Social Deduction Games

When does communication help a group identify hidden adversaries, and how does its value change as the group adapts? In Mafia, an informed minority hides inside an uninformed majority whose only evidence is open play. The zero-information game, where each day's vote eliminates a random player, is exactly solved and scores every society; matched-casting comparisons between protocols identify the effect of communication. Societies of 8-100 claude-haiku-4-5 agents (7,416 analyzed games, 1.9M model calls) adapt by rewriting and inheriting private strategy notes. Simultaneous broadcast improves adversary identification over silence in all nine compositions tested (8-46 players). Turn-taking removes most of this advantage; its voting landslides are as frequent as broadcast's but land on mafia near chance (1.08x versus 2.53x). At 70 players, agents reading eight statements per day identify adversaries worse than silent ones, and limited talk is worth less than at 46 players. Adaptation is fast but need not help. In their first broadcast games, citizens announce their role far more often than mafia (91% vs. 30%) and first-day votes find mafia at three times chance; within two generations citizens stop announcing and the cue fades, a change the inherited notes carry. In controlled redeployments at 16 players, societies carrying sixty generations of their own notes score below societies with none. Communication shapes both collective inference and the signals it depends on, so a protocol's value must be measured together with the adaptation that changes those signals.

Social-deduction games such as Werewolf are increasingly used to evaluate LLM agents, but existing evaluations often rely on final game outcomes. We propose a belief-shift evaluation benchmark in Werewolf for analyzing communication skills through belief updating. Using LLM-played games, we annotate suspicion and accusation messages and measure how an observing village-side model's beliefs change after each message. We evaluate 40 open-weight LLM configurations on 1,224 annotated messages. Our results show that larger models better distinguish true wolves from villagers based on game history, but accusations still strongly influence their beliefs. Models become more suspicious of the accused target and less suspicious of the accuser, especially when the accuser is trusted, even if the accuser is wolf-aligned. Larger models better resist accusations from accusers they already distrust. Overall, our findings suggest that current open-weight LLMs up to 120B parameters still struggle to integrate accusation content with source trust in strategic communication. Our benchmark and code are available at https://rlg.iis.sinica.edu.tw/papers/werewolf-accusation-benchmark.

Social deduction games (SDGs) require agents to reason under partial observability by maintaining relational beliefs about hidden roles and team alignments. While recent LLM-agent approaches improve gameplay through prompting and preference optimization, they often optimize actions and in-game speech without explicitly grounding them in such beliefs. This frequently leads to strategically inconsistent behavior, especially for compact LLM agents. We introduce Multi-Agent Relational Belief Optimization (MARBO), a belief-grounded preference optimization framework that leverages relational beliefs to guide strategic decisions and in-game speech. MARBO provides preference feedback only when behaviors are supported by reliable relational beliefs and lead to strategically favorable social outcomes, encouraging more consistent learning under uncertainty. Experiments on representative SDGs show that MARBO enables compact LLM agents to consistently outperform existing baselines. The Code is available on https://github.com/PleaseTakemeAway/MARBO.

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that VLM agents pursue imposter wins through joint verbal and non-verbal deception, with non-verbal channels emerging as the more decisive winning contributors across both harness ablation and cross-VLM evaluation. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed as agents in high-stakes settings, such as medical and legal systems, understanding their deceptive capabilities is fundamental to safety. Controlled social deduction games provide a reproducible proxy for isolating and evaluating these complex adversarial behaviors. We present the open-source benchmark framework ParliamentBench based on the game Secret Hitler to evaluate LLMs in scenarios that require deception, persuasion, and reasoning under information asymmetry. We evaluate 16 LLMs across 1,600 simulated matches playing each other, playing against humans, and compare them against a large set of online games. We introduce three novel metrics that isolate social deduction, reasoning, and deceptive consistency. Our experiments reveal that frontier models achieve strong performance across cooperative and deceptive roles, with a strong top-four cluster (GPT-5.4, Kimi K2.5, Grok 4.1 Fast, and DeepSeek 3.1 Terminus), whereas the weakest models fall short of random (33%) and simple algorithmic (45%) baselines. Most LLMs struggle to maintain a consistent deceptive persona throughout an entire game, with deception retention dropping below 50%.

Social deduction games (SDGs) such as Werewolf have become challenging testbeds for AI agents. These games require complex social skills such as reasoning, deception, and collaboration. While recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have driven significant progress in SDG agents, current approaches are predominantly text-based, overlooking the multimodal nature that is fundamental to human social interaction. To bridge this gap, we introduce CaM-Wolf, the first SDG agent that integrates multimodal perception and generation. CaM-Wolf processes video inputs from other players, employs a causal-aware Reasoner trained via reinforcement learning to establish logical chains between observable behaviors and hidden roles, and presents itself through an animated avatar. Our experiments and user study show that CaM-Wolf achieves superior agent gameplay performance and enhances the quality of human-AI interaction. This work represents a significant advancement towards creating more human-like AI agents capable of participating in nuanced social dynamics. Our code is available at https://3dagentworld.github.io/avatar_wolf.

Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did. We study this in a 9-player Werewolf environment where agents act under strict, code-level information isolation, and we build an auditable framework that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles, logs belief updates and belief-action deviations as structured evidence, and supports a defensive offline improvement loop that reviews bad cases before any strategy change. Across 1,080 frozen games spanning belief-disabled, active-belief, kernel-ablation, camp-restricted, consumption-policy, and high-load arms, and including a seed-paired A0/A1 comparison, the active-belief condition is associated with substantially better good-side outcomes: in the 200-seed A0/A1 comparison the good-side win rate rises from 0.205 to 0.390 (paired McNemar $χ^2 = 16.4$, $p < 0.001$), with fewer irreversible witch-poison errors. We do not, however, attribute this shift to belief content. Direct action-belief consistency is low ($\approx 0.21$), and giving belief only to the werewolves helps the good side more than giving it only to the good side, which argues against a simple holder-benefit account; we therefore report the effect as an association and treat its mechanism as unresolved. The contribution is the audit framework itself: it makes the effect measurable, exposes low direct action-belief consistency, rejects an unreliable forced-consumption intervention with evidence, and separates strategy effects from load confounds. We accordingly position external belief in high-noise hidden-information games primarily as an auditable cognitive baseline that also carries decision-relevant signal, turning opaque agent behavior into replayable evidence for safer, controlled iteration.

An LLM agent's public behaviour reveals little about its social reasoning: an agent that votes correctly may be guessing, and an agent that lies well leaves no trace of what it actually believes. We present MafiaScope, an open testbed that turns the social deduction game Mafia into a measurement instrument for machine Theory of Mind. After every public utterance, every agent privately answers a configurable set of structured probe questions; the answers never re-enter the game and are scored automatically against the ground truth the engine knows. An interactive visualizer renders the belief trajectories: impersonate mode shows the game as one agent sees it, panels chart timeline-aligned accuracy and calibration, and counterfactual replay forks any recorded step. In a 32-game DeepSeek case study with 13{,}815 parsed probe answers, stated confidence is poorly calibrated, with expected calibration error 0.17, agents over-predict being suspected 1.5 times, and a 30-fork replay experiment walks the counterfactual replay workflow end to end. Engine, viewer and a corpus of 200+ cross-model games are released under an open licence; live demo: https://karpovilia.github.io/mafiascope/; screencast: https://vimeo.com/1208920221.

Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives. We extend the Werewolf game with a Jester, a third faction whose utility on peer suspicion is inverted because it wins by being voted out, so optimal play requires reasoning across three opposing utility functions. Across 60 games on GPT-4.1, DeepSeek-V3.1, and Llama-3.3-70B with Jester self-learning on and off, the Jester wins 60-70% of games while Werewolves never exceed 20%, and GPT-4.1 wolves vote the Jester out on day 1 in 60-70% of games, a strictly self-defeating action. Self-learning helps DeepSeek and Llama but hurts GPT-4.1, with the cost landing on Villagers rather than Werewolves. Only DeepSeek learns the subtle strategy of looking suspicious without looking intentionally suspicious, and it gains the most from the loop. Triadic incentive structure exposes a layer of multi-agent reasoning that dyadic deduction games leave invisible.

Social deduction games have become a popular testbed for probing reasoning, deception, coordination, and belief modeling in Large Language Model (LLM) agents. However, most environments are scored only by game outcomes such as win rates and largely remain to text-only interaction, making it difficult to tell whether an agent's language is actually grounded in what it perceived and did, or to identify the failure modes underlying its behavior. To address this gap, we introduce QUACK, an open-source environment and evaluation framework for auditing the grounding of agent language in multimodal social reasoning. QUACK evaluates agents at three levels: game outcomes, behavioral trajectories, and utterance-level consistency. Its core Statement Verification Pipeline reconstructs each agent's ground-truth trajectory from engine logs and checks every discussion claim against it, automatically flagging spatial hallucination, unsupported accusation, deception collapse, and language-action inconsistency. Evaluating three frontier VLMs in both homogeneous and cross-model adversarial settings, we find that even the strongest agent hallucinates 15.1% of its verifiable spatial claims and 11.5% of accusations are strictly unsupported. We release the full engine, evaluation framework, toolkit, and logs in https://github.com/AAAAA-Academia-Attractions/QUACK.

Social deduction games such as Mafia present a unique AI challenge: players must reason under uncertainty, interpret incomplete and intentionally misleading information, evaluate human-like communication, and make strategic elimination decisions. Unlike deterministic board games, success in Mafia depends not on perfect information or brute-force search, but on inference, memory, and adaptability in the presence of deception. This work presents the design and evaluation of Revac-8, an AI agent developed for the Social Deduction track of the MindGames Arena competition, where it achieved first place. The final agent evolved from a simple two-stage reasoning system into a multi-module architecture that integrates memory-based player profiling, social-graph analysis of accusations and defenses, and dynamic tone selection for communication. These results highlight the importance of structured memory and adaptive communication for achieving strong performance in high-stakes social environments.