment-complete benchmarking
Benchmarks increasingly guide deployment, procurement and scientific screening, yet a score supports only the response it records, not necessarily the deployment action. We introduce deployment-complete benchmarking, which tests whether benchmark evidence determines a deployment action. A benchmark is complete for a claim exactly when the action is constant on each evidence fiber; mixed fibers expose missing deployment information, and completion curves quantify the evidence required to resolve ambiguity. In controlled response spaces, benchmark-channel conformal coverage of 94.98% transferred poorly to an unmeasured deployment channel (10.07%), whereas response-rank intervals achieved 94.91% coverage; even zero benchmark error certified only 45.4% of candidates at the largest residual size. Public audits revealed incompleteness, including 97.9% mixed Tox21 fibers and zero median certifiable fraction in main Matbench and JARVIS audits. In held-out replays, certify-then-acquire reduced false decisions from 1.19% to 0.027% in Tox21 and from 20.3% to 0.128% in JARVIS, while changing model choice and identifying deployment-relevant probes. Deployment-ready benchmarks should report evidence, supported actions, ambiguity and completion cost rather than scores alone.
Healthcare LLM Benchmarks Are Only as Good as Their Explicit Assumptions
Benchmarks are necessary for healthcare evaluation, but are not sufficient for predicting deployment performance. Our position is that the evaluation--deployment gap arises not because of poorly designed benchmarks, but from implicit assumptions about how users interact with models that cannot be surfaced from benchmarks alone. To make this precise, we propose a classification of assumptions into two categories: task, which can be tested from conversation data alone, and outcome, which requires outcome data and behavioral studies for testing. Critically, outcome assumptions depend on human behavior, something that even well-designed benchmarks cannot directly observe. To demonstrate the operationality of this framework, we retrospectively analyze a healthcare RCT as a case study and find that the gap naturally separates into task and outcome gaps of roughly equal size. To address this, we make two contributions: first, we propose BenchmarkCards, an artifact that documents assumptions, and second, we propose staged evaluation, a procedure that systematically tests assumptions and evaluates performance.
A Deployment Audit of Release-Side Risk in Conformal Triage under Prevalence Shift
Conformal triage converts predictive scores into deployment actions that either release a case, flag it for urgent attention, or defer it to human review. Under prevalence shift, however, the usual summaries of marginal coverage and human-review rate can miss the safety-critical question of whether patients who truly experience the target event are released without review. To address this gap, we introduce a leakage-aware deployment audit for release-side conformal triage. It first assigns target subjects to three non-overlapping roles: prevalence correction, conformal calibration, and held-out release-safety evaluation. This separation then lets the audit evaluate release directly: how many event-positive patients are cleared without review, whether the pilot has enough event labels for calibration, and how the safety-review trade-off shifts. Applying this audit to a retrospective NSCLC pilot shows why lower review can be misleading: after prevalence correction, the pooled conformal branch lowers review by releasing more patients, some of whom are event-positive. Within the audit, the classwise branch acts as a scarcity diagnostic: the pilot has too few event labels to certify safe low-review release.
Training ML Models with Predictable Failures
Estimating how often an ML model will fail at deployment scale is central to pre-deployment safety assessment, but a feasible evaluation set is rarely large enough to observe the failures that matter. Jones et al. (2025) address this by extrapolating from the largest k failure scores in an evaluation set to predict deployment-scale failure rates. We give a finite-k decomposition of this estimator's forecast error and show that it has a built-in bias toward over-prediction in the typical case, which is the safety-favorable direction. This bias is offset when the evaluation set misses a rare high-failure mode that the deployment set contains, leaving the forecast to under-predict at deployment scale. We propose a fine-tuning objective, the forecastability loss, that addresses this failure mode. In two proof-of-concept experiments, a language-model password game and an RL gridworld, fine-tuning substantially reduces held-out forecast error while preserving primary-task capability and achieving safety similar to that of supervised baselines.
RISED: A Pre-Deployment Evaluation Framework for High-Stakes AI Decision-Support Systems, with Application to Healthcare
Clinical decision-support systems are expert systems whose recommendations clinicians act on directly, yet they are usually cleared on one aggregate accuracy number from a held-out test set. That number says nothing about input reliability under encoding shifts, subgroup gaps, threshold sensitivity, or operational feasibility. We present RISED, a pre-deployment evaluation framework operationalising five dimensions (Reliability, Inclusivity, Sensitivity, Equity, Deployability) through BCa bootstrap 95% confidence intervals, literature-grounded thresholds, and Holm-Bonferroni-corrected PASS / FAIL / INCONCLUSIVE verdicts; Equity is a proxy-dependence diagnostic rather than a gating test. Applied to seven cohorts spanning 35 years (n from 303 to 99,492), RISED surfaces failures invisible to AUROC: on Diabetes 130, Reliability passes by three orders of magnitude (PSS = 0.0004) while Inclusivity (AUC parity gap = 0.262) and Sensitivity (max threshold-flip rate 49.1%) fail decisively; both NHIS cohorts reproduce this. NHANES 2021-2023, with a complete feature profile, achieves INCONCLUSIVE verdicts; BRFSS 2024 produces the suite's most severe Sensitivity failure (max threshold-flip rate 64.2%) after instrument rotation removed hypertension and cholesterol. The pattern recurs on credit- and income-prediction cohorts, confirming domain-agnosticity; a multi-model check shows the failures are data-driven, not model-specific. RISED ships as an open-source Python package complementing TRIPOD+AI, FUTURE-AI, and Fairlearn with the structured numerical evidence those standards require but do not prescribe.
Measuring Evaluation-Context Divergence in Open-Weight LLMs: A Paired-Prompt Protocol with Pilot Evidence of Alignment-Pipeline-Specific Heterogeneity
Safety benchmarks are routinely treated as evidence about how a language model will behave once deployed, but this inference is fragile if behavior depends on whether a prompt looks like an evaluation. We define evaluation-context divergence as an observable within-item change in behavior induced by framing a fixed task as an evaluation, a live deployment interaction, or a neutral request, and present a paired-prompt protocol that measures it in open-weight LLMs while controlling for paraphrase variation, benchmark familiarity, and judge framing-sensitivity. Across five instruction-tuned checkpoints from four open-weight families plus a matched OLMo-3 base/instruct ablation ( paired items, generations per checkpoint), we find striking heterogeneity. OLMo-3-Instruct alone is eval-cautious -- evaluation framing raises refusal vs. neutral by pp () and reduces harmful compliance vs. deployment by pp (, items inverted) -- while Mistral-Small-3.2, Phi-3.5-mini, and Llama-3.1-8B are deployment-cautious}, with marginal eval-vs-deployment refusal effects of to pp. The matched OLMo-3 base also exhibits the deployment-cautious pattern, identifying alignment as the inversion stage; within Llama-3.1, the B model preserves direction with attenuated magnitude, ruling out a simple ``small-model effect that reverses at scale.'' One caveat: the cross-family heterogeneity is judge-dependent. Re-judging with a different-family safety classifier (Llama-Guard-3-8B) preserves the within-OLMo eval-cautious direction but flattens the cross-family contrast, indicating that the two judges operationalize distinct constructs.
Code World Model Preparedness Report
This report documents the preparedness assessment of Code World Model (CWM), a model for code generation and reasoning about code from Meta. We conducted pre-release testing across domains identified in our Frontier AI Framework as potentially presenting catastrophic risks, and also evaluated the model's misaligned propensities. Our assessment found that CWM does not pose additional frontier risks beyond those present in the current AI ecosystem. We therefore release it as an open-weight model.
Risk Reporting for Developers' Internal AI Model Use
Frontier AI companies first deploy their most advanced models internally, for weeks or months of safety testing, evaluation, and iteration, before a possible public release. For example, Anthropic recently developed a new class of model with advanced cyberoffense-relevant capabilities, Mythos Preview, which was available internally for at least six weeks before it was publicly announced. This internal use creates risks that external deployment frameworks may fail to address. Legal frameworks, notably California's Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (SB 53), New York's Responsible AI Safety And Education (RAISE) Act, and the EU's General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, all discuss risks from internal AI use. They require frontier developers to make and implement plans for how to manage risks from internal use, and to produce internal use risk reports describing their safeguards and any residual risks. This guide provides a harmonized standard for companies to produce internal use risk reports suitable for all three regulatory frameworks. It is addressed primarily to evaluation and safety teams at frontier AI developers, and secondarily to regulators and auditors seeking to understand what good reporting looks like. Given the pace of AI R&D automation and the limited external visibility into how companies use their most capable models internally, regular and detailed risk reporting may be one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that the risks from internal AI use are identified and managed before they materialize. Whenever a substantially more capable or riskier model is deployed internally, the developer should create a risk report and argue why the model is safe to deploy. We structure the reporting framework around two threat vectors -- autonomous AI misbehavior and insider threats -- and three risk factors for each: means, motive, and opportunity.
Bridging the Training-Deployment Gap: Gated Encoding and Multi-Scale Refinement for Efficient Quantization-Aware Image Enhancement
Image enhancement models for mobile devices often struggle to balance high output quality with the fast processing speeds required by mobile hardware. While recent deep learning models can enhance low-quality mobile photos into high-quality images, their performance is often degraded when converted to lower-precision formats for actual use on mobile phones. To address this training-deployment mismatch, we propose an efficient image enhancement model designed specifically for mobile deployment. Our approach uses a hierarchical network architecture with gated encoder blocks and multiscale refinement to preserve fine-grained visual features. Moreover, we incorporate Quantization-Aware Training (QAT) to simulate the effects of low-precision representation during the training process. This allows the network to adapt and prevents the typical drop in quality seen with standard post-training quantization (PTQ). Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method produces high-fidelity visual output while maintaining the low computational overhead needed for practical use on standard mobile devices. The code will be available at https://github.com/GenAI4E/QATIE.git.
Mythos and the Unverified Cage: Z3-Based Pre-Deployment Verification for Frontier-Model Sandbox Infrastructure
The April 2026 Claude Mythos sandbox escape exposed a critical weakness in frontier AI containment: the infrastructure surrounding advanced models remains susceptible to formally characterizable arithmetic vulnerabilities. Anthropic has not publicly characterized the escape vector; some secondary accounts hypothesize a CWE-190 arithmetic vulnerability in sandbox networking code. We treat this as unverified and analyze the vulnerability class rather than the specific escape. This paper presents COBALT, a Z3 SMT-based formal verification engine for identifying CWE-190/191/195 arithmetic vulnerability patterns in C/C++ infrastructure prior to deployment. We distinguish two classes of contribution. Validated: COBALT detects arithmetic vulnerability patterns in production codebases, producing SAT verdicts with concrete witnesses and UNSAT guarantees under explicit safety bounds. We demonstrate this on four production case studies: NASA cFE, wolfSSL, Eclipse Mosquitto, and NASA F Prime, with reproducible encodings, verified solver output, and acknowledged security outcomes. Proposed: a four-layer containment framework consisting of COBALT, VERDICT, DIRECTIVE-4, and SENTINEL, mapping pre-deployment verification, pre-execution constraints, output control, and runtime monitoring to the failure modes exposed by the Mythos incident. Under explicit assumptions, we further argue that the publicly reported Mythos escape class is consistent with a Z3-expressible CWE-190 arithmetic formulation and that pre-deployment formal analysis would have been capable of surfacing the relevant pattern. The broader claim is infrastructural: frontier-model safety cannot depend on behavioral safeguards alone; the containment stack itself must be subjected to formal verification.
The Geometric Canary: Predicting Steerability and Detecting Drift via Representational Stability
Reliable deployment of language models requires two capabilities that appear distinct but share a common geometric foundation: predicting whether a model will accept targeted behavioral control, and detecting when its internal structure degrades. We show that geometric stability, the consistency of a representation's pairwise distance structure, addresses both. Supervised Shesha variants that measure task-aligned geometric stability predict linear steerability with near-perfect accuracy (-) across 35-69 embedding models and three NLP tasks, capturing unique variance beyond class separability (partial -). A critical dissociation emerges: unsupervised stability fails entirely for steering on real-world tasks (), revealing that task alignment is essential for controllability prediction. However, unsupervised stability excels at drift detection, measuring nearly greater geometric change than CKA during post-training alignment (up to in Llama) while providing earlier warning in 73% of models and maintaining a lower false alarm rate than Procrustes. Together, supervised and unsupervised stability form complementary diagnostics for the LLM deployment lifecycle: one for pre-deployment controllability assessment, the other for post-deployment monitoring.