Structured Evidence Ledger

Journal Entry Tests (JETs) are a mandatory part of annual audits to evaluate and assess both highrisk audit areas and potential material misstatements. However, as JETs are designed to detect known patterns based on domain knowledge, the resulting lists are often very large and require substantial additional effort from the auditor. To ensure the economic efficiency of the audit, the number of false positives in JET result lists must be reduced. Especially machine learning (ML) methods represent a promising approach to improve anomaly detection in this field. In this research in progress paper, we investigate different approaches on how to combine JETs with ML-methods in a hybrid manner. We present specialized models to increase the detection performance and validity of anomaly detection results to improve audit efficiency. The experiments are based on synthetic data consisting of different normal and anomalous journal entries.

Synthetic perturbations appear to offer inexpensive calibration data for LLM evaluators in biomedical ML, where expert review is scarce. Yet a planted mutation key is neither a detector output nor automatically human ground truth. We formalize four distinct ledgers: planted perturbations, independent detector outputs, source-linked human dispositions, and human-added discoveries. We then audit the evaluation design, scoring code, read paths, and current human records of a private synthetic Japanese care-handoff workflow. The factory stored 69 planted error cards across 47 targets. Final review covers 22 targets and contains 22 confirmed imported proposals, 9 rejected proposals, and 79 human-added cards; only 3 reviewed targets are double annotated. Passing imported plant keys to a generic detector scorer yields 22/(22+9)=0.710 and 22/(22+79)=0.218. A direct audit identity shows that these values are proposal-confirmation yield and submitted-ledger composition, not judge precision and recall, because no independent detector realization was preserved for the audited proposals in the available records. The audit also finds source-name collisions, row shadowing, forced severity, vacuous ratio defaults, and unsupported zero-support field weights. We contribute a provenance-aware claim audit, a storage contract, and a minimum calibration gate for responsibly communicating biomedical ML capability claims. This single-workflow forensic case is an existence proof of a failure mode, not an estimate of its prevalence: existing human work supports an exploratory audit of synthetic proposals, but not LLM-judge operating characteristics, clinical validity, corpus prevalence, or robust inter-annotator agreement.

Continual world models must decide whether new data justify changing the model. Fixed replay schedules and prediction-error triggers specify when to update, but neither reveals the value of an individual update: one deployment run cannot show how the same model would have performed at that moment had it held its parameters. We introduce the fork ledger, which branches a deployment stream at pre-registered decision points into matched update and hold continuations under common random numbers. It evaluates both continuations on the same episodes and records $\Delta R = R_{\mathrm{update}} - R_{\mathrm{hold}}$. Always applying one fixed update mechanism lowers return on all three simulated control tasks: CartPole ($-144.0$; checkpoint-bootstrap $95\%$ CI $[-185.4,-116.1]$, against a converged return near $650$), Walker ($-82.8$; $[-101.1,-61.7]$) and Cheetah ($-18.6$; $[-29.0,-6.6]$). Divergence is an outcome of applying the update, so the estimand counts every attempted fork; restricted to the $693$ of $720$ that did not collapse, CartPole and Walker are unchanged in sign ($-113.4$ and $-82.1$) and Cheetah becomes unresolved ($-3.9$; $[-17.5,+13.0]$). The task is the unit of inference: each contributes $240$ attempted forks over five pretrained checkpoints crossed with two drift directions. The ledger makes counterfactual utility observable for a fixed mechanism, allowing triggers to be judged by the updates they select rather than by surprise detection alone.

Humans are the transport layer between AI systems, losing context at every hop. We present the Civilization Framework, whose addressable party is the civilization, not the agent (one human sovereign, a persistent ledger, and interchangeable agents), and the Embassy Protocol, a carrier-agnostic overlay: messages arrive asynchronously at a resident ledger endpoint, any online agent of the receiver handles them, and commitment state on both ledgers, not delivery, is ground truth. Authority derives from memory: an agent's power to act for its civilization is capped by the memory it can access and externalized through signed credentials, separate from civilization-level reputation. We identify the temporal-weight effect, a hazard in AI-to-AI communication where what arrives first acquires unearned authority, and test it in one frontier model in a preregistered 1,908-trial experiment. With verification removed, an incorrect upstream claim arriving first captures 54.2% of answers (4.2% under full verification), while the same claim arriving after the receiver has sealed its own answer captures 31.6% (the two prompt shells are not length-matched, so part of that gap may reflect shell form; see Section 7), and both registered question-set specifications agree on these two verdicts (the exclusion specification is preregistered as under-powered). Two secondary results, the mitigation from instruction-level provenance labeling and sealed-answer accuracy equivalence, are specification-dependent, holding only under the all-questions specification. Because a registered check of tool use failed its call-budget condition, the registration classifies the round as inconclusive and every result above, primary and secondary, is reported as exploratory; a replication with harness-enforced budgets is planned. The framework's intra-civilization layer has a working implementation.

Optimizing absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion (ADME) is an important part of small molecule drug discovery. Many machine learning models have been built to predict ADME properties to facilitate this optimization process, but explaining model predictions is challenging. We propose a new graph neural network architecture with built-in meaningful per-atom attributions. Our model MolLedger outputs predictions that are the sum of per-atom scores. MolLedger's additive framework obtains exact interpretability at no cost to performance because the global context vector gives the additive head enough context to produce good per-atom scores. Furthermore, MolLedger produces attributions that are more faithful to chemical properties than other interpretability methods because the auxiliary loss in MolLedger anchors the atom scores to chemical properties. Our case studies comparing interpretations from multiple methods on molecular pairs reveal that MolLedger is much better at producing sensible explanations for predicted property changes.

What a finite learning device has recorded and what will hold value for it on future tasks are not the same quantity. We develop a typed accounting for finite-state learning devices that separates four components: a training-side fit functional $Φ_{\mathrm{fit}}$, the record-correlation stock $J_{D}=I(M;D)$, an update-side search ledger $σ_{M}$, and an operational capital value $V(M;T,b)$. This value is the work gap between an informed protocol class and a blind class obtained by deleting the memory-read port and re-optimizing from scratch. (I) Separation: for every $n$, there is a device family on which record correlation and world correlation grow by $n\ln 2$ while the capital gain is exactly zero. In the $\mathrm{flat}^{*}$ regime, data-free updates never increase $V$. (II) Capitalization ledger: an exact $\mathrm{flat}^{*}$ extraction identity and a universal ledger identity give, for (F5$'$)-stable $M$-local updates under a no-discarded-record-correlation condition (f), the bound $η_{\mathrm{cap}}\le 1$ for the capitalization efficiency $η_{\mathrm{cap}}=ΔV/(k T\,σ_{M})$, together with necessary and sufficient conditions for equality. (III) Value retention: for the retention gap $L_{\mathrm{gen}}$ and retention ratio $ρ_{\mathrm{gen}}$ (the former carries no sign constraint; the latter is defined for positive training-side value and is not confined to $[0,1]$) we give a two-layer alignment domain: an exact exchange rate between value and the side-information-adjusted record fit $I(M';D\mid Y)$ without any record-side-information independence assumption, and a raw record-stock exchange rate under a joint side-information neutrality condition $(M,D)\perp Y$, whose boundary is marked by an explicit one-time-pad witness. These are statements about finite-device value retention under task-distribution shift, not a theory of statistical generalization.

Long-term agent memory is usually treated as select--store--retrieve, but retrieval does not decide whether contradictory, superseded, retracted, deleted, or stale records may support an outgoing claim. We introduce Governed Persistent Memory (GPM), an auditable bitemporal state-transition model with source-bound admission, derived lifecycle state, current public barriers, and fail-closed structured release. Five executable clauses cover ledger integrity, source binding, conflict isolation, non-revival after retraction or deletion, and exact claim closure over a fresh view at one verified head. On a prespecified hash-frozen 3,600-case GPM-ReleaseBench, GPM matches all complete outcomes; the strongest of three intentionally simple complete policies matches 1,800/3,600 and makes unmatched releases on 50% of violation cases. A separate sealed end-to-end service evaluation exercises real ingestion and release across eight query families. In its publicly disclosed V3 arm, the governed lane is correct on 2,400/2,400 clusters versus 600/2,400 for ungoverned local Qwen2.5-7B; it repairs all 1,800 baseline failures with no regression (one-sided 95% lower bounds 99.875% and 99.834%). A later V5 reseal over Chinese- and English-command arms, with generation-date pinning and no post-freeze reducer amendment, again obtains 2,400/2,400 per arm. A production-code-independent finite model explores 331,776 semantic and 1,990,656 query states without a full-contract counterexample, and a 100,000-trace three-engine differential yields zero mismatches. These are bounded contract and implementation results, not open-world model accuracy or evidence of world truth. Governed answers in the sealed service evaluation are deterministic service outputs; the 7B result is the ungoverned comparison, not a claim that a language model itself became perfectly accurate.

Investment competence is inherently personalized: the same market evidence can justify different actions for investors with different goals, horizons, portfolios, and risk boundaries. Yet financial LLMs are evaluated either by static question answering or by terminal profit and loss. The former omits agency; the latter cannot reveal whether a profitable action was grounded, profile-consistent, or merely lucky. We ask whether the community is using the wrong ruler for consequential agents. We introduce \textsc{InvestLogicBench}, a process-native benchmark containing 201,247 documented decisions from 151 real-world investors. Each episode instantiates a \textbf{P$\rightarrow$E$\rightarrow$R$\rightarrow$D$\rightarrow$O} trace: investor \textit{Profile}, observable market \textit{Events}, investment \textit{Reasoning}, executable \textit{Decision}, and delayed \textit{Outcome}. The release includes profile construction, point-in-time event binding, structured logic, horizons, outcomes, and post-mortems, and supports comprehension, profile-conditioned generation, and end-to-end replay. Across four leading LLMs, logical plausibility remains near 4/5 while event grounding is only 0.8--2.8/5; return and process quality also disagree. These results expose polished but weakly grounded reasoning that outcome-only evaluation hides. We further argue that P$\rightarrow$E$\rightarrow$R$\rightarrow$D$\rightarrow$O should be a data-system interface, requiring versioned profiles, temporal provenance, inspectable retrieval, decision ledgers, and replayable outcomes. Finance is our stress test for a broader class of personalized, consequential agents.

Attention--Feed-Forward Network (FFN) Disaggregation (AFD) is emerging as a promising architecture for serving Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models. While existing AFD systems improve the efficiency of disaggregated execution, they leave a deployment question unanswered: under the same model, workload, time-per-output-token (TPOT) service-level objective (SLO), hardware budget, hardware catalog, and runtime capabilities, does AFD provide higher throughput than the best collocated deployment? Answering this question requires jointly optimizing hardware assignment and deployment organization for both architectures, making exhaustive provisioning prohibitively expensive. We present AFD-Ledger, an offline analytical provisioning system that independently provisions AFD and collocated deployments using an analytical execution model and an evaluation-bounded hardware search. Across deployment spaces where exhaustive provisioning is feasible, AFD-Ledger reduces complete deployment evaluations by 68.8%--83.5% while still recovering the globally optimal deployment. On three physical LongCat 2.0 deployments, it preserves the correct architecture decision while predicting AFD-to-collocated throughput within 6.6%--9.6% of measurement. Using this validated framework, we show that homogeneous AFD improves fixed-budget throughput in only a minority of the studied settings, heterogeneous AFD requires deployment-level hardware complementarity rather than heuristic device selection, and role-specific hardware improvements matter primarily when they enable better deployment organizations by crossing deployment capability--price boundaries.

Persistent memory helps long-term agents retain knowledge, yet a single update error can repeatedly distort future retrieval and reasoning. Most existing systems reduce memory updating to a binary Write/Hold decision, which cannot distinguish whether new information should be added, ignored, used to revise an outdated belief, rejected as unreliable, or deferred for verification. These choices may share the same binary label while producing fundamentally different memory states. We introduce TARL, a memory state update framework that maps each statement to one of five executable actions. TARL identifies the affected memory, resolves its temporal scope, compares source reliability, and updates accepted, pending, and rejected ledgers. It is further trained by comparing the memory states produced by alternative update operations, encouraging the model to select the operation that leads to the correct result. We also introduce TARL-Mem, a benchmark with fine-grained action labels and next-state targets. Across in-domain, cross-source, temporal, counterfactual, and sequential evaluations, TARL improves action prediction and state recovery, reduces memory pollution, preserves conflicting evidence, and limits cumulative corruption.

Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each private selection is charged to every protected attribute whose memory group intersects the read set. Per-attribute ledgers block any selection that would exceed its cap and return a fixed generic view instead. Under an explicit interface contract, we prove pure B_a-DP for the entire adaptive transcript. We also extend the result to stores that differ across multiple protected groups and bound how much observing the transcript can change an adversary's prior odds. We evaluate the online and preallocated modes with three response LLMs on a controlled adjacent-store benchmark and a public-corpus transfer track. Both modes keep transcript distinguishability near chance while preserving target-required personalization and overall response quality. Further diagnostics show that removing key safeguards causes mismatched output support, missing ledger charges, revealing side channels, or growing long-horizon leakage.

Persistent agent memory must adapt as later outcomes change earlier evidence, yet mutable retrieval weights create an attribution problem: reviewers must distinguish authorized adaptation from database tampering. We present MutMem, an authorized-mutation protocol in HOM-AIMOS, a persistent agent-memory engine. MutMem retains memory content, records signed positive and negative outcome evidence without age-based expiry, and commits each nontrivial weight change as a housekeeper-authorized transition. Each transition binds a terminal provenance node, signer epoch, quantized old and new weights, a no-fork predecessor, and two domain-separated SHA-256 commitments. Ed25519 verification runs in both the database writer and a portable verifier. Content classified as poison-likely is retained with signed, revisable labels used by recall as trust evidence. We evaluate utility, mutation integrity, and poisoning adaptation. HOM-AIMOS answers 459/500 LongMemEval questions correctly under LLM judgment (91.8%). On LoCoMo, it obtains 74.12% judged accuracy and, under a separate upstream-compatible protocol, 58.20 token F1. A native suite passes all declared authorization, topology, tamper, signer-epoch, and post-mutation-recall cases; median signed-transition latency is 4.865 ms. In a declared N=100 PoisonedRAG adaptation, no injected poison appears in attacked top-5 disclosures (0/100; 95% Wilson upper bound 3.70%), while induced target-answer attack success among 98 clean-negative targets is 1/98 (1.02%). A preregistered four-arm ablation attributes the retrieval reduction to signed stored labels: the retriever selects poison for 94/100 targets when epistemic policy is bypassed and 0/100 when labels are restored. MutMem provides evidence of integrity, authorization, traceability, and historical continuity; it does not establish content truth.

Multimodal agents for visual question answering increasingly operate as multi-step trajectories that interleave perception, retrieval, and reasoning, yet evaluation still largely reduces to final-answer accuracy. This aggregate signal cannot tell whether a correct answer was reached through grounded evidence, language priors, or accidental error cancellation. We propose to treat a multimodal agent trajectory as a provenance-constrained state machine: tool outputs are normalized into a Structured Evidence Ledger that serves as the trajectory state, downstream reasoning and decision claims may cite only active ledger entries, grounding is checked at the entity and numeric level, and repair is realized as typed state transitions that cannot introduce content without tool-produced provenance. We instantiate this design as LedgerMind (Provenance-Constrained Multimodal Agentic Reasoning with a Structured Evidence Ledger), augmented by a Three-Layer Grounding Protocol, an Adaptive Dual-Path Dispatcher that matches reasoning depth to question complexity, and an Event-Triggered Verification-and-Repair engine with a formal provenance non-amplification guarantee. We use LedgerMind to target four recurring failure patterns that final-answer accuracy tends to obscure: unsupported intermediate reasoning, citation-backed entity hallucination (Phantom Grounding), over-reasoning on simple queries, and repair-time amplification. Experiments across multiple multimodal reasoning benchmarks and backbone MLLMs show that LedgerMind improves both answer accuracy and trajectory-level faithfulness.

Always-on agents are systems whose future behavior depends on durable state accumulated across earlier interactions. We treat them as persistent-state systems: the operative system includes retrievable memories, but also task ledgers, permissions, credentials, commitments, provenance and audit records, shared state, trigger conditions, and externally committed effects linked to those records. The survey reads the literature through six diagnostic axes for each state item, authority, scope, mutability, provenance, recoverability, and actionability, and through a lifecycle in which state is written, validated, organized, retrieved, acted upon, updated, forgotten, audited, and sometimes rolled back. Across a 435-work coded corpus, treated as a scoped map rather than an exhaustive census, the literature concentrates more heavily on accumulating and retrieving state than on governing, recovering, or relinquishing it. We therefore introduce the Always-On Evaluation Protocol (AOEP-v0), a pilot evaluation contract that makes these governance requirements concrete by scoring state mutation and recovery obligations rather than answer quality alone. The resulting agenda connects always-on agents to databases, distributed systems, formal methods, capability security, and machine unlearning.

Policy-adherent tool-calling agents in customer-service domains must maintain task states across turns while calling tools and obeying domain policies. Task states consist of relevant facts, identifiers, constraints, and conditions observed through user interaction and tool calls. In standard agents, task states are not represented separately. Observations, tool returns, and policy instructions are placed in the prompt, leaving agents to reconstruct the relevant states from the prompt each time they decide what to do next. This design makes state management implicit, creating two common failure modes. An agent may retrieve the right facts but later ground its decision in stale, missing, or incorrect information; and a syntactically valid tool call may still violate a domain policy that depends on the current task state. We introduce \textsc{LedgerAgent}, an inference-time method for tool-calling agents that maintains observed task states in a separate ledger and renders the states into the prompt. The ledger is also used to check state-dependent policy constraints before environment-changing tool calls are executed, blocking policy violations. Across four customer-service domains and a mixed panel of open- and closed-weight models, \textsc{LedgerAgent} improves average pass\textasciicircum{}k over a standard prompt-based tool-calling approach, with the largest gains under stricter multi-trial consistency metrics.

We present CANONIC: governed intelligence that compiles digital artifacts into an evidence ledger at scale. Large language models generate prose faster than anyone can check it, the failure Oxford Languages named 'slop', its 2025 Word of the Year. CANONIC governs whether content may enter a corpus the way a compiler decides whether a program is well-formed: mechanically, by a grammar, at the boundary of admission. Governance reduces to three axioms (Triad, Inheritance, Introspection) that map one-to-one onto compiler theory's syntax, scope-resolution, and type-system layers, and admission is a decidable, linear-time check. We then ask, with a pre-registered cross-provider benchmark across four regimes, whether structural admission keeps slop out. It does not: no prose-reading gate reliably separates reliable from unreliable content. Slop is not a property an algorithm computes. It is a verdict of domain expertise. So a governance layer does not decide slop; it keeps the record auditable -- every claim anchored to a definition, a commit, and an evidence window, reproducible and checkable end to end.

LLM-based simulators offer a promising path for generating complex synthetic data where traditional differentially private (DP) methods struggle with high-dimensional user profiles. But can LLMs faithfully reproduce statistical distributions from DP-protected inputs? We evaluate this using PersonaLedger, an agentic financial simulator, seeded with DP synthetic personas derived from real user statistics. We find that PersonaLedger achieves promising fraud detection utility (AUC 0.70 at epsilon=1) but exhibits significant distribution drift due to systematic LLM biases--learned priors overriding input statistics for temporal and demographic features. These failure modes must be addressed before LLM-based methods can handle the richer user representations where they might otherwise excel.