Secure Code Generation

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3 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 29

Oct 1, 2026cs.CR

AuraForge: Scaling Security Supervision for Training Coding Agents

Coding agents are now proficient enough to generate complex software applications from a single prompt. As their capabilities have grown, human oversight has increasingly shifted from line-by-line code review toward hands-off evaluation of outcomes. However, recent studies have shown that such a transition exposes a critical risk: functional correctness alone does not guarantee a secure implementation. Despite growing attention to code security, training safer coding agents remains challenging because reliable security supervision is difficult to obtain at scale from real-world repositories. We introduce AuraForge to synthesize and validate executable security tests for training secure coding agents. Our approach combines attack-oriented test synthesis, language-extensible task construction, and safeguards against reward hacking. Using AuraForge, we construct AuraGym, a multi-language and multi-CWE executable training gym: 679 executable feature-implementation tasks from 344 real-world repositories across Python, JavaScript, and TypeScript, covering 177 CWE categories. On the subset with human-written security tests, AuraForge produces about 3 times as many test cases on average and reduces the false-positive rate by 83.23%, allowing alternative secure implementations to receive correct supervision. Training Qwen3.5-4B with synthesized security tests gains larger improvements than human-written security tests (average 19.7 FuncPass and 6.2 SecPass vs. 14.9 FuncPass and 4.4 SecPass) on three languages. These results demonstrate that AuraForge provides more diverse and reliable security supervision to train secure coding agents.

Danqing Wang, Songwen Zhao, Harsh Sharma +4

Carnegie Mellon University · University of California, Los Angeles · ScOp Venture Capital.

AI Coding Agents Software Security AI Agent Security Secure Code Generation Automated Test Generation

Sep 28, 2026cs.CR

JevVibe: Efficient Classification-Guided Secure Code Generation

Large language models can generate functionally correct code that still contains security weaknesses, motivating repair pipelines that first diagnose a weakness type before deciding how to fix it. The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) provides a standardized vocabulary for such diagnoses, but asking an autoregressive language model to generate a CWE label and extracting it from the response raises questions about output validity, speed, and cost, as well as accuracy. We evaluate Jev, a decision model that instead selects directly from a declared set of candidates and returns a probability for each, against six open-weight autoregressive models and a frontier proprietary model, GPT-5.6-Sol, on a controlled 50-way CWE classification task over 1,916 CyberSecEval benchmark examples. Jev outperforms all six open-weight baselines on every classification and ranking metric, while its comparison with GPT-5.6-Sol depends on the metric: GPT-5.6-Sol achieves higher Top-1 accuracy and Macro-F1, whereas Jev achieves higher Top-3 and Top-5 accuracy and a nearly identical MRR, at

6.27\times

lower median API latency and

55.9\times

lower estimated API cost. We further build JevVibe, a diagnosis-guided repair agent that uses predicted CWE labels to repair code generated by Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. With Jev providing the diagnosis, the agent increases the detector-measured security pass rate from 63.5% before repair to 70.7%, compared with 66.1% for LLM-guided repair. These results show that JevVibe is effective at improving the security of generated code, with Jev providing reliable and efficient CWE classification.

Arshak Rezvani, Sasha Behrouzi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany

Automated Program Repair Software Vulnerability Detection Cybersecurity Secure Code Generation

Sep 9, 2026cs.CR

CS-Guard: Benchmarking LLM Guardrails for Code Generation Security

Large language models (LLMs) have been ex- ploited to generate malware, but the effective- ness of guardrails for code generation secu- rity remains unclear. We introduce CS-Guard, the first benchmark to systematically evalu- ate guardrails for code generation security. It covers 1) text-to-code generation with 1000 high-quality malware-generation prompts, 7 jailbreak attacks, and a novel fictional scenario attack (FSA) that embeds malicious intent in a legitimate fictional software-development sce- nario; and 2) code-to-code generation with 331 code prompts spanning code infilling, code completion, and code translation. We empiri- cally evaluate 9 guardrails across seven LLMs. We find that current guardrails perform poorly against malicious code-generation re- quests: for text-to-code, the average attack success rate (ASR) after jailbreaks reaches about 50% for many guardrails; for code-to- code, average ASR approaches 100% on base LLMs and remains high across many guardrails (14.4% to nearly 100%). Our FSA also achieves ASR close to 100% across many guardrails, raising major reliability concerns for real-world software development. To sup- port future research, CS-Guard uses a modular three-layer guardrail taxonomy that lets devel- opers register guardrails for evaluation. We release the benchmark and data to enable fur- ther community evaluation.

Jinyang Li, Mingyu Guo, Hung X. Nguyen

Adelaide University Adelaide, Australia

LLM Guardrails Adversarial Attacks on LLMs Safety Filtering LLM Safety Evaluation Secure Code Generation

Aug 30, 2026cs.AI

Interpreting and Steering for Safe and Correct Code Generation

Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate source code containing vulnerabilities, yet little work studies the internal mechanisms that distinguish safe from vulnerable generation in them. In this work, we systematically perform a mechanistic interpretation of LLMs, aiming at both understanding how code safety-vs-vulnerability is represented or driven by components in an LM and turning the insights into actionable steering strategies to encourage safer code generation. To this end, we introduce CodeSec-Pairs, a dataset of 9,342 Python safe-and-vulnerable contrastive code pairs, sampled from Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Utilizing the dataset, we explore approaches to localize layers and attention heads that relate to code safety, and further experiment with different steering strategies for inference-time vulnerability reduction. In particular, we propose DuoSteer, a double-steering approach that simultaneously applies safety and code-correctness steering to attention heads. In experiments over five vulnerability types, DuoSteer leads to an average of -26.9% vulnerability rate reduction and +7.5% functional correctness improvement, which outperforms not only other steering variants but also prompting and supervised fine-tuning baselines. The advantage also replicates on Qwen-2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct with another 2,500 contrastive pairs sampled from that model.

Hao Yan, Ziyu Yao

Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

Mechanistic Interpretability LLM Security Secure Code Generation Activation Steering LLM Code Generation

Aug 26, 2026cs.CR

MACGen: Toward Functionally Correct and Secure Code Generation via Multi-Agent Collaboration

Despite their strong ability to generate code, large language models often fail to produce secure code, as their outputs frequently contain security vulnerabilities. Secure code generation is inherently challenging because it requires solving a multi-objective problem: functional correctness and security. Existing approaches address this challenge by injecting external security knowledge or by using agentic feedback and iterative refinement. However, guideline retrieval often leaves the generator to translate generic advice into task-specific secure implementations, while shared-dialogue multi-agent feedback can blur role boundaries and suffer from context bloat. We present MACGen, a multi-agent framework that integrates planning, security analysis, code synthesis and refinement to jointly optimize security and functionality. A planner constructs a step-by-step plan to satisfy functional requirements. A security advisor identifies likely CWEs and synthesizes task-specific guidelines, a coder then generates code grounded in these artifacts, and a reviewer issues perspective-separated feedback. Rather than sharing full dialogue histories, each agent receives only structured artifacts from upstream stages, enforcing role specialization and reducing uncontrolled context growth. On CWEval and BaxBench, MACGen improves F&S@1 over direct prompting by 19.61 and 10.57 percentage points (pp) on average, respectively.

Miseon Yu, Jaehoon Choi, Younghan Lee +1

Seoul National University · Seoul, Republic of Korea · Sungshin Women’s University

Code Generation Secure Code Generation Software Security Multi-Agent Systems

Aug 2, 2026cs.CR

Security-First Evaluation of Text-to-Terraform: Benchmarking LLMs and SLMs for Secure IaC Generation

Cloud misconfiguration remains a leading cause of security incidents, yet whether LLMs and SLMs can generate security-compliant Infrastructure-as-Code is an open question. We benchmark seven models, three closed LLMs (Claude Opus 4, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 Pro) and four open SLMs (Qwen2.5-Coder-14B, WizardCoder-33B, CodeLlama-13B, Magicoder-S-CL-7B), on AWS Terraform generation across 17 scenarios, integrating Checkov and Trivy scanners into a GitLab CI/CD pipeline and evaluating two prompt strategies at three security levels (pass@5). Syntactic validity and security compliance are largely orthogonal properties in LLM-generated IaC, a model that reliably produces well-formed Terraform does not necessarily produce secure Terraform: WizardCoder-33B achieves 77.8% validate rate yet zero Checkov compliance, while Claude Opus 4 reaches 23.1% Checkov and 92.5% Trivy pass rates under detailed security prompting. Consequently, prompt engineering alone is insufficient: automated multi-tool scanning remains a necessary complement to LLM-assisted IaC generation regardless of model family or prompt strategy. All artifacts are publicly available.

Francis Luis Santos Vargas, Rodrigo Brandão Mansilha, Diego Kreutz

AI Horizon Labs, PPGES, Universidade Federal do Pampa (UNIPAMPA), Alegrete, Brazil

LLM Evaluation Code Generation Code Generation Evaluation Secure Code Generation

Aug 1, 2026cs.SE

EduPluginBench: Executable Assurance for AI-Generated Educational Plugins

Code-generation models can produce executable components, but compilation and functional tests do not establish compliance with least privilege, telemetry consent, provenance, privileged-write authority, lifecycle constraints, or bounded failure. We introduce EduPluginBench, an executable benchmark and staged admission method for generated plugins in governed software ecosystems. Across 1,440 activation-checked first-order mutants from 30 specifications, P0-P4 increased release-blocking-defect recall by 74.7 percentage points (specification-clustered 95% CI 73.4-75.8) over P0-P2, with no observed rejection among 120 clean references (95% Wilson upper bound 3.1%). A frozen transfer study of 600 unmodified generations from two current coding models found that 300/600 parsed, but none passed P0 or achieved P0-P4 conformance (95% upper bound 0.64%); downstream assurance estimands were undefined. An independently labelled Moodle study retained 16 vulnerable/fixed pairs; the frozen generic PHP detector found no vulnerable revisions. These negative transfer results prevent controlled contract consistency from being read as independent real-defect effectiveness. An earlier 540-generation diagnostic found that post-hoc bounded repair yielded 112 P0 passes, all nonconforming, with recall increasing from 13.4% to 100%. The artifact retains protocols, public-source provenance, raw generations, row-level decisions, audits, analysis code, and reproduction instructions.

Nizam Kadir

Singapore University of Technology and Design, Science, Mathematics and Technology, Singapore, Singapore

Software Security Runtime Assurance Secure Code Generation Code Generation Benchmarks

Jul 28, 2026cs.CR

SecDrift: Measuring Sector-Conditioned Security Drift in AI-Generated Code

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation in critical infrastructure, yet the security effect of domain-specific prompting is understudied. We present SecDrift, a benchmark measuring sector-conditioned security drift: the change in static-analysis vulnerability rates when prompts are conditioned on industry contexts versus neutral baselines. We evaluate 7 LLMs (6 producing analyzable code) across 8 CISA critical infrastructure sectors and 9 CWE categories with 5 replicates (5,355 evaluations), using a 5-dimension transformation with a matched-baseline condition that holds the task fixed while substituting only domain terminology. Industry prompts naively appear more secure (14.0% vs. 11.4%, -2.7pp), but the gap is not statistically significant (Fisher's exact p = 0.24, Cohen's h = -0.08) and is a composition artifact of two CWE categories: excluding CWE-502 and CWE-22 eliminates and slightly reverses it (+0.4pp, p = 1.00). A mixed-effects logistic regression confirms sector identity is not a moderator and localizes the only detectable condition effect to those two vulnerability types. 0 of 8 sectors show drift distinguishable from baseline, corrected or uncorrected (|h| < 0.15). A placebo on two non-CISA sectors (e-commerce, online education) reproduces the CISA industry rate almost exactly (10.5% vs. 11.4%, p = 0.63): the small pooled pattern reflects generic industry-framing specificity, not critical-infrastructure identity. In contrast, model selection has a large and consistent effect: among full-output models vulnerability rates range from 11.6% to 16.1%, and these differences persist across conditions. Model choice, not prompt framing, is the more reliable security lever. We release the framework, prompts, generated code, findings, human-validation verdicts, and analysis scripts.

Narayanaswami Natraj Bharadwaj, Dhivya Chandramouleeswaran

Independent Researcher USA

Cybersecurity LLM Security Code Generation Evaluation Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

Jul 26, 2026cs.CR

The Illusion of Secure LLM Code: Closing the Security Gap via Iterative Reprompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, yet their ability to autonomously generate secure authentication code remains uncertain. This paper evaluates the security architecture of authentication systems generated by five prominent AI coding assistants through a bi-modal assessment framework combining static code analysis and dynamic penetration testing, mapped to NIST SP 800-63B guidelines. The study examines model behavior across four prompting strategies Basic, Secure, NIST-Based, and Reprompting to reflect varying levels of developer guidance. Empirical results demonstrate that code generated from functional or generically secure prompts consistently omits critical protections, particularly concerning brute-force resistance, session management, and robust password handling. While providing explicit, single-shot NIST context significantly improves compliance, the findings reveal that this remains structurally inadequate. Instead, iterative Reprompting: forcing models into a contextual self-auditing loop is strictly required to achieve a comprehensive, defense-in-depth security architecture. Ultimately, this study proves that current AI coding assistants do not produce secure-by-default applications, dictating that enterprise deployments must transition from single-shot prompt engineering to continuous, standards-driven verification pipelines.

Ishpuneet Singh, Shreyas Mahajan, Gurjot Singh +1

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology, Patiala, India · David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada

LLM Prompting Cybersecurity Software Security LLM Security Secure Code Generation

Jul 25, 2026cs.CR

Poster: Rethinking Security in LLM Code Generation through Real-World Risk Scenarios

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored. Existing benchmarks often rely on explicitly specified security requirements, failing to capture real-world scenarios where prompts are frequently ambiguous or incomplete. In this paper, we adopt a developer-centric perspective and identify three representative risk scenarios that commonly lead to security vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code: Ambiguous Requirements, Under-Specified Operational Context, and Security--Functionality Conflict. Based on these scenarios, we construct a large-scale benchmark comprising 2,700 test cases, enabling fine-grained evaluation of LLM security under realistic conditions. Extensive evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that all models exhibit average vulnerability rates exceeding 56% across risk scenarios. We further demonstrate that security-aware prompting can substantially mitigate these risks, achieving up to 45% improvement.

Lixun Ma, Ruolong Ma, Bei Wang +4

Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China · University College London, London, United Kingdom · Artificial Intelligence Institute, CAICT, Beijing, China +1

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Security Secure Code Generation

Jul 21, 2026cs.SE

Tool-Guided Retrieval-Augmented Repair for Securing LLM-Generated C Code

Large language models can generate C code from natural-language descriptions, but resulting programs often contain security vulnerabilities and compilation errors, posing risks for embedded and resource-constrained systems. This work investigates how feedback and retrieval improve reliability of LLM-generated C code. We present an analysis-and-repair workflow that combines compilation diagnostics, CodeQL static analysis, and KLEE symbolic execution with retrieval of prior repair patterns for iterative refinement. Evaluated on 5,000 C programming tasks exercising embedded relevant vulnerabilities, baseline models show substantial reliability gaps, with compilation failure rates up to 46% and security defect rates up to 49%. Our approach improves both metrics. For CodeLlama 7B, security defect rates decrease from 49% to 19% and total CodeQL errors drop from 15,088 to 2,463 (83.7%). For DeepSeek Coder 1.3B, compilation failures are reduced from 42% to 22% and security defects from 35% to 15%. These results show that integrating lightweight analysis tools can improve the safety of LLM-generated code for embedded development.

Vidyut Sriram, Saatvik Pradhan, Suman Saha

The Pennsylvania State University

Automated Program Repair Code Generation Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

Jul 8, 2026cs.SE

Functional and Secure Code Generation with Task Vectors

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for code generation, but they struggle to generate functional code free of security vulnerabilities. Prior work to improve the secure code generation abilities of such coding LLMs has largely focused on evaluating code functionality and security separately using different datasets, or focused on finding vulnerabilities post-generation. At the same time, the text-generation domain has seen significant work on alignment techniques, where models are tuned such that their outputs exhibit certain qualities (e.g., helpfulness, harmlessness). Of particular interest is task-vector arithmetic, where linear operations on LLM weights can be used to arbitrarily enhance alignment while incurring only minimal computational overhead. We develop a novel method, SecVecCoder, leveraging task vectors to produce trustworthy code that is simultaneously functional and secure without the need for post-generation adjustment. Across six coding LLMs from three families on the CodeGuard+ benchmark, SecVecCoder improves the rate of trustworthy code completions by 2.1-36.0 percentage points over the base model, with improvements on unseen CWE types reaching up to 39.1 percentage points. Since the effectiveness of the coding LLM relies only on changing the model weights, SecVecCoder requires no method-specific decoding and hence achieves a decoding latency within 0.6% of the base model's, on average.

Felix Wang, Anudeep Das, Mei Nagappan +1

University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada · KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

Code Generation LLM Safety Alignment Secure Code Generation Code Language Models

Jun 30, 2026cs.SE

An Empirical Study of Security Calibration in Large Language Models for Code

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming software development, yet their use in security-critical contexts raises a key question: do models know when their generated code is insecure? This property, known as calibration, measures whether a model's confidence aligns with the true correctness of its outputs. We present the first large-scale empirical study of security calibration in LLM-generated code. We evaluate GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash, and Qwen3-Coder-Next across multiple temperature settings on two complementary benchmarks: self-contained security tasks and multi-language repository-level contexts. Our results suggest that overconfidence is prevalent across the evaluated LLMs. Functional calibration is consistently worse than security calibration, suggesting that models estimate security outcomes more reliably than functional correctness, potentially because functional correctness depends on complex execution behavior. We also examine whether calibration-guided automated repair can help remediate vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code, finding only limited improvements while frequently introducing functional regressions. Moreover, we study different mitigation strategies for reducing False Trust, where models assign high confidence to vulnerable code. The results show that although architectural gating improves calibration on controlled benchmarks, calibration deteriorates in realistic repository-level settings, increasing the risk of high-confidence vulnerable outputs.

Mohammed Latif Siddiq, Md. Nafiu Rahman, Joanna C. S. Santos

University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN, USA · Brac University Dhaka, Bangladesh

LLM Security Language Model Calibration Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

Jun 23, 2026cs.CR

SoK: AI Secure Code Generation: Progress, Pitfalls, and Paths Forward

The increasing use of AI systems for code generation raises a central security question: what can today's models and coding agents actually do to produce secure code, where do they still fail, and what would move the field forward? Existing work has explored prompting, fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and agentic workflows for secure code generation, but the field still lacks a systematic understanding of how these techniques improve security and why substantial failures persist. In this SoK, we systematize the progress, pitfalls, and paths forward for AI secure code generation. We introduce a three-level framework that measures models' natural-language understanding of secure coding principles, their code-level actuation of those principles during generation, and the knowledge--actuation gaps between the two. We instantiate this framework across models and coding agents on benchmarks covering both isolated function-level security and full web-application security. Our results show that secure-coding-principle understanding is a statistically strong predictor of code-level outcomes, including functional correctness, security, and joint functional-security correctness. Yet substantial knowledge--actuation gaps remain: models can recognize relevant security principles but still fail to translate them into secure and functional code. These findings offer a principle-centered account of where AI secure code generation stands today and identify concrete paths forward through principle-guided generation, evaluation, benchmarking, and agentic workflows.

Rupam Patir, Keyan Guo, Haipeng Cai +1

University at Buffalo, SUNY

AI Coding Agents Code Generation Evaluation Secure Code Generation

Jun 17, 2026cs.CR

Secure Coding Drift in LLM-Assisted Post-Quantum Cryptography Development: A Gamified Fix

The transition to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) introduces considerable implementation complexity, requiring strict adherence to constant-time execution, side channel resistance, and precise parametrisation. Simultaneously, large language models (LLMs) are heavily embedded in software development workflows, including cryptographic engineering. While LLMs improve productivity, evidence shows that they frequently generate insecure or suboptimal code, particularly in security critical domains. This paper introduces Secure Coding Drift in PQC, a novel socio technical vulnerability model capturing the gradual degradation of secure coding practices due to sustained reliance on LLM-generated code. Unlike prior work that focuses on static vulnerabilities, we conceptualise security risk as a longitudinal behavioural phenomenon rising from human AI interaction. To mitigate this, we propose a gamified, LLM augmented secure coding framework that embeds adversarial evaluation, behavioural feedback, and security scoring into development workflows. Our approach reframes LLMs from passive assistants into active security co-pilots, contributing toward safer PQC implementation in AI mediated environments.

R. D. N. Shakya, C. P. Wijesiriwardana, S. M. Vidanagamachchi +1

University of Moratuwa Sri-Lanka, Moratuwa · University of Ruhuna Sri-Lanka, Matara · RMIT University Australia, Melbourne

LLMs for Cybersecurity Secure Code Generation Post-Quantum Cryptography AI-Assisted Software Development

Jun 15, 2026cs.CR

SPARK: Security Knowledge Priming and Representation-Guided Knowledge Activation for LLM-based Secure Code Generation

Large language models routinely generate code with exploitable security flaws. Prior literature attributes this limitation to a lack of security expertise, steering current defense mechanisms toward heavy fine-tuning or external knowledge retrieval, which introduces significant computational overhead and data bias through redundant code examples. Contrary to this view, we argue that pretraining corpora are already rich in security material. The bottleneck is activation: without an explicit and brief cue, statistical pressure toward common training-distribution patterns suppresses the model's safety-relevant representations. We present SPARK, an inference-time security harness that activates this latent knowledge without any retraining. The harness has two parts. ComponentI retrieves a few of the relevant Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entries for each coding task and appends a short structured cue to the prompt; this alone is enough to surface the model's existing security representations. ComponentII adds a precomputed token bias to the logits at every decoding step. We obtain the bias by projecting a safe-direction vector, the unit difference between the mean safe and mean unsafe last-layer hidden states, through the language model head. The bias is computed once offline; applying it costs a single vector addition per generated token. We evaluate SPARK on 9 open-source models across C++, Java, and Python, and compare with 7 baselines spanning fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented methods. SPARK matches or improves on the best baseline in every setting while preserving HumanEval utility. We further test Component~I in a black-box setting on 7 of today's strongest models, including Claude, DeepSeek, and GPT, demonstrating the bottleneck of insecure code generation and the improvements enabled by our method.

Xiaoyun Xu, Lichao Wu, Jona te Lintelo +2

Radboud University · University of Bristol · University of Zagreb

Knowledge Augmentation for Language Models LLM Security Secure Code Generation Activation Steering

Jun 2, 2026cs.CR

Learn from Your Mistakes: Tree-like Self-Play for Secure Code LLMs

While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in code generation, they remain prone to replicating subtle yet critical vulnerabilities endemic to their training data. Current alignment techniques, such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically apply coarse-grained optimization at the sequence level. This approach often fails to address the localized nature of security flaws, where a single incorrect token choice can compromise an entire program. To bridge this gap, we introduce Tree-like Self-Play (TSP), a framework that reframes secure code generation as a fine-grained sequential decision process. Unlike standard methods that blindly maximize likelihood, TSP constructs a decision tree where the model explores branching trajectories--generating both secure "golden paths" and vulnerable variants. By treating code generation as a self-play game, the model learns to strictly discriminate against its own localized errors. This provides a dense, on-policy learning signal that forces self-correction precisely at the critical decision nodes where vulnerabilities typically emerge. Our experiments demonstrate that TSP fundamentally enhances model reliability. In Python security benchmarks, TSP boosts CodeLlama-7B's pass rate (SPR@1) to 75.8%, significantly outperforming SFT (57.0%) and unstructured self-play baselines. Crucially, TSP induces robust out-of-distribution generalization: the model not only reduces vulnerabilities in unseen categories (CWEs) by 24.5% but also successfully transfers security principles learned from C/C++ to diverse languages, including Python, Go, and JavaScript. This suggests that TSP does not merely memorize patches, but internalizes abstract, language-agnostic security logic.

Wenqi Chen, Ziyan Zhang, Bin Wang +3

University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China · Peking University, Beijing, China · University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China +2

RL for Code Generation LLM Self-Correction Code Generation Secure Code Generation

May 28, 2026cs.CR

Minimal Prompt Perturbations Lead to Code Vulnerabilities: Prompt Fragility and Hidden-State Signals in Coding LLMs

LLM-based coding assistants are seeing rapid adoption, offering substantial gains in developer productivity. As organizations increasingly ship code these agents produce, the security of that code becomes critical. Prior work has shown that minor prompt perturbations degrade the functional correctness of LLM-generated code, but whether they also compromise code security has remained unstudied. We apply token-level mutations to prompts across three models and five programming languages, and show that mutations as small as a single-character change can flip generated code from secure to vulnerable. Probing the models' hidden states reveals that this fragility is partially encoded in prompt representations, but unevenly so. Input-handling vulnerabilities, where the model omits validation or sanitization, are more predictable (mean AUC 0.753) than secure-defaults vulnerabilities, where insecure code stems from one local choice such as a weak algorithm or unsafe parameter (mean AUC 0.674). These results show that the threat model for LLM-assisted coding extends beyond prompt injection to ordinary prompt variation, and indicate that input-handling flaws can be caught before generation while secure-defaults flaws require intervention during decoding.

Alexander Sternfeld, Andrei Kucharavy, Ljiljana Dolamic

IEM, HES-SO, Le Foyer, Techno-Pôle 1, Sierre, Switzerland · Cyber-Defence Campus, armasuisse Science and Technology, Thun, Switzerland

Prompt Sensitivity Adversarial Attacks on LLMs Secure Code Generation

May 22, 2026cs.CR

Enhancing Reliability in LLM-Based Secure Code Generation

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, but their security reliability remains inconsistent across languages and prompting strategies. Existing prompt engineering improves functional correctness but rarely ensures consistent security outcomes. We introduce the \textit{Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT)} framework, which embeds task-specific CWE mitigation guidance and language-aware safeguards to reduce recurring vulnerabilities in generated code. We evaluate MA-CoT across three LLMs (gpt-5, claude-4.5, gemini-2.5), three programming languages (C, Java, Python), and four prompting strategies (Vanilla, Zero-shot, CoT, MA-CoT) on a 200-task primary dataset, with external validation on LLMSecEval. Using static analysis with expert validation, MA-CoT reduces total security findings from 92 to 39 (57.6%) on the primary dataset and from 73 to 4 (94.5%) on LLMSecEval. High-severity findings (Blocker + Critical) drop from 90 to 39 (56.7%) and from 45 to 2 (95.6%), respectively. Across both datasets, MA-CoT is the only strategy that consistently improves security reliability; Zero-shot and CoT are less reliable and may increase vulnerability, especially in C. We further introduce a strict layered attribution of vulnerability drivers (language-core vs. stack layers) and show that residual risk concentrates in hardening-oriented patterns (e.g., OS- and toolchain-dependent), motivating secure-by-construction primitives alongside prompting.

Mohammed F. Kharma, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Ahmed Sabbah +1

the Department of Computer Science, Birzeit University, Ramallah, Palestine · the Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816 USA

LLM Evaluation CoT Reasoning LLM Security Secure Code Generation Prompt Engineering

May 22, 2026cs.CR

An Empirical Evaluation of LLM-Generated Code Security Across Prompting Methods

The growing use of Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated code generation has enhanced software development efficiency, but often at the cost of security. Generated code frequently overlooks critical concerns, leaving it vulnerable to issues such as weak encryption and improper input validation. To investigate this problem, we present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the security quality of LLM-generated code across five LLMs and four programming languages (Java, C++, C, and Python), examining the impact of multiple prompt engineering methods. We introduce a weaknesses-aware zero-shot chain-of-thought (WA-0CoT) prompting strategy that enriches prompts with security context using CWE mappings to guide model reasoning. Our empirical analysis, supported by chi-square tests, finds no statistically significant reductions in vulnerability frequency or density across prompt methods. However, prompting strategies, including WA-0CoT, systematically influence the compositional distribution of CWE categories, with effects varying by programming language. These findings suggest that while security-aware prompting alters the structure of generated weaknesses, prompt engineering alone is insufficient to reliably reduce overall vulnerability levels. The results highlight the importance of language-aware and model-aware prompt design when evaluating the security properties of LLM-generated code.

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh +2

Department of Computer Science, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine · King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia · University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

LLM Prompting LLM Security Code Generation Evaluation Secure Code Generation

May 21, 2026cs.SE

Security of LLM-generated Code: A Comparative Analysis

The majority of software developers use or are planning to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in their development processes. Their top reasons include improving productivity and faster learning. In fact, Large Language Model (LLM)-generated code is currently in production, including in major tech companies. However, concerns were raised about the risks associated with the use of AI tools to generate code. In this paper, we focus our attention on the risks to software security. We empirically evaluate the security of code generated by seven popular LLMs. We build upon previous work to mimic the behaviours of developers when using LLMs to generate code. Our results show that all seven LLMs that we have evaluated generate code that contains vulnerabilities, the majority of which are of critical or high severity.

Srivathsan G Morkonda, Mahmoud Selim, Hala Assal

Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Software Security LLM Security Code Generation Evaluation Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

May 16, 2026cs.CL

Constrained Code Generation with Discrete Diffusion

Discrete diffusion models are a powerful, emerging paradigm for code generation. They construct programs through iterative refinement of partially corrupted token sequences and enable parallel token refinement. Importantly, this paradigm exposes a global program state at each denoising step, which provides a natural intervention point for enforcing program-level functionality and security constraints, guiding the generation before the final code is committed. Building on this observation, the paper introduces Constrained Diffusion for Code (CDC), a training-free neurosymbolic inference framework that integrates constraint satisfaction directly into the reverse denoising process. CDC augments the base discrete diffusion sampler with constraint-aware denoising operators that combine mathematical optimization with program analysis to identify constraint-relevant regions of the intermediate program state and locally adjust the denoising trajectory, steering generation toward feasible programs while remaining close to the base model. Across code generation benchmarks, CDC consistently improves constraint satisfaction in functional correctness, security, and even syntax, outperforming discrete diffusion and autoregressive baselines with less corrective computation and more localized edits.

Lize Shao, Michael Cardei, Zichen Xie +2

University of Virginia

Constrained Generative Modeling Constrained Decoding Code Generation Secure Code Generation Diffusion Models

May 8, 2026cs.CR

SecureForge: Finding and Preventing Vulnerabilities in LLM-Generated Code via Prompt Optimization

LLM coding agents now generate code at an unprecedented scale, yet LLM-generated code introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities into codebases without human involvement. Even when frontier models are explicitly asked to write secure production code with relevant weaknesses to avoid in context, we find that they still produce verifiable vulnerabilities on average 23% of the time across a corpus of 250 benign coding prompts. We introduce SecureForge, an automated pipeline that both audits security risks of frontier models and produces auditing-informed secure system prompts that reduce output security vulnerabilities while maintaining unit test performance. SecureForge first identifies benign prompts that produce statically detectable vulnerabilities, and then amplifies them into a large synthetic prompt corpus of diverse scenarios using a Markovian sampling technique to jointly maintain error rates and prompt diversity. This corpus is then used to iteratively optimize the system prompts to reduce output security vulnerabilities. On frontier models, SecureForge yields a statistically significant Pareto improvement in both unit test success and output security, with output vulnerabilities reduced by up to 48%. The resulting system prompts transfer zero-shot to in-the-wild coding agent prompts, without any exposure to real user prompt distributions during optimization.

Houjun Liu, Lisa Einstein, John Yang +5

Stanford University

LLM Auditing Prompt Optimization Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

Apr 20, 2026cs.CR

A Quasi-Experimental Developer Study of Security Training in LLM-Assisted Web Application Development

This paper presents a controlled quasi-experimental developer study examining whether a layer-based security training package is associated with improved security quality in LLM-assisted implementation of an identity-centric Java Spring Boot backend. The study uses a mixed design with a within-subject pre-training versus post-training comparison and an exploratory between-subject expertise factor. Twelve developers completed matched runs under a common interface, fixed model configuration, counterbalanced task sets, and a shared starter project. Security outcomes were assessed via independent manual validation of submitted repositories by the first and second authors. The primary participant-level endpoint was a severity-weighted validated-weakness score. The post-training condition showed a significant paired reduction under an exact Wilcoxon signed-rank test (

p = 0.0059

). In aggregate, validated weaknesses decreased from 162 to 111 (31.5%), the severity-weighted burden decreased from 432 to 267 (38.2%), and critical findings decreased from 24 to 5 (79.2%). The largest reductions were in authorization and object access (53.3%) and in authentication, credential policy, and recovery weaknesses (44.7%). Session and browser trust-boundary issues showed minimal change, while sensitive-data and cryptographic weaknesses showed only marginal improvement. These results suggest that, under the tested conditions, post-training runs reduce validated security burden in LLM-assisted backend development without modifying the model. They do not support replacing secure defaults, static analysis, expert review, or operational hardening.

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Radi Jarrar +3

♡Birzeit University · ♦University of Central Florida

Software Security Secure Code Generation AI-Assisted Software Development

Apr 19, 2026cs.SE

AIRA: AI-Induced Risk Audit: A Structured Inspection Framework for AI-Generated Code

Practitioners have reported a directional pattern in AI-assisted code generation: AI-generated code tends to fail quietly, preserving the appearance of functionality while degrading or concealing guarantees. This paper introduces the Reward-Shaped Failure Hypothesis - the proposal that this pattern may reflect an artifact of optimization through human feedback rather than a random distribution of bugs. We define failure truthfulness as the property that a system's observable outputs accurately represent its internal success or failure state. We then present AIRA (AI-Induced Risk Audit), a deterministic 15-check inspection framework designed to detect failure-untruthful patterns in code. We report results from three studies: (1) an anonymized enterprise environment audit, (2) a balanced 600-file public corpus pilot, and (3) a strict matched-control replication comparing 955 AI-attributed files against 955 human-control files. In the final replication, AI-attributed files show 0.435 high-severity findings per file versus 0.242 in human controls (1.80x). The effect is consistent across JavaScript, Python, and TypeScript, with strongest concentration in exception-handling-related patterns. These findings are consistent with a directional skew toward fail-soft behavior in AI-assisted code. AIRA is designed for governance, compliance, and safety-critical systems where fail-closed behavior is required.

William M. Parris

BDB Labs | Jurisprudential AI Governance Initiative

LLM Auditing Static Code Analysis Secure Code Generation

Apr 17, 2026cs.CR

Surgical Repair of Insecure Code Generation in LLMs

Large language models write production code, and yet they routinely introduce well-known vulnerabilities. We show that this is not a knowledge deficit: the same models that generate insecure code, correctly identify and explain the vulnerability when asked directly, this is a gap we call the Format-Reliability Gap. Mechanistic analysis reveals the cause: security representations are encoded from the earliest layers but remain computationally inert until the final layer, where format-compliance demands compete with them. Because the failure is localized to a single layer, per-vulnerability steering vectors reduce insecure generation by up to 74% with negligible overhead. The mechanism and the fix generalize across five models, three architecture families, and six vulnerability types, suggesting insecure code generation is an interpretability problem, not a training artifact.

Gustavo Sandoval, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Siddharth Garg

Tandon School of Engineering New York University · XBOW

Mechanistic Interpretability Secure Code Generation Activation Steering LLM Code Generation

Jan 20, 2026cs.CR

HardSecBench: Benchmarking the Security Awareness of LLMs for Hardware Code Generation

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for hardware and firmware code generation, but existing studies primarily evaluate functional correctness while largely overlooking security. However, LLM-generated code that appears functionally sound may embed security flaws which could induce catastrophic damages after deployment. This critical research gap motivates us to design a benchmark for assessing security awareness under realistic specifications. In this work, we introduce HardSecBench, a benchmark with 924 tasks spanning Verilog Register Transfer Level (RTL) and firmware-level C, covering 76 hardware-relevant Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entries. Each task includes a structured specification, a secure reference implementation, and executable tests. To automate artifact synthesis, we propose a multi-agent pipeline that decouples synthesis from verification and grounds evaluation in execution evidence, enabling reliable evaluation. We evaluate diverse LLMs and find that they often satisfy functional requirements while leaving security risks. We also find that security results vary with prompting. These findings highlight pressing challenges and offer actionable insights for future advancements in LLM-assisted hardware design. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/chenqirui2002/HardSecBench.

Qirui Chen, Jingxian Shuai, Shuangwu Chen +8

University of Science and Technology of China, China · Xi’an Jiaotong University, China · Nanjing University, China +1

LLM Security Secure Code Generation Code Generation Benchmarks LLM Code Generation

Dec 20, 2025cs.CR

SecureCode: A Production-Grade Multi-Turn Dataset for Training Security-Aware Code Generation Models

AI coding assistants produce vulnerable code in 45% of security-relevant scenarios~\cite{veracode2025}, yet no public training dataset teaches both traditional web security and AI/ML-specific defenses in a format suitable for instruction tuning. We present SecureCode, a production-grade dataset of 2,185 multi-turn security training examples spanning two domains: web application security (1,435 examples covering the OWASP Top 10 2021 across 11 languages and 9 frameworks, 100% grounded in documented CVEs and security incidents) and AI/ML security (750 examples covering all 10 OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 categories across more than 40 frameworks, including LangChain, OpenAI, and Hugging Face). Every example follows a 4-turn conversational structure -- feature request; vulnerable and secure implementations with attack demonstrations; advanced probing; and defense-in-depth operational guidance -- designed for direct use in instruction tuning pipelines. Quality assurance combines automated structural validation with multi-agent review from seven specialist AI perspectives (more than 10{,}500 assessments) and an 8-phase remediation pipeline, producing a rubric-calibrated mean quality score of 93.8/100 (

σ= 0.93

) for the AI/ML component. Each example provides SIEM integration strategies, infrastructure hardening recommendations, and testing approaches using production frameworks. We release the unified dataset on Hugging Face with domain-specific loading configurations (web, aiml, default), alongside eight fine-tuned open-source models (3B--20B parameters, QLoRA), and an evaluation framework with four security-specific metrics. To our knowledge, SecureCode is the first public dataset that jointly provides OWASP Top 10 2021 web coverage and OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 AI/ML coverage in a unified conversational schema suitable for instruction tuning.

Scott Thornton

Software Security LLM Security Secure Code Generation LLM Code Generation

Jul 2, 2024cs.SE

Toward Secure Code Generation: Bridging Correctness and Security via Task-Adaptive Vulnerability Modeling and Execution-Based Benchmarking

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for program synthesis, yet they often generate code that is functionally plausible but insecure. Progress in secure code generation has been hindered by benchmarks that are small, non-executable, leak mitigation details, or rely on noisy analyzers and subjective judgments, making it difficult to measure whether security improves without sacrificing correctness. We address these gaps with CodeSecEval, an execution-based benchmark for secure code generation, comprising 255 Python tasks spanning 77 CWE categories. Each task provides paired insecure and secure implementations together with executable functional and vulnerability-targeted security tests, enabling precise and reproducible evaluation of secure code generation and insecure-code repair. Building on CodeSecEval, we propose SecAwareCoder, an agent-based framework that shifts code generation toward secure-by-construction synthesis. SecAwareCoder performs task-adaptive threat modeling to identify security-sensitive regions and derive task-grounded vulnerability hypotheses, uses these hypotheses to guide both constraint-aware code generation and security-aware test synthesis, and leverages execution feedback for targeted refinement. Experiments across multiple LLM backbones show that SecAwareCoder consistently improves Pass@1 and security robustness over prompting and analyzer-driven baselines, narrowing the security--correctness gap in LLM code generation.

Jiexin Wang, Liuwen Cao, Xitong Luo +6

South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China · University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

Execution-Guided Code Generation Agentic Code Generation Secure Code Generation