Imperfect-Information Games

Overview

These games model settings such as poker, negotiation, and pursuit-evasion, where players must act using incomplete observations and beliefs about hidden cards, types, or intentions. Researchers develop equilibrium concepts and solvers such as counterfactual regret minimization, alongside Bayesian and Stackelberg methods for reasoning about beliefs, commitments, and incentives. Reinforcement learning, search, and opponent modeling produce agents for large games, while benchmarks and variance-reduced evaluation help compare their strength and robustness. A central challenge is scaling methods without losing strategic guarantees, especially when agents must adapt to opponents, exploit mistakes, or remain safe under uncertainty.

Latest papers

CardsList

96 papers7 papers in the last four weeks, down 30% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

  1. IFlowNets: Extending Generative Samplers to Learn Strategies in Incomplete Information Games

    Aug 5, 2026Conor M. Artman, Nicholas Di, Scott PerkinsImperfect-Information GamesGenerative Flow Networks

  2. Dynamic Resource Allocation for Ensemble Determinization MCTS

    Jul 14, 2026Jakub Kowalski, Adam Ciężkowski, Artur Krzyżyński +1Game-Playing AgentsImperfect-Information Games

  3. Beyond Bayesian Nash: Learning Minimax-Regret Equilibria for Adversarial Team Games under Asymmetric Information

    Jul 10, 2026Naman Aggarwal, Jonathan P. HowImperfect-Information GamesGame Theory

  4. Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

    Jul 9, 2026Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan +2Imperfect-Information GamesCooperative MARL

  5. A Gold-Standard Study of What Makes a Lightweight Game-Playing Agent Strong

    Jul 7, 2026Nima Kelidari, Mohammadsaeed Haghi, Mahdi SalmaniSelf-Play RLReinforcement Learning

  6. FootsiesGym: A Fighting Game Benchmark for Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

    Jul 7, 2026Chase McDonald, Nathan Tsang, Wesley N. KerrRL BenchmarksGame-Playing Agents

  7. EMAgnet: Parameter-Space EMA Regularization for Policy Gradient Self-Play in Large Games

    Jun 22, 2026Tristan Maidment, JB Lanier, Chase McDonald +5Self-Play RLImperfect-Information Games

  8. Superhuman AI for Generals.io Using Self-Play Reinforcement Learning

    Jun 22, 2026Matej Straka, Viliam Lisý, Martin SchmidGame-Playing AgentsSelf-Play RL

  9. IRumAI: Reinforcement Learning for Indian Rummy

    Jun 20, 2026Vignesh MohanReinforcement LearningGame-Playing Agents

  10. Mobile Target Search with Imperfect Perception: A Partially Observable Stochastic Game Theoretical Approach

    Jun 18, 2026Hanzheng Zhang, Shu Liang, Shuyu LiuImperfect-Information GamesGame Theory

  11. Strategic Type Spaces

    Jun 6, 2026Olivier Gossner, Rafael VeielImperfect-Information GamesGame Theory

  12. Byzantine Cheap Talk: Adversarial Resilience and Topology Effects in LLM Coordination Games

    Jun 5, 2026Aya El Mir, Martin Takáč, Salem LahlouMulti-Agent LLM SystemsMulti-Agent Coordination

  13. Minimax-Optimal Policy Regret in Partially Observable Markov Games

    Jun 1, 2026Raman AroraRegret Minimization in RLImperfect-Information Games

  14. Used Car Salesbots? Honesty and Credulity of LLMs as Bargaining Agents under Partial Information

    May 29, 2026Antonio Valerio Miceli-Barone, Vaishak Belle, Shay B. CohenMulti-Agent LLM SystemsMulti-Agent Negotiation

  15. PokerSkill: LLMs Can Play Expert-Level Poker without Training or Solvers

    May 28, 2026Boning Li, Baoxiang Wang, Longbo HuangGame-Playing AgentsImperfect-Information Games

  16. Differentiable Belief-based Opponent Shaping

    May 27, 2026Aarav G Sane, Karthik Sivachandran, Rohan PalejaMulti-Agent CoordinationImperfect-Information Games

  17. MAPLE: Multi-State Aggregated Policy Evaluation for AlphaZero in Imperfect-Information Games

    May 22, 2026Qian-Rong Li, Hung Guei, I-Chen Wu +1Game-Playing AgentsImperfect-Information Games

  18. GENSTRAT: Toward a Science of Strategic Reasoning in Large Language Models

    May 22, 2026Vartan Shadarevian, Kia Ghods, Alex Kenich +1LLM EvaluationImperfect-Information Games