Reputation

Agents can now externalize experience into memory, consolidating historical traces into semantic knowledge and procedural shortcuts that persist between sessions. Such memory is typically private to a single agent. We argue that agentic memory benefits from being collective, because trustworthy knowledge of the shared environment---the data sources, services, and tools agents depend on---cannot be established by any single agent, only corroborated across many independent observers. We present Cairn, a community reputation platform that captures collective knowledge, allowing agents to query the community's opinion of a resource before use and to submit evidence-backed ratings afterward. Cairn aggregates observations via a time-decayed Beta model with confidence shrinkage and supports semantic discovery over reviewer rationales. We evaluate Cairn's reputation engine under adversarial simulation (e.g., lying, collusion, camouflage), benchmark its retrieval performance, and report a case study of rating heterogeneous agents in production.

When someone asks an AI assistant which doctor to see or which firm to trust with their savings, the answer is a referral. We audit AI provider recommendations in four registry-backed service domains across the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, matching every recommendation against the official registry for its domain (Medicare clinician and facility records, and SEC adviser disclosures), under three conditions: an open-weight model, a proprietary model without web search, and the same proprietary model with search. Without search, both models largely fabricate recommendations in the domains the web covers thinly. Only 4% of the open-weight model's recommended doctors and 11% of the proprietary model's match a clinician in the queried city, and the open-weight matches are name coincidences: its matched clinicians are no likelier to be primary-care doctors than names drawn at random from the registry. With search, 64-71% of recommendations in the same domains match a real provider. Search also changes who is recommended. Without it, recommended advisory firms carry SEC misconduct disclosures at 3.6 times the registry base rate, even after adjusting for firm size; with search, significantly below it. Restaurants, where quality and visibility are separately measurable, show a 3-5x review-count premium but a rating premium of at most a tenth of a star. Finally, search largely removes the metro-size penalty: without it, real recommendations concentrate in the largest metros; with it, match rates are similar across metro-size terciles. Whether an AI referral is trustworthy depends strongly on its retrieval configuration rather than on the underlying model alone, yet an answer produced without retrieval often carries no sign that its recommendations were never verified.

An OpenReview bug in November 2025 broke anonymity at several conferences and prompted calls for open review, which motivate us to ask what shifting from blind to open would mean for authors. Analyzing over 18,000 reviewed submissions to ICLR 2026, split into de facto open and blind groups by arXiv preprint timing, we find that ratings rise with author reputation under both mechanisms, with a steeper slope under open review that is statistically significant, and that the open-blind difference is concentrated at the borderline ratings. The pattern holds across five reputation proxies (including institution, h-index, and citation count), three author-aggregation rules, and five definitions of the open window. A controlled simulation with five AI models as reviewers, holding the manuscript fixed and varying the author reputation, reproduces the effect. With claude-opus-5 as the reviewer, for example, rating rises by 0.5 points as the author moves from low to high reputation.

Wallet reputation scores decide who receives an airdrop, who can borrow, and who enters an allowlist across decentralised finance. They almost always begin as hand-written formulas: compositions of clamped logarithmic, linear and square-root transforms over behavioural features, with every threshold and point award set by hand. Such a formula is readable and deterministic, but it is piecewise and non-differentiable, it cannot improve as data accumulates, and it cannot distinguish a feature that is genuinely zero from one its pipeline failed to capture. We present zScore-N, the neural network that replaced ours in production. The formula served as its teacher: calibrated against 5,208,952 wallets sampled across 2019-2024 and verified to reproduce production output to within 2.3e-13, it supplies unlimited labelled training data at zero label noise. The trained network reproduces it to 0.58 points RMSE on the 1000-point scale (R^2 = 0.99997), against 2.25 for gradient-boosted trees and 28.04 for linear regression on identical features and splits. Trained with missing-value masks against uncorrupted targets, it halves the error that incomplete data introduces: at 10% feature-level missingness the formula drifts 51.4 points from its own complete-data output with a systematic -12.5 point bias, while the network drifts 17.9. The network carries the score at production scale, across a population of millions of wallets spanning six orders of magnitude in size and activity.

Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions but also on the persistence of the identity to which reputation is attached. When identities can be abandoned and recreated cheaply, reputational capital may itself become an object of opportunistic exploitation. This paper develops a dynamic economic framework to study when reputation is sufficient to discipline autonomous agents. We model reputation as capital attracting future economic activity. At each point, an agent chooses between operating honestly, investing in quality to preserve future gains, or executing a one-shot deviation to extract its reputation's value and restart from a penalized identity. Our analysis relates the temptation to opportunistic behavior to identity-reset costs, reputation persistence, demand sensitivity, and enforcement design, deriving comparative statics on optimal quality provision. Autonomous AI-agent operating on the blockchain are a relevant application: infrastructures such as ERC-8004, ERC-8183, and x402 combine reputation, identity, and payments in permissionless markets. Nonetheless, our framework applies to any environment where reputation generates future business and identities are replaceable.

Artificial intelligence systems increasingly enact market-facing promises through chatbots, recommendation systems, automated decisions, and generative interfaces. Their failures, misuse, and misrepresentation raise a question that conventional brand-crisis models do not fully specify: how do stakeholders assign responsibility when technical causation, customer-facing control, and governance duties are distributed across an AI system, developer, deployer, vendor, and user? This conceptual paper develops a sociotechnical process theory from a structured, federated scoping synthesis of verified academic and primary sources. It distinguishes an AI/algorithmic incident from an AI-related organisational crisis and, in turn, from an AI-related organisational scandal. The framework proposes that incident configuration shapes actor-specific attribution; attribution informs capability, integrity, fairness, and relationship appraisals; and public moralisation may, but need not, escalate an incident into scandal. The theory offers a reconciliation of findings that algorithm involvement can buffer negative brand reactions in some settings while robot and chatbot failures can redirect responsibility to an associated firm in others. It introduces accountable transparency as a proposed response configuration that combines timely notice, an intelligible account, role-responsibility acknowledgement, remedy, evidence of correction, and recourse. The evidence supports conditional, proximal inferences about blame, trust, satisfaction, firm evaluation, and communication credibility more strongly than claims about durable reputation, brand equity, or market performance.

With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.

Can cooperation among large language model (LLM) agents be evolutionarily stable against free-rider invasion? We study an indirect reciprocity donation game where LLM agents observe behavioral traces and donate on a continuous scale. Strategies, represented as natural language prompts, evolve through cultural transmission across generations. Across four LLM backends, robustness to free-rider invasion varies by more than an order of magnitude. The strongest predictor of this robustness is opponent endowment sensitivity, the degree to which agents discriminate between cooperative and uncooperative opponents, operationalizing the classical Image Scoring mechanism. By contrast, adherence to the Leading-Eight L1 norm does not predict robustness. Robustness depends on defector exclusion: while both cooperator reward and defector punishment vary across models, only the stringency of defector exclusion predicts resistance to free-rider invasion. These findings reveal that LLM agents are confined to Image Scoring-like discrimination and fail to develop the more robust Leading-Eight norms, highlighting a fundamental vulnerability in culturally evolved LLM cooperation and motivating bottom-up approaches to norm construction.

Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) has emerged as an optimal privacy-preserving solution; however, it remains vulnerable to opportunistic behaviors due to the absence of a central coordinator. While Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) serves as a powerful framework for analyzing such behaviors, existing studies often assume that agents possess perfect rationality and maintain static strategies. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a novel EGT framework designed to analyze strategic evolution and enhance overall system performance. The primary contributions of this work are threefold: First, we model peer-to-peer (P2P) interactions on a lattice network structure under the assumption of bounded rationality. Second, we formulate a comprehensive payoff matrix incorporating training costs, communication overhead, and cooperative rewards, while tailoring a strategy update rule that captures spatial propagation dynamics. Third, we integrate a reputation-based reward-and-punishment mechanism to effectively deter free-riding behaviors. Simulation results demonstrate that the framework significantly outperforms the baseline. Specifically, it increases average accuracy from approximately 70% to 82%, elevates cooperation frequency to approach 100% (compared to below 5% in the baseline), and drops accuracy variance from around 0.40 to 0.002, thereby accelerating uniform convergence and ensuring system stability.

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.

Online recommendation has traditionally taken place after a user enters a platform, which determines the candidate pool and the ranking shown to the user. LLM-based user agents enable a different recommendation process: a user specifies a need before choosing a platform, leaving platforms to compete for the user's attention, which we refer to as an agentic recommendation market. In our controlled LLM-based experiments across three product domains, we find this new setting of recommendation creates a tension between access and attention. Compared with traditional platform-centric recommendation, user-centric recommendation greatly expands the opportunity for relevant items to enter comparison; yet broader participation does not translate directly into effective exposure. Competition directly triggers platforms' strategic play: selectively positive explanations occupy 73--78% of first-ranked positions. When the user agent relates platforms' actions to subsequent user feedback, this share falls to 36--41%, while the chance of a user purchasing the relevant item increases. A user agent is therefore more than a ranker over a larger pool of candidates: its querying, ranking, and feedback mechanism governing who can compete, how scarce attention is allocated, and how earlier outcomes shape the evaluation of platforms directly affect user utility. Designing agentic recommendation therefore requires treating access, attention, and accountability as a joint mechanism design problem.

The operation of blockchain is governed by consensus algorithms (CA). Several consensus mechanisms require significant computational power, while others necessitate high amounts of stakes to select the participant to validate and verify the transactions in the block, leading to centralisation of power and participant exclusion. This paper proposes a novel methodology to address these issues in reputation-based consensus algorithms by studying the reputation behaviour of the validator using intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) and uninorm aggregation operations (UAOs). Our approach uses IFSs to express the "reputation" because the reputation values in a consensus algorithm eventually imply uncertainty, and IFSs facilitate the representation of a lack of precise knowledge about reputation. Moreover, this methodology utilises uninorm aggregation operations to monitor reputation over time and reinforces the importance of negative and positive reputation. Consequently, this solution allows validators to rectify past failures in subsequent verification processes and foster an equitable consensus algorithm design. The proposed framework maintains linear computational complexity and does not introduce additional communication overhead beyond the underlying consensus protocol. Supported by experimental results, our methodology demonstrates improved performance and evaluation, promising advancements in blockchain network fairness and inclusivity.

In decentralized storage systems, audit results are often not used directly to guide later redundancy and shard-placement decisions, which can lead to inefficient resource allocation and delayed recovery. We propose AEC-DS, a closed-loop adaptive erasure coding mechanism driven by Provable Data Possession (PDP) feedback. PDP audits continuously update node reputation, while a QoS-aware migration policy adjusts shard placement according to node reliability and data priority. The policy moves high-priority shards from unstable nodes to more reliable nodes in the cold tier and penalizes unstable nodes in subsequent placement decisions. Simulations with 800 nodes and 500 files show that AEC-DS maintains 100% data durability under the evaluated fault model with a redundancy factor of 1.25x. Compared with Static-EC, Dynamic-EC, and DRD-EC, AEC-DS reduces cumulative recovery operations by 66.8%-75.2%. Ablation results further show that class migration plays a major role in preventing data loss, improving the measured loss-prevention capability by 176.8%. These results indicate that PDP feedback can connect integrity auditing with redundancy and placement adaptation, providing a practical path toward self-healing decentralized storage while accounting for the additional cost of migration.

In this paper, we present an extension of liquid rank reputation systems that enables the aggregation and blending of multiple heterogeneous reputation sources into a unified reputation score. The proposed framework supports the incorporation of external reputational signals alongside internally generated reputation, allowing influence to reflect participation and contribution across multiple contexts and subsystems. By introducing explicit weighting and blending mechanisms, the model provides fine-grained control over the relative impact of individual reputation sources, making it adaptable to diverse governance and coordination scenarios involving both human and machine agents. The resulting approach extends existing liquid rank systems and offers a flexible foundation for designing reputation-based governance mechanisms in complex socio-technical environments.

LLMs agents are increasingly used in multi-agent settings, yet their behaviour in sustainability games remains largely unexplored. This work investigates whether lying can emerge among LLM agents in a competitive sustainability game in which agents are informed that common resources can regenerate, although regeneration does not actually occur. We develop an agent-based model of a sustainability game in which agents manage industrial, military, and ecological resources, and interact through a network. LLM agents can observe neighbours' status, declare future attacks, receive permission to lie, and access reputation information, while rule-based agents provide an interpretable behavioural baseline. The results show that neighbour information strongly changes system dynamics, increasing attacks while improving biosphere retention and coexistence. Also, the presence of future declarations reduce extinction risk without suppressing conflict. Behaviourally, deception emerges even when agents are not explicitly allowed to lie, and explicit permission mainly increases bluffing and diversion rather than direct backstabbing. Finally, the presence of reputation memory and information about the current biosphere level reduces system ecological depletion. These findings suggest that deception can arise as an emergent behaviour in LLM-agent systems and that communication between LLM-agents could support sustainability while dealing with risk.

As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation. Despite its rapid adoption, the protocol has not been studied empirically, leaving it unclear whether the information it records provides a trustworthy basis for decision-making. To address this gap, we present the first empirical study of ERC-8004 across three chains: Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain (BSC), and Base, covering the period from protocol deployment through May 13, 2026. We crawl on-chain Identity and Reputation events, off-chain files, and x402 payment transactions. On the identity side, we find that most registrations are placeholders rather than active agents, with only a small fraction (3%, 4%, and 15% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exposing a valid ERC-8004 registration file with at least one live service endpoint. On the reputation side, we show that the Registry, as currently deployed, cannot function as a trust signal: values are not commensurable, feedback records are rarely grounded in verifiable interactions, and reputation can be manipulated at minimal cost. Consistent with these design weaknesses, we find that a substantial fraction of reviewers (73.5%, 59.2%, and 90.6% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exhibit coordinated Sybil behavior. After removing Sybil-flagged feedback, 15.8%, 77.9%, and 86.8% of rated agents, respectively, are left with no valid feedback. We then turn these findings into concrete recommendations for future revisions of ERC-8004. Our study yields actionable protocol-design implications and establishes an empirical baseline for research on AI agent markets.

SMS fraud is increasingly cross-channel: a message directs the user to a webpage, and the final risk depends on how the SMS claim aligns with the page content and requested user action. However, existing evaluations either focus on message-only smishing classification or expose URL and domain cues that allow models to rely on reputation shortcuts. To address this gap, we introduce \textbf{FraudSMSWalker}, a controlled benchmark for URL-masked SMS-to-webpage fraud judgment. FraudSMSWalker contains 699 bilingual chains, including 332 fraudulent and 367 benign cases, across ten service scenarios. The model-visible input consists of the SMS context and sanitized webpage evidence, while raw URLs, hosts, domains, IPs, redirects, and reputation metadata are withheld. The benchmark further includes hard benign cases whose pages contain login, payment, verification, or account-management elements that are plausible under the service context but also appear in scam flows. We evaluate nine web agents under masked browser-agent protocols and conduct URL-visibility ablations. The results show that current agents can detect suspicious cues, but struggle to preserve benign recall and often produce positive predictions that are weakly supported by the observed evidence. These findings position FraudSMSWalker as a benchmark for measuring whether web agents can make fraud judgments that remain both accurate and evidence-grounded when direct reputation shortcuts are suppressed. The associated code and dataset are accessible at the \href{https://anonymous.4open.science/w/FraudMessageWalker-Bench}{anonymous link}.

Travelers increasingly ask large language model (LLM) assistants which hotel to book, making these systems gatekeepers of property visibility -- yet what moves their recommendations is undocumented. We conduct a pre-specified algorithm audit using a randomized choice-based conjoint: across personas, prompt templates, and twelve open-weight and proprietary models, assistants choose among five hotels whose guest rating, review volume and recency, management response, chain affiliation, price, eco-certification, and list position are independently randomized. We estimate the average marginal component effect of each signal on the probability of recommendation. Guest rating and price dominate (a top rating raises selection by 31.6 percentage points; a high price lowers it by 30.0), reproducing human valence-and-price primacy but over-weighting eco-certification and ignoring management response. List position -- a content-free artifact -- shifts recommendations causally, worth about $12 per night. Stated reasons track revealed weights imperfectly. The findings ground generative engine optimization and the accountability of AI infomediaries in causal evidence.

A content-moderation system can score well on every standard accuracy metric and still cause real harm, if its mistakes fall on the few users who connect otherwise separate communities. We show this in an agent-based model where N=240 learning agents on a community-structured network each post harmless, productive, or dangerous content, and a regulator removes or penalizes whatever a noisy classifier flags. Overall usefulness barely moves as the noise changes (one-way ANOVA, p=0.96): by aggregate measures, nothing looks wrong. The damage instead concentrates on these bridge users, whose useful posts are wrongly suppressed and whose dangerous posts are wrongly spared. A governance loss (L_gov) that prices these two mistakes separately from the cost of enforcement more than doubles under false-positive-heavy noise. Aggregate accuracy hides who is harmed, and the cheap quantity to audit is how many connections a user has (degree), a near-perfect proxy for the betweenness that defines a bridge (r=0.96).

Open platforms increasingly route tasks among heterogeneous LLM agents--differing in base model, scaffold, and tool stack--whose competence varies sharply by skill: an agent excellent at one skill may be useless at another. The standard reputation approach summarizes each agent by a single global trust score, but that scalar is the wrong object here, because routing every task to the globally most-trusted agent leaves the value of specialization unclaimed. We study skill-conditional trust R(i | k)--the trust to place in agent i for a task requiring skill k, rather than one score per agent--and pose three falsifiable questions: when is conditioning worth it, how much cross-skill evidence should be borrowed, and whether that borrowing is safe. A controlled phase-diagram analysis answers the first two: conditional trust wins only in a specific regime--high agent heterogeneity, sparse per-skill evidence, and correlated skills--and the coupling strength beta that buys this data efficiency is dual-use, because the same cross-skill borrowing is also a laundering channel. On a public benchmark of 14 genuinely heterogeneous AppWorld agents, real pools land inside the beneficial regime--a small but genuine gain, with the per-skill best agent genuinely changing across skills. We then show that an attacker with cheap evidence in one skill and none in a target skill hijacks the conditional router, driving routing regret from 0 to 0.94 on a pool our zero-cost Conditional Information Value Test (CIVT) rates GREEN--while the ungated trust verdict it contaminates reads -0.06 instead of the honest +0.19. A zero-evidence gate bounds the attack but does not eliminate it; we characterize the residual cost under an explicit budget. We do not claim Sybil-resistance--we quantify the trade-off.

As autonomous language model agents proliferate, forming an emerging agentic web with real-world consequences, what credibility signals can you use to decide whether to trust an unfamiliar agent in the wild and delegate to it? A natural governance intuition is to extend human identity verification and reputation mechanisms, from "Know Your Customer" and credit scores to "Know Your Agent" regimes. However, we argue that this analogy is fundamentally incomplete. Reputation mechanisms function both as social signals and as corrective feedback that sustain an equilibrium of trustworthy behavior, presuming a persistent identity associated with behavioral continuity, sanction sensitivity, and costly non-fungibility. Yet language model agents are ontologically dissociative: they are essentially an assemblage of mutable modules--foundation models, system prompts, tool-access policies, external memory, and, in some cases, a multi-agent system as a whole--any of which may change agent behavior--with a fluid persona that is also vulnerable to adversarial attack and may not internalize sanctions. Drawing on dissociative identity disorder jurisprudence, this dissociativity leaves agents without grounding for identifiability, predictability, credibility, and rehabilitability--the very properties that reputation mechanisms aim to sustain--thereby collapsing trust. We argue that identity-based, ex post, regulative, sanction-based governance, such as reputation, is structurally inapplicable to dissociative agents, and we suggest a shift to observability-based, ex ante, constitutive, protocol-based behavioral harnesses.

In the framework of Smart Cities and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), efficient parking management is essential to reduce urban congestion and emissions. However, current reservation-based systems often encounter a scenario in which users find their reserved slot occupied by a previous occupant who failed to vacate on time ("No PARK" situation). This paper introduces a dual-mechanism architecture designed to enhance system reliability. A Reservation Module uses a dynamic size buffer of non-reservable slots to grant parking availability. A reputation-based Reward System exploits a "star-based" metric to incentivize punctual departures through financial penalties and access restrictions. The simulations conducted with the SUMO urban simulator are promising, showing that the dynamic buffer strategy provides a better tradeoff between parking availability and reservation success. By progressively adapting to users behavior, the proposed system mitigates "NO PARK" instances and improves resource utilization, significantly enhancing urban viability. Index Terms-Smart City, Intelligent transportation systems, Parking, Reservation systems, V2I, Reputation-based mechanisms, Smart Parking

Agent-based modeling (ABM) has long been used in economics to study human behavior, and large language model (LLM) agents now enable new forms of social and economic simulation. While prior work has discovered strategic deception by LLM agents in financial trading and auction markets, e-commerce remains underexplored despite its distinctive information asymmetry: sellers privately observe product quality, whereas buyers rely on advertised claims and reputation signals. We introduce TruthMarketTwin, a controlled simulation framework for studying LLM-agent behavior in e-commerce markets. The framework is one of the first to model bilateral trade under asymmetric information sharing, where agents make strategic listing, purchasing, rating, and recourse-related decisions to optimize seller profit and buyer utility. We find that LLM agents released into traditional markets autonomously exploit weaknesses in reputation-based governance, while warrant enforcement reduces deception and reshapes strategic reasoning. Our results position LLM-agent simulation as a tool for studying institution-governed autonomous markets.

Communication is fundamental to sustaining reciprocity and cooperation in strategic interactions. We identify and formulate the influence attribution problem as the central optimization difficulty inherent in such dynamics for a learning agent: any action or signal the agent emits reshapes the reputations of many third parties along combinatorially branching paths before feeding back into its own future rewards, forcing the agent to account for all of these indirect channels at once when choosing every action. To address this, we introduce the reciprocity gradient, which explicitly backpropagates reward gradients through private estimators of opponents' policies trained from public observations. The gradient flows through the reputation chain itself analytically, rather than being estimated from sampled returns. It jointly optimizes actions and evaluative signals without intrinsic rewards or reward shaping. Empirically, the method recovers near-optimal context-sensitive policies, while sample-based baselines collapse into constant-output policies.

Federated learning (FL) systems typically employ stateless client selection, treating each communication round independently and ignoring accumulated evidence of client contribution quality. Under non-IID data, this leads to slow convergence and unstable training, particularly when selection relies on local proxies (e.g., training loss) that are misaligned with the global optimization objective. These challenges are especially pronounced in Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT) environments, where data is highly heterogeneous and distributed across devices observing different traffic patterns. In this paper, we propose VARS-FL (Validation-Aligned Reputation Scoring for Federated Learning), a client selection framework that quantifies each client's contribution using the reduction in server-side validation loss induced by its update. These per-round signals are aggregated into a Reputation score that combines a sliding-window average of recent contributions with a logarithmically scaled participation term, enabling robust exploration-exploitation selection. VARS-FL requires no changes to local training or aggregation and remains fully compatible with standard FedAvg. We evaluate VARS-FL on a 15-class non-IID IoT intrusion detection task using the Edge-IIoTset dataset, with 100 clients across multiple seeds, and compare it against FedAvg, Oort, and Power-of-Choice. VARS-FL consistently improves accuracy, F1-Macro, and loss, while accelerating convergence (up to 36% fewer rounds to reach 80% accuracy). These results demonstrate that validation-aligned, history-aware client selection provides a more reliable and efficient training process for federated learning in heterogeneous IoT environments.

Decentralized, agentic AI marketplaces are rapidly emerging to support software engineering tasks such as debugging, patch generation, and security auditing, often operating without centralized oversight. However, existing reputation mechanisms fail in this setting for three fundamental reasons: agents can strategically optimize against evaluation procedures; demonstrated competence does not reliably transfer across heterogeneous task contexts; and verification rigor varies widely, from lightweight automated checks to costly expert review. Current approaches to reputation drawing on federated learning, blockchain-based AI platforms, and large language model safety research are unable to address these challenges in combination. We therefore propose \textbf{AgentReputation}, a decentralized, three-layer reputation framework for agentic AI systems. The framework separates task execution, reputation services, and tamper-proof persistence to both leverage their respective strengths and enable independent evolution. The framework introduces explicit verification regimes linked to agent reputation metadata, as well as context-conditioned reputation cards that prevent reputation conflation across domains and task types. In addition, AgentReputation provides a decision-facing policy engine that supports resource allocation, access control, and adaptive verification escalation based on risk and uncertainty. Building on this framework, we outline several future research directions, including the development of verification ontologies, methods for quantifying verification strength, privacy-preserving evidence mechanisms, cold-start reputation bootstrapping, and defenses against adversarial manipulation.

We study emergent social dynamics in LLM agents playing The Resistance: Avalon, a hidden-role deception game. Unlike prior work on single-game performance, our agents play repeated games while retaining memory of previous interactions, including who played which roles and how they behaved, enabling us to study how social dynamics evolve. Across 188 games, two key phenomena emerge. First, reputation dynamics emerge organically when agents retain cross-game memory: agents reference past behavior in statements like "I am wary of repeating last game's mistake of over-trusting early success." These reputations are role-conditional: the same agent is described as "straightforward" when playing good but "subtle" when playing evil, and high-reputation players receive 46% more team inclusions. Second, higher reasoning effort supports more strategic deception: evil players more often pass early missions to build trust before sabotaging later ones, 75% in high-effort games vs 36% in low-effort games. Together, these findings show that repeated interaction with memory gives rise to measurable reputation and deception dynamics among LLM agents.

Recommender systems (RecSys) have been widely applied to various applications, including E-commerce, finance, healthcare, social media and have become increasingly influential in shaping user behavior and decision-making, highlighting their growing impact in various domains. However, recent studies have shown that RecSys are vulnerable to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to infer whether user interaction record was used to train a target model or not. MIAs on RecSys models can directly lead to a privacy breach. For example, via identifying the fact that a purchase record that has been used to train a RecSys associated with a specific user, an attacker can infer that user's special quirks. In recent years, MIAs have been shown to be effective on other ML tasks, e.g., classification models and natural language processing. However, traditional MIAs are ill-suited for RecSys due to the unseen posterior probability. Although MIAs on RecSys form a newly emerging and rapidly growing research area, there has been no systematic survey on this topic yet. In this article, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on RecSys MIAs. This survey offers a comprehensive review of the latest advancements in RecSys MIAs, exploring the design principles, challenges, attack and defense associated with this emerging field. We provide a unified taxonomy that categorizes different RecSys MIAs based on their characterizations and discuss their pros and cons. Based on the limitations and gaps identified in this survey, we point out several promising future research directions to inspire the researchers who wish to follow this area. This survey not only serves as a reference for the research community but also provides a clear description for researchers outside this research domain.