Mechanism Design

Industrial laparoscopic graspers rely on multi-link rigid mechanisms manufactured to tight tolerances, resulting in high manufacturing and assembly costs. This work presents the design and proof-of-concept validation of a monolithic, fully compliant, bistable, laparoscopic grasper that eliminates the need for multiple rigid links, thereby reducing part count. The device integrates a compliant trigger and a compliant gripper end-effector, coupled via a control push-rod, to achieve stable grasping without continuous user input. A hybrid approach combining an analytical model, iterative prototyping, and finite element analyses is employed to design the laparoscopic grasper. The trigger mechanism is synthesized using a Two-Element Beam Constraint Model as a design framework to control the deformation and stiffness of I-beam-like elements. This technique enables elastic energy storage while preventing snap-through instability. The end-effector is designed as a compliant gripper to achieve adaptive grasping through elastic deformation. The laparoscopic design presented here is fabricated using fused deposition 3D printing. A comparative study of the jaws' opening and closing performance is presented using nonlinear finite element analysis and experimentation. The fabricated prototype demonstrates reliable bistable actuation, confirming the feasibility of such compliant laparoscopic grasper architectures.

The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of positive spillovers: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination. While such spillovers can improve content quality, they also reshape incentives, as creators may reduce effort when they can benefit from others' contributions. We introduce the Content Creation with Spillovers (CCS) model, a game between a platform and strategic creators. In this game, each creator chooses an effort level, and qualities are jointly determined by all creators' efforts. The platform contracts on qualities while seeking to maximize social welfare. We show that standard contest mechanisms can be unstable, and propose a parametrized family of Provisional Allocation mechanisms that guarantee a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Although optimizing welfare within this family is hard to approximate in general, we develop approximation algorithms whose guarantees hold either deterministically across structured spillover classes or with high probability under random instances.

The celebrated Myerson--Satterthwaite theorem shows that in bilateral trade, no mechanism can be simultaneously fully efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), and budget balanced (BB). This naturally raises the question of how closely the gains from trade (GFT) achievable by a BIC and BB mechanism can approximate the first-best (fully efficient) benchmark. The optimal BIC and BB mechanism is typically complex and highly distribution-dependent, making it difficult to characterize directly. Consequently, much of the literature analyzes simpler mechanisms such as the Random-Offerer (RO) mechanism and establishes constant-factor guarantees relative to the first-best GFT. An important open question concerns the worst-case performance of the RO mechanism relative to first-best (FB) efficiency. While it was originally hypothesized that the approximation ratio $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}}$ is bounded by $2$, recent work provided counterexamples to this conjecture: Cai et al. proved that the ratio can be strictly larger than $2$, and Babaioff et al. exhibited an explicit example with ratio approximately $2.02$. In this work, we employ AlphaEvolve, an AI-guided evolutionary search framework, to explore the space of value distributions. We identify a new worst-case instance that yields an improved lower bound of $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}} \ge \textbf{2.0749}$. This establishes a new lower bound on the worst-case performance of the Random-Offerer mechanism, demonstrating a wider efficiency gap than previously known.

Automated design of multi-agent interactions with desirable equilibrium outcomes is inherently difficult due to the computational hardness, non-uniqueness, and instability of the resulting equilibria. In this work, we propose the use of game-agnostic differentiable equilibrium blocks (DEBs) as modules in a novel, differentiable framework to address a wide variety of incentive design problems from economics and computer science. We call this framework deep incentive design (DID). To validate our approach, we examine three diverse, challenging incentive design tasks: contract design, machine scheduling, and inverse equilibrium problems. For each task, we train a single neural network using a unified pipeline and DEB. This architecture solves the full distribution of problem instances, parameterized by a context, handling all games across a wide range of scales (from two to sixteen actions per player).

Selecting an appropriate motor-gearbox combination is a critical design task in robotics because it directly affects cost, mass, and dynamic performance. This process is especially challenging in modular robots with closed kinematic chains, where joint torques are coupled and actuator inertia propagates through the mechanism. We present Robodimm, a software framework for automated actuator sizing in scalable robot architectures. By leveraging Pinocchio for dynamics and Pink for inverse kinematics, Robodimm uses a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) formulation for constrained inverse dynamics. The platform supports parametric scaling, interactive trajectory programming through jog modes, and a two-round validation workflow that addresses actuator self-weight effects.

Autonomous AI agents are becoming economic actors. They compose deadline-bound services across the device-edge-cloud continuum and contend for capacity no single operator owns. This article asks when decentralised pricing can coordinate them exactly and truthfully, and what their service dependencies must satisfy. We model the pipelines as service-dependency graphs under governance constraints and identify the decisive property: laminarity of the induced leaf-block family. Where it holds, the feasible allocation space is a polymatroid and efficient incentive-compatible clearing exists per epoch; where a crossing breaks it, exactness and truthfulness can fail, while clearing prices survive on every totally unimodular family. The formal results instantiate polymatroid, gross-substitutes and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves theory; the contribution is the bridge from dependency structure to that machinery and an integrator architecture that exposes a laminar interface. The node-level evaluation (32,020 runs), at testbed-calibrated congestion, locates the boundary. One crossing costs exactness in 14.7% of high-load rounds and none on laminar instances, and truthfulness fails where exactness does, across contention. An integrator's inner exposure restores exactness at a cost in admitted volume, and before translation overhead it cuts median latency by 16 to 17 percent. Against truth-free posted prices the tuned market leads at medium load and trails a demand-responsive one in four of six high-load cells. Recorded and composed agent workloads drive the allocation. For platform designers, laminar pipelines admit exact decentralised pricing, truthful under the VCG mechanism, and a crossing needs an integrator's inner exposure.

The rapid proliferation of AI applications has intensified debate on effective regulation of these black-box services. Effective regulation must balance two competing goals: (1) deterring non-compliant providers from entering the market, while (2) retaining compliant ones. We call this ideal the perfect market outcome (PMO). Regulators face two compounding obstacles that make PMO difficult to achieve: providers hold private information and can act strategically to evade compliance, while any evidence drawn or derived from a finite sample carries statistical uncertainty in proving non-compliance. As this information asymmetry and statistical uncertainty is inherent to any effective regulation, we formalise them through a mechanism design framework that explicitly accounts for such statistical uncertainty. This yields a sharp characterisation: a mechanism achieves PMO if and only if the set of non-compliant evidence distributions forms a closed, convex set of probability measures, known in imprecise probability as a credal set. This result serves as a diagnostic tool to determine whether PMO is achievable under a given regulation. We further show that PMO-achieving mechanisms can be constructed from a collection of hypothesis tests, and validate our theoretical contributions through experiments on spurious-feature and fairness-based regulations.

This paper focuses on geometric methods for generating rational motions used in the design of single-loop rational linkages, 1-degree-of-freedom mechanisms that can execute prescribed spatial tasks. Building on established rational motion synthesis methods, we introduce a new interpolation scheme for seven 3D points based on cubic quaternionic Bezier curves. The resulting motion admits factorization, i.e. the synthesis of a spatial six-bar mechanism whose tool frame passes the specified seven points. To support engineering practice, we provide open-source CAD tools that implement also the other methods and provide fast visual evaluation of motion generation and mechanism synthesis.

Kinematics of mechanisms is intricately coupled to their geometry and their utility often arises out of the ability to perform reproducible motion with fewer actuating degrees of freedom. In this article, we explore the assembly of scissor-units, each made of two rigid linear members connected by a pin joint. The assembly has a single degree of freedom, where actuating any single unit results in a shape change of the entire assembly. We derive expressions for the effective curvature of the unit and the trajectory of the mechanism's tip as a function of the geometric variables which we then use as the basis to program two tasks in the mechanism: shape morphing and writing. By phrasing these tasks as optimization problems and utilizing the differentiable simulation framework, we arrive at solutions that are then tested in table-top experiments. Our results show that the geometry of scissor assemblies can be leveraged for automated navigation and inspection in complex domains, in light of the optimization framework. However, we highlight that the challenges associated with rapid programming and error-free implementation in experiments without feedback still remain.

The commercialization of LLM applications is the next frontier in online advertising, with LLM-native advertising emerging as a promising paradigm by integrating ads into LLM-generated content. However, classic mechanisms are no longer applicable in this setting where the auction object is shifted from discrete ad slots to distributions over LLM outputs, and existing methods are impractical in industrial scenarios due to ignored externalities or high inference costs. To address these issues, we propose LLM-Auction, the first learning-based generative auction mechanism that integrates auction and generation. By formulating the allocation as preference alignment between LLM outputs and a mechanism objective that balances advertisers' value and user experience, we optimize the LLMs to inherently model allocation externalities without extra inference cost. Theoretically, we identify the allocation monotonicity and continuity of the optimal allocation rule of LLM-Auction, and prove that a simple first-price payment rule exhibits favorable incentive properties under this allocation rule. Furthermore, we build an LLM-as-a-judge simulation environment for quantitative evaluation, and experiments demonstrate that LLM-Auction achieves the state-of-the-art allocation efficiency while approximately satisfying key mechanism properties.

Typically, heuristic/trial-based approaches are used to design soft pneumatic grippers (SPGs). This paper presents a systematic topology optimization framework for developing SPGs. The design-dependent nature of actuating load is modeled using Darcy's law with an added drainage term. A 2D soft arm unit is then optimized as a compliant mechanism under pneumatic loading. To ensure the design is robust and manufacturable, the problem is formulated as a min-max optimization, where output deformations of blueprint and eroded designs are considered. A volume constraint is imposed on the blueprint part, while a strain-energy constraint is enforced on the eroded part. The Method of Moving Asymptotes is employed to solve optimization problems. The optimized 2D part is extruded suitably to generate a 3D unit. Ten such 3D units are assembled to create a gripper arm. Both the optimized 2D unit and the corresponding gripper arm outperform their conventional rectangular designs under pneumatic loading, demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed approach. The arms are fabricated using the SLA printing technique. Numerical and experimental results are compared at different pneumatic loads. Four 3D-printed arms are integrated with a supporting structure to form the SPG. The gripping action of the SPG is demonstrated on objects with different weights, sizes, structures, stiffnesses, and shapes.

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically addressed separately, for example, through opponent modelling and incentive design. Drawing inspiration from conjectural variations games, we propose an incentive design framework in which a coordinator first computes an equilibrium by optimizing a predefined objective function, then communicates this equilibrium as a target for the players to reach. In a centralized setting, the coordinator also optimizes the conjectures to steer the players towards the target. In decentralized settings, players independently compute conjectures and update their strategies based on individual targets. We provide a guarantee of equilibrium existence in both cases. This framework uses conjectures not only to guide the system towards desirable outcomes but also to decouple the game into independent optimization problems, enabling efficient computation and parallelization in large-scale settings. We illustrate our theoretical results on classical representative noncooperative games, demonstrating its application potential.

We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports. We find standard primal-dual methods fragile in this setting: agents easily manipulate their reports to distort dual variables, sacrificing social efficiency for individual utility. To address this, we propose the Incentive-Aware Primal-Dual (IAPD) framework. On the primal side, we integrate three components to suppress manipulation: a VCG-based payment neutralizes immediate misreporting benefits, while epoch-based lazy updates and random exploration together ensure potential future gains are outweighed by immediate penalties. On the dual side, to overcome a learning barrier due to lazy updates -- which we call the "price of incentives" -- we design a novel optimistic online learning algorithm, O-FTRL-FP. It utilizes a fixed-point oracle to resolve the circular dependency between optimistic dual variables and the resulting allocations. Ultimately, our mechanism attains $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ social welfare regret, satisfies all long-term constraints, and induces a near-truthful equilibrium. It also smoothly generalizes to multi-unit multi-demand allocation problems. Notably, this $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ regret near-matches the non-strategic $Ω(\sqrt T)$ lower bound, demonstrating that incentive-awareness can be accommodated at nearly no cost.

Hedonic Games are a well-established model for describing the formation of coalitions. In this work, we considered the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, that are mechanisms that bounded rational agents may fail to recognize as manipulable, for two relevant classes of succinctly representable Hedonic Games, namely Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games. In these classes, agents have cardinal scores towards other agents, and their preferences towards different coalitions are determined by aggregating these scores. Moreover, the quality of an outcome can also be easily evaluated through these scores by means of the utilitarian social welfare. We first prove that, when scores can be arbitrary, every welfare-maximizing mechanism is NOM, and, when scores are limited in a continuous interval, then there exist tie-breaking rules making welfare-maximizing mechanisms NOM. Next, we focus on efficient NOM mechanisms, since there is no known polynomial-time algorithm to compute welfare-maximizing outcomes in the considered classes of hedonic games. To this aim, we first prove a characterization of NOM mechanisms that simplifies the class of mechanisms of interest. Then, we design a NOM mechanism returning approximations that essentially match the best-known approximation achievable in polynomial time. Finally, we turn our attention to discrete scores, and specifically, the case that scores are $\{-x, 0, 1\}$ for $x > 0$. We prove that the ability to design welfare-maximizing NOM mechanisms depends on the magnitude of the scores. In particular, for $x > 1$, we prove that a welfare-maximizing NOM mechanism exists only when $x$ is very large. For $x \leq 1$, instead, we observe that a welfare-maximizing NOM mechanism always exists except when $x$ lies in the interval $[a, b]$ where $a \approx 2/n^2$ and $b \approx 1/n$.

In federated learning (FL), a center trains a shared model from updates that clients compute on their private data. Collecting and training on data is costly, so a strategic client may contribute little data and free-ride on the model trained by the others. We study mechanisms that incentivize data contribution and learn the model at the same time. Our first mechanism, UPBReD, updates the clients ' contributions and the model jointly, and converges at a geometric rate to a Nash equilibrium of the contribution game together with the welfare-maximizing model for those contributions. This equilibrium can involve under-contribution, so our second mechanism, 2P-UPBReD, adds budget-balanced transfers that make full contribution a dominant strategy, after which training converges to the optimal model; we also give conditions under which every client prefers to participate. Both mechanisms trust what clients report about the data they use and the gradients they compute. We show that no payment rule can reward unverifiable contributions unless something the center observes depends on the data actually used. Building on this, T-2P-UPBReD checks each client's reported contribution against the other clients ' realized valuations of the trained model, and prices gradient reports with a budget-balanced charge. It elicits truthful contribution reports, makes gradient reports approximately truthful, still reaches full contribution and the optimal model, and never runs a deficit. Experiments on CIFAR-10, FEMNIST, and Twitter show that 2P-UPBReD matches the welfare of FedAvg trained on all data, while strategic clients without incentives lower the welfare of the learned model.

Rigid link flapping mechanisms remain the most practical choice for flapping wing micro-aerial vehicles (MAVs) to carry useful payloads and onboard batteries for free flight due to their long-term durability and reliability. However, MAVs with these mechanisms require significant weight reduction to achieve high agility and maneuverability. One approach involves using single-DOF planar rigid linkages, which are rarely optimized dimensionally for high lift and low power, considering their sweeping kinematics and the unsteady aerodynamic effects. We integrated a mechanism simulator based on a quasistatic nonlinear finite element method with an unsteady vortex lattice method-based aerodynamic analysis tool within an optimization routine. We optimized three different mechanism topologies from the literature. Significant power savings were observed up to 34% in some cases, due to increased amplitude and higher lift coefficients resulting from optimized asymmetric sweeping velocity profiles. We also conducted a robustness analysis to quantify performance sensitivity to manufacturing tolerances. It provided a trade-off between performance and reliability and revealed the need for tight manufacturing tolerances and careful material selection. Finally, the analysis helped select the best mechanism topology, as we observed significant variation in sensitivity to manufacturing tolerances and peak input torque values across different topologies for a given design lift value. The presented unified computational tool can find application in flapping mechanism topology optimization, as it can simulate any generic single-DOF planar rigid linkage without supplying kinematics manually.

To alleviate the training burden in federated learning while enhancing convergence speed, Split Federated Learning (SFL) has emerged as a promising approach by combining the advantages of federated and split learning. However, despite its advantages, existing SFL studies have largely overlooked the strategic interactions among self-interested participants during the SFL process. In this framework, the SFL model owner can choose the cut layer to balance the training load between the server and clients, ensuring the necessary level of privacy for the clients. Additionally, the SFL model owner sets incentives to encourage client participation in the SFL process. The optimization strategies employed by the SFL model owner influence clients' decisions regarding the amount of data they contribute, taking into account the shared incentives over clients and anticipated energy consumption from both computation and networking during SFL. To address this framework, we model the problem using a hierarchical decision-making approach, formulated as a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among clients and analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium by examining the leader's game. Furthermore, we discuss privacy concerns related to differential privacy and the criteria for selecting the minimum required cut layer. Our findings show that the Stackelberg equilibrium solution maximizes the utility for both the clients and the SFL model owner while achieving a well-balanced trade-off between model accuracy and the associated computing and networking overhead during the SFL process.

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

We study a multi-round mechanism design problem, where we interact with a set of agents over a sequence of rounds. We wish to design an incentive-compatible (IC) online learning scheme to maximize an application-specific objective within a given class of mechanisms, without prior knowledge of the agents' type distributions. Even if each mechanism in this class is IC in a single round, if an algorithm naively chooses from this class on each round, the entire learning process may not be IC against non-myopic buyers who appear over multiple rounds. On each round, our method randomly chooses between the recommendation of a weakly differentially private online learning algorithm (e.g., Hedge), and a commitment mechanism which penalizes non-truthful behavior. Our method is IC and achieves $O(T^{\frac{1+h}{2}})$ regret for the application-specific objective in an adversarial setting, where $h$ quantifies the long-sightedness of the agents. When compared to prior work, our approach is conceptually simpler,it applies to general mechanism design problems (beyond auctions), and its regret scales gracefully with the size of the mechanism class.

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known to a seller and has a corresponding price [Bergemann et al., 2018]. Each buyer has their own decision to make in a world environment, and their subjective expected value for the information associated with a particular experiment comes from the improvement in this decision and depends on their prior and value for different outcomes. In a setting with multiple buyers, a buyer's expected value for an experiment may also depend on the information sold to others [Bonatti et al., 2022]. We introduce the application of deep learning for the design of revenue-optimal data markets, looking to expand the frontiers of what can be understood and achieved. Relative to earlier work on deep learning for auction design [Dütting et al., 2023], we must learn signaling schemes rather than allocation rules and handle obedience constraints $-$ these arising from modeling the downstream actions of buyers $-$ in addition to incentive constraints on bids. Our experiments demonstrate that this new deep learning framework can almost precisely replicate all known solutions from theory, expand to more complex settings, and be used to establish the optimality of new designs for data markets and make conjectures in regard to the structure of optimal designs.

Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.

Many real-world domains--including e-commerce platform design, security planning, and multi-agent coordination--feature leader-follower problems where one decision-maker commits to a policy and others react strategically. We develop a reinforcement learning framework for such interactions in sequential environments with partial observations and multiple followers. Followers may adapt through no-regret learning or reinforcement learning, potentially departing from equilibrium behavior. The framework embeds follower adaptation into the leader's environment to construct a single-agent partially observable Markov decision process--the Stackelberg POMDP. For policy-interactive response algorithms, which access the leader's policy through queries, we prove that an optimal policy based only on the leader's game history yields an optimal commitment under the specified response procedure. We use proximal policy optimization with a centralized critic and train contextual meta-followers to respond across leader policies. In indirect mechanism design, mechanisms using buyer messages achieve higher social welfare than optimal standard sequential price mechanisms across all tested type counts, with responses certified as approximate Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria. In platform design, learned display rules increase mean consumer surplus by 8.4% over an optimized fixed price cap while accommodating hidden seller costs. In Atari bilateral trade, meta-learned follower responses support joint learning of visual gameplay and economic decisions; assigning leadership to the seller or buyer shifts transaction prices and payoffs in that agent's favor. Controlled ablations examine how response credit, policy consistency, and reward timing affect learning.