Phishing

Email spam and phishing attacks remain a critical security threat. Adversaries increasingly exploit large language models to craft contextually convincing malicious messages, and existing spam detection systems often struggle to keep pace. Generalization across diverse and evolving attack scenarios is limited, which reduces effectiveness once these systems are deployed in practice. This paper introduces Adaptive Uncertainty-Routed Analysis (AURA), a multimodal email threat detection system that analyzes both the content of an email and its embedded URLs. AURA is built around two layers: the first quantifies prediction uncertainty from a URL classifier, and only ambiguous messages are escalated to a fine-tuned transformer encoder for semantic analysis. The system is evaluated on eight heterogeneous training corpora together with two held-out real-world corpora spanning a decade of adversarial campaigns. AURA reaches a macro F1-score of 0.9858 in-distribution, and on NazPhish-Eval and GuenterTrap-Eval it maintains 0.9502 and 0.9436, respectively, which is evidence of robust generalization under genuine distribution shift.

Voice phishing (vishing) unfolds in real time; by the time a call has ended and post-hoc classification is possible, the harm has already been done. The more actionable question is which concrete harm (Information Gathering or Financial Exploitation) an ongoing call is tactically progressing toward. We present Vishing-Tactics-Bench, a benchmark grounded in Endsley's situation-awareness (SA) framework that recasts vishing defense from after-the-fact fraud classification to harm projection: predicting at each turn whether the call will reach either terminal harm. We adapt MITRE ATT&CK to vishing as a 6-tactic taxonomy (Vishing-Tactics) and label 35,340 scammer utterances across 5,645 synthetic Chinese calls. We define Exploitation Trajectory Forecasting, a survival-style protocol over the two terminal harms with three metrics: AP@k, C-index, and divergence error. Baselines ranging from a Markov heuristic to fine-tuned LLMs show that the tactical trajectory serves as an interpretable representation of the call's tactical state, supporting harm-specific forecasting, which can then be used for the downstream application of intervention selection; a stratified lead-time analysis at a tight false-alarm budget further identifies at what point in a call the trajectory signal yields early warning.

Phishing emails remain one of the most persistent cybersecurity threats, and machine-learning classifiers are widely used to detect them. Most reported detection accuracies, however, are measured on clean, in-distribution test data rather than on emails deliberately altered to evade detection. This paper reports a controlled, pairwise comparison of two phishing-detection approaches a TF-IDF + Logistic Regression baseline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT transformer trained on a unified corpus of 82,255 emails drawn from six public datasets and evaluated under three conditions: normal in-distribution, synthetic phishing, and adversarial phishing. Both models exceeded 98% accuracy on clean data yet degraded sharply under adversarial testing: TF-IDF + LR fell to 64.00% (a 34.59-percentage-point drop) and DistilBERT fell to 63.64% (a 35.40-percentage-point drop) a gap of only 0.36 percentage points, equivalent to a single email in the 275-sample adversarial test set. LIME, SHAP, and attention-rollout analysis indicate the two models relied on different evidence yet showed similar vulnerability. Pairwise error analysis shows the models agreed on 54.9% of adversarial samples but each made a similar number of exclusive errors (24 and 25 respectively), indicating partly complementary rather than identical failure modes. The results show that clean-data accuracy does not predict adversarial robustness, and that adversarial testing should be a standard part of phishing-detection evaluation.

Legged robots rely on accurate ground interaction awareness to traverse variable terrains, such as slippery surfaces. Existing slip detection methods often rely on kinematics and proprioception, which lack the sensitivity to detect early-stage slips that occur prior to catastrophic instability. Thus, this paper presents SlipSense, a novel framework for online force-based slip detection using a custom lightweight sensorized foot for quadrupeds to detect slip. The framework integrates a multimodal sensor design with a LSTM-based model to infer ground reaction forces and detect slip-indicative anomalies during locomotion. The proposed framework is deployed on a Unitree Go1 quadruped to demonstrate blind online slip detection over a slippery terrain. Our method detects early-stage slips down to an average displacement of 24.1 +/-6.4mm with an overall accuracy of 85.9%. This represents a 3.3-fold finer detection resolution and a 24% relative accuracy improvement over a standard kinematic baseline that uses foot velocity inferred through state estimation. The work in this paper serves as a foundation for force-aware gait adaptation in legged robotic locomotion, allowing future controllers to estimate terrain friction and adjust constraints, thus improving the overall stability of the system.

Phishing is a multi-modal threat. We present a hybrid pipeline that scores each modality with its own engine and fuses the results. Three engines are built, deployed, and independently benchmarked: a four-stage URL stack (Domain Guard, lexical model, threat intelligence, and an asymmetric L2 fusion sidecar); a generalization-hardened DistilBERT NLP classifier whose held-out real-phishing recall rises from 0.8% to 87.3%; and a threat-intelligence synchronizer with end-to-end OpenTelemetry instrumentation confirming 1:1 message conservation. A decision-level fusion stage, characterized on a 10,677-email whole-system benchmark, reaches F1=0.914 with a calibrated probabilistic-OR over URL, header, and phishing-probability channels while reducing held-out real-spam false positives to 3.6%. Because that benchmark uses proxy URL and header channels and an operating point still needing recalibration, we present it as a preliminary integrated result. For deployable detection, the limiting factor is how well a model generalizes, not how accurately it scores data drawn from its own training distribution.

When a new domain resembling a popular brand appears, defenders face a fundamental ambiguity: it may be an attacker-created squatting site for phishing, or it may be a domain the brand itself registered, either defensively, to block attackers, or legitimately, for a new product or service launch. Incorrectly flagging a brand-owned domain as malicious produces a false positive that harms end users and damages the brand's reputation. Resolving this ambiguity requires brand intelligence: the ability to determine, at scale, whether a given domain belongs to a brand. Large language models (LLMs), with their broad knowledge of brand domain relationships, offer a promising zero configuration approach to this problem, but their reliability for brand intelligence tasks remains unknown. We present the first systematic empirical evaluation of LLM brand intelligence across three tasks: domain enumeration (Q1), open ended brand attribution (Q2), and binary ownership classification (Q3). We evaluate four models, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Claude Sonnet 4.6, across four retrieval settings (in context, web search, WHOIS lookup, and combined) on 36 of the most phished brands. Our results reveal a stark dichotomy: models achieve up to 82% precision enumerating brand domains from memory alone, yet fail at ownership verification without external tools, with macro F1 at most 0.37 in ICL mode. WHOIS augmentation lifts Q3 macro F1 by up to 0.65 points, yielding near perfect precision (<= 0.99), dramatically reducing the false positive risk for defenders. We provide concrete recommendations for deploying LLMs in brand protection pipelines.

The expansion of the digital domain has resulted in a substantial increase in digital communication, with email emerging as one of the most prominent channels. The proliferation of email communication is apparent in both professional and personal contexts, thereby creating numerous vulnerabilities for malicious actors to exploit. Spam emails, a form of unsolicited correspondence often bearing malicious intent towards recipients, have been an ongoing challenge for email users since the inception of email technology, and this problem has been exacerbated by the growth of the digital landscape. Email spam filters are integral components of email clients, engineered to identify potentially harmful messages and alert users to their malicious content. Phishing, frequently the initial phase of malware-based attacks, is evolving rapidly, with malware becoming increasingly sophisticated over time. A widely adopted approach for detecting malicious activity within malware and spam domains is the application of machine learning. Our aim is to assess the impact of the evolution within the spam email domain on these machine learning-based detection systems and to explore strategies for mitigating associated performance degradation.

Phishing attacks remain a major cybersecurity threat, exploiting deceptive URLs to steal sensitive user information. Traditional blacklist and rule-based detection approaches are reactive and often fail to identify newly emerging phishing URLs. This paper proposes a lightweight hybrid framework for real-time phishing URL detection that combines blacklist-based screening with a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier operating solely on structural URL features. The framework extracts 16 URL-derived features capturing structural, domain-based, and security-related characteristics without requiring webpage content access, third-party APIs, or visual rendering, making it computationally efficient for real-time deployment. The system was trained and evaluated on the PhiUSIIL phishing dataset containing 235,795 labelled URLs. Experimental results show that the proposed MLP achieved 99.24% accuracy, 98.74% precision, 99.95% recall, 99.34% F1-score, and 99.65% ROC-AUC, outperforming Random Forest, Logistic Regression, XGBoost, LightGBM, and CatBoost under the same evaluation setting. The hybrid architecture achieved an average inference latency of 1.2 ms per URL and a peak throughput of 4,200 URLs per second under concurrent processing. A functional desktop application prototype, CyberGuard, further demonstrates deployment viability. The results indicate that the proposed framework provides an accurate and computationally efficient solution for real-time phishing URL detection in resource-constrained environments.

Email importance labeling has long been a critical yet challenging problem for businesses and individuals. Traditional approaches; such as keyword matching, user-defined rules, and sender-based heuristics; demand extensive manual feature engineering and fail to scale effectively or generalize. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong potential and a natural fit for this task, offering deep contextual understanding and superior labeling quality. However, using LLM models like GPT-4.1 at enterprise email volumes incurs prohibitive computational costs and hinders real-world deployment. We explore the trade-off space of using alternative labeling schemes as opposed to GPT4.1 scale LLMs, with the goal of achieving near GPT level labeling quality with significantly lower cost. We develop Argo, an enterprise email labeling framework, where we construct a profiler to efficiently search the cost quality trade-off space of labeling and identify cost-efficient alternatives to labeling emails. Additionally, we design an on-demand provisioning scheme to intelligently scale Argo with real time load, to minimize cost increases during peak load inference. Over 3 open-source email datasets, Argo achieves 148-167X inference cost reduction with negligible quality degradation and 20-640000X lower profiling costs, making large-scale, context-aware email labeling practical for enterprises.

Social engineering attacks exploit human trust rather than software vulnerabilities, making them difficult to detect using conventional filters. We propose a two-stage filter-then-verify framework combining inductive Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) for structural anomaly detection with a co-attention ModernBERT model for content verification. The GNN identifies anomalous sender-receiver patterns, while BERT analyzes message context to reduce false positives. Using the Enron dataset augmented with realistic synthetic campaigns, we show that the framework achieves 86% recall in structural filtering and over 92% precision after BERT refinement, effectively detecting both external attacks and insider threats. Our results demonstrate that combining structural and content analysis allows practical, scalable detection of multi-stage social engineering attacks in email networks.

The rapid growth of electronic communication has necessitated more robust systems for email classification and sentiment detection. This study presents a comparative performance analysis between traditional machine learning algorithms and deep learning architectures, specifically focusing on Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes, and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). Utilizing Word2Vec embeddings for feature representation, our experimental results indicate that the SVM model with a linear kernel achieves the highest efficiency and accuracy, reaching a peak performance of 98.74%. While the LSTM model demonstrates exceptional recall capabilities in detecting spam-related sentiments, it requires significantly more computational time compared to discriminative statistical models. Detailed evaluations via confusion matrices further reveal that traditional classifiers remain highly robust for dense vector spaces. This research concludes that for email detection tasks, SVM offers the most optimal balance between predictive precision and processing speed. These findings provide critical insights for developing high-performance automated email filtering systems in professional and academic environments.

In phishing detection, machine learning classifiers act as a first line of defense, but the false positives they produce are triaged by human analysts. The excessive false alarms cause alert fatigue that erodes human oversight. We propose CoGReV, a hybrid framework that augments standard machine learning classifiers with a post-hoc non-monotonic reasoning layer implemented in Answer Set Programming. The layer applies a confidence-gated defeasible rule that revises a phishing prediction toward legitimate only when website metadata is present and the classifier's decision is low-confidence, deferring uncertain predictions to the reasoning layer while leaving out confident decisions to the classifiers. This gating acts as a function-allocation mechanism between the classifier and the reasoning layer. Unlike an ungated rule, which reduces false positives only by discarding genuine detections and degrades phishing recall by about nine percentage points, the proposed gated rule keeps recall within 0.7 percentage points of the no-revision baseline for all classifiers while revising only 0.27 percent of decisions. By lowering false alarms, without sacrificing detection, CoGReV reduces analysts alert fatigue and integrates new domain knowledge into the reasoning layer in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ time.

Privacy-critical domains require phishing detection systems that satisfy contradictory constraints: near-zero false positives to prevent workflow disruption, transparent explanations for non-expert staff, strict regulatory compliance prohibiting sensitive data exposure to external APIs, and robustness against AI-generated attacks. Existing rule-based systems are brittle to novel campaigns, while LLM-based detectors violate privacy regulations through unredacted data transmission. We introduce CyberCane, a neuro-symbolic framework integrating deterministic symbolic analysis with privacy-preserving retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Our dual-phase pipeline applies lightweight symbolic rules to email metadata, then escalates borderline cases to semantic classification via RAG with automated sensitive data redaction and retrieval from a phishing-only corpus. We further introduce PhishOnt, an OWL ontology enabling verifiable attack classification through formal reasoning chains. Evaluation on DataPhish2025 (12.3k emails; mixed human/LLM) and Nazario/SpamAssassin demonstrates a 78.6-point recall gain over symbolic-only detection on AI-generated threats, with precision exceeding 98% and FPR as low as 0.16%. Healthcare deployment projects a 542x ROI; tunable operating points support diverse risk tolerances, with open-source implementation at https://github.com/sbhakim/Cybercane.

Modern phishing campaigns increasingly evade snapshot-based URL classifiers using interaction gates (e.g., checkbox/slider challenges), delayed content rendering, and logo-less credential harvesters. This shifts URL triage from static classification toward an interactive forensics task: an analyst must actively navigate the page while isolating themselves from potential runtime exploits. We present TraceScope, a decoupled triage pipeline that operationalizes this workflow at scale. To prevent the observer effect and ensure safety, a sandboxed operator agent drives a real GUI browser guided by visual motivation to elicit page behavior, freezing the session into an immutable evidence bundle. Separately, an adjudicator agent circumvents LLM context limitations by querying evidence on demand to verify a MITRE ATT&CK checklist, and generates an audit-ready report with extracted indicators of compromise (IOCs) and a final verdict. Evaluated on 708 reachable URLs from existing dataset (241 verified phishing from PhishTank and 467 benign from Tranco-derived crawling), TraceScope achieves 0.94 precision and 0.78 recall, substantially improving recall over three prior visual/reference-based classifiers while producing reproducible, analyst-grade evidence suitable for review. More importantly, we manually curated a dataset of real-world phishing emails to evaluate our system in a practical setting. Our evaluation reveals that TraceScope demonstrates superior performance in a real-world scenario as well, successfully detecting sophisticated phishing attempts that current state-of-the-art defenses fail to identify.