Static Code Analysis

Software clones are fragments of code that are similar or functionally equivalent to each other. They pose significant challenges for maintenance, refactoring, and bug detection. Detecting Type-IV clones, which are semantically equivalent but may differ syntactically, is particularly difficult for traditional token- or syntax-based methods. Recent machine learning approaches rely on contrastive learning, which requires careful negative sampling and can introduce bias. In this paper, we propose LWVIC4Code, a non-contrastive representation learning approach specifically designed for Type-IV clone detection. Building on the Variance-Invariance-Covariance Regularization (VICReg) framework and prior layer-wise VICReg training, LWVIC4Code introduces cross-layer consistency regularization and depth-dependent layer weighting to progressively refine semantic information across transformer layers, producing robust and discriminative code representations. We conduct an empirical study comparing LWVIC4Code against a contrastive learning baseline and zero-shot large language models on Python (Kamino) and multi-language (GPTCloneBench) datasets. Results show that LWVIC4Code achieves competitive or superior performance without negative samples, benefits from layer-wise supervision, and generalizes effectively from Python to other languages, particularly Java and C#. These results demonstrate that non-contrastive, layer-wise representation learning is a promising direction for robust semantic code clone detection.

Advances in large language models (LLMs) fuel the quest for scalable methods to assess the security of generated and security-sensitive software. Static analysis is widely adopted as a scalable, reproducible, and inexpensive security gate, but cannot directly observe runtime exploit behaviour. Vulnerabilities dependent on adversarial inputs, execution context, or exploit chaining may evade static checks while remaining exploitable in practice, yet passing static analysis is often treated as evidence of secure behaviour. This paper introduces the Static-Pass Dynamic-Fail (SPDF) phenomenon and a three-stage agentic pipeline combining static scanning, LLM-driven Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) reasoning, and autonomous exploit verification in isolated Docker containers. We evaluate 1,355 Python samples from SecurityEval, RedCode, and CyberNative datasets. Of the 654 samples producing no findings under the composite Bandit-Semgrep gate, the LLM detection stage identified 394 candidate vulnerabilities across 235 files. Dynamic verification confirmed or partially confirmed exploitability in 95 files, yielding an inclusive pipeline rate of 14.53% (roughly 1 in 7 statically clean samples). This rate represents the proportion of Bandit-Semgrep-clean samples for which the pipeline identified a candidate vulnerability and obtained runtime evidence supporting exploitability. Outcomes varied by dataset: among candidate file--CWE pairs, confirmed exploitability was 33.7% for RedCode, 28.6% for CyberNative, and 5.4% for SecurityEval. Several frequently confirmed classes, including CWE-338 and CWE-916, were flagged by neither Bandit nor Semgrep. These findings indicate that static-analysis success and runtime security are hierarchical layers of software assurance rather than interchangeable measures, and have the potential to reshape how AI-generated and security-sensitive code is evaluated.

Comprendia is an Eclipse plugin that integrates structural dependency visualization with LLM-powered code explanation on a shared interactive graph for Java program comprehension. The tool rests on four pillars: (1) a multi-edge-type dependency graph with live search and multiple layouts; (2) LLM explanations grounded in Graph-Aware Callee Pruning (GACP), an auditable strategy that selects relevant callees using the same graph the developer navigates; (3) a clone-detection overlay that highlights duplication and suggests extract-to-parent refactoring opportunities; and (4) a CVE risk overlay powered by OSV.dev. GACP uses graph distance, inheritance collapse, and edge-type weighting to produce prompts that are reproducible across LLM families and traceable to visible graph nodes. We demonstrate Comprendia on a Java project containing known clones and vulnerabilities, showing how the unified graph substrate supports comprehension while keeping the developer in control. Screencast: https://youtu.be/1wlh_RYehzA

Agent Skills---structured packages of instructions and scripts that augment LLM-based agents---are rapidly proliferating, yet their security properties remain under-explored. We present \textsc{SkillsMetric}, a five-stage static analysis framework that scores skill packages along pattern density, statistical anomaly, dataflow taint, import anomaly, and capability mismatch dimensions. We construct an adversarial evaluation dataset of 2{,}266 skills spanning 16~attack types across code-level, system-level, and semantic-level threats, and evaluate on the full SkillMD-138K corpus. Our framework achieves an AUC of 0.93 and 5-fold cross-validated F1 of 73.4%$\pm$0.5%, with strong detection of data exfiltration (93%) and steganographic payloads (93%). Crucially, we identify fundamental blind spots: \emph{host destruction} attacks using common shell commands evade all five stages (0% detection), and \emph{prompt injection} via natural-language manipulation achieves only 42% detection. These findings establish that static analysis alone is insufficient for skill security, motivating defense-in-depth architectures that combine fast static pre-screening with semantic review.

The growing diversity of code clone types, from syntactic copies to cross-language semantic clones to AI-generated duplicates, has created a fragmentation crisis in clone detection. Current deep learning detectors are domain specialists that degrade significantly outside their training distribution, with F1 drops exceeding 70% across domains. Deploying multiple specialized models is impractical, yet training a single cross-domain detector requires simultaneous access to all training data. To address this, we investigate model merging, a family of post-hoc techniques that operate solely on trained checkpoints. We evaluate parameter merging with five task-vector methods, architecture merging via greedy layer stitching, and cross-tokenizer alignment across four code models, three benchmarks, and twelve configurations. Same-base TIES merging creates effective cross-domain detectors, validated across two model families and three random seeds, reaching 0.865 combined F1 on UniXcoder, 93% of multi-task performance without any training data at the merging step. WUDI achieves the highest in-distribution combined F1 at 0.899, but TIES generalizes better to unseen AI-generated clones, making it our recommended method. Cross-base merging yields only marginal and high-variance gains across all five methods, indicating that task vector compatibility through a shared pre-trained base is the binding factor for effective merging. Merged detectors also outperform zero-shot code LLMs on GPTCloneBench at lower inference cost and generalize up to 4x better than multi-task training to unseen AI-generated clones, suggesting a trade-off between in-domain performance and OOD robustness. This work provides one of the first systematic empirical studies of model merging for software engineering and a practical recipe for building cross-domain clone detectors.

Symbolic execution seeks to explore feasible program paths, yet a practical run may exhaust its resources while much program behaviour remains unreached. We investigate a complementary way of extending its practical reach by reasoning about how the same tool is utilised from one bounded run to the next, while leaving ordinary state exploration to the underlying tool. We present Agolic, an agentic planning system that uses evidence from earlier runs to choose and configure later bounded symbolic execution (BSE) runs, which the underlying symbolic execution tool then carries out. The planning intelligence, available evidence and execution modes can be adapted to the symbolic execution tool and analysis objective. We evaluate one adaptation for branch-coverage exploration, in which an LLM-based agent reasons over source code, replayed coverage and earlier targeting attempts. We evaluate Agolic on several C and C++ programs. On every program, it extends the branch coverage obtained by continuous symbolic execution and covers more than $3\times$ as many branches on average. It also covers more branches than each individual corpus from coverage-guided fuzzing and compiler-based concolic execution in our evaluation and reaches branches absent from all comparison corpora combined on six of the seven programs. Taken together, these results point to considerable untapped potential in existing symbolic execution tools, some of which may be realised by reasoning about how their capabilities are used across runs while leaving state selection during ordinary symbolic exploration to the underlying tool.

Previous work has shown that the simple dataflow primitives of the Lustre language allow the natural, semantically unambiguous, and compact representation of machine learning (ML) applications, including models featuring complex conditional execution and recurrent state. The Lustre clock calculus is responsible for the static determination of important properties such as liveness (absence of deadlocks) and static memory bounds. Yet existing clock calculi are tailored for embedded control applications. We show they do not cater for the representation of control patterns commonly found in training algorithms, resulting in cumbersome expressions and inefficient compilation. We propose a conservative extension of Lustre's clock calculus addressing this limitation, thereby facilitating the embedding of ML models in reactive applications.

Languages with rich static semantics, such as Rust, provide stronger guarantees for AI-generated code, but their strictness makes generation more difficult. Off-the-shelf compilers can provide useful feedback post-generation, but does not guide intermediate generation steps, such as those during autoregressive LLM decoding. Constrained decoding intervenes earlier by rejecting invalid tokens during sampling, but requires white-box model access and costly reimplementation for semantic constraints.We introduce generative compilation, the first approach to obtaining compiler feedback on partial programs during generation. The core technical device is a sealor: a lightweight, mostly syntax-guided transformation that converts partial programs into complete ones that standard compilers can diagnose. It is designed such that possible-to-complete partial programs are never rejected, while preserving enough code context to catch genuine dead ends early. We construct such a sealor on a core Rust-like calculus and prove that it satisfies these properties, all mechanized in Lean. We extend it to the first partial-program checker for real Rust. We evaluate our method on challenging repository-level Rust coding tasks, across both frontier black-box and open-weight models. We show that generative compilation reduces non-compiling outputs and improves functional correctness, relative to standard post-generation feedback. It does so by detecting a broad range of errors close to their source and early during generation, thereby reducing errors cascades and enabling focused diagnostics. More broadly, generative compilation is a step toward making compilers a first-class citizen of AI-assisted programming active during generation, rather than a separate post-generation check.

Given a vulnerability-fixing commit, trigger localization asks which specific statement turns the vulnerable program state into a concrete unsafe operation. This question is harder than binary vulnerability detection because the answer demands interprocedural, causal reasoning: in a substantial fraction of real-world CVEs the triggering statement lies several call layers outside the patched function, beyond the reach of static rule sets and pattern-matching language models alike. We present AutoTrace, an agentic pipeline that localizes vulnerability triggers by exploring a code property graph layer by layer, with LLM agents deciding where to look next and deterministic admissibility gates deciding what evidence is required before a trigger can be reported. Agents never accept a trigger on their own authority; every reported trigger is backed by explicit evidence drawn from the graph, so the pipeline covers both intra- and interprocedural vulnerabilities without relying on ungrounded model judgment. On the full InterPVD benchmark, AutoTrace reaches 75.0% VulnHit and 80.8% FuncHit, surpassing the prior state of the art on the same corpus. Building on the same machinery, we construct SinkTrace-Bench, a dataset that exposes each vulnerability as a source-to-sink (S2S) causal chain from attacker-controlled input through propagation to the dangerous operation, drawn from matched vulnerable and patched program states. It comprises 1,542 verifier-confirmed, perfectly balanced vulnerable/safe samples whose label fidelity we audit against expert annotations. Benchmarking frontier LLMs on it, we find that even the strongest struggle to separate the matched pairs, exposing the causal-reasoning gap that trigger localization targets. Artifact available at https://github.com/Erroristotle/AutoTrace.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for code smell detection tasks due to their ability to interpret program semantics. However, their reliability in this context remains poorly explored, particularly under varying prompt conditions where model predictions may be influenced by external cues rather than code characteristics. One such limitation is sycophancy bias, where models tend to align their outputs with user-provided assumptions instead of performing objective analysis. In this paper, we present the first systematic empirical study of sycophancy bias in LLM-based code smell detection. Using the MLCQ dataset, we evaluate how different prompt framings like confirmation bias, contradictory hints, and false premises affect model predictions. Our results show that LLMs are highly sensitive to prompt variations, with Decision Flip Rates reaching up to 72% and False Alignment Rates exceeding 90%, indicating substantial instability and agreement with misleading prompts. To address this issue, we propose Evidence-Guided Debiasing Prompting (EGDP), a structured prompting strategy that enforces evidence-first reasoning. EGDP reduces decision instability and improves robustness, lowering Decision Flip Rates to as low as 12% and False Alignment Rates to as low as 21%, while increasing reliance on structurally grounded evidence. Our findings demonstrate that sycophancy bias poses a critical threat to the reliability of LLM-based code smell detection, and that evidence-guided reasoning provides an effective and generalizable mitigation approach.

LLM-generated code often compiles, passes tests, and appears correct, yet breaks once deployed. The root cause is frequently structural rather than logical. A generated endpoint references configuration keys never declared in the project, an import targets a package that does not exist in any registry, or a new route omits the authentication guard applied to every sibling endpoint. Each patch is locally valid but globally incoherent, and standard CI toolchains rarely surface these failures. As LLM-powered coding tools see widespread adoption, this blind spot poses a growing risk to software quality. We call this the \textbf{patchwork problem}. This paper formalizes structural coherence as consistency invariants over graph representations of repository artifacts, including import, call, dependency, configuration, schema, resource, control-flow, and routing graphs, and introduces an eight-category failure taxonomy distinguishing defects specific to LLM generation from those merely amplified by it. We present a hybrid verification framework that delegates to mature static analysis tools where they already excel and deploys purpose-built detectors for cross-cutting invariants underserved by existing toolchains, targeting provable constraint violations rather than heuristic pattern matching. Empirical evaluation across two frontier models under four prompting strategies reveals that the vast majority of structural failures evade type checking, testing, and SAST entirely, and that failure patterns diverge qualitatively between models in ways that challenge model-agnostic mitigation strategies. External validation on real-world AI-generated repositories confirms that these failures are not artifacts of controlled experimentation but are prevalent wherever LLMs write code with minimal human oversight.

The increasing energy demand of software systems is raising concerns about their environmental impact and associated costs. Reasoning on energy usage early in the development flow has the potential to significantly reduce the overall energy usage of a software system, as it allows developers to make informed design and refactoring decisions before inefficiencies propagate. However, assessing energy usage without repeated profiling and direct measurement is difficult, which limits early reasoning in practice. This study investigates the limits of method-level energy prediction in Java, examining whether static source code metrics complemented with method-level execution time can estimate the energy consumption of Java methods. We profile 2,786 Java methods to extract 33 static features and measure execution time and energy, then train and compare eleven regression models. Our findings show that static source code metrics alone yield poor predictive performance, with average R2 values close to zero. Incorporating execution time as a lightweight dynamic input significantly improves accuracy, raising R2 to as high as 0.46. Execution time, internal method calls, and cyclomatic complexity consistently emerge as the strongest predictors of energy consumption.

LLM-integrated applications blend natural language prompts with program code, and much of their runtime behavior originates in the prompt layer rather than in the code itself. Existing complexity metrics, however, operate solely at the code level and therefore overlook this behavioral logic entirely. We present HECATE, the first tool designed to assess complexity in both the prompt and code layers of such applications. Central to HECATE is Prompt-as-Specification, a Hoare-logic-inspired formalism that interprets every prompt as a specification of intended behavior. Grounded in 25 complexity dimensions identified across published taxonomies, the tool generates 52 candidate metrics. We assess each metric against 118 components collected from 18 open-source repositories, relying on maintenance activity derived from version history as an empirical proxy for complexity, and discard any metric that loses significance once code size is accounted for. Only ten metrics withstand this test. Seven belong to our newly introduced set; rather than measuring sheer volume, each tallies structurally distinct elements, such as LLM call sites, memory attributes, and prompt templates, an attribute we call structural breadth. Of the three surviving conventional metrics, RFC exhibits a similar breadth-oriented character, while Halstead N and V survive only as a residual effect of size; our top-performing metrics exceed all three. Crucially, the prompt-layer metrics retain significance even when the strongest code-level metric is added as a covariate, establishing prompt complexity as a dimension in its own right. A final validation on 20 components spanning six held-out repositories shows that the two best-performing metrics continue to predict maintenance effort, supporting their generalizability beyond the training set.

This paper investigates the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to detect and classify floating-point errors statically in software code. We introduce InterFLOPBench, a benchmark of 90 C kernels with 1 130 test samples designed to evaluate LLMs across six categories of floating-point error: cancellation, comparison, division by zero, overflow, underflow and NaN, compared across 14 LLMs. The evaluation framework treats floating-point error detection as a multi-label classification problem and employs the F1-score metric to measure performance. Results demonstrate that latest models (Qwen 3 32b, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Phi 4 Reasoning, DeepSeek R1T2, and gpt-oss 20b and 120b) achieve a performance greater than 0.88 overall F1-score. Performance varies between error categories, between explicit operations such as division by zero (Average F1-score: 0.8479) and more subtle numerical phenomena such as underflow (Average F1-score: 0.6059) and cancellation (Average F1-score: 0.6164).

Vulnerability detection in C/C++ software remains a major security challenge due to code complexity, manual memory management, and the limitations of traditional static analysis. Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a promising approach, particularly for fuzzing, test generation, program exploration, and, more recently, vulnerability detection and localization. Following PRISMA 2020 guidelines, this work reviews RL techniques for software vulnerability analysis, focusing on C/C++ source code and static analysis. We identified 21 primary studies published between 2015 and 2026 from major scientific databases and complementary searches. We analyze the addressed tasks, algorithms, state-action-reward-environment formulations, code representations, datasets, and evaluation metrics. Results show that 15 studies focus on fuzzing and guided exploration, only 3 on direct vulnerability detection, and just 1 on statement-level localization. Moreover, statically extracted structural representations such as Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) and Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) are rarely used as agent states, and benchmarks lack comparability. We propose a task- and formulation-oriented taxonomy and identify a key research gap: the absence of RL agents that use source-code CFGs as states to detect and localize vulnerable nodes.

Local LLM agents such as OpenClaw and Nanobot run on end-user machines and act on host resources - the shell, filesystem, browser, stored credentials, and messaging applications - through natural-language goals. These agents have become privileged software runtimes that mediate between user intent, model outputs, and host-level actions. Existing research characterizes the landscape through prompt injection, malicious skills, marketplace risks, or black-box evaluation of agents. But the implementation layer that performs this mediation, the prompt builder, parser, tool dispatcher, skill loader, memory writer, network client, and permission gate, has remained an unexamined safety boundary. To our knowledge, no prior work has examined the agent's source tree to audit these components for implementation-level security weaknesses. We present CLAWAUDIT, a static auditing framework for measuring vulnerability exposure in local LLM agent runtimes. CLAWAUDIT derives a five-category vulnerability taxonomy from STRIDE and develops custom static-analysis rules that target agent-specific patterns absent from established rule sets for vulnerability analysis. We instantiate the taxonomy in two backends, 47 Semgrep YAML rules and 30 CodeQL queries, and evaluate on OPENCLAWBENCH, a benchmark of 446 source-code-level advisories from the OpenClaw repository and split temporally into 229 rule-derivation (train) and 217 held-out (test) advisories. On the held-out test, CLAWAUDIT raises Semgrep recall from 21.7% (Pro baseline) to 66.8%, and CodeQL recall from 13.8% (security-extended) to 75.1%. Train/test gaps remain within 4 percentage points for all four configurations, indicating that the rules generalize to vulnerabilities unseen during rule writing. A preliminary live-code audit shows that these recall-oriented rules require manual triage, motivating semantic filtering before production deployment.

Automated vulnerability discovery in large codebases remains challenging: traditional static analysis produces high false-positive rates, while dynamic approaches such as fuzzing require substantial infrastructure and often target narrow classes of bugs. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) enable semantic reasoning about program behavior, but applying LLMs to repository-scale security analysis introduces challenges related to context management, cost, and verification. We present OpenAnt, an open-source vulnerability discovery system that integrates static program analysis with LLM-based reasoning in a multi-stage pipeline. OpenAnt introduces three key techniques. First, codebases are decomposed into self-contained analysis units filtered by reachability from external entry points, reducing the analysis surface by up to 97% while preserving attack-relevant code. Second, candidate vulnerabilities undergo adversarial verification through constrained attacker simulation, where the model evaluates exploitability under realistic attacker capabilities. Third, findings are validated through dynamic verification, in which exploit environments are generated automatically, executed in sandboxed containers, and discarded after use. Evaluation on widely used open-source projects including OpenSSL, WordPress, and Flowise shows that this architecture can identify previously unknown vulnerabilities while maintaining manageable analysis cost and substantially reducing false positives. Our results suggest that closed-loop vulnerability discovery pipelines, combining semantic reasoning with exploit validation, provide a practical path toward scalable automated security analysis. OpenAnt is released as open source under the Apache 2.0 license at https://github.com/knostic/OpenAnt.

We ran 300 repeated vulnerability-finding scans to measure how repeatable agentic large language model (LLM) security review is on the same JavaScript code, prompt, and benchmark harness. The headline result is that LLM security findings were unevenly repeatable: reference-matched findings were stable, but extra model reports varied heavily from run to run. Across 250 model runs, 80 of 161 unique unmatched findings appeared in only one of five identical repetitions, while only 22 appeared in all five. By contrast, when Claude matched a Snyk Code reference finding, the behavior was much more stable: 134 of 158 unique reference-matched findings appeared in all five repetitions. The benchmark also shows complementarity. Models consistently found familiar, high-signal exploit shapes, and in one case surfaced a likely Snyk Code product gap. Snyk Code static application security testing (SAST) was deterministic and better at systematically enumerating repeated data-flow sinks. The results support combining agentic LLM review with deterministic SAST rather than treating either technique as a replacement for the other.

Semantic faults specific to the use of machine learning models are a common problem for machine learning developers, causing suboptimal predictions, high computational cost, or incorrect outputs. For example, one may erroneously use unscaled data to train a scale-sensitive model. Machine learning developers detect these faults after training their models and manually analyzing the results, making it an inefficient process. We propose a novel data-aware static analysis approach to detect semantic faults in machine learning code, allowing developers to reveal these bugs while writing code instead of after training the model. Our approach uses combined data and control flow analysis, and API contracts, enabling data-aware reasoning about machine learning code at a high level of abstraction. We highlight the potential of our solution by analyzing a sample of real-world machine learning notebooks, finding that we can detect faults that require a data-aware approach.

MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software systems for diverse purposes, due to their versatility, flexibility, and ability to simulate human reasoning to some extent. However, poor integration of LLM inference in source code can undermine software system quality. Therefore, inadequate LLM integration coding practices must be documented to help developers mitigate such issues. Following our earlier work on LLM code smells, this paper consolidates and refines the concept by presenting a self-contained taxonomy and a catalog of nine LLM code smells. We also create SpecDetect4LLM, a static source code analysis tool for their detection, and conduct extensive empirical evaluations of its detection effectiveness (precision and recall) as well as the prevalence of LLM code smells across 692 open-source software projects (171,194 source files). Our results show that LLM code smells affect 73.5% of the analyzed systems, with a detection precision of 91.3% and a recall of 71.8%.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an important paradigm for aligning Diffusion Language Models (DLMs) toward functional correctness in code generation. However, these models often encounter a ``capability cliff'' on complex tasks, where execution-based semantic rewards become too low to provide a viable learning signal. In this paper, we present a systematic empirical study of RL post-training for diffusion-based code generation along three axes: reward design, hint-conditioned sampling, and task difficulty. We investigate the effectiveness of execution-free rewards as alternatives to traditional unit-test execution, the role of training-time hint-conditioned diffusion sampling in mitigating exploration bottlenecks, and the impact of these design choices varies across tasks with different difficulty levels. Across HumanEval, MBPP, and LiveCodeBench, we find that static checking is the strongest overall standalone execution-free reward in our setting, especially improving DiffuCoder from 53.9 to 67.1 on HumanEval and from 14.9 to 15.5 on LiveCodeBench while reducing rollout time by 9.4%. We further find that moderate AST-based hinting is most useful on harder benchmarks, while the best reward design depends strongly on task difficulty: similarity-based rewards are more effective on easier subsets, whereas static checking is more reliable on harder subsets where execution rewards are low. These findings suggest that reward design and training guidance substantially affect diffusion RL performance in our evaluated code-generation setting.

Microservices are widely adopted in modern cloud systems due to their scalability and fault tolerance. However, microservice architectures introduce significant complexity in privilege and permission control, creating risks of privilege escalation where attackers can gain unauthorized access to resources or operations. Detecting such vulnerabilities is challenging due to complex cross-service interactions, polyglot codebases, and diverse privileged operations and permission checks. We present Neo, an agentic program analysis framework that combines large language models (LLMs) with classic program analysis to address these challenges. Neo leverages an LLM-based agent that dynamically generates analysis plans, adapts code search strategies, and validates semantics. We develop code search primitives that enable Neo to perform scalable and flexible code exploration across services and languages. We evaluated Neo on 25 open-source microservice applications spanning 7 programming languages and 6.2 million lines of code. Neo uncovered 24 zero-day privilege escalation vulnerabilities and achieved 81.0% precision and 85.0% recall on a ground-truth dataset. Compared to existing program analysis and agentic solutions, Neo demonstrated significant improvements in both detection accuracy and scalability. We further showcased Neo's extensibility by applying it to other application domains and vulnerability types, uncovering 18 additional zero-day vulnerabilities.

Large language models are increasingly used for code generation, but many generated programs fail to compile, a prerequisite for further correctness checks such as unit tests. Existing solutions for repairing static errors are costly in both latency and token consumption. Post-hoc repair delays error detection until generation completes and commonly regenerates large regions of previously valid code. Constrained semantic decoding checks after each token, incurring per-token overhead while limiting repair to the current token even when the root cause lies earlier. We present Hydra, a system for efficient recovery from static errors during code generation. Hydra allows checking to proceed asynchronously with generation, avoiding checker overhead when the generated code is semantically correct. In addition, it provides checkpoint-and-rollback support for targeted repair, avoiding regeneration and rechecking of valid prefixes. We retrofit the Clang C/C++ compiler to support Hydra with modest modifications. Paired with a token-efficient repair strategy, Hydra reduces latency by up to 71% and token consumption by up to 70% relative to post-hoc repair on C/C++ code generation tasks that encounter static errors.

Large language models can consult information that fixed static analyzers cannot, such as documentation, current security advisories, version-specific metadata, and informal API contracts. This makes LLMs a compelling option for program analyses that depend on information beyond the source program, or that are otherwise not amenable to conventional static analyzers. However, directly asking an LLM for a one-shot whole-program analysis is brittle because it compresses many evidence-dependent judgments into a single opaque answer, rather than exposing which conclusions are supported or disputed and using intermediate findings to guide later, more focused searches. In this paper, we propose agentic interpretation, a framework that brings the discipline of lattice-based static analysis to LLM-driven program reasoning. At a high level, agentic interpretation decomposes a high-level analysis goal into localized claims, and tracks the LLM's judgment about each claim in a finite-height lattice. A worklist algorithm governs how claims and their judgments evolve during the analysis. We introduce a formal model of agentic interpretation, explore the design space it opens, and illustrate the approach with a worked example analyzing code that depends on opaque third-party components.

The irreversible nature of blockchain transactions makes the identification of smart contract vulnerabilities an essential requirement for secure system development. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into developer workflows, their reliability as autonomous security auditors remains unproven. We assess whether current generative models are a viable replacement for, or only a complement to, traditional static-analysis tools. Our findings indicate that LLM efficacy is undermined by both inherent lexical bias and a lack of rigorous validation of external data inputs. This reliance on non-semantic heuristics, such as identifier naming, leads to a high frequency of false positives. Furthermore, prompting techniques reveal a trade-off between precision and recall. These results were derived using our custom automated framework, which achieves 92% accuracy in classifying model outputs.

Automated vulnerability detection is a fundamental task in software security, yet existing learning-based methods still struggle to capture the structural dependencies, domain-specific vulnerability knowledge, and complex program semantics required for accurate detection. Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown strong code understanding ability, but directly prompting them with raw source code often leads to missed vulnerabilities or false alarms, especially when vulnerable and benign functions differ only in subtle semantic details. To address this, we propose VulTriage, a triple-path context augmentation framework for LLM-based vulnerability detection. VulTriage enhances the LLM input through three complementary paths: a Control Path that extracts and verbalizes AST, CFG, and DFG information to expose control and data dependencies; a Knowledge Path that retrieves relevant CWE-derived vulnerability patterns and examples through hybrid dense--sparse retrieval; and a Semantic Path that summarizes the functional behavior of the code before the final judgment. These contexts are integrated into a unified instruction to guide the LLM toward more reliable vulnerability reasoning. Experiments on the PrimeVul pair test set show that VulTriage achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming existing deep learning and LLM-based baselines on key pair-wise and classification metrics. Further ablation studies verify the effectiveness of each path, and additional experiments on the Kotlin dataset demonstrate the generalization ability of VulTriage under low-resource and class-imbalanced settings. Our code is available at https://github.com/vinsontang1/VulTriage

Smart-contract exploits have caused billions of USD in cumulative losses, yet audits remain expensive and slow. Automated tools have emerged to close this gap, but each class has a characteristic failure mode. Static analyzers report findings that frequently fail manual triage at high rates, while large language models (LLMs) hallucinate findings that contradict the source code. Thus, we propose Chaintrix, an end-to-end auditing framework whose central architectural commitment is that every LLM-generated claim must be discharged against a deterministic structural contract representation. We introduce a Cross-Contract Interaction Model (CCIM) that parses Solidity into a structured map of function-level reads, writes, modifiers and resolved cross-contract calls. CCIM serves as the substrate against which all 12 of Chaintrix's deterministic signal engines and the parallel LLM audit pipelines operate. A staged false-positive-reduction pipeline, terminating in a Structural Verdict Engine (SVE) that applies deterministic structural checks against parsed code, filters the merged finding set, with selected high-confidence findings further validated through symbolic execution and fuzz testing. We evaluate Chaintrix on EVMbench, the smart-contract security benchmark by OpenAI, Paradigm, OtterSec. Chaintrix detects 86 of 120 high-severity vulnerabilities (71.7% recall), with 25 audits scoring 100% recall, placing Chaintrix 26 percentage points above the strongest frontier-model baseline.

Automated program repair at repository scale requires an agent to locate a fault among thousands of files and synthesize a correct patch. Existing graph-based agents represent how a repository is organized into files, classes, and functions, but they do not model how variable values flow within a procedure, which leaves the agent without the semantic precision that function-level and line-level localization demand. We present ARISE (Agentic Repository-level Issue Solving Engine), a framework-agnostic toolset that builds a multi-granularity program graph, extending structural relationships down to statement-level nodes connected by intra-procedural definition-use edges, and exposes it through a three-tier tool API that mounts on any tool-use agentic framework. The central primitive is data-flow slicing, a queryable agent tool that traces in a single call which statements define or consume a variable of interest. On SWE-bench Lite (300 real GitHub issues across 11 Python repositories) with the open-source Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct backbone, mounting ARISE on SWE-agent as the host resolves 22.0% of issues (66/300), a 4.7 percentage-point gain over the unmodified SWE-agent baseline under the identical backbone and host. We show this gain is largely attributable to sharper localization, with Function Recall@1 (R@1) rising from 0.43 to 0.60 (a 40% relative gain) and Line R@1 from 0.26 to 0.41 (a 58% relative gain). Controlled ablations attribute the improvement to the data-flow graph rather than the tool schema, and we further mount the same toolset on a second host framework to study its portability. Decoupled from any single scaffold, the graph builder and slicing API form a drop-in toolset for future repair research.

An agent skill is a configuration package that equips an LLM-driven agent with a concrete capability, such as reading email, executing shell commands, or signing blockchain transactions. Each skill is a hybrid artifact-a structured half declares executable interfaces, while a prose half dictates when and how those interfaces fire-and the prose is reinterpreted probabilistically on every invocation. Conventional static analyzers parse the structured half but ignore the prose; LLM-based tools read the prose but cannot reproducibly prove that a tainted input reaches a high-impact sink. We present Semia, a static auditor for agent skills. Semia lifts each skill into the Skill Description Language (SDL), a Datalog fact base that captures LLM-triggered actions, prose-defined conditions, and human-in-the-loop checkpoints. Synthesizing a fact base that is both structurally sound and semantically faithful to the original prose is the central challenge; we address it with Constraint-Guided Representation Synthesis (CGRS), a propose-verify-evaluate loop that refines LLM candidates until convergence. Security properties (e.g., indirect injection, secret leakage, confused deputies, unguarded sinks, etc.) over an agent skill can then be reduced to Datalog reachability queries. We evaluate Semia on 13,728 real-world skills from public marketplaces. Semia renders all of them auditable and finds that more than half carry at least one critical semantic risk. On a stratified sample of 541 expert-labeled skills, Semia achieves 97.7% recall and an F1 of 90.6%, substantially outperforming signature-based scanners and LLM baselines.