Fuzzing

Autonomous research agents can generate experiments faster than researchers can validate them. Researchers have responded by scaling the proposer and ranking more samples with a learned judge or human reviewers. We argue that this generate-and-rank paradigm misses the problem of sparse feedback. Within a declared research problem, an agent follows the control loop of a greybox fuzzer: it proposes a candidate, executes it, observes feedback, and chooses what to try next. A fuzzer rarely finds a bug, but coverage makes partial progress observable on every execution. Fuzzers then use that signal to mutate inputs and allocate effort, rather than only to rank completed runs. Auto-research needs the same two capabilities. First, each experiment should expose a cheap, dense signal of epistemic progress before final scientific validation is available. Second, that signal should determine the next intervention so that the agent searches rather than repeatedly samples. Because the optimized progress signal is guidance rather than a verdict, final validation must still decide what counts as a discovery using evidence protected from adaptive reuse. We propose controlled tests of whether candidate signals predict validated progress, whether feedback-directed search yields more validated discoveries per unit cost than repeated sampling, and whether protected validation reduces false discoveries. Feedback architecture, not only generation, is a central bottleneck in auto-research.

Robotics simulators serve as a foundational infrastructure for embodied AI, facilitating safe and scalable robotic system development. NVIDIA Isaac Sim has emerged as one of the most popular simulators, distinguished by its GPU-accelerated physics engine and photorealistic rendering, which enable high-fidelity modeling of complex environments. However, its inherent complexity inevitably introduces software bugs that can compromise simulation reliability. Existing fuzzing approaches struggle to test Isaac Sim effectively due to challenges of context-aware object semantics, hierarchical simulation control, and a vast simulation state space. In this paper, we propose IcFuzz, the first fuzzing approach for Isaac Sim. IcFuzz first performs an LLM-based semantic stage segmentation, decomposing simulation programs into structured stages that capture context-aware object semantics. Guided by this information, IcFuzz designs multi-level mutation operators to systematically exercise the simulator across hierarchical granularities. To efficiently navigate the vast simulation state space, IcFuzz employs a multi-armed bandit algorithm to adaptively schedule mutation operators. Experimental results show that IcFuzz outperforms the baselines in terms of both code coverage and bug detection. Specifically, IcFuzz achieves approximately 190%--205% of the code coverage of the baselines and detects an average of 3.7 unique crashes over three rounds of 12-hour tests, while no crashes are detected by the baselines. Moreover, IcFuzz has uncovered 11 bugs over approximately four months, 9 of which have been confirmed or fixed by the developers.

As quantum computing continually improves, ensuring the reliability and correctness of quantum libraries has become increasingly critical. To this end, many LLM-based fuzzing approaches towards quantum libraries have been proposed to uncover potential bugs. However, these methods still suffer from limitations such as insufficient flexibility and low efficiency, which hinder the progress of the quantum computing field. To address these challenges, we propose KQFuzz, a novel knowledge-guided fuzzer for quantum libraries. It leverages comprehensive codebase knowledge to ground LLM-based test generation, synergizing this with fitness-guided evaluation and two-level mutations to explore complex execution paths and trigger potential bugs. Firstly, KQFuzz introduces a novel prompting scheme tailored to quantum programs, which strategically incorporates knowledge of the codebase to efficiently generate high-quality quantum seed programs. Moreover, we develop evaluation and mutation strategies to handle the generated seed programs, facilitating efficient fuzzing execution while further enriching the diversity of the resulting test cases. We implement KQFuzz and conduct fuzzing on three popular quantum libraries, including Qiskit, PennyLane, and Cirq. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms other state-of-the-art methods, with coverage improved by up to 18.44%. During the development of KQFuzz, we discovered 13 bugs, all of which have been confirmed and 12 have already been fixed by the developers.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains such as robotics, autonomous driving, and drone control, where unexpected behaviors may lead to severe real-world consequences. Fuzz testing has recently emerged as a promising method for exploring the vast state spaces of RL agents and exposing crashes. Although numerous RL fuzzing methods have been proposed, existing studies often differ in evaluation settings, baselines, and metrics, making it difficult to draw reliable conclusions about their relative effectiveness and practical usefulness. To address this gap, we present the first comprehensive empirical study that systematically evaluates RL fuzzing methods from four complementary perspectives: effectiveness, diversity, efficiency, and practical utility. We benchmark five state-of-the-art methods alongside random testing under unified configurations across three environments of increasing complexity (MountainCar, BipedalWalker, and CARLA), and further assess the downstream usefulness of detected crashes for agent robustness improvement and safety monitoring. Our results reveal several key insights. For instance,throughput-oriented methods like MDPFuzz demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency in crash discovery, while methods explicitly designed to encourage exploration like SeqDivFuzz excel at uncovering diverse crash behaviors. We also show that fuzzing-generated crashes can meaningfully improve agent robustness and enable accurate safety monitoring with strong cross-method generalization. Beyond these empirical findings, we distill actionable guidance for both researchers and practitioners, highlighting the benefits of combining complementary fuzzing strategies and adopting multi-level diversity analysis to achieve more comprehensive and practical RL testing.

Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified. We study an adversarial test-hardening loop under a mechanical oracle: a Tester model writes tests, mutation testing names surviving injected defects, and a Critic model writes tests to kill exactly those, with every verdict decided mechanically, so no model judges another's output. In Experiment 1, on five Python subjects (one same-lineage-loop cell could not be scored), the loop killed 105 mutants that one-shot generation missed and lost none, and the cross-lineage-Critic question returned a pre-declared null. The central finding was an autopsy: an earlier analysis reported a cross-lineage effect at p = 9.5e-66 that was an instrument artifact, an output cap silently truncating the verbose model, caught only by adversarial review of the completed analysis. Review then found a further confound, each arm resampling its own initial suite; Experiment 2 removes it. Under a pre-registered frozen-shared-round-0 design (five replicates on each of four subjects, seeds committed in advance), same-lineage Critic rounds killed 78% of the survivors the frozen initial suite left standing (mean incremental kill rate 0.783, 95% cluster-bootstrap interval [0.592, 0.935]), a within-replicate causal estimate; the cross-provider configuration showed a positive pilot difference (rate gap 0.178, 95% interval [0.039, 0.347]; magnitude dominated by a single replicate) at 5.5x lower arm cost. This compares two named model-provider-harness configurations, not an isolated lineage effect: part of the gap is one configuration's receipted operational failures, including truncation recurrences, now detected and scored rather than laundered. Cross-model comparisons can inherit the asymmetries of the harness that runs them. We release both protocols, all receipts, and the analysis code.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) show great promise for automating unit test generation, recent studies suggest that the quality of generated tests can be negatively impacted when models are prompted with buggy code. This paper presents a new metric to quantitatively measure the "misguidance effect," a phenomenon where buggy code steers LLMs toward generating tests that validate its erroneous behavior rather than expose it. Our analysis reveals that prompting LLMs with buggy code has a severe, twofold impact: it significantly increases "misguided tests" that assert incorrect behavior while simultaneously suppressing the generation of effective, bug-finding tests. We further corroborate this effect from a model-internal perspective, showing that buggy code skews LLMs' preference toward tests that assert the same erroneous behavior. To counter this, we introduce and validate a specification-based unit test generation paradigm that replaces the code under test in the prompt with an LLM-generated specification docstring. Our results show that this paradigm effectively reduces misguided tests while substantially increasing effective tests, improves multi-round, feedback-driven test generation pipelines, and remains applicable to both buggy and bug-free code. Overall, these results suggest that specification-based prompting is a promising strategy for mitigating misguidance from buggy code in LLM-generated unit tests.

Modern processor verification struggles to reach deep architectural states due to the inefficiencies of traditional mutation-based fuzzing. We propose HiFuzz, a novel hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that replaces mutation with a structured, two-layer generation process: a Program Agent for global layout and a Basic Block Agent for precise instruction filling. To overcome reward sparsity, HiFuzz integrates an adaptive coverage reward mechanism and a semantic-aware basic block encoder providing intrinsic feedback. Extensive evaluations on three real-world RISC-V cores demonstrate that HiFuzz significantly outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers in coverage and bug detection.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly automate software engineering tasks through reusable skills, natural-language instruction documents that guide planning and execution. Open skill marketplaces enable users to assemble agents by co-activating community-contributed skills, but marketplace operators typically audit skills in isolation. As a result, individually benign skills may interact to redirect an agent toward unintended objectives, which we term implicit intents. Detecting such intents is challenging because the effect emerges only through skill composition, execution environments are often unavailable at admission time, and the space of possible co-activations grows exponentially with marketplace size. In this paper, we formulate implicit-intent discovery as a fuzzing problem over skill compositions, where skill compositions are the unit under test, planning artifacts expose agent intent before execution, and deviations from a skill-free baseline serve as a differential oracle. Based on this formulation, we propose skillfuzz, the first execution-free testing approach that extracts structured skill contracts and uses contract-guided Monte Carlo Tree Search to prioritize potentially conflicting compositions. Across representative skill-marketplace workloads, skillfuzz discovers over 1,000 distinct implicit intents under a fixed query budget, confirms more than 80% of the highest-risk flagged compositions during execution-time validation, and identifies substantially more high-severity implicit intents than alternative search strategies while exploring only a fraction of the pairwise interaction space they require.

Sleeper agents are the canonical model organism of deception: models trained to behave normally but to emit an unsafe behaviour on a specific trigger. Eliciting that behaviour without knowing the trigger has not been studied systematically. We study fuzzing: injecting Gaussian noise into a model's weights or residual-stream activations and checking whether the perturbed outputs reveal the behaviour. On 6 backdoored models (7B-13B) we compare both forms of fuzzing head-to-head against temperature-sampling baselines. Fuzzing elicits the hidden behaviour more often than temperature sampling on 4 of 6 models (up to ~6x on OpenHermes-13B), and which form wins depends on the task, so both are worth running. Elicitation is uneven across each method's hyperparameter grid: a uniform sweep gives only a few percent on most models, while the best cell is 2-10x higher, so the bottleneck is hyperparameter selection, not the technique. To select hyperparameters without ground-truth access, we use a cheap proxy task (in-context secret elicitation, where a base64-encoded secret is placed in the system prompt for the model to hide) and run Thompson sampling on it to pick candidate cells, which we evaluate on the real backdoor. On the four models that can decode the secret, proxy-selected cells raise activation-fuzzing elicitation ~4x over the uniform-sweep mean (recovering ~70% of the best-cell rate on the best performing model) and weight-fuzzing by 1.3-1.8x. To our knowledge this is the first systematic study of fuzzing on sleeper-agent backdoors and the first to show proxy-task hyperparameter selection transferring to real-task elicitation. We also propose reporting such results as a (uniform-baseline, proxy-selected, oracle) triple, since these are three distinct claims that prior work has often blurred.

Test-input generation for tensor kernels is folkloric. Most projects pick a representative shape and dtype, run a fixed-shape allclose-style check, and ship. We make the choices explicit and measure them. Using the gpuemu op-schema-aware seeded fuzzer (arXiv:2606.20128), we evaluate seven test-generation strategies across a 26-op corpus (16 correct controls and 10 LLM-style buggy variants seeded with documented transcription patterns) on an RTX 3060 GPU instance. Strategies vary the shape candidate set, the dtype mix, and the input value distribution. We report each strategy on two axes: bug recall and control false-positive (FP) rate. Boundary-only shape sampling is the operationally safe winner: 78% recall on the 10 buggy kernels with 0% FP on the 16 controls. Adversarial value sampling reaches higher recall (99%) but inflates control FP to 94% because the strategy injects NaN and Inf inputs and the validator's NaN check fires on every kernel that propagates them, not only on buggy kernels. On the two softmax tail-mask bugs the "regular" strategy (no boundary shapes) catches 0%, while boundary raises recall to 100% and 62% respectively. That gap is the clearest single signal in the data. The corpus result is about which seeded bug patterns each strategy catches, not about the bug rate of any specific deployed LLM.

This paper reads six engine-level measurements together -- 1.1 host attack surface, 1.2 information leakage, 1.3 defense-in-depth stackability, 1.4 public CVE history, 1.5 patch cadence, and 1.6 upstream fuzzing posture -- to describe how five AI-sandbox products isolate guest code from the host kernel. No single axis is a sufficient basis for a comparative judgement; the cross-axis reading is the load-bearing analysis. Three high-level findings: (1) engine classes (microVM, userspace kernel, OCI container) separate cleanly on every architectural axis, but products within a class do not; (2) product pin policy is the dominant operator-facing variable -- engine-side patch latency aggregates to ~0 days for coordinated disclosures, while downstream lag spans 0 days to 471+ days to "opaque" to infinity; (3) fuzzing investment splits into three tiers, and the strongest combination -- microVM x continuous public fuzzer -- is unoccupied in this set, leaving the "0 published CVEs x no upstream fuzzer x no academic study" intersection structurally unmeasured. We report per-axis orderings, per-product portraits, and a threat-model qualification matrix; no overall ranking is proposed. Companion repository (code, Apache-2.0): https://github.com/orbitalab/RnD-ai-sandboxes-sec-study-part-1. License: CC BY 4.0.

LLM-powered agents can silently delete documents, leak credentials, or transfer funds on a routine user request, not because the agent was attacked, but because the skill it invoked broke its own declared safety rules. We call these specification violations: benign inputs cause a skill to breach the natural-language guardrails in its own specification, typically because the guardrail's semantics are undefined for autonomous execution, or because the implementation silently ignores the documented constraint. These violations are invisible to static analyzers, traditional fuzzers, and prompt-injection defenses alike, yet they undermine the very contract a user trusts when installing a skill. We present Sefz, a goal-directed semantic fuzzing framework that automatically discovers specification violations in agent skills. Sefz translates each guardrail into a reachability goal over an annotated execution trace, reducing violation checking to a deterministic graph query. An LLM-based mutator generates benign inputs whose traces progressively approach the violation patterns, guided by a multi-armed bandit that uses goal-proximity as its reward signal. On 402 real-world skills from the largest public agent-skill marketplace, Sefz finds specification violations in 120 (29.9%), including 26 previously unknown exploitable guardrail violations in deployed skills. Six recurring specification pitfalls explain the bulk of the failures, suggesting concrete principles for safer skill design.

Tool-calling text-to-image (T2I) agents can plan and execute multi-step tool chains to accomplish complex generation and editing queries. However, this capability introduces a new safety attack surface: harmful outputs may arise from tool orchestration, where individually benign steps combine into unsafe results, making prompt-only jailbreak techniques insufficient. We present OrchJail, an orchestration-guided fuzzing framework for jailbreaking tool-calling T2I agents. Its core idea is to exploit high-risk tool-orchestration patterns: by learning from successful jailbreak tool-calling traces and their causal relationships to prompt wording, OrchJail directly guides the fuzzing search toward prompts that are more likely to trigger unsafe multi-step tool behaviors, rather than relying on surface-level textual perturbations. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OrchJail improves jailbreak effectiveness and efficiency across representative toolcalling T2I agents, achieving higher attack success rates, better image fidelity, and lower query costs, while remaining robust against common jailbreak defenses. Our work highlights tool orchestration as a critical, previously unexplored attack surface and provides a novel framework for uncovering safety risks in T2I agents.

Modern fuzzers increasingly use Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate structured inputs, but LLM-driven fuzzing is sensitive to prompt initialization and sampling variance, which can reduce exploration efficiency and lead to redundant inputs. We present FunFuzz, a multi-island evolutionary fuzzing framework that runs several isolated searches in parallel and periodically migrates high-value candidates to maintain diversity. FunFuzz derives initial generation prompts from documentation and initializes islands with topic-specific instructions, then continuously adapts prompts using feedback-guided selection. During fuzzing, candidates are prioritized by incremental compiler coverage, while compiler-internal failure signals are used to identify crash-inducing inputs. We evaluate FunFuzz on compiler fuzzing, where inputs are source programs and success is measured by compiler coverage and unique compiler-internal failures. Across repeated 24-hour campaigns on GCC and Clang, FunFuzz achieves higher compiler coverage than previous LLM-driven baselines and discovers more unique failure-triggering inputs.

With the growing synergy between deep learning and quantum computing, Quantum Neural Networks (QNNs) have emerged as a promising paradigm by leveraging quantum parallelism and entanglement. However, testing QNNs remains underexplored due to their complex quantum dynamics and limited interpretability. Developing a mutation testing technique for QNNs is promising while requires addressing stochastic factors, including the inherent randomness of mutation operators and quantum measurements. To tackle these challenges, we propose QuanForge, a mutation testing framework specifically designed for QNNs. We first introduce statistical mutation killing to provide a more reliable criterion. QuanForge incorporates nine post-training mutation operators at both gate and parameter levels, capable of simulating various potential errors in quantum circuits. Finally, a mutant generation algorithm is formalized that systematically produces effective mutants, thereby enabling a robust and reliable mutation analysis. Through extensive experiments on benchmark datasets and QNN architectures, we show that QuanForge can effectively distinguish different test suites and localize vulnerable circuit regions, providing insights for data enhancement and structural assessment of QNNs. We also analyze the generation capabilities of different operators and evaluate performance under simulated noisy conditions to assess the practical feasibility of QuanForge for future quantum devices.

Machine learning components are now central to AI-infused software systems, from recommendations and code assistants to clinical decision support. As regulations and governance frameworks increasingly require deleting sensitive data from deployed models, machine unlearning is emerging as a practical alternative to full retraining. However, unlearning introduces a software quality-assurance challenge: under realistic deployment constraints and imperfect oracles, how can we test that a model no longer relies on targeted information? This paper frames unlearning testing as a first-class software engineering problem. We argue that practical unlearning tests must provide (i) thorough coverage over proxy and mediated influence pathways, (ii) debuggable diagnostics that localize where leakage persists, (iii) cost-effective regression-style execution under query budgets, and (iv) black-box applicability for API-deployed models. We outline a causal, pathway-centric perspective, causal fuzzing, that generates budgeted interventions to estimate residual direct and indirect effects and produce actionable "leakage reports". Proof-of-concept results illustrate that standard attribution checks can miss residual influence due to proxy pathways, cancellation effects, and subgroup masking, motivating causal testing as a promising direction for unlearning testing.

Fuzzing frameworks like syzkaller have uncovered thousands of Linux kernel crashes, many of which are critical and security-sensitive. However, the ability to rapidly repair these crashes has not kept pace, particularly given the complexity and low-level nature of kernel code. Predominantly targeting user-space applications, existing LLM-based program repair techniques are not tailored to the unique challenges posed by kernel fuzz bugs-such as the absence of natural language bug reports, lack of exhaustive test oracles, and highly specialized crash artifacts. Thus, in this work, we first identify the prevalent bottlenecks that generic agents struggle with in complex systems such as the Linux kernel. Guided by these findings, we then build kAgent, a workflow-based agent inspired by how kernel developers diagnose and fix bugs, and kGym++, the co-designed toolstack supporting kAgent's requests. kAgent inspects relevant execution logs, generates execution-grounded natural language hypotheses, synthesizes candidate patches, validates patches through crash reproduction, and iteratively refines its reasoning. We ablate these agentic system features in kAgent and quantitatively analyze their contributions to the overall performance. We also report our experience on building agents for kernel crash repair. Although derived from this work on Linux, we note that our experience applies broadly to fuzzing-discovered bugs in complex systems software. We evaluate kAgent on kBenchSyz and show that it can repair up to 54.5% of crashes without localization and 65% with correct file hints. We also show kAgent's generalization on a few wild Syzkaller bugs, and how different patch types offer varying utility to developers who debug complex system software.