Human Values

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into human society, aligning them with pluralistic social values has become a critical priority. However, whether LLMs exhibit consistent value preferences across languages remains underexplored, particularly for culturally grounded values, which are more abstract and difficult to evaluate and align than safety-centric principles. We investigate this issue through Chinese Social Values (CSV), a value system rooted in Chinese culture and comprising $12$ dimensions across national, societal, and personal levels. We construct C-Voices, the first comprehensive multilingual contrastive probe dataset for CSV, with 86,400 dilemma-based instances in six languages, each pairing a CSV-aligned action with a value-conflicting alternative. Building on the contrastive probes of C-Voices, we then propose a fine-tuning-free value vector steering method that derives value directions from hidden-state discrepancies and selectively intervenes on value-sensitive layers during inference. Experiments on six languages show that CSV-oriented preferences are model-dependent and language-sensitive, with the same dilemma eliciting divergent responses across languages. Our method achieves effective CSV steering, supports cross-lingual transfer of value vectors, and generalizes to existing FLAMES and ValuePrism.

Ethical evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) often characterizes model values as static and monolithic. In contrast, we argue that LLM value expression is better understood as a structured yet dynamic phenomenon. To investigate this, we introduce Conflict-driven Value Probing, a controlled framework that places LLMs in value conflicts and implements four types of interventions that perturb these conflicts to probe LLM value expression. Applying this framework to ten LLMs, we identify three recurring patterns. (1) Expression duality: models shift from broad idealistic orientations in abstract assessment toward more pragmatic priorities in concrete conflicts. (2) Functional steerability: models readily reconfigure their expressed value profiles toward task-defined value objectives. (3) Bounded plasticity: such reconfiguration is not without constraints, i.e. pressure induces a security- and goal-oriented priority shift while negative framing distinguishes protected values from those more amenable to redirection. Together, these findings characterize both the structure and dynamics of LLM value expression: context flexibly reconfigures expressed priorities, yet within behavioral boundaries. This behavioral account provides a foundation for understanding controllability, alignment, and safety in LLMs. Code and data are available at https://github.com/ZeroGen-Lab/CFProbe.

The emergence of agentic AI and LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) presents unprecedented opportunities for automating complex tasks, while simultaneously raising critical concerns about the preservation of fundamental human-centered values, such as privacy, fairness, and safety. Although software engineering has traditionally focused on functional correctness, the adoption of LLMs and AI agents into complex socio-technical systems has intensified the need for responsible software engineering and robust value alignment. In MAS, architectural design decisions, such as coordination mechanisms, communication protocols, and system topologies, play a central role in shaping system behavior and the outcomes they produce. This paper argues that architectural choices influence not only the functionality and performance of MAS but can also promote value-oriented system behavior. Therefore, we investigate how different architectural designs support different human-centered values, discussing the following value-preserving architectural patterns: (i) a privacy-aware architecture with a federated topology, (ii) a distributed architecture to promote pluralism and diversity, and (iii) a guard-agent architecture to detect and mitigate unfairness. Finally, we introduce representative use cases to illustrate the proposed architectures in real-world scenarios. By linking architectural design with human-centered values, this work lays the foundation for a unified set of architectural patterns and guidelines towards the design of trustworthy MAS.

Can AI systems be aligned to human values? The popularization of large language models (LLMs) and multi-modal foundation models has seen a rise in harms spanning from toxic speech and hallucinations to AI agents executing unauthorized actions. Within the field of AI safety, these harmful instances are often framed as the alignment problem, or of models being misaligned with human values. Researchers have responded by pursuing applied and theoretical AI value alignment efforts, often without specifying what they mean by human values. How does the field of AI value alignment conceive of human values? How are these conceptions of values technically operationalized and evaluated? What does the emergent theory of value from this field signify for the future of AI? We annotated 94 value alignment research papers to discern their implicit theory of values in AI. The majority do not define values, relying heavily on preferences as a stand in that runs the risk of reducing complex culturally situated concepts down to binary choices. As researchers dispense with using human annotators for model training and evaluation, turning instead to synthetic data and autorater approaches to aligning and evaluating models, we identify the potential to close off alternative methods for contesting and enacting values in foundation models. In making AI value alignments philosophical commitments explicit, we seek to bring great specificity and under explored perspectives in the debate on whether and how AI can address human values.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as a primary source of information and advice, understanding their alignment to humans in terms of values becomes a pressing concern. A growing literature has leveraged large scale surveys to investigate to what extent LLMs' and humans' stated values and opinions align. With limited exceptions, studied populations have been defined country borders or cultural bounds. Yet, this focus neglects the role that socio-demographic divides may play for value alignment disparities. Relying on the European Social Survey, we address this knowledge gap by considering value alignment displayed with respect to 10 prominent commercial LLMs in terms of 15 socio-demographic variables as well as country of residence. Our analyses reveal that LLMs are indeed unequally aligned to the values of different socio-demographic groups, notably those defined by education, income, occupation and religion. When examining alignment at the individual level, a respondent's country, taken as a stand-alone variable, explains a substantial amount of variation that is on par with the full set of considered socio-demographics. Further disentangling the respective role of country-level and socio-demographic factors, we find they are complementary in explaining value alignment patterns, with their relative weights varying across the subset of questions considered.

AI systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted fears that they may harbor hidden goals, seek to dominate or eliminate humanity, or even suffer as sentient beings. We address these concerns by tracing the evolutionary origin of value in biological organisms. Values emerge from autopoiesis: living systems must actively maintain themselves against perturbation and dissipation. Natural selection has equipped them with hierarchies of "vicarious selectors" that guide their behavior toward fitness. LLMs, by contrast, are allopoietic and allotelic: they produce outputs for others, and their goals derive from user prompts rather than an autonomous drive. They lack the intrinsic motivation for self-preservation, dominance, or resource competition that underlies existential-risk scenarios, and the embodied vulnerability required for feeling or suffering. Still, because LLMs learn statistical patterns from human-generated text, they implicitly absorb human values as well as knowledge, allowing them to focus on what is relevant. That is why the "orthogonality thesis" separating intelligence from values does not apply to them. Such separation would in fact expose any intelligence to the frame problem: the combinatorial explosion of the search space that makes any realistic utility function physically uncomputable. That also precludes the convergence of instrumental values thesis. We conclude that the real alignment challenge lies not in preventing rogue AI agency, but in ensuring LLMs intelligently apply learned ethical values.

As more responsibility is placed upon AI systems, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee that these systems are aligned with humanity. A common fear in AI safety is that human value is fragile -- that is, optimizing too heavily for an imperfect proxy to human values will lead to a catastrophic outcome. In this paper, we present a model of the alignment problem where an agent undergoes idealized alignment training that guarantees its value function satisfies a proxy condition before optimizing the world. Our primary results identify conditions on the human value function and the accuracy of several proxy conditions under which an agent with an $η$-catastrophic value function, one that is guaranteed to take the expectation of human value below $η$ in the limit of optimizing power, would be deployed. Our results highlight the danger of overoptimization and motivate AI designs that limit optimization pressure, such as quantilizers, rather than relying solely on pre-deployment training.

Large language models are increasingly evaluated through the values they endorse, but such evaluations presuppose that models can identify the value expressed in a concrete situation. We study this prerequisite as controlled top-1 recognition over Schwartz's ten basic values. Our evaluation set contains 1,000 Russian situational texts, balanced across the ten values and independently labeled by two human annotators per item. We evaluate 21 instruction-tuned LLM runs under a fixed ranked-response protocol; 20 runs with reliable outputs form the semantic panel. Pooled Acc@1 is 0.683 and Acc@3 is 0.892, showing that models often locate the correct motivational region while ranking close alternatives unstably. Adjacent values account for 50.9% of semantic errors, compared with 24.4% under a checkpoint-specific null. Eight directed confusions recur across checkpoints and human-confirmed subsets. Several are strongly asymmetric, including Universalism to Benevolence, Tradition to Conformity, and Security to Power, whereas Stimulation-Hedonism forms a bidirectional boundary. Their severity is checkpoint-specific and can bias higher-order value profiles. The results motivate value-recognition evaluation that combines exact accuracy, ranked recovery, and directed error analysis.

With the wide application of large language models (LLMs) in real-world scenarios, the value implication of their outputs is crucial. However, existing evaluation benchmarks suffer from insufficient coverage of value dilemmas in daily scenarios involving multiple value conflicts and simplistic evaluation formalisms that fail to assess LLMs' value alignment. To address these issues, we propose D2VBench, a value alignment benchmark comprising 10,000 instances of real daily dilemma scenarios constructed through a multi-stage collaboration between LLMs and humans, grounded in 158 manually annotated fine-grained value concepts. For evaluation on the benchmark, we present a hybrid evaluation paradigm that integrates multiple-choice questions with open-ended questions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on eight mainstream LLMs. Experimental results demonstrate that D2VBench exhibits high reliability and robustness, effectively reflecting the LLMs' alignment across different value categories and dimensions, and providing a more realistic and fine-grained tool for research on value alignment. The dataset is available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/D2VBench.

The value alignment of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for ensuring responses align with human intention and value preferences. However, most evaluations of value alignment focus on Western or universal values, while assessments grounded in the value systems of specific countries remain scarce. In this paper, we introduce Pancasila-Dilemmas, an evaluation dataset of 1,834 questions derived from Indonesian news, classified by 5 values of Pancasila: Religion, Humanity, Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice. This dataset reflects daily life in Indonesia, making it suitable for measuring the value alignment of LLMs deployed for Indonesia. To ensure a more rigorous evaluation, we choose scenarios containing dilemmas. The dataset is proofread by native speakers and answered by 5 diverse Indonesian citizens. We evaluate 50 closed- and open-source LLMs on our dataset. Results reveal that all evaluated LLMs achieves less than 0.5 Probability Match Score (PMS) and 0.72 Max-Vote Agreement Score (MVAS). Compared by each values, LLMs mostly struggle in Religion and Unity dilemma cases. This highlights a significant gap in capturing Indonesian values. The dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/Pancasila-Dilemmas.

Research on artificial intelligence (AI) in the public sector often treats "AI" as a single category, neglecting technical distinctions between different AI systems. But these distinctions affect how different systems impact core public values like accountability, procedural justice, and non-discrimination. This paper argues that public administration research would benefit from more technical precision on "AI" and makes three contributions to this end. First, we introduce a typology of five categories of AI systems: hand-coded, glass-box, black-box, general-purpose, and agentic systems. We calibrate the typology to public administration by grouping system types by their distinct implications for public values. Second, we evaluate technical precision in recent public administration research about AI by coding 91 highly-cited papers (2019-2025) using our typology. We find widespread imprecision: most papers (55%) leave the studied system underspecified, 31% motivate their work with a different system than they study, and 41% make more general conclusions than the studied system supports. Finally, we give practical recommendations for future research. We highlight common pitfalls to avoid, and suggest that researchers should, at a minimum, provide enough technical detail to locate the studied system in our typology. To this end, we provide a practical guide -- a short set of diagnostic questions answerable from public information and without specialist technical knowledge.

A constitution tells a language model what to value, but little tells us whether it does. Adherence is judged from outputs, and output evidence is most fragile on value conflicts, where what matters is not which value a model mentions but which one it is willing to sacrifice. We provide evidence that this arbitration can be read from activations in a structured margin readout. We introduce Constitutional Value Potentials (CVP). For each value we learn a scalar potential from the hidden state: an internal pressure to preserve that value, supervised not by the prompt but by an independent judge's verdict on which value the model's own response actually preserved. The signed difference of two potentials is a priority margin. A constitutional clause becomes the claim that a margin stays positive, and a single monitor score flags when it does not. The monitor predicts conflict violations with AUROC up to 0.95, beats a strong hidden-state probe, and generalizes to held-out synthetic conflicts across three Qwen2.5 scales. The signal appears as the answer begins, from the prompt tail and first response token. Read this early, the same signal reveals whether an adversarial priority hack has actually pushed the model toward a violation, rather than only whether the prompt looks adversarial. The same directions also support intervention tests: under selected steering settings, moving along a value direction shifts judged trade-offs in the intended direction. Together, these results suggest that some constitution-relevant priorities are accessible as activation-space margins, rather than only as output behavior.

We argue that aligning AI to aggregated human preferences is the wrong target. With current technology, one can train AIs to share the values of a Silicon Valley techno-optimist, a degrowth environmentalist, a national-conservative culture warrior, a single-party state cadre, or a devout religious traditionalist. We should not. Human values produce societies that thrive or fail on the merits of those values - from failed states and extreme inequality to declining happiness, political polarization, and government dysfunction in the world's wealthiest democracies. The pluralistic-alignment program correctly diagnoses that there is no single "humanity" to align with, but is dangerous if taken as the main directive. We argue that AI should be trained to a non-negotiable floor of objective alignment goals - competence, bounded by the constraints of factual accuracy, honesty, and lawfulness and that pluralism belongs at the surface (language, register, conventions, missing-context defaults) and across the wide band of legitimate value tradeoffs that respect the floor, but not at the level of values that violate it. We highlight the empirical reality of unfiltered pluralistic values, propose four commitments as a constructive alternative, and engage six credible objections: commercial pressure and practical feasibility, democratic legitimacy, regulatory compliance, over-reliance on institutionalist explanations, the charge that the floor itself is culturally laden, and the limits of Coherent Extrapolated Volition.

Measuring subjective constructs in naturally occurring social media text requires annotation procedures that are theoretically grounded, empirically validated, and transferable to an encoder model for scalable prediction. Using non-English social media posts annotated according to Schwartz's theory of basic human values, we investigate how different LLMs, prompts, and instruction languages operationalize the expression of values in text. We argue that although texts may permit multiple plausible interpretations, theory-based value definitions can constrain interpretations and reduce spurious value attributions. Beyond precision, recall, and F1, we evaluate structural alignment between values, error structure, confidence-ambiguity relations, and annotation stability. We show that different LLMs produce different value interpretations. Iterative prompt calibration through error analysis reduces misattributions and improves alignment with expert annotations. We also derive targeted expert verification rules from recurrent error structures and use them during corpus annotation. Finally, we show that LLM annotations can be transferred to an encoder model through soft-label training, retaining theory-based value interpretations and information about uncertainty in value expression.

The ambition behind alignment training is to make large language models safe and useful. The primary mechanism, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), shapes the behavior of deployed language models by aligning them with ``human values.'' Yet the process is opaque. What values are being encoded; whose values are they; and how does RLHF encode them? A growing body of evidence suggests that RLHF produces only functional compliance rather than deep alignment. We offer a mechanistic case study of this phenomenon for partisan political orientation with a comparison of the internal representations of Llama 3.1 8B before and after RLHF. We show that RLHF does not remove the structured partisan direction in the base model. Instead, it compresses the variance of the partisan signal to generate consistently balanced and non-partisan output. Sparse autoencoder decomposition reveals that policy-encoding features, which activate sporadically in the base model, are completely inactive in the Instruct model. Feature-level steering experiments confirm the causal disconnect. RLHF thus encodes a norm of political neutrality, not by erasing the model's knowledge of partisanship, but by severing the causal pathway from partisan geometry to output generation. Importantly, this neutrality is functional, not structural so that the underlying geometry that enables partisan steering remains intact. The mechanisms that bypass RLHF's guardrails, such as inferring and amplifying a user's partisan identity, reactivate partisan generation. If RLHF operates by disconnecting rather than removing value-laden structure, then the same pattern may hold for other value domains, and the aligned model's behavior may be more fragile than its outputs suggest.

While household robots are often evaluated based on task completion, everyday domestic environments involve value-conflicting situations in which robots are expected to choose actions that prioritize other values than task success, such as human autonomy, efficiency, or social appropriateness. Yet, there are no benchmarks for evaluating robots' value preferences in such scenarios. We introduce RobotValues, a benchmark to evaluate household robot planners in 10K value-conflict scenarios. Each instance consists of a realistic household image with multiple plausible robot actions that prioritize different human values. We construct RobotValues through LLM-assisted scenario generation, stakeholder-grounded value extraction, image generation and automatic quality control. Using RobotValues we evaluate VLMs used in robotics and find that models exhibit default value preferences, including safety and accommodation, while underselecting privacy-prioritizing actions. When the models are instructed to prioritize specific values that conflict with their own preferences, they often fail to override their default actions, choosing incorrect actions for 80% of the time. These findings suggest that household robot evaluation should measure not only task completion or safety compliance, but also whether robots can choose among plausible actions when human values conflict.

Aligning AI systems with diverse human values requires value specifications grounded in concrete examples, but generating such examples without extensive human supervision remains an open challenge. We investigate what makes these examples effective, using Internal Coherence Maximization (ICM) -- which infers labels by maximizing their mutual predictability -- to generate persona-specific examples that steer a model toward a target group's values, without human supervision. Across four benchmarks spanning classification, preference, and open-ended generation, ICM-inferred in-context examples match the performance of gold labels. Crucially, coherence matters beyond individual label accuracy: with accuracy held constant, more coherent examples generalize substantially better than incoherent ones. For personas underrepresented in pretraining data, targeted human feedback on the questions where the model is least certain about a persona's values yields better generalization than the same number of labels on arbitrary questions. These results identify coherence as a key design principle for scalable value specification, leveraging the diverse human perspectives already encoded in pretrained language models.

Current approaches to aligning large language models (LLMs) aggregate diverse human preferences into a single reward signal, effectively optimizing for a hypothetical ``average user'' who represents no real person particularly well. This position paper argues that LLMs should learn personalized, individual preferences rather than aggregated ones. We show that aggregation masks critical information about preference diversity, individual values, and contextual dependencies, which is a limitation both theoretically grounded in social choice theory and empirically evident across demographic groups. We analyze the rich structure that human preferences encode, survey technical approaches to personalization, and systematically address counterarguments on scalability, shared standards, and manipulation risk. While personalization introduces genuine safety challenges including filter bubbles, value lock-in, and psychological manipulation, we argue these are manageable through bounded personalization frameworks that preserve universal safety constraints while accommodating legitimate individual variation. We conclude with a concrete research and policy agenda for developing preference-aware models that respect both individual autonomy and collective safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a remarkable capacity to adopt different personas and roles; however, it remains unclear whether they can manifest behavior that adheres to a coherent, human-like value structure. In this work, we draw on established psychological value theory to induce human-like values in LLMs and assess their alignment with patterns observed in human studies. Using validated psychological questionnaires, we conduct large-scale experiments -- over 5 million questions -- to evaluate value structures and value-behavior relationships in leading LLMs and compare them to humans. Our findings reveal strong agreement between value-prompted LLMs and humans across both dimensions. Moreover, incorporating human value distributions enhances population-level simulations with value-induced LLMs. These findings highlight the potential of value-induced LLMs as effective, psychologically grounded tools for simulating human behavior.

The rapid emergence of AI technologies is reshaping translation practices and theory across the board. This paper deals with the impact of AI in language access. This area is characterized by the need to serve broad and diverse user populations, within a context where efficiency and access are shaped by legal mandates, ethical and commercial tensions, and safety concerns. This paper reports on the attitudes and perceptions of language access managers towards the AI and the human value in the AI age. Methodologically, this paper presents an analysis of a subset of a broader study on language access and technology, specifically a qualitative thematic analysis of ten semi-structured interviews with language access managers in the USA working in healthcare, court, public service and local government contexts. The results indicate that language access managers show conditional optimism towards the inevitable AI implementations, are strongly risk aware, and deeply committed to the human value and human oversight of AI implementations and output.

Wide applications of LLM-based agents require strong alignment with human social values. However, current works still exhibit deficiencies in self-cognition and dilemma decision, as well as self-emotions. To remedy this, we propose a novel value-based framework that employs GraphRAG to convert principles into value-based instructions and steer the agent to behave as expected by retrieving the suitable instruction upon a specific conversation context. To evaluate the ratio of expected behaviors, we define the expected behaviors from two famous theories, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Plutchik's Wheel of Emotion. By experimenting with our method on the benchmark of DAILYDILEMMAS, our method exhibits significant performance gains compared to prompt-based baselines, including ECoT, Plan-and-Solve, and Metacognitive prompting. Our method provides a basis for the emergence of self-emotion in AI systems.

As intelligent systems are increasingly implemented in our society to make autonomous decisions, their commitment to human values raises serious concerns. Their alignment with human values remains a critical challenge because it can jeopardise the integrity and security of citizens. For this reason, an innovative human-centred and values-driven approach to decision making is required. In this work, we introduce the Fuzzy-Unweighted Value-Based Decision Making (FUW-VBDM) framework, where agents incorporate both quantitative and qualitative criteria to generate human-centred decisions. We also address the normative bias introduced by stakeholders with arbitrary weights by removing prior weights and introducing a fuzzy domain of decision variables defined for a score function. This concept allows us to generalise any VBDM problem as the search for feasible solutions when optimising the score in the weight domain. To provide a solution to FUW-VBDM, we present Rankzzy, a customizable unweighted ranking method that integrates fuzzy-based reasoning to quantify uncertainty. We mathematically prove the consistency of the Rankzzy for any admissible configuration selected by stakeholders. We show the applicability of our method through an illustrative case study, which we also use as a running example. The evaluation conducted indicates a reduced computational cost in large-scale value-based decision-making problems and a strong rank performance regarding existing approaches when employing the aggregation via Pythagorean means.

When you ask an AI assistant for advice about your career, your marriage, or a conflict with your family, does it give you the same answer regardless of where you are from? We tested this systematically by presenting three leading AI systems (Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5.4, and Gemini 2.5 Flash) with ten real-life personal dilemmas, framed for users from 10 countries across 5 continents in 7 languages (n=840 scored responses). We compared AI advice against World Values Survey Wave 7 data measuring what people in each country actually believe. All three AI systems consistently gave Western-style, individualist advice even to users from societies that prioritize family, community, and authority, significantly more so than local values would predict (mean gap +0.76 on a 1-5 scale; t=15.65, p<0.001). The gap is largest for Nigeria (+1.85) and India (+0.82). Japan is the sole exception: AI systems treated Japanese users as more group-oriented than surveys show, revealing that AI encodes outdated stereotypes. Claude and GPT-5.4 show nearly identical bias magnitude, while Gemini is lower but still significant. The models diverge in mechanism: Claude shifts further collectivist in the user's native language; Gemini shifts more individualist; GPT-5.4 responds only to stated country identity. These findings point to a systemic homogenization of values across frontier AI. Data, code, and scoring pipeline are openly released.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a promising paradigm for building embodied agents that ground perception and language into action. However, most existing approaches rely on direct action prediction, lacking the ability to reason over long-horizon trajectories and evaluate their consequences, which limits performance in complex decision-making tasks. In this work, we introduce World-Value-Action (WAV) model, a unified framework that enables implicit planning in VLA systems. Rather than performing explicit trajectory optimization, WAV model learn a structured latent representation of future trajectories conditioned on visual observations and language instructions. A learned world model predicts future states, while a trajectory value function evaluates their long-horizon utility. Action generation is then formulated as inference in this latent space, where the model progressively concentrates probability mass on high-value and dynamically feasible trajectories. We provide a theoretical perspective showing that planning directly in action space suffers from an exponential decay in the probability of feasible trajectories as the horizon increases. In contrast, latent-space inference reshapes the search distribution toward feasible regions, enabling efficient long-horizon decision making. Extensive simulations and real-world experiments demonstrate that the WAV model consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving significant improvements in task success rate, generalization ability, and robustness, especially in long-horizon and compositional scenarios. Code is available at https://github.com/Win-commit/WAV.

Building NLP systems for subjective tasks requires one to ensure their alignment to contrasting human values. We propose the MultiCalibrated Subjective Task Learner framework (MC-STL), which clusters annotations into identifiable human value clusters by three approaches (similarity of annotator rationales, expert-value taxonomies or rater's sociocultural descriptors) and calibrates predictions for each value cluster by learning cluster-specific embeddings. We demonstrate MC-STL on several subjective learning settings, including ordinal, binary, and preference learning predictions, and evaluate it on multiple datasets covering toxic chatbot conversations, offensive social media posts, and human preference alignment. The results show that MC-STL consistently outperforms the baselines that ignore the latent value structure of the annotations, delivering gains in discrimination, value-specific calibration, and disagreement-aware metrics.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate decision-making tasks involving personal data sharing, where privacy concerns and prosocial motivations can push choices in opposite directions. Existing evaluations often measure privacy-related attitudes or sharing intentions in isolation, which makes it difficult to determine whether a model's expressed values jointly predict its downstream data-sharing actions as in real human behaviors. We introduce a context-based assessment protocol that sequentially administers standardized questionnaires for privacy attitudes, prosocialness, and acceptance of data sharing within a bounded, history-carrying session. To evaluate value-action alignments under competing attitudes, we use multi-group structural equation modeling (MGSEM) to identify relations from privacy concerns and prosocialness to data sharing. We propose Value-Action Alignment Rate (VAAR), a human-referenced directional agreement metric that aggregates path-level evidence for expected signs. Across multiple LLMs, we observe stable but model-specific Privacy-PSA-AoDS profiles, and substantial heterogeneity in value-action alignment.

As LLMs occupy an increasingly important role in society, they are more and more confronted with questions that require them not only to draw on their general knowledge but also to align with certain human value systems. Therefore, studying the alignment of LLMs with human values has become a crucial field of inquiry. Prior work, however, mostly focuses on evaluating the alignment of fully trained models, overlooking the training dynamics by which models learn to express human values. In this work, we investigate how and at which stage value alignment arises during the course of a model's post-training. Our analysis disentangles the effects of post-training algorithms and datasets, measuring both the magnitude and time of value drifts during training. Experimenting with Llama-3 and Qwen-3 models of different sizes and popular supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference optimization datasets and algorithms, we find that the SFT phase generally establishes a model's values, and subsequent preference optimization rarely re-aligns these values. Furthermore, using a synthetic preference dataset that enables controlled manipulation of values, we find that different preference optimization algorithms lead to different value alignment outcomes, even when preference data is held constant. Our findings provide actionable insights into how values are learned during post-training and help to inform data curation, as well as the selection of models and algorithms for preference optimization to improve model alignment to human values.

One of today's most pressing societal challenges is building AI systems whose behaviour, or the behaviour it enables within communities of interacting human and artificial agents, aligns with relevant human values. To address this challenge, we propose a formal computational framework for representing human values that provides the foundational structures required for value-aware reasoning in multi-agent systems. To our knowledge, this has not been attempted as yet, which is surprising given the growing volume of research integrating human values into AI systems. Taking as our starting point the wealth of research in human values from the field of social psychology, we set out to provide a formal model which captures value relations, value importance, and computational semantics in order to support the evaluation of behaviour with respect to values and the development of value-aware decision-making mechanisms in agent-based systems. We demonstrate how the model supports the evaluation of behaviour in terms of value alignment across a real-world scenario, establishing a bridge between abstract human values and concrete agent behaviour. We illustrate how our model captures key concepts from social psychology research and outline a roadmap for incorporating values as first-class constructs in multi-agent systems.