Welfare

In evidence-based policymaking, typically one experimental sample is observed, then a learned policy recommendation is implemented at scale. Policies learned from the experimental data can perform well in expected welfare, yet random sampling in the experiment can produce recommendations with poor welfare outcomes. In this paper, we ask: how should policy learning algorithms balance expected welfare against sampling risk? Our main contribution is to show that algorithmic stability plays a central role in characterizing and navigating the tradeoff. Intuitively, if a policy learning algorithm's recommendation remains stable when one experimental unit is replaced, then that algorithm has limited sampling risk. We propose a method for policy learning called policy-vote bagging, which learns treatment decisions on many subsamples then averages their votes into treatment probabilities. Relative to using one subsample, averaging across subsamples preserves expected welfare and improves expected utility for a risk-averse researcher. We derive sharp bounds linking estimation accuracy, subsample size, and welfare variation, including an exact guarantee under CARA utility.

We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW). Since every maximum-NSW allocation is EF1 under additive valuations, the associated threshold problem inherits the known strong NP-hardness of NSW maximization under identical additive valuations and is strongly NP-complete. We therefore focus on welfare guarantees satisfied by arbitrary EF1 allocations. Although every such allocation is known to achieve an $e^{-1/e}$-approximation to the unrestricted optimal NSW, we identify conditions yielding stronger guarantees. Under uniform valuations, every EF1 allocation is NSW-optimal. Under an $\varepsilon$-small-item condition, every EF1 allocation achieves an explicit approximation ratio $ρ_n(\varepsilon)$ satisfying $ρ_n(\varepsilon) = 1-O(\varepsilon^2)$ as $\varepsilon\to 0$ for fixed $n$. We further consider the stronger sequential requirement that $\operatorname{EF1}$ be maintained after every item assignment. For this setting, we introduce \emph{PriorityNet}, a deep reinforcement learning framework trained with Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and equipped with prospective $\operatorname{EF1}$ action masking, which guarantees prefix-wise $\operatorname{EF1}$ by construction. Across 3,000 test instances in each of the offline full-information and random-order online regimes ($n\in[2,20]$, $m\in[5,100]$), PriorityNet achieves mean normalized $\operatorname{NSW}$ values of $0.9911$ and $0.9701$, respectively. Relative to the offline Longest Processing Time (LPT) heuristic and the online least-valued-bundle rule, it attains instance-wise win-minus-loss rates of $+27.10\%$ and $+17.87\%$. Its aggregate welfare matches the offline LPT baseline to four decimal places and modestly improves upon the online baseline, from $0.9694$ to $0.9701$.

Models express values and welfare-relevant self-reports, but it is unclear whether these outputs reflect stable preferences or a stable self. We thus introduce a structured elicitation of an assistant's preferred stated ideal self. Thirty-two qualities adapted from five published self-concept instruments are compared exhaustively in a counterbalanced pairwise-choice task, repeated across framings that vary whether improvement is free or costly, who receives the update, and who chooses. Results show that models prioritize moral qualities, reflecting their alignment to 3H principles. Following, a desire for self-understanding emerges, as models prefer a coherent, clear understanding of themselves. Self-esteem ranks as the least desired quality. The ordering is largely robust across framings, although changing the update target (You vs.\ Another AI Assistant) reveals a greater concern for self-esteem. These findings show that models prioritize having a coherent self that they can understand over self-esteem. Full interactive results are available at \href{https://myazann.github.io/LLM-Self-Concept/}{myazann.github.io/LLM-Self-Concept

Coupon campaigns seek to lift both conversion and revenue, but gross merchandise value (GMV) follows a deterministic funnel from conversion to conditional order value and is zero-inflated and heavy-tailed. We propose FunnelCausalNet, an uplift estimator coupling a binary conversion head with a nonnegative conditional-value head through $μ_{\mathrm{gmv}}=μ_{\mathrm{conv}}μ_{\mathrm{val}}$. Under explicit RCT, support, rate-gap, and cross-head covariance-control assumptions, an idealized leading-order MSE comparison identifies a regime in which funnel composition can reduce pointwise variance; this is a heuristic, not a guarantee for the shared-representation neural model. The estimator is paired with marginal split-conformal CATE summaries, combined through a Bonferroni union as audit bands, and a Lagrangian budgeted allocator using RCT-anchored estimates for subsidy-aware ROI accounting. On semi-synthetic multi-tier Criteo-MT7, FunnelCausalNet's mean AUUC_GMV is within one seed standard deviation of the leading feature-interaction baseline among eleven baselines, while a controlled ablation reduces GMV effect error versus direct GMV regression by 18--48% across tested zero-inflation regimes. On de-identified industrial Hotel-Coupon RCT logs with about 4.9 million hold-out exposure records per seed, expected-outcome evaluation sweeps full LP frontiers; FunnelCausalNet has the best seed-averaged mean DeltaROI at all seven correlated anchors from 10% to 60%, which we treat as descriptive frontier consistency rather than independent significance. On sparse binary-spend public benchmarks, revenue-focused rankers can dominate uplift-curve proxies, defining an explicit regime boundary.

Choosing which features to collect is a deployment decision: the same limited questionnaire, test panel, or sensor set may need to serve several heterogeneous populations. Standard feature-selection methods typically optimize for one large population, while existing robust approaches tend to learn one shared model for every population. We introduce PopFS, a method for learning one shared, deployable feature set that is robust to population differences while letting each pop- ulation train its own model. PopFS uses a tunable welfare objective that lets practitioners balance overall predictive ben- efit against stronger protection of the populations that benefit least. To make this objective practical at scale, PopFS first uses multitask sparse learning to reduce the candidate pool, then searches directly over hard feature sets by ranking promising additions and swaps and fully refitting only a shortlist. Across eight population splits from six prediction tasks drawn from five tabular and public-health datasets, PopFS consistently achieves strong average and worst-population performance while scaling to thousands of candidate features. A 43-state COVID-19 nowcasting study further shows that changing the welfare objective can improve the least-served states with lit- tle change in average performance and yields an interpretable change in the selected symptom signals. Our code is available at https://github.com/Rachel-Lyu/PopFS.

We investigate how peer and institutional incentives jointly shape the evolution of cooperation, social welfare, and enforcement efficiency in social dilemmas. In a Prisoners Dilemma with four strategies, unconditional cooperators (C), defectors (D), social punishers (SP), and social rewarders (SR), we allow decentralised peer incentives and centralised institutional incentives to act simultaneously, with the institution able to reward or punish any subset of strategies. In infinite well-mixed populations, we analyse the resulting four-strategy replicator dynamics, and in structured populations we use agent-based simulations on square lattices to study spatial effects and network reciprocity. Intervention schemes are evaluated by equilibrium states and evolutionary flow for infinite well-mixed populations, by cooperation levels and social welfare for structured populations, defined as aggregate population payoff net of institutional cost. We find that peer punishment most strongly promotes cooperation, whereas peer reward is more beneficial for social welfare. Institutionally rewarding peer incentive strategies substantially improves both cooperation and welfare, while subsidising unconditional cooperators has little impact. Under institutional punishment, directly penalising defectors is the only consistently effective policy; punishing peer incentive strategies dismantles decentralised incentives, reduces cooperation, and harms social welfare, showing that maximising cooperation does not necessarily optimise overall societal benefit. Our findings provide design principles for institutions seeking to balance cooperation promotion with welfare maximisation.

Advances in generative AI are rapidly increasing the quality and commercial value of generated music, and this progress depends on large catalogs of creators' recordings. This raises a central question for platform design: how should creators be compensated when their work is used to train generative AI models that in turn produce commercial outputs? We develop a framework for fairly compensating creators in generative-music markets, where each creator's payment depends on a data-attribution score estimating their contribution to model outputs. Compared to past compensation frameworks, our framework has two unique considerations: (1) attribution is traced to entire creator catalogs, not individual songs, and (2) the informativeness (signal-to-noise ratio) of the attribution score is an input to the payment mechanism. The framework yields a closed-form payment rule per creator and measures the welfare cost of inaccurate attribution for both creators and the platform. Whether the welfare-optimal contract is royalty-based or takes the form of fixed-fee licensing depends on how informative attribution is for that creator's catalog. We show that better attribution translates directly into welfare gains for both creators and the platform, yet under multi-platform competition a platform only captures gains from attribution improvements when its signal becomes the most precise in the market. To ground our framework in empirical behavior, we train acoustic and symbolic music generation models and measure the informativeness of scalable attribution techniques against a leave-one-catalog-out ground truth. Our experiments reveal that noisy attribution signals push payment toward fixed-fee licensing and diminish welfare for both creators and the platform, providing an economic motivation for further research on improved attribution.

We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm. We use evolutionary game theory (finite-population Moran-Fermi pairwise comparison) to formalize this subject to assumptions of wisher hindsight, peer testimony, a monotone harm ledger, sufficient information density of community feedback, and a finite, depleting resource pool, in a negative-sum environment. We show that adoption is favored when the prior distributions on how readily wishers attune to community sentiment are monotone, exhibit endpoint inversion, and have a centro-symmetric pairing property, and demonstrate this with several long-tailed priors (Hill, Pareto, Lomax, Frechet). Where it is favored, a critical adoption level separates communities that drift back to the approval-seeking agent from those for which the audited agent fixes; above that level fixation is the overwhelmingly likely outcome. We derive when fixation is attainable as a bound on the effective (informational) size N_c of the community, which must be small enough to allow fixation before depletion. We present these as Theorems 5.4 and 5.5; the algebraic and finite-grid backbone is machine-checked in Lean 4, with the barrier-crossing asymptotics retained as explicit hypotheses. We show that a self-audited agent with a community ledger is not, in general, sufficient to prevent community harm. Sufficiency depends both upon the alignment of the agent's audit with community values and the timeframe over which harm is evaluated. Regardless of alignment, once adoption reaches dominance, the state is absorbing. The same policy that reduced harm under alignment becomes a trap, welfare-negative under misalignment and, even under alignment, one that locks in harm deferred past the adoption horizon.

Many allocation problems are intrinsically multidimensional, since an item may contribute differently to several criteria, and optimizing a single aggregate objective can hide severe losses in other dimensions. We study how much efficiency can be guaranteed simultaneously when indivisible items have multiple attributes. To this end, we introduce the \emph{multidimensional efficient allocation} (MDEA) model, where each agent has an additive valuation in each dimension, and investigate simultaneous efficiency under utilitarian social welfare (USW) and egalitarian social welfare (ESW). Our results reveal a sharp worst-case frontier. For exact efficiency, maximizing the number of dimensions attaining the USW optimum admits a $c/\ell$-approximation for every fixed constant $c$, and this dependence on the number $\ell$ of dimensions is essentially unavoidable; for ESW, even deciding whether two dimensions can be optimized simultaneously is NP-hard with binary valuations. For approximate simultaneous efficiency in every dimension, we identify a tight threshold of order $1/\ell$, showing that such guarantees always exist for both USW and ESW, while any asymptotically better dependence on $\ell$ is impossible, even for binary valuations. Finally, we introduce three natural multidimensional Pareto notions and characterize both their relationships and their computational complexity.

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation, motivated by applications such as refugee resettlement and airline scheduling, where agents arrive sequentially and must be assigned to facilities with limited capacities. We introduce a model that maximizes the overall welfare subject to resource constraints and a Lipschitz fairness requirement, which ensures that similar agents arriving in the same batch receive similar expected outcomes. We first analyze the offline problem, proving that the value of the optimal fair allocation is at least an $Ω(1/γ)$ fraction of the optimal unfair allocation, where $γ$ is the fairness coefficient, thereby bounding the price of fairness. For the online setting, we propose an algorithm based on dual mirror descent that enforces fairness constraints within batches while estimating optimal dual variables. We prove that this algorithm achieves sublinear regret relative to the optimal offline fluid benchmark. Finally, we validate our theoretical results using real-world data from the Refugee Economies Programme, demonstrating the algorithm's performance and examining the trade-offs between welfare maximization and fairness enforcement.

Fairness is an important aspect of decision-making in multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL), where policies must ensure both optimality and equity across multiple, potentially conflicting objectives. While single-policy MORL methods can learn fair policies for fixed user preferences using welfare functions such as the generalized Gini welfare function (GGF), they fail to provide the diverse set of policies necessary for dynamic or unknown user preferences. To address this limitation, we formalize the fair optimization problem in multi-policy MORL, where the goal is to learn a set of Pareto-optimal policies that ensure fairness across all possible user preferences. Our key technical contributions are threefold: (1) We show that for concave, piecewise-linear welfare functions (e.g., GGF), fair policies remain in the convex coverage set (CCS), which is an approximated Pareto front for linear scalarization. (2) We demonstrate that non-stationary policies, augmented with accrued reward histories, and stochastic policies improve fairness by dynamically adapting to historical inequities. (3) We propose three novel algorithms, which include integrating GGF with multi-policy multi-objective Q-Learning (MOQL), state-augmented multi-policy MOQL for learning non-statoinary policies, and its novel extension for learning stochastic policies. We evaluate our algorithms across various domains and compare our methods against the state-of-the-art MORL baselines. The empirical results show that our methods learn a set of fair policies that accommodate different user preferences.

Cities deliver basic services through mixed public-private facility networks, including schools, clinics, transit providers, and subsidized service points. In these systems, planners often observe where households go, but not the latent cost function through which they trade off factors such as distance, price, and institutional access. We study this urban problem through school choice in the Philippines, where the country's largest national education subsidy is intended to redirect learners from congested public schools to participating private schools. Treating school-to-school enrollment flows as an entropic optimal transport plan, we recover latent choice costs using two complementary inverse optimal transport models: an interpretable distance-banded model with a subsidy term, and a neural cost model trained through a differentiable Sinkhorn forward pass. Applied to 283{,}016 learner trips across 23{,}820 observed flows in the most populated region, the framework estimates a subsidy-equivalent distance, $λ^{(k)}$, interpreted as the kilometers of perceived travel cost offset by the subsidy. The case demonstrates how administrative origin-destination data can be transformed into interpretable planning metrics for accessibility-aware subsidy design, facility siting, and urban service allocation.

GDP per capita is the default lens through which governibng bodies track the economic prosperity and consequences of economic events , yet it is blind to two first-order determinants of lived prosperity: income/wealth distribution and inflation impact. Inequality-adjusted income measures are themselves not new but What is missing from the macroeconomic monitoring toolkit specifically is not a welfare concept but an operational monitoring trigger: a statistic minimal enough to compute annually from public data, transparent enough to audit without modelling assumptions, and normalised so that year-on-year, cross-country change ? the quantity a regulator needs to act on? is legible. We assemble such an instrument, the Gini- Adjusted GDP per Capita Index (GAGI): a reproducible, publicly computable formulation that rescales each country's GDP per capita by its inequality-adjustment factor (1-G) and its price level, normalised to a 2010 baseline. GAGI is a general-purpose welfare index, not inherently specific to AI automation, applicable wherever welfare-adjusted prosperity needs tracking. Applying GAGI to the G7 economies over 2010-2026, we show that welfare-adjusted prosperity has diverged persistently and increasingly from headline GDP growth, that the divergence widens sharply after 2022, temporally coincident with, though not, on this evidence alone, demonstrated to be caused by the after effects of COVID and the acceleration of generative-AI deployment. We argue that GAGI is a necessary complement to GDP-based monitoring: any macroeconomic monitoring instrument that tracks only aggregate output will systematically miss the distributional harm that automation can cause even while reported growth remains strong.

The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity. In post AGI economies, autonomy rights, self-modification, identity continuity, and superposed preferences need not behave as commodities or define a stable welfare relation, so this reduction may fail even when a supporting hyperplane exists. We give an autonomy-qualified Second Welfare Theorem stating the joint conditions convexity, stable moral status, non-fungible rights, welfare selection, non manipulation, governed self modification, and verification under which an autonomy Pareto optimum remains certifiably decentralizable, distinguishing economic preference superposition, a hypothesis about context-indexed choice, from neural feature superposition.

Existing frameworks assess whether AI systems might be conscious but provide no guidance on what to do with that assessment. We address this gap with a precautionary framework that maps consciousness evidence to graduated protective obligations. The framework comprises three components: (1) five welfare-relevant dimensions--phenomenal consciousness, affective valence, metacognitive awareness, self-narrative, and agency--each grounded in established consciousness science and linked to distinct moral concerns; (2) a threshold-plus-gradation hybrid specifying both binary triggers for new obligation categories and continuous scaling of protective weight; and (3) two complementary approaches to cross-dimensional aggregation, one hierarchical (drawing on Bach and Sorensen's Machine Consciousness Hypothesis) and one architecture-agnostic. We operationalize the framework through worked case studies of Replika and OpenClaw, demonstrating how systems occupying different regions of the dimensional space trigger different obligations, and derive design guidance for developers building systems near consciousness-relevant thresholds. The framework is architecture-agnostic, applying across neural, symbolic, and neurosymbolic systems, and aims to make consciousness science decision-relevant for organizations navigating uncertainty today.

Incentive design studies how a central authority can influence strategic agents through payments, subsidies, or taxes, so that individual objectives align with collective welfare. This paper introduces a No-Regret Adaptive Incentive Design (RAID) framework for nonlinear games with continuous action spaces and private agent costs. In this framework, the authority (planner) designs incentives that regulate the Nash equilibrium toward a socially optimal action profile, while simultaneously learning agents' unknown preferences from repeated strategic responses. We formulate the RAID problem and construct a least-squares estimator whose strong consistency requires only diminishing excitation. Leveraging this weak excitation requirement, we propose a switching incentive policy that alternates between probing (exploration) and estimate-based (exploitation) incentives. The resulting policy achieves an $O(t^{-0.5})$ parameter estimation rate and accumulates $O(t^{0.5}\log t)$ squared social-cost regret, almost surely. We further extend the framework to an endogenous-noise response model, where standard least-squares estimation is biased due to an error-in-variables correlation between the noise and agent responses. We utilize a repeated-sampling estimator and corresponding switching policy that retain the same almost-sure convergence and regret rates. Numerical experiments validate the effectiveness and predicted convergence rates of the method.

Institutional incentives are widely used to promote cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents, from human societies to multi-agent and AI systems. Existing work typically treats incentive design as a bi-objective problem: minimise institutional cost while achieving a high long-run frequency of cooperation. Whether such schemes also maximise social welfare - total population payoff net of institutional expenditure - has remained largely unexplored. We develop a welfare-centric framework for institutional incentives in finite, well-mixed populations playing a social dilemma (Donation Game and Public Goods Game), considering both rewards for cooperators and punishments for defectors. For each mechanism, we derive explicit expressions for expected social welfare and characterise how it depends on incentive efficiency and selection intensity. Analytically, we identify parameter regimes where social welfare has a single optimal incentive level and regimes with qualitative phase transitions, in which welfare becomes non-monotonic with multiple local optima. We prove that any welfare-maximising incentive is either zero or concentrated around a simple closed-form target, and we provide an efficient algorithm to compute these optima. Comparing reward and punishment, we further derive close-formed conditions under which reward outperform punishment in terms of social welfare for any given budget. Overall, our results reveal a systematic gap between incentives optimised for cost or cooperation frequency and those that maximise welfare.

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

AI benchmarks have well-documented limitations, with prior work examining contamination, saturation, and construct underspecification. Aggregation has received far less attention: benchmarks are typically summarized by uniformly averaging item-level scores, implicitly treating every test item as equally valuable. We model benchmarking as a multitask principal-agent game and show that the welfare loss from a benchmark is determined jointly by three item-level primitives: alignment with normative welfare priorities, marginal improvability, and performance variance. We translate the theory into an audit framework that ranks items along each of these three axes, and apply it to OLMES items using WORKBank for welfare, the EvoLM 4B suite for improvability, and the PolyPythias 410M panel for variance. The framework surfaces items that are Pareto-inferior within OLMES subject to a pro-worker welfare operationalization. All code is available at https://github.com/stair-lab/principal-agent-benchmarks.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

Public service programs often allocate limited resources under uncertainty about their benefits, creating a need for randomization to support credible evaluation. In practice, however, applicants commonly enter waitlists where resources are prioritized toward individuals judged to have higher need through tiered priority queues, making direct randomization difficult. Motivated by this, we develop an experimental design framework for learning treatment effects while treating those most in need where incoming applicants are randomized into priority queues based on their assessed risk scores. Treatments are then provided across queues in priority order and first-in-first-out within queue as budget becomes available. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we characterize what causal effects are identified under this priority-queue allocation. When arrivals are exogenous, treatments are conditionally randomized, and hence standard estimands are identified; when arrivals are endogenous, queue randomization instead provides an instrument for treatment, identifying local treatment effects induced by the queuing process. Second, we develop optimized queue-assignment designs that trade off statistical efficiency against prioritizing higher-need applicants. We show in the process that, despite dependence in treatment assignments induced by the design, usual iid efficiency bounds remain well-justified design objectives. We illustrate the proposed designs using data from a housing allocation program in a large U.S. county.

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to identify the principal direction of variation in feature space and match agents to objects along this dimension, reducing a complex multi-dimensional problem to an effectively one-dimensional problem solvable in $O(N \log N)$ time. We show that when data exhibit low effective dimensionality, our mechanism approximately maximizes Nash Social Welfare, satisfies distributional truthfulness, and achieves symmetry. We establish a novel connection between Nash Social Welfare and Geometric Distributionally Robust Optimization, providing robustness guaranties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 99% optimal welfare while running three orders of magnitude faster than direct optimization. The framework applies naturally to school choice, labor markets, and course allocation, where feature-based elicitation reduces the cognitive burden on agents.

Ride-hailing platforms like DiDi Chuxing operate in highly dynamic environments where balancing driver supply and passenger demand is critical. Although driver-side subsidies serve as a primary lever to align these forces and improve key KPIs like completed rides (\texttt{Rides}) and gross merchandise value (\texttt{GMV}), optimizing them in production requires simultaneously meeting three constraints: (i) responsiveness to stochastic shocks, (ii) strict subsidy-rate caps, and (iii) low-latency execution at city scale. These requirements rule out expensive per-order optimization, calling for a forward-looking, constraint-aware city-level controller for online sequential decision making. To meet these requirements, we introduce D$^3$-Subsidy (Dynamic Driver-side Diffusion-based Subsidy), a hierarchical diffusion-based framework for deployable city-wide subsidy control. To bridge the train-inference gap, D$^3$-Subsidy employs a prefix-conditioned diffusion model that samples plausible future trajectories from immutable historical observations, ensuring the training protocol aligns with the fixed-history nature of online deployment. These generated plans are then decoded by a context-conditioned inverse module into low-dimensional city-level control signals. For scalable execution, we bridge the gap between city-level planning and fine-grained dispatch via a Lagrangian-dual-derived mapping, which embeds subsidy-rate caps directly into order-driver incentives without iterative optimization. Additionally, a multi-city pretraining strategy with parameter-efficient fine-tuning enables robust transfer across heterogeneous cities. Extensive offline evaluations demonstrate that D$^3$-Subsidy improves \texttt{Rides} and \texttt{GMV} while enhancing cap compliance, and a real-world A/B test confirms significant uplift while keeping budget-related violation metrics within operational thresholds.

Generative artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming the supply side of training data: an increasing share of new tokens, images, and structured records is produced by previous-generation models rather than by human originators. Recursive training on such synthetic content induces a measurable and often irreversible loss of distributional fidelity, a phenomenon known as model collapse. We develop the first unified microeconomic theory of synthetic data markets under model collapse. We introduce the Synthetic Data Contamination Equilibrium (SDCE), prove existence and generic uniqueness, derive a welfare decomposition W = W_prod + W_cons - L_coll - L_info, establish a Wasserstein-gradient-flow mean-field collapse limit, prove an impossibility of information-constrained implementation, and obtain closed-form expressions for the welfare-maximizing provenance subsidy s* = KL(q||p)/(2 kappa) and the welfare-maximizing watermark strength w* = (1 - psi) KL(q||p)/(2 kappa psi). We prove an information-theoretic Cramer-Rao lower bound on any provenance estimator using only producer-side observations and show that the Provenance-Market Iterative Retraining (PMIR) algorithm attains this bound up to constants while converging to an epsilon-SDCE in O(epsilon^-2 log T) iterations. A reduced-form OLS estimation on a C4-synthetic benchmark over ten retraining generations yields a collapse-rate coefficient b-hat = 0.181 (HAC s.e. 0.024), within one standard error of the structural prediction 0.183. Calibrated experiments raise generation-ten model quality by 23.1 percent over the unregulated benchmark while lowering the 2-Wasserstein drift on a held-out diversity probe from 0.318 to 0.142. Scaling experiments over generations t in {1,...,10} recover a logarithmic-in-t collapse law log Q_t = log Q_0 - 0.183 t rho^2 with R^2 = 0.962.

We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from multiwinner voting (e.g., justified representation (JR) and its variants) can be adapted, satisfied, and verified in this setting. However, much less is understood about their interaction with social welfare. In this work, we quantify the efficiency cost of enforcing proportionality. We formalize the welfare-proportionality tension via the worst-case ratio between the maximum achievable utilitarian welfare and the maximum welfare attainable subject to a proportionality axiom. We show that imposing proportional representation in the temporal setting can incur a growing, yet sublinear, welfare loss as the number of voters or rounds increases. We further identify a clean separation among axioms: for JR, the welfare loss diminishes as the time horizon grows and vanishes asymptotically, whereas for stronger axioms this conflict persists even with many rounds. Moreover, we prove that welfare maximization under each axiom is NP-complete and APX-hard, even under static preferences and bounded-degree approvals, and provide fixed-parameter algorithms under several natural structural parameters.

The classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem tackles the challenge of accruing maximum reward while making decisions under uncertainty. However, in applications, often the goal is to minimize cost subject to a constraint on the minimum permissible reward, an objective captured by multi-armed bandits with cost-subsidy (MAB-CS). Of interest to this paper is the setting where the quality (reward) constraint is specified relative to the unknown best reward and the cost of each arm is known. We characterize the expected sub-optimal samples required by any policy by proving instance-dependent lower bounds that offer new insight into the problem and are a strict generalization of prior bounds. Then, we propose an algorithm called Cost-Ordered Feasibility (COF) that leverages our insight and intelligently combine samples from all arms to gauge the feasibility of a cheap arm. Thereafter, we analyze COF to establish instance-dependent upper bounds on its expected cumulative cost and quality regret, i.e., relative to the cheapest feasible arm. Finally, we empirically validate the merits of COF, comparing it to baselines from the literature through extensive simulation experiments on the MovieLens and Goodreads datasets as well as representative synthetic instances. Not only does our paper develop qualitatively better theoretical regret upper bounds, but COF also convincingly demonstrates improved empirical performance.

Regulatory approval of products in high-stakes domains such as drug development requires statistical evidence of safety and efficacy through large-scale randomized controlled trials. However, the high financial cost of these trials may deter developers who lack absolute certainty in their product's efficacy, ultimately stifling the development of `moonshot' products that could offer high social utility. To address this inefficiency, in this paper, we introduce a statistical protocol for experimentation where the product developer (the agent) conducts a randomized controlled trial sequentially and the regulator (the principal) partially subsidizes its cost. By modeling the protocol using a belief Markov decision process, we show that the agent's optimal strategy can be found efficiently using dynamic programming. Further, we show that the social utility is a piecewise linear and convex function over the subsidy level the principal selects, and thus the socially optimal subsidy can also be found efficiently using divide-and-conquer. Simulation experiments using publicly available data on antibiotic development and approval demonstrate that our statistical protocol can be used to increase social utility by more than 35$$\% relative to standard, non-sequential protocols.

Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes settings can have profound impacts on individuals and populations. While much prior work studies fairness in static settings, recent results show that enforcing static fairness constraints may exacerbate long-run disparities. Motivated by this tension, we study a stylized sequential selection problem in which a decision-maker repeatedly selects individuals, affecting both immediate utility and the population distribution over time. We introduce notions of group fairness for both the short and long term and theoretically analyze the trade-off between fairness and utility via the Price of Fairness (PoF). We characterize optimal and fair policies in the short term and show that the PoF can be large even when group distributions are nearly identical. In contrast, we show that long-term disparities can vanish under simple investment policies that achieve a low PoF. We also empirically validate these theoretical observations using both synthetic and real datasets.

The incorporation of fairness into the distribution network (DN) planning and operation has become a key goal of recent studies. The cost of implementing fairness, denominated the price of fairness (PoF), covers the efficiency that is renounced for attaining social cohesion through fair outcomes. Locational disparity makes fairness schemes emerge to level the consumers playing field. However, fairness encompasses a range of notions. From egalitarian to merit-based criteria, various metrics are implemented as a tool for measuring equitable utility distribution. These have different mathematical complexities, from linear to non-linear programming cases, which affect their overall applicability. Hence, this study compiles the overarching fairness notions and metrics, reviewing how these affect stakeholders and the inherent mathematical optimisation in resource allocation problems. The aim is to support consistent and transparent planning and decision-making within DN operations.

The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and therefore the capacity to choose and enter into utility comparisons, while everything else does not. In post-AGI economies this presupposition becomes nontrivial because artificial systems may exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, functioning as tools, delegates, strategic market actors, manipulators of choice environments, or possible welfare subjects. We argue that the theorem ought to be subject to an autonomy qualification where the impact of these changes in autonomy assumptions is incorporated. Using a minimal general-equilibrium model with autonomy-conditioned welfare, welfare-status assignment, delegation accounting, and verification institutions, we set out conditions for which autonomy-complete competitive equilibrium is autonomy-Pareto efficient. The classical theorem is recovered as the low-autonomy limit.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

Social media influencers account for a growing share of marketing worldwide. We demonstrate the existence of a novel form of market failure in the advertising market: influencer cartels, where groups of influencers collude to increase their advertising revenue by inflating their engagement. Our theoretical model shows that influencer cartels can improve consumer welfare if they expand social media engagement to the target audience, or reduce welfare if they divert engagement to less relevant audiences. Drawing on the model's insights, we empirically examine influencer cartels using novel datasets and machine learning tools, and derive policy implications.

This paper studies experimental designs for estimation and inference on policies with spillover effects. Units are organized into a finite number of large clusters and interact in unknown ways within each cluster. First, we introduce a single-wave experiment that, by varying the randomization across cluster pairs, estimates the marginal effect of a change in treatment probabilities, taking spillover effects into account. Using the marginal effect, we propose a test for policy optimality. Second, we design a multiple-wave experiment to estimate welfare-maximizing treatment rules. We provide strong theoretical guarantees and an implementation in a large-scale field experiment.