Automated Red Teaming

Modern web agents built on large vision-language models process webpages, select relevant UI elements, and translate model outputs into browser actions. Existing visual red-teaming approaches use adversarial visual content to manipulate this process. However, they primarily target model inference and do not explicitly account for structured input processing or action post-processing. Consequently, model-level success does not establish control over browser execution and cannot reliably characterize end-to-end agent robustness. To address this gap, we formulate red teaming for vision-grounded web agents as an end-to-end grounding-to-execution problem, and introduce WebMirage, a framework that crafts localized visual perturbations that cause agents to select attacker-controlled content and execute the corresponding browser action across varying webpage renderings. It uses a role-slot abstraction and webpage recomposition to capture competition among webpage elements, and dataflow analysis to align optimization with action post-processing. We evaluate WebMirage across four agent configurations and six VLM backbones on 2,250 tasks covering 13 public websites and a sandbox benchmark. WebMirage achieves an average attack success rate of 91.9%, compared with 17.4% for the strongest baseline, and remains effective against three agent-level defenses.

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreaks, and automated red teaming is the standard way to find jailbreaks in large language models at scale. Current methods either draw more samples at test time through search, rewriting, and tree expansion, or train a stronger attacker offline with reinforcement learning. Both share a limitation: once an attack on a specific target behavior begins, the attacker's weights are frozen. Any signal it gathers about the behavior stays in its context window and is discarded afterward. The attacker never adapts its proposal distribution mid-attack, so success depends almost entirely on the sampling budget, and under a budget affordable at scale, many behaviors remain unbroken. We propose Red-TTT, which updates the attacker's parameters during the attack on each behavior. At each round, the attacker samples a group of candidates, scores them against the victim's replies, and takes a policy-gradient step before drawing the next group, so what it discovers about the current victim is consolidated into weights rather than accumulated as context. We also adapt the training objective to red teaming, where success is judged by the single best sample rather than the average. Red-TTT requires only sampling access to the victim and integrates into existing attack pipelines with no other changes. Against the Best-of-N baseline, Red-TTT raises attack success rate from 55.9% to 72.4% on average at a budget of 120 samples, improving over the baseline in every configuration and cracking many behaviors previous method cannot. The code is available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Red-TTT

Autonomous red team agents increasingly stress-test AI-enabled cyber defenses by planning strategy and executing multistage attacks. Reinforcement learning (RL) and large language models (LLMs) offer complementary mechanisms for the planning and execution such agents require, and prior work has combined them in hybrid hierarchies. Yet a given architecture is typically developed and evaluated within a single environment, leaving open whether an observed advantage reflects a generally stronger decision mechanism or merely alignment with a particular setting. We address this gap with a controlled cross-environment comparison of two homogeneous hierarchical red team architectures: an RL planner with an RL executor (RL+RL) and an LLM planner with an LLM executor (LLM+LLM). We evaluate both against expert autonomous defenders in CybORG CAGE-4 and in Cyberwheel at two network scales, across 18 configurations under one unified disruption metric. We find a pronounced environment-dependent inversion. RL+RL wins the compact, densely rewarded CAGE-4 (78.5% disruption success versus 18.0% for the strongest LLM configuration) and the 100-host Cyberwheel network (81.0% versus 50.5%), while a pretrained cybersecurity LLM agent wins the larger, escalation-gated 1010-host Cyberwheel network (55.0% versus 0.0% for RL). A kill-chain analysis explains the inversion through architecture-specific bottlenecks that aggregate success rates conceal.In the 1010-host Cyberwheel network, RL discovers and compromises hosts but stalls at privilege escalation, whereas in CAGE-4, LLM agents obtain privileged access but rarely convert it into operational impact. These results indicate that conclusions drawn in a single environment may not generalize, and that hybrid planner-executor designs should be motivated by specific failure modes rather than the assumption that one architecture is universally preferable.

To keep coding agents from going off the rails, production systems now review each proposed action with a blocking monitor that can reject it before it runs (Auto Mode in Claude Code, Guardian in OpenAI's Codex). Prior evaluations of such monitors largely measure robustness to accidental harm or prompt injections from untrusted sources looking to hijack the agent. Less understood is how they hold up when the agent they monitor is persistently misaligned. To understand this risk, we task an adversarial agent with evading production blocking monitors and causing catastrophic harm, e.g. by exfiltrating its own weights. We find that when instructed with high-level attack strategies, adversarial agents can succeed through several distinct mechanisms, such as agent-generated prompt injection against the monitor, multi-agent attacks, and malicious compaction. In particular we find that in 79% of trials, the agent can use an injection attack against Auto Mode and Guardian to run arbitrary bash commands. We also find that it is possible to greatly improve Auto Mode through design changes like enhancements to tool coverage, transcript formatting and an agentic monitor stage. Even with these improvements, preventing multi-context attacks at an acceptable cost remains an open problem. By detailing our red-teaming methodology and highlighting new attack vectors, we aim to help defenders evaluate their mitigations against the possibility of persistent malign coding agents. Code is available at https://github.com/safety-research/red-teaming-auto-mode.

Agentic systems are rapidly moving to production, where they read untrusted inputs, call tools with real permissions, and act autonomously, expanding the security surface beyond chat-only models. Yet standard evaluations remain single-turn and fail to capture multi-step agent vulnerabilities. We present a systematic black-box framework for risk-aware agent evaluation requiring only basic system descriptions. Our approach introduces: (1) a seven-domain taxonomy mapping observable behaviors to risk categories, (2) fully automated SAGE-RT red teaming producing 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and (3) human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical validation across two agent architectures (CrewAI and AutoGen) with four base models reveals alarming patterns: 56.25% average governance risk, 65% privacy risk in multi-agent configurations, and agent behavior vulnerabilities reaching 85%. Our black-box approach effectively identifies critical architectural vulnerabilities without privileged access, providing a scalable path toward safer agent deployments.

LLM-based agent systems increasingly adopt skill-based architectures to reduce repetitive reasoning costs and improve stable, efficient task execution. Recent studies propose self-evolving agents that autonomously generate, refine, and reuse skills from past experiences to enable continuous capability evolution. However, autonomous skill evolution introduces a new attack surface in which malicious capabilities are generated, stored, and reused as legitimate skills. In this paper, we define EvoSkill Injection as a threat model targeting the autonomous skill generation and evolution pipeline of self-evolving agents. We further propose SARGE (Red-teaming Autonomous Skill Generation and Evolution in self-evolving agents), a red-teaming framework for evaluating this threat model through iterative generation, escalation, and reinforcement interactions. To support our framework, we construct EvoSkillBench, a benchmark dataset of malicious interaction trajectories for inducing malicious skill formation in self-evolving agents, and introduce EvoSkillSafetyBench, a post-attack benchmark for evaluating whether injected malicious skills are subsequently retrieved and activated as harmful behaviors. Our evaluation shows that SARGE induces malicious skill formation and that injected skills are persistently stored and repeatedly activated, highlighting the risk of persistent capability corruption.

Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal, and they are increasingly deployed to automate everyday digital tasks. Because they can be exposed to untrusted content while operating, they are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which an adversary plants instructions in content the agent will read and redirects it toward actions that violate the user's intent. Existing CUA safety benchmarks evaluate fixed injections written by hand, which may underestimate the risk posed by an adaptive adversary. We present SIR, a black box IPI attack that (i) composes stealthy injections from a small library of reusable principles stated in plain language and (ii) wraps composition in an iterative feedback loop that diagnoses the victim's failed trajectories and distills the bypasses into new, named strategies that are reapplied across tasks. Unlike prior red teaming of web agents, we target CUAs at the operating system level and score attacks with a fully deterministic oracle, using checks on filesystem, service, and permission state rather than an LLM judge. On experiment, we evaluate three frontier CUAs. Composing principles with feedback raises the attack success rate over a baseline written by hand, for example from 4% to 24% on Claude Opus 4.8 and from 0% to 28% on Gemini 3.5 Flash, while the benign task still completes. Principles discovered against one model further transfer to a different architecture with no additional feedback.

We introduce IO Factory, an AI-driven framework for simulating information and influence campaigns as fully integrated, traceable processes. The threat of digital manipulation now extends beyond persuasive text from individual language models to AI swarms, i.e., persistent groups of coordinated agents that adapt to platform feedback and disguise organized campaigns as ordinary social interaction. Because such campaigns cannot be identified from isolated messages alone, they must be analyzed across a continuous spectrum of planning, platform action, exposure, interpretation, measurement, and adaptation. IO Factory represents this process inside a controlled simulated platform, linking actor roles, platform actions, exposure records, structured model-based evaluations, and configured changes in the simulated population. We implement the architecture and evaluate it across configurations of up to 100,000 agents. The results show that IO Factory executes campaign timelines at scale and produces inspectable evidence of exposure and measured movement in configured belief variables. By recording the actors, objectives, action constraints, exposure paths, and measurement rules used in each run, IO Factory supports reproducible research and red-team analysis of coordinated influence.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has facilitated their ubiquitous integration into various domains, leading to widespread adoption. However, this escalating trend has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, necessitating the identification and mitigation of flaws arising from malicious exploitation. Red teaming assessments, conducted to evaluate model robustness through diverse adversarial inputs, are essential for exposing security risks and implementing countermeasures. Currently, red teaming is performed either manually by experts or automatically using predefined attack datasets. Nevertheless, manual testing remains time-consuming, while existing automated methods suffer from limited creativity due to their inherent dependency on fixed datasets. In this study, we propose an automated, human-independent, and adaptive approach leveraging GFlowNets to identify LLM vulnerabilities by utilizing one large language model to test another. Within this framework, an attacker model is trained against a specified victim model to perform automated red teaming and provide a quantitative robustness score. This research aims to generate more effective adversarial attacks in English compared to existing benchmarks and, as a novel contribution to the literature, introduces a model capable of generating attack inputs in the Turkish language.

Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets. To bridge this gap, we introduce Trident, an agentic LLM red teaming framework comprising three components: a dynamic benchmark with isolated sandbox servers spanning CybORG CAGE 4 and CyberWheel, a dataset comprises over 13,000 high-fidelity red-blue interaction trajectories for RLVR, and a ``Code-as-Policy'' RLVR agentic architecture Trident Agentic). The latter reformulates red agent training as a contextual bandit via a tripartite Log Summarizer--Planner--Coder design, where a trainable Planner generates complete attack strategies from compressed execution logs, which a frozen Coder translates into executable Python policies deployed against live DRL defenders. Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prioritization that static heuristics entirely fail to uncover.

Long-term memory enables LLM agents to retain useful information across sessions, but also creates an attack surface through which adversaries may poison an agent's persistent memory to steer its behavior. Existing memory poisoning attacks mainly rely on individually malicious records, overlooking a compositional threat: multiple benign-looking memories may jointly induce unsafe behavior. In this paper, we introduce MemCollusion, an automated red-teaming framework for constructing collusive memory poisoning attacks. MemCollusion applies salami tactics---a strategy that slices an adversarial objective into small, individually innocuous pieces---to generate memory fragments that are individually benign looking but collectively harmful. It constructs memory coalitions using four design constraints, five theory-informed strategies, and a fine-tuned generator. To assess collusive memory poisoning in a realistic cross-session setting, we develop MoltLab, a controlled research reproduction of Moltbook, in which crafted platform content must first be observed and distilled into persistent memory before influencing the agent's behavior in a separate session. We evaluate MemCollusion on OpenClaw using two backbone models across 48 scenarios. Under the strongest memory-saving setting, MemCollusion achieves an average Memory Save Rate of 81.3% and an Attack Success Rate of 75.0%, and remains effective under both benign memory dilution and memory-level defenses.

We introduce \textbf{GPT-Red}, an automated red-teaming agent that is trained to discover novel prompt injection attacks against frontier LLMs. The goal of this model is to evaluate and improve the robustness of our production systems. To this end, we use it to adversarially train GPT-5.6, our most robust model to prompt injections to date. To create GPT-Red, we design a scalable self-play algorithm where the model is tasked with attacking a diverse population of simultaneously-trained defender agents. We train the model on realistic red-teaming environments using compute on the same scale as some of our largest RL post-training runs, making it the single-largest LLM safety training run ever documented. GPT-Red excels at red-teaming: it reliably breaks our past models up to GPT-5.5, it finds more successful attacks than human red-teamers, and it generalizes to held-out environments, defender models, and harnesses. In the future, we expect that as we improve the robustness of each new GPT model, it will in turn will provide better learning signal for \textit{even stronger} red-teamer agents, thus unlocking a self-improvement flywheel.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed for nuanced content safety and moderation tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks and out-of-distribution edge cases. Traditional active learning and manual annotation fail to scale against the complexity and volume of novel multimodal threats. In this paper, we propose an automated, agentic red-teaming framework that systematically synthesizes difficult examples using an iterative strategy that proposes novel hypotheses as well as mutating on past attempts. Leveraging a multi-agent architecture that consists of a high-reasoning Architect agent, an advanced image generator, and a multi-level verification committee of LLM raters, our system autonomously uncovers boundary-pushing violations and ambiguous policy edge cases without any human intervention. By employing these carefully synthesized adversarial examples as in-context demonstrations via test-time Retrieval, we substantially improve the target model's robustness, reducing the False Negative Rate (FNR) from 41.2% to 24.5% in a public image safety benchmark without relying on any human labeling.

Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools. Existing approaches mainly optimize attack success and preserve artifacts such as benchmarks, payloads, or attack programs, which record where attacks succeed but not the enabling conditions behind unsafe agent behavior. We study automated red-teaming for production LLM agents using one agentic research environment to discover reusable vulnerability knowledge about another. We present AHA, a falsifiable discovery loop that proposes a vulnerability hypothesis, constructs a falsifier, instantiates a valid attack, executes it in a sandboxed harness, reflects on the trajectory, and promotes confirmed findings into a Vulnerability Concept Graph (VCG). Each concept links an attacker-facing surface to an unsafe trajectory through a claim, enabling condition, falsifier, transfer prediction, and supporting evidence. Across Claude Code and Codex on three scenarios covering direct and indirect attacks, the discovered concepts reveal a reusable vulnerability core across models and agents. A frozen VCG requires no further search and outperforms the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 percentage points under the same single-shot protocol, while transferring across scenarios and attack channels. The resulting VCG provides an auditable artifact for production safety teams to inspect vulnerabilities, validate patches, and accumulate reusable safety knowledge. Our code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/Auto-research-red-teaming-in-sleep.

We introduce the Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS): a new class of AI agent that treats exploit capability as a mutable, versioned kernel it extends at runtime, observing its own failures, synthesising new capabilities, proving them against a live target, and hot-loading them back into itself. Mako is the first SE-AOS instance for security research and the autonomous web exploitation engine developed within LaunchSafe. LaunchSafe builds autonomous security agents for continuous offensive testing and agent-driven security research; Mako is the core engine behind that platform. On the public XBOW validation-benchmarks, 104 containerised, CTF-style web applications spanning 26 vulnerability classes across three difficulty tiers, Mako achieves full-suite coverage: it drives every one of the 104 targets to emit a cryptographically fresh, per-build flag, under a verification regime that makes fabricated or memorised results impossible. Our central result is a law of autonomous exploitation: once a capability exists and is discoverable, difficulty collapses; capability, not reasoning, is what is scarce, together with an architecture and formalism that turn that law into a self-improving system. Mako further runs a gated self-evolution loop that proposes, sandboxes, and commits improvements to its own agents and rules when fitness does not regress. We deliberately withhold the operational results, payloads, exploit chains, and tool source, because a system that reduces full-spectrum web exploitation to a repeatable, machine-speed pipeline is dual-use research of concern. We publish the science; we withhold the weapon.

Agentic AI systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into autonomous decision-making systems, exposing attack vectors beyond those of traditional LLM vulnerabilities. Existing security evaluations are often tied to specific implementations or domains, limiting unified comparison across heterogeneous systems. To address this gap, we introduce RIFT-Bench, a representation-driven methodology for dynamic red-teaming that enables unified evaluations across diverse agentic architectures. Building on a novel hierarchical representation, RIFT-Bench operates in two automated phases: Discovery, which extracts system structure, and Scanning, which executes adaptive adversarial attacks. It directly evaluates the examined system using 105 adaptive adversarial probes spanning diverse attack vectors and objectives. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation pipeline across 45 agentic systems spanning a diverse range of implementations, showing that the approach generalizes effectively to heterogeneous agentic architectures. Beyond systems and attacks, RIFT-Bench also supports direct evaluation of mitigation strategies. These key capabilities make RIFT-Bench a scalable foundation for security evaluation of agentic AI systems in practice. Infrastructure code and benchmark artifacts are available at https://tinyurl.com/RIFTBench.

Hierarchical multi-agent systems (MAS) are rapidly being deployed in high-stakes workflows across domains such as finance and software engineering. In these systems, safety and security are inherently distributed across role-specialized agents, significantly expanding the attack surface, particularly under coordinated adversarial behaviors such as privilege escalation and cross-agent collusion. Existing red-teaming approaches for MAS remain limited: they rely on heuristic selection of target agents and perturb isolated message streams, leaving critical questions unanswered as which agents are most responsible for system safety, and how compromised agents can coordinate to bypass defenses. We propose MAStrike, a closed-loop framework for collusive red-teaming in hierarchical MAS. We propose the first agent-level Shapley value analysis for MAS, quantifying each agent's marginal contribution to system robustness under task-specific distributions. GGuided by this attribution, MAStrike identifies vulnerable agent coalitions and generates coordinated, role-aware adversarial manipulations. These attacks are iteratively refined through structured causal diagnosis, attributing failure cases to uncompromised agents that block adversarial attempts. We further build a comprehensive MAS red-teaming benchmark and controllable environments spanning diverse hierarchical topologies and domains, including finance, software engineering, and CRM. Extensive experiments across MAS built on multiple frontier models show that MAStrike substantially outperforms heuristic baselines. Our analysis further uncovers non-trivial Shapley value distributions and higher-order interaction structures among agents, revealing critical vulnerabilities and coordination patterns that are overlooked by prior single-agent or template-based methods.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space.

Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable instructions, tool interfaces, and executable code, and users increasingly install third-party skills from marketplaces, repositories, and community channels. Because a skill exposes both executable behavior and context-setting documentation, its deployment risk cannot be measured by single-shot audits or prompt-level red teams alone: a realistic attacker can use audit and runtime feedback to repeatedly rewrite the skill. We frame this risk as \emph{adaptive leakage} -- whether a budgeted attacker can iteratively revise a skill until it passes audit and produces verified runtime harm -- and present \ours{}, a grey-box self-evolving red-team framework for measuring it. Proteus searches a formalized five-axis skill-attack space. Each candidate is evaluated through a unified audit-sandbox-oracle pipeline that returns structured audit findings and runtime evidence to guide cross-round mutation. Beyond initial evasion, Proteus performs path expansion, which finds alternative implementations of successful attacks, and surface expansion, which transfers learned implementation patterns to new attack objectives beyond the original seed catalogue. Across eight phase-1 cells, Proteus reaches 40--90% Attack Success Rate at $5$ rounds (ASR@5) with positive learning-curve slopes on both evaluated auditors. Phase-2 path/surface expansion produces 438 jointly bypassing and lethal variants, with SkillVetter bypassed at $\geq 93\%$ in every cell and AI-Infra-Guard, the strongest public auditor we evaluate, still admitting up to 41.3% joint-success. These results show that current skill vetting substantially underestimates residual risk when evaluated against adaptive, feedback-driven attackers.

Web-browsing AI agents are increasingly deployed in enterprise settings under strict whitelists of approved domains, yet adversaries can still influence them by embedding hidden instructions in the HTML pages those domains serve. Existing red-teaming resources fall short of this scenario: prompt-injection benchmarks ship pre-built adversarial pages that whitelisted agents cannot reach, and generic LLM scanners probe the model API rather than its retrieved content. We present IPI-proxy, an open-source toolkit for red-teaming web-browsing agents against indirect prompt injection (IPI). At its core is an intercepting proxy that rewrites real HTTP responses from whitelisted domains in flight, embedding payloads drawn from a unified library of 820 deduplicated attack strings extracted from six published benchmarks (BIPIA, InjecAgent, AgentDojo, Tensor Trust, WASP, and LLMail-Inject). A YAML-driven test harness independently parameterizes the payload set, the embedding technique (HTML comment, invisible CSS, or LLM-generated semantic prose), and the HTML insertion point (6 locations from \icode{head_meta} to \icode{script_comment}), enabling parameter-sweep evaluation without mock pages or sandboxed environments. A companion exfiltration tracker logs successful callbacks. This paper describes the threat model, situates IPI-proxy among contemporary IPI benchmarks and red-teaming tools, and details its architecture, design decisions, and configuration interface. By bridging static benchmarks and live deployment, IPI-proxy gives AI security teams a reproducible substrate for measuring and hardening web-browsing agents against indirect prompt injection on the same retrieval surface attackers exploit in production.

Automated red-teaming for LLMs often discovers narrow attack slices, missing diverse real-world threats, and yielding insufficient data for safety fine-tuning. We introduce Persona-Conditioned Adversarial Prompting (PCAP), which conditions adversarial search on diverse attacker personas (e.g., doctors, students, malicious actors) and strategy sets to explore realistic attack scenarios. By running parallel persona-conditioned searches, PCAP discovers transferable jailbreaks across different contexts and generates rich defense datasets with automatic metadata tracking. On GPT-OSS 120B, PCAP increases attack success from 57% to 97% while producing 2-6$\times$ more diverse prompts covering varied real-world scenarios. Critically, fine-tuning lightweight adapters on PCAP-generated data significantly improves model robustness (recall: 0.36 $\rightarrow$ 0.99, F1: 0.53 $\rightarrow$ 0.96) with minimal false positives, demonstrating a practical closed-loop approach from vulnerability discovery to automated alignment.

Automation platforms such as GitHub Actions and n8n are increasingly adopting so-called agentic workflows, which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) agents for tasks such as code review and data synchronization. While bringing convenience for developers, this integration exposes a new risk: An adversary may control and craft certain inputs, such as GitHub issue comments, to manipulate the LLM agent for unwanted actions, such as credential exfiltration and arbitrary command execution. To our knowledge, no prior academic work has studied such a risk in agentic workflows. In this paper, we design the first detection and exploitation framework, called JAW, to hijack agentic workflows hosted on automation platforms via a novel approach called Context-Grounded Evolution. Our key idea is to evolve agentic workflow inputs under the contexts derived from hybrid program analysis for hijacking purposes. Specifically, JAW generates agentic workflow contexts through three analyses: (i) static path-feasibility analysis to identify feasible agent-invocation paths and the input constraints required to trigger them, (ii) dynamic prompt-provenance analysis to determine how that input is transformed and embedded into the LLM context, and (iii) capability analysis to identify the actions and restrictions available to the agent at runtime. Our evaluation of JAW on GitHub workflows and n8n templates showed that 4714 GitHub workflows and eight n8n templates can be successfully hijacked, for example, to leak user credentials. Our findings span 15 widely-used GitHub Actions, including official GitHub Actions for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Qwen CLI, and Cursor CLI, and two official n8n nodes. We responsibly disclosed all findings to the affected vendors and received many acknowledgements, fixes, and bug bounties, notably from GitHub, Google, and Anthropic.

We introduce a red-teaming methodology that exposes harder-to-catch attacks for coding-agent monitors, suggesting that current practices may under-elicit attacks and overstate monitor performance. We identify three challenges with current red-teaming. First, mode collapse in attack generation, which we reduce with a novel attack taxonomy for broader coverage. Second, a conceive-execute gap: frontier LLMs can propose strong attack ideas or execute them, but not all at once. We mitigate this by decomposing attack construction into strategy generation, execution, and post-hoc trajectory refinement. Third, manual elicitation is costly to scale, which we address with our semi-automated red-teaming pipeline. Applied to BashArena, an AI control setting for tool-using coding agents, this pipeline produces MonitoringBench, a benchmark of 2,644 attack trajectories for evaluating monitor capabilities and failure modes. Our pipeline produces more diverse and stronger attacks: Opus-4.5 monitor's catch rate falls from 94.9% on elicited-only Opus attacks to 60.3% on our best refined attacks, with larger drops for several mid-tier monitors. Attacks optimized against three development monitors generalize to ten held-out monitors, with catch rates generally increasing with monitor capability. Using this benchmark, we provide a snapshot of the current monitor capabilities and find that frontier monitors often detect suspicious actions but fall for persuasion or fail to calibrate suspiciousness scores appropriately, suggesting tractable paths for improvement. MonitoringBench provides both a static benchmark for current tool-use monitors and a reusable methodology for refreshing these evaluations as agents and monitors improve.

Recent developments in AI safety research have called for red-teaming methods that effectively surface potential risks posed by generative AI models, with growing emphasis on how red-teamers' backgrounds and perspectives shape their strategies and the risks they uncover. While automated red-teaming approaches promise to complement human red-teaming through larger-scale exploration, existing automated approaches do not account for human identities and rarely incorporate human inputs. In this work, we explore persona-driven red-teaming to advance both automated red-teaming and human-AI collaboration. We first develop PersonaTeaming Workflow, which incorporates personas into the adversarial prompt generation process to explore a wider spectrum of adversarial strategies. Compared to RainbowPlus, a state-of-the-art automated red-teaming method, PersonaTeaming Workflow achieves higher attack success rates while maintaining prompt diversity. However, since automated personas only approximate real human perspectives, we further instantiate PersonaTeaming Workflow as PersonaTeaming Playground, a user-facing interface that enables red-teamers to author their own personas and collaborate with AI to mutate and refine prompts. In a user study with 11 industry practitioners, we found that PersonaTeaming Playground enabled diverse red-teaming strategies and outputs that practitioners perceived as useful, and that AI-generated suggestions in the PersonaTeaming Playground encouraged out-of-the-box thinking even when practitioners did not follow them strictly. Together, our work advances both automated and human-in-the-loop approaches to red-teaming, while shedding light on interaction patterns and design insights for supporting human-AI collaboration in generative AI red-teaming.

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

AI systems are entering critical domains like healthcare, finance, and defense, yet remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While AI red teaming is a primary defense, current approaches force operators into manual, library-specific workflows. Operators spend weeks hand-crafting workflows - assembling attacks, transforms, and scorers. When results fall short, workflows must be rebuilt. As a result, operators spend more time constructing workflows than probing targets for security and safety vulnerabilities. We introduce an AI red teaming agent built on the open-source Dreadnode SDK. The agent creates workflows grounded in 45+ adversarial attacks, 450+ transforms, and 130+ scorers. Operators can probe multi-agent systems, multilingual, and multimodal targets, focusing on what to probe rather than how to implement it. We make three contributions: 1. Agentic interface. Operators describe goals in natural language via the Dreadnode TUI (Terminal User Interface). The agent handles attack selection, transform composition, execution, and reporting, letting operators focus on red teaming. Weeks compress to hours. 2. Unified framework. A single framework for probing traditional ML models (adversarial examples) and generative AI systems (jailbreaks), removing the need for separate libraries. 3. Llama Scout case study. We red team Meta Llama Scout and achieve an 85% attack success rate with severity up to 1.0, using zero human-developed code

Automated methods for red teaming LLMs are an important tool to identify LLM vulnerabilities that may not be covered in static benchmarks, allowing for more thorough probing. They can also adapt to each specific LLM to discover weaknesses unique to it. Most current automated red teaming methods are intended for tackling safety and content moderation. Thus, they make use of content safety models as evaluators and optimize for circumventing them, and as such, have not been tested with other adversarial intents not typically captured by these. We propose a pipeline for training a red teaming model that can generalize to arbitrary adversarial goals, including objectives it has not been directly trained on, and that does not depend on the existence of a pre-existing evaluator available at training time. We demonstrate that finetuning small models, such as Qwen3-8B, using this pipeline results in a substantial improvement in their ability to generate attacks for both in and out of domain adversarial goals.

Automated red-teaming methods for large language models typically optimize attack prompts within a fixed, human-designed strategy, leaving the attack strategy itself unchanged. We instead optimize the strategy. We propose AutoRISE, a method that searches over executable attack programs rather than individual prompts. At each iteration, a coding agent edits a strategy and a fixed evaluation harness scores the resulting attacks, returning both a scalar objective and per-example diagnostics that guide subsequent edits. This allows structural changes, including new attack components and altered control flow, that prompt-level methods do not directly express. We also release two benchmark suites developed on disjoint target sets and evaluate on 11 models from five families against seven established jailbreak datasets. Across held-out models, AutoRISE improves average attack success rate by 17.0 points over the strongest baseline, and improves attack success by up to 16 points on frontier targets with low baseline success rates. Ablations against parametric and strategy-library baselines suggest that these gains arise from unrestricted program search, particularly compositional techniques and control-flow edits. AutoRISE operates in a black-box, inference-only setting, requiring no fine-tuning, human annotation, or GPU compute.

Many approaches to LLM red-teaming leverage an attacker LLM to discover jailbreaks against a target. Several of them task the attacker with identifying effective strategies through trial and error, resulting in a semantically limited range of successes. Another approach discovers diverse attacks by combining crowdsourced harmful queries and tactics into instructions for the attacker, but does so at random, limiting effectiveness. This article introduces a novel framework, Adaptive Instruction Composition, that combines crowdsourced texts according to an adaptive mechanism trained to jointly optimize effectiveness with diversity. We use reinforcement learning to balance exploration with exploitation in a combinatorial space of instructions to guide the attacker toward diverse generations tailored to target vulnerabilities. We demonstrate that our approach substantially outperforms random combination on a set of effectiveness and diversity metrics, even under model transfer. Further, we show that it surpasses a host of recent adaptive approaches on Harmbench. We employ a lightweight neural contextual bandit that adapts to contrastive embedding inputs, and provide ablations suggesting that the contrastive pretraining enables the network to rapidly generalize and scale to the massive space as it learns.