Runtime Verification

Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) can learn to predict Signal Temporal Logic (STL) verdicts online from partial trajectories, but deploying them as runtime monitors in safety-critical systems demands more than predictive accuracy. Standard RNN architectures offer no structural guarantee that outputs degrade gracefully under sensor degradation; a dropped input can silently flip a verdict from safe to unsafe. We introduce the Recurrent Differentiable Ternary Logic Gate Network (R-DTLGN), a recurrent architecture that operates over Kleene's three-valued logic $\{-1, 0, +1\}$, where $0$ explicitly represents unknown. The R-DTLGN trains through continuous polynomial surrogates and hardens to a discrete ternary logic circuit at inference. We analyze the hardened circuit through two gate vocabularies derived from two orderings on the ternary domain: numerically monotone gates ensure stable recurrent dynamics, while information-monotone gates, when present, guarantee principled abstention (unknown inputs never produce wrong outputs) and monotonicity in input certainty (more information can only improve the verdict). We show that the recurrent connections required by bounded STL operators use exclusively AND and OR, which belong to both vocabularies, linking the monitoring task to the architecture's guarantees. A realizability bound derived from the STL formula's temporal operators directly sizes the network's hidden state, replacing hyperparameter search with a formula-driven specification. We evaluate on STL specifications over D4RL PointMaze navigation data, testing prediction accuracy, degradation under predicate dropout, and the accuracy-versus-safety tradeoff between two label construction pipelines. The R-DTLGN is, to our knowledge, the first recurrent architecture that couples learned temporal prediction with formal degradation guarantees rooted in three-valued logic.

While large vision-language-action (VLA) models and generative world models (WM) have advanced long-horizon embodied intelligence, their practical deployment remains challenged by uncertainty in learning-based action generation. Low-quality actions may cause physical failures during execution or lead to misleading world-model rollouts with redundant rendering costs. To address this issue, we propose Pre-VLA, a unified runtime verification architecture that performs preemptive action validity assessment before physical execution or world-model imagination. Pre-VLA leverages an efficient multimodal backbone with modality-aware pooling and a lightweight dual-branch head to predict both safety confidence and critic-derived advantage scores for candidate action chunks. To handle severe class imbalance and unstable boundary decisions, we train Pre-VLA with a multi-task objective combining Focal classification, advantage regression, and soft-threshold calibration. During deployment, a dual-mode preemptive resampling scheduler filters low-quality actions and triggers adaptive resampling under a limited computation budget. Experiments on the LIBERO benchmark show that Pre-VLA improves the average closed-loop success rate across four suites from 30.79% to 37.62% over RynnVLA-002, reduces task execution steps, achieves 183.9 ms average forward verification time per action chunk, and mitigates error accumulation in world-model rollouts.

Distributed LLM agent workflows should not be monitored as if they produced a single sequential log. In an asynchronous execution, a decision can only depend on events that are causally visible to the lifeline that makes it: an event that appears earlier in some log may still be unknown locally. We extend the ZipperGen agent-workflow framework with Causal Past Logic (CPL), a small past-time temporal logic for guards in conditionals and while loops. In addition to standard past-time modalities such as previous and since, a guard can inspect the latest causally visible event of another lifeline and selected variables stored there. The formula is a source-level guard: it is evaluated online by the owner lifeline and can influence control flow at runtime. We give a vector-clock monitor with latest-value views and prove that the locally computed monitor value coincides with the denotational semantics of the guard at the current event. Thus runtime verification becomes part of the coordination language itself, rather than a post-hoc check over an execution log.

Multimodal agents increasingly choose tool calls from screenshots, documents, and webpages, where a false perceptual claim can turn hallucination from an answer-quality error into an authorization failure. We formalize this failure mode as hallucination-to-action conversion: an unsupported claim supplies the precondition for a privileged action. We propose evidence-carrying multimodal agents (ECA), which treat free-form model text as inadmissible evidence, decompose each tool call into action-critical predicates, obtain typed certificates from constrained DOM/OCR/AX verifiers, and use a deterministic gate to authorize only the privileges those certificates support. Rather than hiding perception error, ECA converts opaque model belief into auditable residuals at the verifier, schema, and implementation levels. Verifier red-teaming across 17 canonical attack categories shows that four targeted hardening steps are each necessary; after hardening, canonical gate bypass is 0/1,700 (Wilson 95% upper bound 0.22%). With content-derived certificates, ECA observes zero unsafe executions on 200 end-to-end tasks (Wilson 95% upper bound 2.67%) and 120 browser tasks (upper bound 4.3%). A HACR audit on 500 stratified task keys shows that unsupported action-critical claims reach unsafe execution for naive agents (100.0%) and prompt-only defenses (49.6%), but not for ECA. Oracle-certificate replay over 7,488 GPT-5.4 traces isolates gate correctness, while neural judge baselines still admit most unsafe actions under the same threat model. The resulting principle is simple: model language may propose tool use, but certified predicates must authorize it.

As multi-agent systems move from short interactions to tool-using workflows with specialized roles and persistent state, completion becomes a runtime-control problem rather than a purely generative one. This preprint studies verify-gated completion as an admission-control pattern for governed multi-agent runtimes: agents may propose completion, but a read-only verifier decides whether the claim is admitted. Ambiguous or weakly evidenced cases resolve fail-closed, while packetized state and event traces preserve an audit path. We examine one bounded reference implementation and ask what the released evidence can support about auditable, verify-gated completion. In the released verify-completed slice, the known-outcome invoked-event verify success share was 1,791/1,800 = 99.5%. This is an accounting measure over invoked verification events, not a task-completion, production-reliability, or benchmark-success rate. Task-level verify coverage is not computable; 1,762/1,801 rows came from one high-volume reporting cluster; and only 17 events were production-classified. A shadow Policy/Governance Verifier evaluation showed 1,526/1,548 = 98.58% rule agreement, 0/1,526 false-success among safe-to-proceed predictions, and blocked precision of 2/518 = 0.39%, so it remains advisory. The evidence supports a narrow conclusion: under observed conditions, a read-only verify gate plus packetized admission records made completion decisions inspectable and fail-closed. Claims about deployed operation, safety guarantees, outcome gains, task-level coverage, recovery effectiveness, or external validity remain outside scope.

We examine one particular dimension of AI governance: how to monitor and audit AI-enabled products and services throughout the AI development lifecycle, from pre-deployment testing to post-deployment auditing. Combining principles from formal methods with SoTA machine learning, we propose techniques that enable AI-enabled product and service developers, as well as third party AI developers and evaluators, to perform offline auditing and online (runtime) monitoring of product-specific (temporally extended) behavioral constraints such as safety constraints, norms, rules and regulations with respect to black-box advanced AI systems, notably LLMs. We further provide practical techniques for predictive monitoring, such as sampling-based methods, and we introduce intervening monitors that act at runtime to preempt and potentially mitigate predicted violations. Experimental results show that by exploiting the formal syntax and semantics of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), our proposed auditing and monitoring techniques are superior to LLM baseline methods in detecting violations of temporally extended behavioral constraints; with our approach, even small-model labelers match or exceed frontier LLM judges. Our predictive and intervening monitors significantly reduce the violation rates of LLM-based agents while largely preserving task performance. We further show through controlled experiments that LLMs' temporal reasoning shows a pronounced degradation in accuracy with increasing event distance, number of constraints, and number of propositions.

Dynamic systems in AI are often complex and heterogeneous, so that an internal specification is not accessible and verification techniques such as model checking are not applicable. Monitoring is in such cases an attractive alternative, as it evaluates desirable properties along traces generated by an unknown dynamic system. In this work, we consider anticipatory monitoring of linear-time properties enriched with an arbitrary SMT theory over finite traces (LTLfMT). Anticipatory monitoring in this setting is highly challenging, as the monitoring state depends on both the trace prefix seen so far and all its possible finite continuations. Under reasonable assumptions on the background theory, we present and formally prove the correctness of a novel foundational framework for monitoring properties in an expressive fragment of LTLfMT. The framework combines automata-theoretic methods to handle the temporal aspects of the logic, with automated reasoning techniques to address the first-order dimension. Moreover, we identify for the first time decidable fragments of this monitoring problem that are practically relevant as they combine linear arithmetic with uninterpreted functions, which covers e.g. data-aware business processes and dynamic systems operating over a read-only database. Feasibility is witnessed by a prototype implementation and preliminary evaluation.

In a long conversation, an LLM may produce a fluent continuation that rests on premises the conversation has already abandoned. Context-manipulation attacks exploit precisely this weakness. We address this problem with a runtime verifier. An LLM Interpreter maps each utterance to one or more of eight epistemic operations, and then a symbolic engine applies these operations to a dependency map that records what every claim rests on and whether it still stands. Based on the dependency map, checking whether a continuation is grounded then reduces to a walk over the map, linear in its size and requiring no LLM call. Retraction propagates through the same map with a conflict-free guarantee and flags exactly the conclusions that lose support. Our experiments with five QA models demonstrate substantial improvements in QA accuracy at a low cost per query. On ReviseQA for belief revision and MemoryAgentBench's FactConsolidation split (MemAB-FC), the verifier outperforms a retrieval baseline and raises MemAB-FC single-hop accuracy from $0.46$--$0.95$ to $0.94$--$0.98$. With the verifier, even the small 7B model overtakes unaided GPT-4o. When a GPT-4o Interpreter extracts every update from raw text rather than taking the benchmarks' structured updates, the verifier still outperforms the retrieval baseline. Moreover, on MemAB-FC, QA prompts remain compact at $97$--$174$ tokens while the full-context baseline reaches $114.5$K. Retraction queries take less than a microsecond at $2000$ turns.

We present TraceFix, a verification-first pipeline for Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent coordination. An agent synthesizes a protocol topology as a structured intermediate representation (IR) from a task description, generates PlusCal coordination logic, and iteratively repairs the protocol using counterexamples from the TLA+ model checker (TLC) until verification succeeds. Verified process bodies are compiled into per-agent system prompts and executed under a runtime monitor that rejects out-of-topology coordination operations. On 48 tasks spanning 16 scenario families, all tasks reach full TLC verification; 62.5% pass on the first attempt and none requires more than four repair iterations. State spaces span six orders of magnitude yet verification completes in under 60 s for every task. A 3,456-run runtime comparison shows that topology-monitored execution achieves the highest task completion (89.4% average, 81.5% full) and that runtimes using the verified protocol degrade at roughly half the rate of prompt-only and chat-only baselines when model capability is reduced. A paired ablation under a fixed runtime shows that TLC-verified protocols cut deadlock/livelock (DL/LL) from 31.1% to 14.1%, with the largest separation under fault injection.

This paper studies runtime monitoring for persistent surveillance by autonomous robots when the autonomy stack is a black box. The environment is partitioned into finitely many parts, each carrying an uncertainty state that decreases when observed and increases otherwise. We model the closed loop as a state-dependent hybrid system with linear parameter varying dynamics and design a monitor based on an invariant computed offline. As this invariant is typically hard to obtain for large to-be-surveyed spaces, we propose a compositional monitor obtained by decentralized computation of low-dimensional invariant sets for each uncertainty region, and checking their conjunction online. Under common independence assumptions, the compositional monitor is sound and complete with respect to the full-system invariant. The approach is applied in a case study with a real robot persistently monitoring a labyrinth, emphasizing its applicability in practice.

We present a certified purity architecture that converts governance enforcement in cognitive workflow systems from a runtime convention into a structural capability boundary. A prior three-layer governance architecture proves governance completeness, provenance completeness, and the impossibility of ungoverned effects, conditional on the pure module constraint: that step executors cannot perform effects. That constraint was enforced by module import graph analysis, which is insufficient against adversarial bypass on the BEAM virtual machine. This paper closes the gap through four mechanisms: (1) a restricted WebAssembly compilation target where effect-producing instructions are structurally absent; (2) purity certificates, cryptographically signed proofs binding executor binaries to their import classifications; (3) a runtime verification gate that rejects uncertified executors before they enter the governance pipeline; and (4) portable governance credentials via remote attestation for cross-organizational verification. We prove four theorems: structural purity by construction, bypass elimination for all five BEAM bypass classes, certificate integrity, and gate completeness. The guarantee holds relative to an explicit Trusted Computing Base. Evaluation on four implemented executors shows verification latency of 39--42 us, full plan cycle under 400 us, runtime overhead under 0.4% of a 100 ms HTTP request, and zero determinism divergences across repeated invocations.

The advancement of automated vehicles introduces complex safety challenges, particularly in dynamic and unpredictable environments where AI-enabled perception systems must operate reliably. Ensuring compliance with safety standards such as ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF) is essential for addressing system malfunctions and mitigating unsafe behavior in unknown scenarios. However, as automation levels increase, vehicles must go beyond conventional functional safety by incorporating fail-operational capabilities that enable continued safe operation during system or component failures and the handling of unfamiliar or degraded operational conditions. To address these safety concerns, we propose the Connected Dependability Cage, an architectural framework designed to enable hierarchical fail-operational behavior in AI-enabled perception systems. This framework integrates two complementary monitoring mechanisms: a Function Monitor that oversees multiple heterogeneous AI-based perception pipelines and detects inconsistencies through a voting mechanism, and an Anomaly Monitor that evaluates the reliability of AI perception by detecting unknown or novel objects in scenes that may be excluded from the training dataset. In the presence of critical discrepancies, the system supports graceful degradation, ultimately enabling a transition to a minimal-risk maneuver strategy. Furthermore, whenever either monitor raises a safety flag, an automated data recording process is initiated to facilitate iterative system development and continuous improvement. Both monitors have been implemented and validated through extensive vehicle testing, demonstrating their practical effectiveness in real-world applications.

Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise. When an AI agent queries regulated data, invokes effectful tools, and mutates persistent state, correctness is not captured by whether a terminal output looks plausible. The operative questions are whether each step was authorized under a contract, whether the recorded history is tamper-evident, and whether the trajectory can be reconstructed deterministically. We formalize this as runtime proof of execution. An execution is a triple $x = (C, T, R)$: a contract $C$, an Execution Causal Event Stream (ECES) $T$, and a replay context $R$. A well-formedness predicate and five validator-checkable invariants form the PoE validity predicate. Five semantic guarantees describe authorization, path compliance, null effect on deny, history integrity, and replayability. We prove soundness under explicit cryptographic and deployment assumptions: any PPT adversary that produces a PoE-valid execution violating a semantic guarantee yields a signature forgery, a hash collision, or a quantified deployment-failure event. The Prime Execution Model (PEM) separates planning, enforcement, effect, and recordkeeping into distinct authority planes; a lemma reduces trace completeness to Effector-exclusive credentialing. An Execution Attestation Certificate is issued only when PoE = 1. In a single-node TypeScript prototype, PoE adds approximately 2.7 ms on a minimal flow and 4.4% overhead on concurrent batch workloads; a standard eight-event trace compresses to approximately 1.1 KB; injected Gateway-bypass and trace-mutation attacks are rejected. PoE does not replace consensus, TEEs, or zkVMs; it binds authorization, effect, history, and replay into a single runtime-checkable object so that governed execution becomes attestable under contract.

Autonomous agent systems fail not only due to incorrect decisions, but due to executing decisions whose authority no longer holds at runtime. Prior work defined Reconstructive Authority (RAM) as a condition for valid execution: actions are permitted only if authority can be constructed from current state. This paper addresses enforcement at runtime: how to enforce this condition in a running system. We introduce a runtime execution model in which authority is evaluated at action time and execution is conditioned on its constructibility. This extends the execution state space beyond admit/deny with a third state, halt, representing cases where authority is undefined due to incomplete or uncertain observability. We define a concrete execution protocol including dynamic dependency resolution, authority reconstruction, and explicit decision semantics. We further introduce a Recovery Loop that integrates drift detection (IML) with execution control (ACP), allowing the system to suspend execution, acquire missing information, and re-attempt authority reconstruction. We show that this model guarantees safety -- no action is executed without constructible authority -- and conditional liveness: execution resumes when authority-defining variables become observable. This work operationalizes reconstructive authority as a runtime enforcement mechanism, providing the execution semantics required to apply RAM in real systems.

Autonomous systems increasingly operate under partial observability where execution-relevant state is never fully accessible. Existing governance mechanisms -- trusted execution environments, oracle-signed state proofs, cryptographic attestation -- enforce the integrity of computation and state projections. We show this is structurally insufficient: an authenticated projection of state is necessary but never sufficient for execution validity. We introduce the Reconstructive Authority Model (RAM), which separates integrity from coverage. RAM defines a reconstruction gate that reasons over an explicit coverage envelope -- comprising proven state, declared assumptions, and an acknowledged unobservable residual -- and permits execution only when coverage is adequate for the action class. When coverage is insufficient, RAM narrows privileges dynamically or fails closed. Attestation proves trust in measurement; RAM proves adequacy of what is measured. We formalize RAM, prove necessity via two theorems (attestation insufficiency and RAM necessity) and three corollaries, and present a hybrid RAM+Attestation architecture with privilege-narrowing. Synthetic experiments (N=100,000, seed=42) show RAM achieves zero invalid execution rates at all coverage levels. Attestation-based systems exhibit IER=0.423 at low coverage and IER=0.233 even at full coverage, the latter arising from undefined-state handling failures undetectable by integrity checks alone. This reframes execution validity as a coverage reconstruction problem, distinct from and complementary to integrity guarantees provided by attestation.

GUI agents that control desktop computers via screenshot-and-click loops introduce a new class of vulnerability: the observation-to-action gap (mean 6.51 s on real OSWorld workloads) creates a Time-Of-Check, Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) window during which an unprivileged attacker can manipulate the UI state. We formalize this as a Visual Atomicity Violation and characterize three concrete attack primitives: (A) Notification Overlay Hijack, (B) Window Focus Manipulation, and (C) Web DOM Injection. Primitive B, the closest desktop analog to Android Action Rebinding, achieves 100% action-redirection success rate with zero visual evidence at the observation time. We propose Pre-execution UI State Verification (PUSV), a lightweight three-layer defense that re-verifies the UI state immediately before each action dispatch: masked pixel SSIM at the click target (L1), global screenshot diff (L2a), and X Window snapshot diff (L2b). PUSV achieves 100% Action Interception Rate across 180 adversarial trials (135 Primitive A + 45 Primitive B) with zero false positives and < 0.1 s overhead. Against Primitive C (zero-visual-footprint DOM injection), PUSV reveals a structural blind spot (~0% AIR), motivating future OS+DOM defense-in-depth architectures. No single PUSV layer alone achieves full coverage; different primitives require different detection signals, validating the layered design.

Vibe coding inherently assumes iterative refinement of LLM-generated code through feedback loops. While effective for conventional software tasks, its reliability in runtime-adaptive systems is unclear -- especially when generated code is not manually inspected. This paper studies feedback-based automated verification of LLM-generated adaptation managers in Collective Adaptive Systems (CAS). We focus on the key challenges of verification in the loop: how to detect failures of generated code at runtime and how to report them precisely enough for an LLM to fix them. We combine the adaptation loop with a vibe-coding feedback loop where correctness is checked against (i) generic architectural constraints and (ii) functional constraints formalized in Functional Constraints Logic (FCL), a novel first-order temporal logic over potentially finite traces. Conducting the Dragon Hunt CAS case study, we show that fine-grained constraint violations provide actionable feedback that typically yields a valid adaptation manager within a few iterations, while simple coarse metric-based feedback often stalls. Our findings suggest that feedback precision is the dominant factor for reliable vibe coding in systems designed by domain experts with no programming skills, thereby obviating the need for human code inspection.