Strategic Classification

When an AI system is deployed, the individuals who use and or are evaluated by it form beliefs about how the system operates and use those beliefs to strategically present their preferences, behaviors, or attributes. The system then responds with feedback or a decision outcome, thereby creating a human-AI interaction loop. This thesis studies how to design and shape such interactions to achieve three goals: (1) help individuals develop accurate beliefs about the AI systems so they can improve and or secure favorable outcomes at minimal cost, (2) encourage improvement and or discourage gaming behaviors, and (3) ensure that the AI system continues to achieve its intended objectives, such as maximizing accuracy. To address these goals, the thesis is organized into three complementary parts that examine and study human-AI interactions from the perspectives of both evaluated individuals and AI systems. Together, the work presented in this thesis advances human-centered machine learning by providing principles and methods for designing AI systems that align with human needs, values, and capabilities. Methodologically, this thesis integrates theoretical analysis, data-driven modeling, human-subject experiments, and empirical evaluations on real-world and semi-synthetic datasets.

Humans facing algorithmic decision systems have been found to ``game'' them by altering their input data (at a cost to them) in order to favorably change the algorithmic outcomes they receive (at a cost to the algorithm). The growing literature on strategic classification seeks to develop robust machine learning algorithms that account for, and reduce, unwanted strategic behavior. A limitation of these existing works is that they assume the cost of strategic behavior to be fixed and independent of the classifier's decision. In practice, however, manipulation costs evolve and depend on past algorithmic decisions: today's decisions influence tomorrow's costs. This paper proposes and analyzes a two-stage robust optimization framework with a decision-dependent uncertainty set to capture such dependencies. We highlight that awareness of policy-dependent costs not only reduces uncertainty, but also better curtails gaming of the algorithmic system over time.

Algorithmic developments in Strategic Classification have been mostly limited to linear classifiers in settings where the best response has a closed-form solution or can be easily approximated. While some work has explored the role of non-linear classifiers in strategic settings, progress in this direction is impeded by the computational intractability of the strategic behaviour. Addressing this, we present a novel method for approximating the best response by exploiting Lagrangian duality. By reformulating the strategic response as a constrained optimisation problem, we can construct a Lagrangian that is amenable to first order optimisation methods. This approach reproduces closed-form strategic behaviour in linear settings and can be straight-forwardly applied to non-linear settings. We show how the Implicit Function Theorem can be used in conjunction with our proposed response formulation during classifier learning to compute the total gradient of the loss. This connects the classifier parameters directly to the consequent strategic behaviour, yielding a novel training algorithm that can exploit this relationship. Experimental evaluation shows that the resulting models achieve improved strategic accuracy on common machine learning datasets.

When algorithmic predictors inform resource allocation in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, these predictors must account for strategic manipulation of input features. The typical solution is to redesign the predictor itself to explicitly account for strategic interactions. In practice, however, decision makers are often constrained to adjusting coarser levers within existing prediction pipelines. For example, healthcare organizations often select which features to exclude based on perceived manipulability, while using standard regularization procedures to shrink the coefficients of retained features. In this work, we initiate a formal study of strategic classification through feature selection and its interaction with ridge regularization. Our main finding is that excluding individual features based on their manipulability alone is generally suboptimal. We provide a fine-grained characterization of the performance of a feature subset under optimal regularization, yielding new insights for policy design. Motivated by this characterization, we develop a practical algorithm for jointly choosing the feature set and the level of ridge regularization. Through a real-world case study on a healthcare payments benchmark, we illustrate how our algorithm can guide the design of coarse policy levers in practice. Our results provide a principled, practical framework for mitigating the effects of strategic behavior in algorithmic decision-making systems.

A common assumption in strategic classification is that the classifier is public knowledge. However, it remains unclear whether, and why, a system would choose to commit to full disclosure. We study a setting in which regulation requires the system to disclose some, but not all, of the information. This induces a learning task in which the learner must jointly optimize the classifier and the uncertainty surrounding it. To this end, we adopt from robust mechanism design the notion of ambiguity, which in our setting allows the learner to reveal a set or range of possible classifiers, while privately choosing which of them to ultimately realize. We investigate how ambiguity affects the learning task, develop efficient algorithms for computing best-responses and training, and empirically explore strategic learning and its outcomes in this novel setting and using our approach.

We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates. Such behavior induces a policy-dependent covariate shift, breaking the standard assumption in existing methods that covariates are exogenous to the policy. Related work addresses this challenge by imposing strong assumptions such as repeated interactions or full knowledge of agents' response behavior, substantially limiting its applicability to OPE. In contrast, we consider a one-shot OPE setting where the decision maker has only partial knowledge of the agents' response behavior. Our key insight is that disclosing local information through post-hoc explanations reveals agents' pre-strategic covariates prior to adaptation, mitigating the information loss induced by strategic behavior. Leveraging this structure, we estimate a statistical model for the agents' responses and construct a doubly robust estimator for policy value. By assuming that the agents' cost sensitivity follows a conditional log-normal distribution, we establish consistency of the proposed estimator and validate our approach empirically. More broadly, our results highlight how interaction design can mitigate information asymmetry by revealing otherwise hidden structure in agents' strategic responses.

Strategic classification studies settings in which agents respond to a deployed classifier by modifying observable features at a cost. Classical models typically treat such responses as cosmetic: features may change, but true labels remain fixed. We study an improvement-aware variant in which strategic responses can induce genuine changes in outcome-relevant features. Agents choose post-deployment feature vectors strategically, and labels are then generated according to a stable conditional outcome law that preserves the relationship between features and outcomes. We formalize this problem for linear classifiers under a single-index qualification model and linear-decomposable costs. We show that the strategic-optimal classifier is obtained by a parallel shift of the Bayes-optimal decision boundary, and that it provides a better surrogate for the improvement-aware objective than the Bayes classifier. Since improvement-aware learning requires post-deployment labels, which are typically unavailable before deployment, we provide PAC-style guar- antees under an oracle model, propose a practical plug-in algorithm, establish its generalization bound, and evaluate it on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Strategic classification (SC) investigates scenarios where agents manipulate their features to obtain favorable decisions from predictive models. Existing fairness-aware SC approaches primarily focus on group fairness and typically assume that agents respond independently. However, when individual fairness is required, ensuring similar individuals receive similar outcomes, agents' manipulation becomes interdependent: an agent's preferred manipulation depends on the neighborhoods' outcomes. This induces a mismatch between classical SC formulations and fairness-aware decision settings, where independent models no longer accurately characterize strategic manipulations. To address this issue, we introduce individual fairness-aware strategic classification (IFSC), a framework that models peer-driven manipulation arising from individual fairness, where agents imitate nearby positively decided peers to obtain favorable outcomes. IFSC characterizes strategic manipulation as similarity-based imitation toward visible accepted peers and learns classifiers under the resulting post-manipulation distributions. To account for uncertainty in peer observability, IFSC employs a robust learning process that introduces stochastic perturbations during manipulation simulation. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that IFSC improves individual-fairness consistency and mitigates imitation-induced distortions.

Strategic machine learning investigates scenarios where agents manipulate their features to receive favorable decisions from predictive models. To address fairness concerns intrinsic to strategic classification, recent work has introduced group-specific fairness constraints. However, current fairness-aware approaches face a fundamental dilemma in the issue of fairness exposure: making these constraints public enables strategic manipulation and can lead to fairness reversal, while keeping them hidden may reduce social welfare and discourage genuine improvement. To fill this gap, we subsequently propose the problem of partial fairness awareness (PFA), as our theoretical analysis informs that such a dilemma can be mitigated by releasing the candidate set of fairness constraints and concealing the grounding constraint. To be specific, we introduce a belief-guided strategic mechanism, wherein agents iteratively interact with the decision system and maintain a belief distribution over the candidate set of fairness constraints. This belief-guided process enables agents, through iterative interaction and feedback, to update their belief distribution over the candidate set, thereby gradually aligning their belief with the grounding fairness constraint employed by the system. Extensive experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrate that PFA achieves lower group fairness gaps, higher acceptance of truly qualified individuals, and more stable outcomes compared to fully public or private fairness regimes.

In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice.

Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes. Existing SC frameworks typically rely on the idealized assumption that agents are strictly rational. However, evidence from behavioral economics and psychology consistently shows that real-world decision-making is often shaped by cognitive biases, deviating from pure rationality. To formalize this limitation, we identify and define a new problem setting, termed the behaviorally realistic strategic classification problem, where agents' strategic manipulations deviate from full rationality due to psychological biases. Motivated by the identified limitation, we propose the Prospect-Guided Strategic Framework (Pro-SF) to address the problem, a principled framework grounded in prospect theory to model and learn under behaviorally realistic strategic responses. Specifically, to capture behaviorally realistic strategic manipulations, our framework reformulates the Stackelberg-style interaction between agents and the decision-maker by incorporating three key mechanisms inspired by prospect theory, including the asymmetry between benefits and costs, different subjective reference points, and non-rational probability distortion. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets establish Pro-SF as a behaviorally grounded approach to strategic classification, bridging machine learning and behavioral economics for more reliable deployment in the real world.

Tabular foundation models based on pretrained prior-data fitted networks~(PFNs) have shown strong generalization on diverse tabular tasks, but they are typically designed for \emph{non-strategic} settings where data distributions are independent of deployed classifiers. In many real-world decision scenarios, however, individuals may strategically modify their features after deployment to obtain favorable outcomes, inducing a post-deployment distribution shift. This paper studies whether PFN-style tabular foundation models can generalize to such \emph{strategic} tabular data. We show that strategic manipulation creates a mismatch between the non-strategic prior learned during pretraining and the post-manipulation strategic prior, which leads to systematic prediction bias. To address this issue, we propose \textbf{Strategic Prior-data Fitted Network}~\textit{(SPN)}, an inference-time strategy-aware framework that adapts tabular foundation models to strategic environments without retraining. SPN constructs strategic in-context examples to approximate post-manipulation inputs and aligns PFN predictions with the induced strategic distribution. Experiments on real-world and synthetic tabular datasets show that SPN consistently improves robustness and predictive performance under strategic manipulation compared with both tabular foundation models and classical tabular methods.

Strategic classification studies learning settings in which individuals can modify their features, at a cost, in order to influence the classifier's decision. A central question is how the sample complexity of the induced (strategic) hypothesis class depends on the complexities of the underlying hypothesis class and the cost structure governing feasible manipulations. Prior work has shown that in several natural settings, such as linear classifiers with norm costs, the induced complexity can be controlled. We begin by showing that such guarantees fail in general - even in simple cases: there exist hypothesis classes of VC dimension $1$ on the real line such that, even under the simplest interval neighborhoods, the induced class has infinite VC dimension. Thus, strategic behavior can turn an easy learning problem into a non-learnable one. To overcome this, we introduce structure via a geometric definability assumption: both the hypothesis class and the cost-induced neighborhood relation can be defined by first-order formulas over $\mathbb{R}_{\mathtt{exp}}$. Intuitively, this means that hypotheses and costs can be described using arithmetic operations, exponentiation, logarithms, and comparisons. This captures a broad range of natural classes and cost functions, including $\ell_p$ distances, Wasserstein distance, and information-theoretic divergences. Under this assumption, we prove that learnability is preserved, with sample complexity controlled by the complexity of the defining formulas.

Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly than genuine efforts. Prior works have demonstrated a fundamental inability to get out of this conundrum by only focusing on the design of a classifier. We note that prior work also heavily focuses on either one-shot settings or repeated interaction with the same classifier. Real-world decision making is often multi-stage, involving a sequence of potentially different classifiers as an agent progresses. This paper introduces a sequential, stochastic, multi-stage model of strategic classification, by capturing how agents adapt their behavior, through improvement actions (enhancing both observable features and true attributes) and gaming actions (enhancing only observable features), over multiple levels of classification with increasing difficulty as well as reward. For each level, we adopt a selective classifier that can abstain from making a prediction at low confidence. Consequently, a positive (resp. negative) outcome leads to promotion (resp. demotion) of the agent to the next higher (resp. lower) level, while abstention keeps the agent at the same level. We fully characterize the agent's optimal instantaneous action under selective classifiers and compare the long-term properties and utility of the agent repeatedly following an optimal myopic policy of either no-improvement (never choose the improvement action) or no-gaming (never choose the gaming action). We further examine design principles over the sequence of classifiers that yield higher long-term utility for the latter policy, thereby effectively incentivizing genuine effort in the long run.