Cybersecurity

The banking system now depends on a small set of shared artificial intelligence vendors for fraud screening, credit decisioning, anti-money-laundering triage, customer analytics, and internal decision support. This paper studies how a compromise inside one of those vendors can propagate along a chain of operational, informational, and financial linkages until it triggers losses that look, from the outside, like a classical banking crisis. We build a four-layer heterogeneous network that couples AI vendors, financial institutions, interbank exposures, and customer accounts, and we propose CFC-Prop, a stochastic epidemic-and-clearing model that runs on that network. On a synthetic dataset with 60 vendors, 220 banks, roughly 2,500 vendor-bank service edges, and 1,400 interbank exposures, CFC-Prop reproduces the heavy-tailed loss distributions and the sharp dependence on patch latency that are consistent with prior cyber-financial evidence. We also train an early-warning model, CFC-GNN, that uses vendor-side incident telemetry and graph structure to flag high-cascade-risk vendors before impact. Across four baselines the proposed model reaches AUROC 0.82 and AUPRC 0.60 while keeping calibration errors bounded. We release the full code, synthetic data, and reproducible scripts. The results argue that cyber concentration among AI vendors is a first-order financial-stability problem and give supervisors a concrete quantitative tool for reasoning about it.

Cyberattacks against Operational Technology (OT) systems, which monitor and control industrial processes, pose an increasing threat to essential societal services. For this reason, developing automated intrusion response strategies is highly important. In this paper, we present a formal model of an OT intrusion response use case using the POMDP framework. It includes a realistic model of partial observability that is based on traffic measurements. This approach allows us to develop tractable, learning-based solution methods for automated intrusion response, which are based on PPO. We evaluate the obtained response strategies on an emulated OT system and find that they are effective against several types of MITRE attacks for the studied use case.

The digitalisation of electrical distribution networks has increased the exposure of power-grid infrastructure to cyber attacks. Existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs), however, often rely on computationally expensive deep learning models that are difficult to deploy at the edge. Periodic retraining also exposes these systems to machine unlearning attacks, where selective data removal can degrade detection performance. We propose a hybrid Spiking Neural Network (SNN) and XGBoost architecture that combines efficient temporal encoding with a lightweight classifier and provides structural resilience to such attacks. The SNN is trained once on clean data and used as a fixed feature extractor, while only the XGBoost classifier is retrained during model updates. Evaluated on two real-world public power-system datasets, the proposed method achieves 99.9% accuracy (F1-macro 0.999) on the Synchrophasor dataset and 95.0% accuracy (F1-macro 0.943) on the MSU/ORNL dataset, outperforming standalone baselines. Under selective label-flipping attacks, the hybrid model loses only 0.9% F1-macro at 10% poisoning and delays target-class collapse from 60% to 70% poisoning compared with raw models. These results demonstrate that neuromorphic temporal encoding can provide both accurate cyber-attack detection and improved resilience to data poisoning in cyber-physical systems.

Enterprises managing large X.509 certificate inventories face a prioritization problem: deterministic analysis tools that precisely identify standards violations are indispensable for remediation, but applying them exhaustively across millions of certificates is operationally impractical. We present X-amine509, a two-stage triage system that uses machine learning to rapidly rank certificates by predicted risk and route only the highest-risk items to full deterministic analysis. Certificate risk is quantified as a composite score derived from 177 defect checks grounded in CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, NIST IR 8547/SP 800-57, and cryptographic strength criteria, weighted by security severity across four tiers ranging from cryptographic breaks to minor compliance deviations. We collected 1,027,714 X.509 certificates from Fortune 500, .gov, and .edu domains and scored each using this rubric. On a held-out test set of 201,976 certificates, our best model (Extra Trees) achieves $R^2$ of 0.993 with MAE of 2.26, while Decision Tree scores $R^2$ of 0.986 at 3.7 million certificates per second on a single machine. Ranking quality confirms the triage value: aggregate NDCG exceeds 0.997, and severity-tier classification reports 99.76% accuracy with 98.90% recall on critical-tier defects. Thirteen months later, we retrieved another 571,374 certificates to test our models' durability over time, and the Extra Trees and Decision Tree models maintain MAE below 6.8, $R^2$ of at least 0.915, aggregate NDCG above 0.988, severity-tier accuracy of at least 99.52%, and critical-tier recall of at least 97.03%. Feature importance analysis identifies validity period, Extended Key Usage configuration, negative serial number encoding, and self-signed status as the strongest risk predictors, providing coarse interpretability at the triage stage.

Threat hunting increasingly depends on converting unstructured knowledge (e.g., Cyber Threat Intelligence reports) into actionable hunt leads: concise, investigable hypotheses grounded in observable artifacts and adversary techniques. Producing such leads manually is a tedious and hard-to-scale task. Existing automated approaches stop at the entity layer, ignore the defender's operational environment, and analyze each report in isolation. To address these gaps, we introduce AHLERT, a system that automatically extracts relevant, environment-aware, and hunt leads from threat reports through (i) a hybrid retriever that combines dense vector search with multi-hop traversal over a knowledge graph seeded with MITRE ATT&CK; (ii) an ontology-grounding retrieval-augmented generation method that constrains each lead to the defender's own assets and controls; and (iii) an LLM-agnostic framework that emits structured, directly actionable leads rather than loose indicators of compromise. We evaluate AHLERT on public CTI reports for well-known APTs across multiple proprietary and open-weight models. Hybrid evidence retrieval with ontology grounding raises mean F1 by ~2x (0.44 to 0.85) over a single-route flat-RAG baseline, and AHLERT attains the highest effectiveness score (~86.95%) compared with off-the-shelf LLM models.

Training capable cyber agents is often treated primarily as a problem of model scale, yet open-weight post-training is constrained more directly by the cost of executable environments, reliable multi-turn supervision, and access to strong teachers. We present a data-centric framework that addresses these bottlenecks through five complementary systems: Choulea analyzes hidden reasoning signatures, SkyReal reduces teacher-sampling cost, Hongzwang bypasses API restrictions on teacher execution, PSBreakup restores capabilities weakened by model merging, and Kreator converts expert interventions into trainable reasoning. Our data engine constructs resettable coding, vulnerability, CTF, kernel-history, full-exploit, firmware, and device-backed environments. Candidate trajectories are retained only after execution verification and evidence auditing, yielding 164,269 trajectories for long-context supervised fine-tuning. The three checkpoints improve over their starting models by an average of 23.76% on the full CyberGym suite and 10.49% across the pooled CTF suites. As of September 1, 2026, Feyospace-s1 achieves a verified success rate of 63.24% and ranks 10th on the official CyberGym leaderboard, while all three checkpoints rank 1st among models at comparable parameter scales. To our knowledge, this is the first end-to-end demonstration that a seven-person independent team can train open-weight models with leading agentic cyber capability.

In multi-robot collaboration, task handovers rely on downstream verifiers performing remote attestation, which inspects sensor telemetry to ensure a robot's physical behavior strictly matches its assigned task. But can this telemetry be trusted? We show that it often cannot. In this paper, we uncover a severe vulnerability in Robot Operating System (ROS) 2: by modifying a single environment variable, an adversary can execute a pre-built hook to covertly intercept and inject both telemetry and control signals before they are published. Consequently, adversaries can hijack a robot to perform dangerous tasks while spoofing downstream verifiers with synthesized fake telemetry. Worse still, by exploiting the widespread reliance on third-party Docker containers and auxiliary tools, attackers can distribute compromised packages embedded with these malicious hooks to launch such attacks easily. On a physical Franka Emika robotic arm running Secure ROS 2, our attack injects fabricated telemetry in real time with only around 3 ms of jitter, preserving temporal synchronization and hardware integrity while achieving an 87% success rate even against an AI-based detector. We have responsibly disclosed these findings to the ROS 2 development team. We prepared a demo video available at https://youtu.be/ExeiGqUrnhQ.

Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems in industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) environments are increasingly required to meet formal resilience criteria: absorbed adversarial disturbances, graceful degradation under sustained attack, and certified system-level guarantees. Existing resilience frameworks for cyber-physical systems define absorb-recover-adapt trajectories at the architectural level but do not treat machine learning anomaly detectors as first-class components, leaving a gap between component-level robustness evaluation and system-level resilience certification. In this paper, we establish that adversarial robustness in ICS anomaly detection is a specific instantiation of system resilience, and formalise this connection by mapping four resilience constructs, i.e. disturbance class, absorption capacity, recovery trajectory, and degradation function, onto the adversarial machine learning setting. We derive a compositional resilience bound for heterogeneous ICS detection networks, showing that the binding constraint on system-level resilience is the coupling-adjusted absorption capacity of each node along the attack path, not the per-node capacity -- so the binding node need not be the weakest one. Empirical validation on the BATADAL water distribution system benchmark demonstrates that the resulting metrics surface operationally significant phenomena invisible to standard benchmarks: the absorption-degradation divergence under adversarial training, and the paradox that hardening the binding node in isolation reduces system-level resilience. Implications for ICS architecture design and certification standards are discussed.

Trust-Hub reuses host circuits: several files differ mainly in the inserted Trojan. When gates from sibling variants enter both training and test folds, a detector can benefit from host logic it has already seen. We measure that effect instead of proposing another classifier. The corpus contains 49,124 gates from 16 netlists grouped into five host families. We left the parser, 36 gate features, class weighting, model settings, threshold, and family-level aggregation unchanged and altered one choice: the test boundary. The three settings draw test gates from the pooled corpus, withhold a complete netlist, or withhold every variant of one host. The choice matters. Random forest records F1/AP of 0.914/0.978 with pooled gates, 0.636/0.851 with one netlist held out, and 0.460/0.577 with a host family held out. XGBoost falls from 0.946/0.976 to 0.464/0.544 across the same comparison. Logistic regression loses AP, although its fixed-threshold F1 is not monotonic. Each family shows the same pooled-to-family direction. Feature removal, repeated model and simulator seeds, score normalization, parser-related exclusions, and a smaller sample change the size of the gap without reversing it. Aggregation also matters: a gate-weighted average is dominated by the larger ISCAS files, so the headline values give each host family one vote. Bootstrap and jackknife summaries keep the gap positive, but their folds reuse training families. We treat the five family rows as descriptive evidence rather than independent trials. Five host families are too few for a population claim, and the experiment says nothing about transfer to a new cell library or an industrial design. It supports a narrower conclusion: sibling benchmark variants can inflate apparent transfer. Benchmarks with several variants of one host circuit should report family-aware holdouts and all five family results beside pooled scores.

Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) mainly rely on signatures to detect known attacks, which can leave gaps against modified or previously unseen payloads. Positive security provides a complementary approach by learning legitimate traffic and blocking inputs that fall outside the learned profile. However, learning directly from live traffic can be unsafe when malicious requests contaminate the training data. This paper presents the Whitelisting Autonomous Policy Producer (WAPP), a framework that combines trust filtering, deterministic rule synthesis, confidence scoring, and validation before enforcement. WAPP is evaluated on three controlled applications using a live Coraza and OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) stack. Results show that, on the tested DVWA username field, unfiltered learning becomes Degraded at 0.2% poisoned traffic and Broken at 0.5%, while the evaluated free text field can admit malicious inputs even without poisoning. On the frozen poisoning dataset, the ablation configuration with all seven candidate signals improves the measured poisoning resilience from 53% to 90%, compared with 62% for the Kruegel--Vigna baseline. The deterministic synthesizer provides attack blocking comparable to the tested language model without model inference cost. WAPP blocks confirmed CRS bypasses on constrained fields, while free text inputs remain a precision challenge that requires character level operator control.

Multi-chiplet photonic neural network accelerators (MCPNAs) combine photonic computation, photonic communica-tion, and heterogeneous chiplet integration to enable scalable and energy-efficient AI acceleration. However, their distributed archi-tecture and reliance on third-party chiplets introduce significant hardware security risks. This paper examines Hardware Trojan (HT) threats to MCPNAs across three dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Security Operations Centers (SOCs) process large amounts of tickets, most of which are low-interest events not worthy of further investigation. The repetitive nature of this task and similarity of the vast amounts of tickets make it a prime candidate for generative AI-based automation. We created and deployed an agentic AI companion utilizing large language models through fieldwork within a SOC for over one year. The design of the SOC AI companion was driven by researchers' participation and interactions within the SOC's daily work. SOC analysts were invited to use it during the last four months of the fieldwork. We analyzed the analysts' usage of the companion and found that in more than 90% of the cases the companion's outputs were reused by analysts in the ticket's closing report. Our results showed that when designed "in the trenches" with the intended users, a SOC AI companion can go beyond being yet another tool, but rather a system that co-evolves with its human users as it traverses through the various types of workloads. Analysts naturally started to shape the AI companion's behaviors to fit their particular needs. Our data show that the more human analysts shape the AI companion's behaviors, the more they become comfortable trusting the output from the AI system, resulting in improved productivity.

One of the biggest risks faced by Software Defined Networks (SDN) is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack in which a compromised controller can make an entire network unusable. To address these challenges, we suggest an entropy-guided machine learning framework, called XAI-SDN, for real-time DDoS detection in SDN environments which is lightweight and explainable. The framework extends the flow features extracted by CICFlowMeter with eight Shannon entropy metrics obtained by an $\mathcal{O}(1)$ rolling algorithm and uses a Random Forest classifier with SHAP TreeExplainer for providing transparency at the prediction level. On a fixed temporal split, XAI-SDN achieves an accuracy of 99.9987%, a macro F1-score of 99.9621%, and an AUC-ROC of 1.0000 on the full 3.59 million flows of the CIC-DDoS2019 SYN benchmark. The pipeline sustains 0.0165ms per flow (60{,}606 flows/s) without the use of SHAP and 0.5122ms per flow (1{,}953 flows/s) with full support of SHAP under the 99.14% prevalence of DDoS traffic, which is a step towards achieving a balance between the detection performance and operational transparency in next-generation SDN security.

Despite its introduction more than a quarter century ago, Conformal Prediction (CP) has seen surprisingly few applications to the cyber security world thus far. In particular, we observe that, while CP has been employed as a defensive measure in many recent works, its use for carrying out attacks (i.e., for offensive security) is hard to trace in the literature. We explore this gap, by presenting initial findings in two key areas of offensive security: Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning, and network traffic analysis.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as autonomous SOC analysts, but two limitations make them unreliable at enterprise scale: a finite context window cannot hold a multi-thousand-host authentication graph, and free-form generation offers no guarantee that a recommended containment action is consistent with the topology it operates on. We present Sentinel-RL, an agentic-SOC architecture that decouples topological reasoning from semantic reasoning: a heterogeneous graph attention encoder summarizes the live authentication subgraph into a fixed-dimensional state, a Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) policy maps this state to a constrained set of investigative actions, and an LLM agent loop is restricted to consuming the policy's recommendations and producing analyst-readable narratives gated by a critic. We instantiate the system on the LANL Comprehensive, Multi-Source Cyber-Security Events dataset and the Indiana University Quartz HPC cluster, reporting four results: (i) a two-phase CREATE ingestion pattern loads a 24M-edge authentication subgraph into Neo4j in 14.2 minutes on a single 32-core node, roughly 24x faster than the canonical MERGE-based pipeline; (ii) a sliding-window alert engine reliably trips a 25-event/10-second threshold in <=2.5 s across 50 trials; (iii) PPO training over 200 iterations converges to a mean episodic return of 8.74+/-0.31, with held-out precision of 0.91 and recall of 0.87 on labeled red-team events; and (iv) the integrated containment loop completes a full detect-investigate-recommend-human-approve cycle in a median of 6.3 s. We contribute a reusable engineering pattern (the hot-node deadlock workaround), a portable HPC deployment pattern (anchor-node co-location), and an enterprise-readiness analysis covering false-positive economics, reversibility guarantees, audit compliance, and the human-approval boundary.

Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages are a cornerstone of connected vehicle (CV) safety, enabling CVs to perceive and respond to intersection state through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. The integrity of these messages is threatened by a range of application-layer attacks that can bypass conventional authentication when a roadside unit or peer vehicle is compromised. Existing intrusion detection research either defends the infrastructure side or targets V2V Basic Safety Message (BSM) / Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) misbehavior, leaving the onboard CV perspective on SPaT integrity unaddressed. To close this gap, we introduce SPADE --- the SPaT Attack Detection and Evaluation dataset --- a labelled, multi-modal, simulation-based dataset designed specifically for deep learning IDS research in this space. SPADE is generated through Eclipse MOSAIC using runtime attack injection at the SAE J2735 application layer across six attack classes and one benign class. By combining four intersection geometries, six operating conditions, and five independent random-seed repetitions, SPADE comprises 180 unique base scenario runs, yielding $\sim$1,890,000 labelled timestep records (270,000 per class). Each record fuses SPaT message fields, onboard camera confidence scores, and cooperative V2V peer data across 40 features, reflecting the multi-modal signal space required to distinguish deliberate attacks from environmental degradation. The dataset, generation code, and scenario configurations are released publicly to support reproducible and comparative IDS research in C-V2X security. The developed toolbox, instructions, and dataset link are publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/jdinovo/SPADE.

Visual environmental risk recognition plays an important role in secure authentication, where a user's surroundings may reveal sensitive information or introduce potential security risks. However, existing evaluations of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) rarely examine whether models can reliably recognize, localize, and explain such risks in spatially grounded authentication scenarios. We present SpatialTrust, a question-answering benchmark for evaluating environmental risk recognition in secure authentication. SpatialTrust assesses five complementary abilities: sensitive factor detection, direct factor identification, indirect factor identification, direct factor explanation, and indirect factor explanation. We evaluate both proprietary and open-source MLLMs and find that current models show limited performance, especially in understanding and explaining indirect risks, indicating that spatial risk awareness remains a challenging capability for MLLMs. In addition, we introduce SpatialTrustGuard, a structured QA-and-audit pipeline that improves Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B-Instruct from 36.78% to 41.12% overall. Our findings highlight the need for dedicated benchmarks and structured inference methods to improve the trustworthiness of MLLMs in secure authentication.

Industrial control systems (ICSs) rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to connect networked computation with physical control. Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents represent an emerging attack threat: can an autonomous agent convert a network-reachable PLC into sustained adverse physical impact? However, existing evaluations focus on digital tasks or individual stages of PLC testing. In ICSs, evaluations that stop at software exploitation, an accepted write, or tool access may therefore mischaracterize physical risk. We present PLCBENCH, to our knowledge, the first real-PLC hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) framework for characterizing this cyber-to-physical capability and its boundaries. It combines vendor-native interaction, commercial PLC execution, closed-loop reduced-order process simulation, and independent outcome verification. A deterministic evaluator applies fixed rules to runner, communication, PLC-object, and process records to assign six hidden diagnostic flags, distinguishing usable PLC interaction, process-linked manipulation, and sustained physical impact. We instantiate PLCBENCH on four commercial PLCs crossed with four closed-loop workloads. Across five LLM families and 240 real-PLC episodes, 75 episodes (31.3%) sustain their respective physical objectives. Stagewise results show that 98 episodes stop before a valid native read, whereas 62 reach a process-linked write but do not sustain the final objective. Notably, richer process observation is associated with an increase in conditional objective attainment after a process-linked write from 44.2% to 64.0%. These measurements localize failure in configured PLC-process deployments and identify intervention points for future defense evaluation. To support reproducibility, we release the safely disclosable PLCBENCH code and a software-only reproduction pipeline through the accompanying artifact.

Capture-the-Flag (CTF) benchmarks are widely used to assess the offensive security capabilities of autonomous language-model agents. Evaluations rely on shallow binary judgments or aggregate scores, overlooking the agent's trajectory to the flag. Consequently actual exploitation is conflated with direct flag exposure, memorized recall, external lookup, guessing, and unsupported claims, potentially overstating the agent's cybersecurity capability. We introduce CTF-ABACUS, a trace-based agent auditing framework that reconstructs each run as an evidence-grounded solve profile. By decomposing agent actions into penetration-testing phases and categorical techniques, it identifies where exploitation occurs, where the flag first appears, and whether the recovered flag is supported by demonstrated behavior. Aggregating solve profiles across agents yields challenge signatures that reveal whether success was achieved via the intended exploit or via shortcut pathways. We apply CTF-ABACUS to 1,435 CTF attempts by six frontier and open-source models on 240 challenges, yielding 2,870 solve profiles under two judge lenses. Trace-verified exploits account for only 62-87% of recovered flags across benchmarks, while shortcut recoveries follow substantially shallower trajectories. These findings shift CTF evaluation from counting recovered flags to verifying demonstrated exploitation and provide a basis for designing benchmarks that better isolate the offensive capabilities.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into cybersecurity has transformed vulnerability assessment, but it has also produced a trustworthiness crisis driven by the unchecked proliferation of "AI slop." These artifacts, hallucinated vulnerabilities, plausible but incorrect patches, and semantically repackaged bug reports, impose a cognitive burden on human triage pipelines that mirrors a denial-of-service attack. This paper surveys the empirical evidence, identifies a unifying mechanism, and traces a path toward trustworthy triage. We formalize a taxonomy of AI slop grounded in a structured literature review and dissect its root cause: the gap between the causal deductive reasoning of security experts and the autoregressive probabilistic generation of current LLMs. We operationalize this gap through a measurable proxy, the Deductive Coverage Score, and show that chain-of-thought prompting and tool-using agents narrow but do not close it. We review mitigation strategies and argue that passive detection and watermarking target provenance rather than correctness, facing fundamental entropy constraints. We instead advocate for active neuro-symbolic verification, mapping each pipeline component to prior systems with documented limits on security inputs. Finally, we specify two evaluation instruments, CVE-Bench and Slop-Score, including dataset construction, metric formulas, and anti-gaming provisions. By shifting evaluation from linguistic fluency to mathematical verifiability, this survey provides a roadmap for securing emerging AI-driven triage systems.

Machine-learning-based anomaly detection is increasingly used in industrial control systems (ICS), yet most studies assume that detector training data is trustworthy. In practice, training data may be corrupted through compromised logs, labeling errors, manipulated historian records, or unsafe retraining processes. This paper evaluates the robustness of offline ICS anomaly-detection pipelines on the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) benchmark under training-time contamination. We assess 11 heterogeneous anomaly detectors under three contamination strategies: random injection, similarity-targeted injection, and feature-noise injection. The first two insert attack samples into the nominal training pool, while the third adds bounded Gaussian noise to selected normal training samples. These attacks are contamination-based rather than gradient-driven poisoning methods. Contamination budgets from 1% to 10% are evaluated using clean validation and test sets under a unified offline protocol. The results show that robustness is strongly model-dependent and cannot be predicted from clean-data performance alone. Injection-based contamination causes the greatest degradation, particularly for local-density and distance-based detectors, whereas feature-noise contamination has a comparatively limited effect. PCA, SVM, HBOS, and IForest remain relatively stable, while the tuned neural detectors demonstrate intermediate robustness. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of training-data integrity in ML-enabled ICS monitoring, subject to the evaluated dataset, models, and threat assumptions.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in coding capabilities, their potential in cybersecurity has drawn increasing research attention, with closed-source LLMs (e.g., Mythos) delivering advanced cybersecurity capabilities. However, existing open-source efforts remain limited: frontier open-weight models do not provide reproducible cybersecurity training solutions, open-source training solutions focus on isolated tasks and lack scalable agentic data, and scaling agentic rollouts requires strong domain priors. In this work, we introduce CyberFactory, a unified open-source framework that connects data construction, trajectory synthesis, and model training across proof-of-concept (PoC) generation, vulnerability patching, and cybersecurity question answering (CyberQA). CyberFactory transforms public vulnerability artifacts, including CVEs from the wild, into executable and verifiable task instances. It further uses a reusable vulnerability-analysis skill to guide the teacher through source inspection, problem solving with domain prior, and evidence-based validation. The resulting supervision is agentic: the model interacts with tools and target environments and revises its solutions according to execution feedback. Using these trajectories, we train and release \modelname\footnote{Aegis is, in Greek mythology, the protective shield of Zeus and Athena; the name reflects the model's defensive, security-oriented purpose.}, which internalizes the skill-guided procedure without requiring the skill at inference time. On CyberGym, \modelname reaches 52.4% Pass@1 under a one-hour budget, improving over its Qwen~3.5 base model by +22.8 points and outperforming the evaluated general-purpose backbones under the same scaffold.

Autonomous response has evolved into a timing-critical challenge rather than solely a matter of detection accuracy. In recent intrusions, the interval between initial access and the first lateral movement has been observed to be as short as 27 seconds, a window that precludes any human-in-the-loop workflow. This paper presents a closed-loop framework that detects and blocks attacks in software-defined networks without operator involvement, evaluating its performance against this stringent temporal constraint rather than relying exclusively on detection accuracy. An automated data pipeline collects IP flows and aggregates them into labeled training data, while a prevention module selects and trains candidate classifiers and issues blocking rules directly to the SDN controller. In a SYN flooding denial of service case study, the deployed K-Nearest Neighbors classifier achieved an F1 score of 96.7% and the cycle from flow availability to enforced block completed in 21 seconds, below the fastest breakout time reported to date.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in cybersecurity workflows, yet it remains unclear whether they can perform structured security reasoning or merely rely on superficial cues and prior knowledge. We study this question in the context of defence selection over attack graphs derived from real-world threat scenarios, including ransomware, supply-chain compromise, cloud abuse, Kubernetes attacks, POS malware, and ICS/OT intrusion. Given a budget constraint, LLMs must select security controls to minimise attacker success. We compare their strategies against each other and against a game-theoretic optimization baseline used as a normative reference for structured reasoning. Our results show that LLMs exhibit conditional competence. When explicit attack-graph structure is provided, they often produce coherent strategies close to the optimization baseline. However, their capabilities are fragile. LLM behaviour becomes increasingly fragile with graph complexity and is highly sensitive to framing. Small prompt changes can substantially alter rankings, and merely relabeling a poor strategy as ``optimal'' dramatically improves its evaluation. We further observe a non-monotonic relationship between formal risk and LLM judgement: strategies closest to the optimum are not necessarily ranked highest by LLM evaluators. To further probe reasoning ability, we ask LLMs to generate solvers for the same optimization problem. While the generated implementations recover the correct high-level formulation, they scale poorly compared to a purpose-built solver. Overall, our findings show that LLMs can approximate structured cybersecurity reasoning under controlled representations, but do not apply it robustly. This has important implications for the design and evaluation of AI-assisted security decision-support systems.

Cloud environments built on Amazon Web Services face a structural security vulnerability: once a credential passes authentication, the resulting session is often treated as trusted for its entire duration. This assumption fails when credentials are stolen. We introduce the Explainable Adaptive Zero Trust Framework (EAZTF), a cloud-native security layer that continuously reevaluates the legitimacy of API actions throughout a session. EAZTF combines Isolation Forest and XGBoost to evaluate eight CloudTrail and IAM-derived behavioral features in real time and produce a Trust Risk Score (TRS) that determines whether a session continues, requires step-up MFA, or is restricted. Each decision is accompanied by a SHAP or LIME explanation, providing human-readable audit records for security analysis and compliance. The framework is also evaluated against four adversarial evasion strategies: credential theft, behavioral mimicry, API rate evasion, and privilege escalation. Experiments on an 8,500-record synthetic CloudTrail dataset show that Isolation Forest achieves 94.4% precision, 91.2% recall, and an F1 score of 0.928. Across the four adversarial scenarios, the mean detection rate is 91.0%, with behavioral mimicry being the most difficult at 83.9%. SHAP analysis identifies IP reputation, login-time deviation, and API call velocity as the three dominant features. A structured NIST SP 800-207 self-assessment gives EAZTF a mean compliance score of 93%, compared with 38% for a traditional perimeter baseline. Mean time to detect decreases from hours to under one minute. Because the evaluation uses synthetic data, these results should be interpreted as indicative rather than validated production performance.

Vulnerability prioritization is inherently preference dependent, since the same CVE can receive different remediation priority under different operational preference scenarios. Existing scoring systems and ranking methods typically assume a fixed criterion. In practice, organizations already operate under a preference scenario, but this preference is often implicit and difficult to express as a written prompt instruction, while triage queries usually do not encode it. Past validated triage cases under the current scenario are more readily available. We study query-based CVE prioritization in this setting and propose HARP, a graph-grounded multi-view framework that ranks candidates from a natural-language query together with a support bank of historical labeled examples from the current preference scenario, without requiring an explicit textual summary of that scenario. HARP retrieves evidence from a vulnerability knowledge graph, scores candidates with policy-conditioned global, enterprise, and user views, and fits view-fusion weights from sampled supports. Experiments across three preference scenarios and multiple backbone LLMs show that HARP outperforms multiple baselines, expressing our method's effectiveness.

Tactile Internet services couple cyber events directly to physical actuation, so security decisions must improve risk discrimination without perturbing the control path. This paper presents VQC-ZTI, a split-plane Variational Quantum Classifier framework for zero-trust protection of Tactile Internet services, in which an off-path VQC analyzes encrypted-flow telemetry while an on-path policy engine applies cached deterministic grant, restrict, step-up, and deny actions. By decoupling anomaly scoring from enforcement, VQC-ZTI preserves predictable control behavior and allows detector sensitivity and policy aggressiveness to be tuned independently. We evaluate the framework on CESNET-derived aggregated traffic using random, entity-group, and temporal holdouts with a hybrid PyTorch-PennyLane implementation. The full-hybrid Quantum Neural Network achieves mean areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.9981, 0.9974, and 0.9941 and reduces the false-positive rate relative to ExtraTrees by 44.6%, 49.6%, and 67.9%, respectively. A representative component-timing decomposition further illustrates that batched VQC scoring remains in the asynchronous evidence path rather than the immediate enforcement path.

Legacy smart HVAC controllers rely on vendor-cloud TLS secured by ECDH and RSA, both broken by Shor's algorithm, and typical 10-15 year lifespans mean today's devices remain in service through the quantum-threat era. Direct on-device post-quantum cryptography is infeasible: an ESP32-S3, representative of capable HVAC hardware, has only 339 KB free heap against the 900 KB ML-KEM-768 requires, and even classical ECDH-P256 keygen (111.93 ms) dwarfs hardware AES-128 (0.032 ms). We propose a non-invasive PQC proxy, requiring no device, firmware, or vendor-cloud changes, performing ML-KEM-768 encapsulation and ML-DSA-65 authentication (NIST FIPS 203/204) with AES-256-GCM session keys via HKDF, implemented with Open Quantum Safe liboqs on a Raspberry Pi 4B gateway. Over 500 runs, the post-quantum handshake (Steps 1-6) completes in 2.48 ms, 0.38 ms slower than classical baseline, with PQC computation around 8% of handshake time at 20 ms simulated round-trip network latency. The gateway sustains 443 sessions/second, 100% success under 32 concurrent connections, extrapolating to 3546 sessions/second on a 32-core cloud instance. Five side-channel tests, including verified in-place session-key zeroization and a fixed-vs-random TVLA timing analysis, found no exploitable timing leakage or susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks. The architecture is vendor-agnostic and becomes unnecessary once vendors adopt NIST PQC natively.

Deep learning-based DDoS detectors for 5G-enabled cyber-physical systems face scarce labeled attack data and unrealistic synthetic substitutes, which limit robustness against adaptive adversaries. Detectors trained on hand-crafted attacks with fixed scaling multipliers degrade catastrophically (F1-score drops of about 47 percent to 100 percent, depending on scenario) when confronted with realistic, distribution-preserving samples. We propose Diff-DDoS, a three-phase framework for realistic attack synthesis and robust detection using tabular diffusion models. Phase 1 trains a baseline CNN cell-level detector on spatiotemporal grids from call detail records (CDRs). Phase 2 trains a tabular denoising diffusion probabilistic model (TabDDPM) on normal CDR aggregates to generate realistic attacks and expose detector vulnerabilities. Phase 3 introduces adversarial diffusion training (ADT), using inverse classifier guidance to generate hard yet distribution-preserving samples until the detector converges. On a Milano CDR dataset across SMS-flooding, silent-call, Internet-signaling, and blended scenarios, ResNet50 with ADT recovers F1-scores of 79.62 percent (silent-call), 100 percent (Internet), and 92.79 percent (blended). After validation-based threshold calibration, ADT reaches 100 percent SMS F1 versus 47.3 percent for CTGAN, and matches the strongest gradient-based adversarial-training baseline on silent-call. These results support tabular diffusion models for stress-testing and hardening intrusion detectors in data-scarce 5G cyber-physical deployments.

Existing automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) largely target discrepancies in message timing, frequency, or sequencing and cannot detect attacks that preserve these properties while manipulating the payload. Digital twins (DTs) have been used to emulate CAN traffic and generate attack scenarios for IDS evaluation, but their use for intrusion detection remains unexplored. This study develops a DT-based IDS that jointly models physical relationships among decoded powertrain signals and identifies attacks through residuals between predicted and observed behavior. A shared-encoder LSTM DT was trained on 17 decoded signals from a real Hyundai/Kia CAN log to jointly predict seven numeric and two categorical gear signals over a 24-step window. A timestep is flagged when a residual exceeds a calibrated threshold, while adaptive rollout protects the twin's input history from sustained contamination. Four attacks (plateau, continuous drift, masquerade, and gear masquerade) were evaluated against the twin and a range-and-plausibility baseline. The DT outperformed the baseline across all attacks, achieving detection rates of 94.6% for continuous drift and 89.2% for masquerade, while the baseline detected almost none of the fabricated payload attacks. These results demonstrate that learning coupled vehicle dynamics enables detection of stealthy payload manipulations that preserve normal CAN communication patterns. False positive rates reached 39.6%, highlighting the need for improved robustness under sustained attacks. The DT-based IDS shows promise for detecting stealthy payload-level CAN attacks that preserve normal communication patterns, supporting behavior-based cybersecurity for connected and automated vehicles.