AI Accountability

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14 papers in the last four weeks, up 133% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 111

Jul 22, 2026cs.CR

The Ethics of Autonomous AI Agents for Offensive Security

LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security. Unlike traditional penetration-testing tooling - deterministic, narrowly scoped, and operated by trained practitioners - agentic security tools exhibit indeterminacy along three independent dimensions. First, their actions are drawn from a non-deterministic policy whose outputs resist both ex-ante and ex-post explanation. This complicates incident attribution and pre-deployment safety reviews. Second, their impact is open-ended due to their non-deterministic actions, agency of utilized models, and opaque LLM supply-chains. Third, their user population is indeterminate in both size and required skill: the operating skill floor for using or developing offensive capabilities has dropped sharply. These three properties are linked thematically, but are not derivable from one another. Combined with the structural cost asymmetry between offense and defense, they enable the industrialization of offensive capability. The net short-term effect favors attackers, even if the same technology may, in the long run, democratize access to defensive practice. Existing dual-use cybersecurity and AI-ethics frameworks struggle to address this combination. Our work analyzes how moral attribution becomes diffuse between users, tool-makers, and third parties when employing autonomous AI agents for offensive security. We also examine the stakeholder impact of this technology and provide stratified recommendations.

Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Jasmin Wachter

TU Wien, Vienna, Austria · University of Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

AI Accountability Cybersecurity AI Agent Security AI Agent Governance Responsible AI

Jul 21, 2026cs.CY

The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems

Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios. That focus is incomplete. In deployed systems, many of the most consequential failures are quieter: plausible rather than spectacular, distributed across components rather than localized in a single output, and normalized by workflows before they are recognized as hazards. We argue that a central safety challenge in modern AI systems is increasingly not only whether a model emits a harmful response, but whether the broader socio-technical system preserves the conditions under which errors remain visible, contestable, containable, and recoverable. We propose a five-layer framework for diagnosing these hidden risks: (1) epistemic integrity, concerning whether evidence and uncertainty are represented honestly enough to support calibrated reliance; (2) control integrity, concerning whether authority, permissions, and action boundaries remain robust under attack and optimization; (3) temporal integrity, concerning whether safety holds across sessions, memory updates, and deployment drift; (4) organizational integrity, concerning whether institutions retain the capacity to audit, assign responsibility, and intervene effectively; and (5) ecosystem integrity, concerning whether AI systems preserve rather than erode the information environment on which future oversight depends. Across these layers, we identify under-recognized risk patterns, including overreliance, uncertainty and legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations and a research agenda for shifting AI safety from model-centric evaluation toward socio-technical reliability.

Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci

Technical University of Munich

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Governance AI Safety

Jul 19, 2026cs.SE

A Large-Scale Measurement of AI Bill of Materials Completeness in Hugging Face Models

Pretrained machine learning (ML) models help developers build ML-intensive software systems without training models from scratch. However, model repositories often provide incomplete machine-readable documentation about model provenance, licenses, datasets, limitations, and external references, creating transparency and governance gaps across the AI supply chain. Artificial Intelligence Bills of Materials (AIBOMs) address these gaps by documenting AI artifacts, including models, metadata, licenses, datasets, model-card information, and external references. Taking public Hugging Face (HF) model repositories as a case study, this paper empirically investigates AIBOM completeness, defined as the extent to which repositories provide AIBOM-relevant information for machine-readable AI supply-chain documentation. We examine approximately 97.5K AIBOM artifacts to assess the extent to which generated AIBOMs: (i) contain required structural and metadata fields, (ii) represent model identity, license, and external-reference information, (iii) capture model-card documentation such as datasets, limitations, safety-risk assessment, and environmental information, and (iv) vary in documentation coverage across repository and artifact characteristics such as task, license availability, dataset declaration, model family, and paper reference. Results indicate that generated AIBOMs provide complete coverage of required AIBOM structure but limited AI-specific documentation completeness. Required fields are fully represented, but model-card, metadata, responsible-use, environmental, limitation, and meaningful-description fields remain weakly represented or missing across generated artifacts. Our findings motivate improved model-card practices, repository-level traceability, and automated AIBOM validation to advance the generation and adoption of more complete AIBOMs.

Md Erfan, Ahmed Ryan, Md Rayhanur Rahman

Department of Computer Science, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA

AI Accountability Software Supply Chain Security

Jul 15, 2026cs.CY

Unsafe at any AUC: Unlearned Lessons from Sociotechnical Disasters for Responsible AI

As automated decision-making and data-driven technologies pervade society and are used to manage consequential outcomes, understanding the technology's capabilities, limitations, and attendant risks in context requires analysis of full sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical analysis of risks in highly complex systems provides clear lessons for the design and evaluation of AI systems, transcending a technical focus on reliable or "responsibly designed" components to understand risks at a systems level. Human-made catastrophes have been studied for decades because of the severity of these events: consider Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima-Daiichi, Bhopal, the Challenger disaster. A common misconception is that these kinds of events are freak accidents, resulting from the inherently unforeseeable interactions in complex systems. Closer examination reveals that the risks and hazards were well-known beforehand but not acted upon due to social structural, political and economic factors. We outline several areas where the development and use of AI can benefit from learning these unlearned lessons: improved risk perception, communication, and analysis at the organizational level; traceability of requirements and responsibilities; and holistic approaches to responsibility and safety that include social and organizational dynamics as first-order engineering concerns. For each area, we offer concrete unlearned lessons and exemplify how they led to failure in prior accidents as well as examples of how these lessons remain unlearned for modern computing systems, particularly AI.

Joshua A. Kroll, Andrew Smart, R. Stuart Geiger +1

Naval Postgraduate School · Google Research · University of California, San Diego +1

AI Accountability AI Risk Management AI Safety Responsible AI

Jul 15, 2026cs.AI

Traccia: An OpenTelemetry-Based Governance Platform for AI Systems

The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Artificial Intelligent (AI) powered autonomous agents has fundamentally changed the existing forms of software governance. In spite of the rigorous standards of transparency and account ability required according to the international frameworks such as the European Union's AI Act, there is a considerable gap between theory and reality. The present study discusses the inherent drawbacks of currently utilized platforms for LLM evaluation, machine learning workflow, and application performance monitoring in general. It has been shown that current disjointed solutions fail to protect unbound state space agentic architecture from serious threats such as alignment drift, SaaS security concerns, and unauthorized deployment of shadow AI systems. Moreover, a solution is proposed for overcoming the discussed challenges in form of a coherent multi-level AI governance stack Traccia built on the top of OpenTelemetry infrastructure platform. Traccia resolves the last mile for AI Alignment by adding the telemetry data, passive semantic guardrail assessment, and execution lineage into a hashed trace ledger. Traccia automatically creates compliance evidence packages by appending tamper-resistant fingerprints and SHA-256 content hash, that map to regulatory requirements (Articles 12, 14, 19, 26(6), and 50 of the EU AI Act) without invading any data privacy. By performing this evaluation in a methodical manner, a solid machine-readable base has been created for enterprise-wide management of autonomous AI systems.

Nutan Kumar Naik, Aditya Kumar Saroj, Vijay Prasad Poudel +2

Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences National Institute of Technology Rourkela Odisha, India · Algen.AI2026 Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

AI Accountability AI Agent Monitoring AI Governance Language Model Auditing

Jul 14, 2026cs.AI

Agentic Service-Oriented Computing: A Manifesto for the Next Frontier of Service-Oriented Computing

The rapid emergence of LLM-powered autonomous and semi-autonomous agents is reshaping software systems from static, request-response components into goal-directed, adaptive, and tool-using computational actors. As these agents move from isolated cognitive prototypes into complex distributed workflows, they confront challenges that the Service-Oriented Computing community has studied for more than two decades: composition, interoperability, quality of service, lifecycle management, governance, security, and trust. Yet much of today's agentic AI ecosystem is developing these foundations ad hoc, without the engineering rigour required for dependable enterprise and societal deployment. This paper introduces Agentic Service-Oriented Computing (ASOC) as a new research and practice area concerned with engineering agents as services, orchestrating services through autonomous and semi-autonomous agents, and governing ecosystems of agents and services under constraints of trust, cybersecurity, compliance, performance, and accountability. We articulate six foundational principles of ASOC (harness-ability, composability, lifecycle engineering, trustworthiness by design, goal-driven orchestration, and observability/accountability) and organise a five-dimensional research agenda spanning: (i) agentic services foundations and lifecycle engineering; (ii) composition, orchestration, and interoperability; (iii) governance, observability, and accountability; (iv) security, trust, and risk management; and (v) evaluation, certification, and Agentic QoS. We argue that the Services Computing community is especially well positioned to provide the conceptual and engineering spine for this emerging field, transforming agentic AI from fragmented demonstrations into dependable, service-based systems worthy of human and organisational trust.

Amin Beheshti, Rong N. Chang, Boualem Benatallah +7

Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia · IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, USA · School of Computing, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland +5

AI Accountability LLM Agent Orchestration AI Agent Security AI Agent Governance

Jul 1, 2026cs.HC

AI, Trust, and Teaming: The Humans-as-Handlers Approach for Autonomous and Opaque AI Systems

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming ubiquitous, and across domains, increasingly autonomous systems are carrying out tasks which raise significant ethical and legal challenges which demonstrate a need for strong human-machine teams rooted in trust. In this article, I argue that within highly impactful areas (such as medicine or warfighting) there are grounds for us initially treating autonomous and opaque systems as relevantly analogous to dogs (or other animals with which we have close relationships). Under this analogy, humans making use of these systems are not to be viewed as "users" or "deployers" of these systems, but instead take the role of "handlers". This recasting of roles shifts the way we view humans, AI-enabled and autonomous systems, and the relations between them, and moreover clarifies the clear and traceable lines of responsibility humans have for the outcomes brought about when using these systems. In developing this point, I clarify that the machine-animal analogy does admit disanalogous elements, but that its touch-points ground it as a starting point. I then explore how we can divest the humans-as-handlers approach of those aspects of our relationships with animals which are unfitting for how we engage with and make use of autonomous and AI-enabled systems. I conclude by arguing that the trajectory of human-machine teamings for autonomous and AI-enabled systems should be a state where we authentically view these not as artifacts which we simply make use of, but as collaborators with which we pursue complex goals and carry out complex tasks.

Nathan G. Wood

AI Accountability Trust in AI Human Oversight of AI Human-AI Collaboration

Jun 30, 2026cs.CY

FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AI

Flaw reporting for deployed AI systems is fundamental to identifying system failures and improving AI safety. Yet the AI reporting ecosystem is fragmented: researchers who identify flaws often do not know what or where to report, and groups who receive reports rarely share them with other relevant stakeholders. As a result, good-faith reporters duplicate effort by submitting many different forms, and recipients lack standardized, triage-ready information. We audit 12 reporting systems published by AI developers, cybersecurity groups, and AI flaw aggregators, identifying five recurring design challenges spanning discoverability, scope, information collection, coordination, and guidance for strict-liability cases. Building on this analysis and feedback from 49 experts across 32 organizations representing developers, security researchers, and ecosystem coordinators, we introduce FLARE-AI, an open-source AI flaw reporting system designed for interoperability with existing systems. FLARE-AI streamlines flaw report creation by collecting triage-relevant information through conditional logic and early classification, then enables optional dissemination of standardized, machine-readable reports to multiple developers, coordinators, and incident registries from a single submission. By lowering barriers to reporting AI flaws and improving interoperability across stakeholders, FLARE-AI helps break down silos and accelerate remediation across the AI ecosystem.

Shayne Longpre, Elaine Zhu, Carson Ezell +15

Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Northeastern University · Harvard University +9

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Safety

Jun 29, 2026cs.AI

Behavioral Governance for Autonomous AI Agents: The AgentBound Framework

Autonomous AI agents increasingly perform consequential actions on behalf of human principals, including financial transactions, external communications, and enterprise workflows. Existing agent infrastructure relies on identity federation and delegated authorization to authenticate workloads and control resource access, but it cannot determine whether an authorized action should be executed under the current behavioral and operational context. We present AgentBound, a runtime governance framework that provides verifiable behavioral oversight for autonomous AI agents. AgentBound evaluates each proposed action using three independent authorities: delegated authorization, owner-signed behavioral constitutions, and site action contracts. Their judgments are conservatively composed through a formal decision model to determine whether an action should be permitted, reviewed, or denied before execution. To provide accountability, AgentBound generates cryptographically verifiable governance receipts that bind every action to the exact delegation, policy, and semantic artifacts governing the decision, enabling independent replay verification and policy provenance. The framework also introduces standing delegation for long-running agents, allowing periodic workloads to operate under continuously refreshed governance policies while preserving revocability and bounded authority. We present the formal foundation, system architecture, governance receipt protocol, and AgentBound-Bench, a benchmark framework for evaluating governance correctness, authority composition, and accountability. Rather than replacing model alignment, AgentBound complements it by providing a deterministic governance layer between authorization and execution, transforming governance from a process that must be trusted into one that can be independently verified.

Anuj Kaul, Qianlong Lan, Pranay Gupta

eBay Inc. · Independent Researcher

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jun 23, 2026cs.AI

The Clinician's Veto: Navigating Trust, Liability, and Uncertainty in Autonomous AI Prescribing

Autonomous AI systems are transitioning from advisory to autonomous roles for medication prescriptions. Recent United States bill H.R. 238 and Utah's prescription-renewal pilot both authorize AI to prescribe medications in an agentic capacity. While some regulatory guidelines suggest aggregate model performance metrics for clearance, they do not require i) calibrated per-prediction confidence for action-gated thresholds, ii) differentiated communication of uncertainty arising from model ignorance (epistemic) versus genuine clinical ambiguity (aleatoric), and iii) inferential transparency at the moment of decision that allows for liability allocation. Here, we present a regulatory and technical argument (tested with a survey of 136 U.S. prescribing clinicians) positioning these as minimum architectural requirements for safe autonomous prescribing. Our results suggest prescribing clinicians i) would not permit autonomous prescribing without a calibrated confidence-based escalation mechanism, ii) preferred a competing-options summary when uncertainty was aleatoric but shifted to abstention when uncertainty was epistemic, and iii) were only willing to accept additional liability when inferential transparency enabled a substantive judgment under acknowledged uncertainty. These findings indicate our recommended architectural features would encourage higher rates of clinician adoption, largely through collapsing much of what "autonomy" conventionally means. A system meeting these requirements would function less as an autonomous agent and more as a heavily supervised decision-support tool. As legislation and state pilots proceed, our technical argument backed by clinician perspectives provides opportunities for regulation to constrain the degree of autonomy ethically granted to AI in prescribing while aligning liability with the institutional actors who control system design and deployment.

Eileanor LaRocco, Sarah Tan, Adarsh Subbaswamy +4

University of Virginia · Cornell University · University of Maryland, Baltimore +1

AI Accountability Clinical Decision Support Trust in AI Human Oversight of AI

Jun 19, 2026cs.AI

Whistleblowing and the machine -- towards a considered position

Artificial intelligent agents and autonomous systems are embedded in our environments. They are both a commercial product and a personal tool that generates a lot of data and can draw conclusions from it: machines generate and keep secrets. But should machines protect all secrets? It has been shown that artificial agents are able to whistleblow and it has been argued that digital multi-agent environments should allow for agents in them to whistleblow. We argue that machine whistleblowing must be normative and principled and routed in the existing understanding of whistleblowing as an important rule-breaking mechanism in society. We also argue that there is a need for government regulators to formulate an informed stance on both what machines should be allowed to whistleblow on and how to legally protect those who develop whistleblowing machines

Marija Slavkovik, Liuwen Yu, Leon van der Torre +1

University of Bergen Bergen, Norway · University of Luxembourg Luxembourg, Luxembourg

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jun 17, 2026cs.SE

JustDiag!: A Diagnostic Justification Engine for Accountable Root Cause Analysis

Large language models can produce fluent root cause analyses, but fluent final answers alone are insufficient evidence for accountability in high-stakes operations. In real incident response, engineers need to know what evidence supported a diagnosis, which alternatives were considered, where contradictions remained, and whether the system resolved the case or preserved uncertainty. We address this gap with JustDiag, a diagnostic justification engine for RCA that maintains an explicit process state over evidence, findings, competing hypotheses, conflicts, and next checks. We evaluated the system on 66 real-world incidents using a two-layer protocol that separately scores final-answer quality and process quality. Relative to a matched control without diagnostic justification, JustDiag achieved stronger outcome and process scores, while accepting slightly lower terminal completion due to more calibrated non-closure. These results suggest that accountable RCA requires explicit diagnostic justification artifacts and process-aware evaluation, not only fluent final answers.

Tingzhu Bi, Xinrui Jiang, Xun Zhang +5

Peking University · University of Edinburgh · Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

AI Accountability Evidence-Grounded Reasoning Root Cause Analysis Fault Diagnosis

Jun 16, 2026cs.RO

Accountability in Autonomous Drone-Based Firefighting: Insights From a Field Trial

There is a growing research field exploring how autonomous drones can enhance emergency response effectiveness. Integrating these (artificial) agents into existing emergency teams and workflows may significantly impact established accountability relationships. This paper examines how autonomous drones affect accountability attribution within complex socio-technical systems. Drawing on two real-life field trials in firefighting, the study reveals substantial uncertainty around accountability when drones are organizationally deployed. Using Bovens' accountability framework, two challenges are identified: (1) uncertainty about the role of drones within hierarchical structures, leading to confused accountability ascriptions; and (2) new forms of human-drone interactions introducing additional accountability-relevant issues. Based on these insights, the paper proposes actionable recommendations to support the responsible integration of autonomous drones into firefighting operations without undermining accountability. These findings offer practical guidance for policymakers and contribute to further research on accountability in autonomous systems.

Dzmitry Katsiuba, Anna Katharina Boos, Robin Hany +2

University of Zurich · Zeppelin University

AI Accountability Human-Robot Collaboration

Jun 15, 2026cs.CY

From Democracies to Autocracies: How AI Systems Enable Authoritarianism by Design

AI-enabled authoritarianism is not confined to autocracies. In this paper, we provide greater transparency by investigating and mapping the lifecycles of six AI systems deployed in different political regimes, ranging from the US to China. By drawing on an extensive range of sources (academic publications, investigative research reports, third-party evaluations, media interviews, government procurement notices), we conduct a systematic, qualitative comparison across systems to identify the critical technical and operational features that enable authoritarianism within their respective political contexts. We find that enabling features include the centralization and co-optation of administrative data for law enforcement and political punishment, regulatory gaps that fail to deter misuse, weak user compliance that nullifies human oversight mechanisms, and the encoding of protected group traits that identify members of vulnerable populations. We find that these features are present across systems deployed in autocratic and democratic regimes, albeit in varying configurations. We also find that both centralized and fragmented AI systems can contribute to authoritarianism by exploiting governance gaps: centralized systems directed by executive authorities, particularly within security and military institutions, are often not subjected to formal oversight mechanisms, while fragmented systems diffuse accountability between stakeholders, paving the way for entrenchment. These findings reveal that AI-enabled authoritarianism is distributed, resulting from design and operational choices made by developers, administrators, and users alike. We conclude with recommendations for developers and policymakers to mitigate these risks.

Jeba Sania, Marta Ziosi, Fazl Barez

Harvard Kennedy School Cambridge, MA, USA · University of Oxford Oxford, UK

AI Accountability AI Governance

Jun 15, 2026cs.LG

We Need Explanation Cards to Connect Explanation Algorithms to the Real World

Algorithmic explanations are intended to help stakeholders understand opaque algorithmic decisions, but in practice, they often fall short. First, the meaning of algorithmic explanations is often not what one might intuitively expect, so expert knowledge is required to interpret them correctly. Second, recent work has shown that popular explanation algorithms are uninformative about the behavior of complex decision functions. Together, these issues create a gap between what explanations appear to convey and what they actually provide. In this work, we propose Explanation Cards for Explanation Algorithms, which augment standard explanations with complementary information about robustness and validity, as well as clear instructions for interpretation. The complementary information can render otherwise uninformative explanations practically useful, while also helping to detect cases where they are not. Importantly, the interpretation instructions in explanation cards shift responsibility from users to providers: Rather than expecting users to recognize what can and cannot be concluded from an explanation, providers must make this explicit upfront. Using counterfactual explanations and SHAP as examples, we demonstrate how providers can construct explanation cards and that these cards provide users with the guidance needed for sound interpretation. We further argue that explanation cards offer a practical means of operationalising the explainability provisions of the EU AI Act. Overall, explanation cards are a significant step toward making explanation algorithms fit for real-world use cases.

Eric Günther, Balázs Szabados, Kristof Meding +3

University of Tübingen · Tübingen AI Center · HUN-REN Institute for Computer Science and Control (SZTAKI), Budapest, Hungary

Explainable Artificial Intelligence AI Accountability Explainability Evaluation

Jun 15, 2026cs.AI

AI Pluralism and the Worlds It Misses

AI pluralism is often framed as a problem of representing diverse values, preferences, users, or outputs. This paper argues that this framing is incomplete because AI systems also impose ontologies: they define what counts as an entity, relation, feature, harm, benefit, and valid form of evidence. We define ontological flattening as the conversion of situated, contested, and historically specific meanings into a restricted technical category, proxy, aggregation rule, or benchmark target that is treated as neutral and difficult to contest. The paper develops a bounded conceptual and qualitative synthesis across value pluralism, pluralistic alignment, participatory and democratic AI, procedural justice, science and technology studies, accountability research, aggregate themes from 11 expert interviews, and three urban AI companion cases. The cases illustrate how pluralistic methods can improve or structure model behavior while still compressing categories, proxies, aggregation rules, and revision rights before affected actors have procedural standing. We introduce Pluralistic Lifecycle Governance (PLG) as a preliminary qualitative audit scaffold for documenting ontological openness, epistemic inclusion, procedural authority, evaluation pluralism, and lifecycle accountability. PLG is not presented as a validated scoring instrument; it is a framework for making the evidence and governance conditions of pluralistic AI explicit.

Rashid Mushkani

Universit´e de Montr´eal, Montr´eal, Qu´ebec, Canada · Mila – Qu´ebec AI Institute, Montr´eal, Qu´ebec, Canada

AI Accountability AI Governance Pluralistic Alignment

Jun 14, 2026cs.CY

How to Detect and Measure the AI Dangers to Democracy

Research on artificial intelligence and democracy has grown quickly over the last decade. A shared conclusion in this literature is that AI does not create new democratic problems so much as it makes old ones worse. We now see this across information ecosystems, in elections, and in public administration. However, despite growing evidence, we lack a clear way to prioritize risks in this area, compare them across domains, and identify where democratic control is most likely to break down. So, our problem is: How can we systematize the problems that AI systems pose to democratic processes? This paper argues that principal agent theory may fit the task. In many phases of democratic systems, principals delegate key functions to AI systems and their providers without really being able to monitor how these systems operate or the outputs they produce. Treating AI as a delegation problem helps identify accountability gaps and other governance failures. Most importantly, as we shall illustrate, it provides metrics for empirical assessments of AI impact on democracy. As a second analytical element, we draw on the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and its seven characteristics of trustworthy AI, which supply substantive criteria for evaluating delegated tasks. Operationalized across the three domains through measurable indicators and domain specific trustworthiness criteria, we propose an analytical framework that centers on institutional assessability as the central condition for democratic control over AI. However, we stress that how severe a harm is, and how much risk is acceptable, are evaluative judgments that current methodologies neither acknowledge nor operationalize. This becomes acute when such evaluative judgments are (silently) delegated to private vendors. We identify this as a strong limitation left for future work.

Giulia Sandri, Claudio Novelli

Université libre de Bruxelles · DEC, Yale University

AI Accountability AI Governance

Jun 12, 2026cs.CY

Final Authority in AI Governance: Frontier-Provider Sovereignty and Action-Centered Deployer Governance

This paper examines where final authority should sit once capable AI systems are embedded in organizational workflows. It compares two governance models. The first, frontier-provider sovereignty, assigns privileged authority to the provider of the most capable models and is reflected in contemporary arguments for frontier-model testing, release gating, transparency duties, and compute-related controls. The second, action-centered deployer sovereignty, places final authority over high-impact actions with the organization that authorizes the action, embeds it in a business process, and bears the downstream legal, operational, and commercial consequences. The paper combines comparative reading of public governance frameworks with implementation-informed analysis of runtime heterogeneity and enterprise control requirements. It compares EU AI Act guidance, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, recent Japanese AI policy instruments, and Canada's voluntary code and managerial guidance. Across these materials, the paper finds stronger support for distributed operational accountability than for unilateral frontier-provider control. It further argues that rapid enterprise adoption, declining provider transparency, and widening control gaps increase the value of a portable governance layer centered on governed action rather than on provider-native session objects. The conclusion is layered rather than absolutist: strong upstream authority remains justified for frontier capability gating, but final authority over concrete enterprise action is better located with the deployer and consequence-bearer.

Zexun Wang

Ond Holdings Inc. · Toronto, Canada

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jun 11, 2026cs.CY

Fault Lines: Navigating Ethics and Responsible AI Where National Policy Meets Local Practice in Public Sector Transformation

The UK government has adopted a pro-AI stance to help transform public service delivery in the face of severe financial pressures, but the path to translate this vision into responsible AI practice remains ill-defined. While UK policy is often set at the national level, local authorities are responsible for most public service delivery, and the rapid advance of AI-first narratives in the public sector is exposing fault lines in knowledge and practice at this national-local interface. This paper examines how responsible AI is interpreted and implemented at the interface between the UK's central government and local authorities, taking the high-stakes area of Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND) as a case study. We present a thematic analysis of 17 semi-structured interviews with policymakers, practitioners, and third-sector professionals to identify barriers and enabling conditions for responsible AI where national policy meets local practice. We identify five interconnected challenges facing local authorities: shadow usage of AI and data privacy risks, market-government asymmetry in AI provision, insufficient workforce readiness, a lack of standardised definitions and measurements, and gaps in human accountability. For each, participants proposed actionable steps, from strengthening data protection frameworks and rebalancing the market-government relationship to enhancing workforce capacity. Our examination of SEND brings these challenges into sharper focus, showing how high-stakes decisions affecting vulnerable children and families intensify tensions around accountability, fairness, and human oversight, exposing the limits of a principle-based regulatory approach. We argue that responsible public sector AI requires both national policy adjustments and structural reforms to institutional capacity, values, and governance mechanisms at the local level.

Sitong Lyu, Shabnam Taghiyeva, Mohit Kukadia +1

Centre for Machine Intelligence, University of Sheffield · Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford

AI Accountability AI Governance Human Oversight of AI Responsible AI

Jun 10, 2026cs.AI

Towards Responsibly Non-Compliant Machines

We consider the problem of engineering autonomous intelligent agents that are capable to responsibly not comply with user requests. We argue that machine non-compliance comes in many different forms, and sketch the issues we should pursue on the road of accomplishing responsibly non-compliant intelligent machines. We anchor responsible non-compliance in justifications for task refusal, pathways to override the non-compliance, as well as careful tracking of security risks and liability transfers.

Marija Slavkovik, Marie Farrell, Louise Dennis +3

University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom · University of Bergen Bergen, Norway · University of Manchester Manchester, United Kingdom

AI Accountability AI Agent Safety Responsible AI

Jun 8, 2026cs.CR

Local Is Not a Sufficient Privacy Boundary: Governing OS-Integrated On-Device AI

As AI systems move into operating systems, privacy no longer turns only on whether a model runs locally. A local assistant may assemble email, calendar entries, files, screenshots, notifications, and app intents; retain embeddings or summaries; invoke tools; emit telemetry; or route difficult requests to cloud infrastructure. Local inference reduces some exposure, but it answers only one question: where computation occurs. It does not answer who may assemble context, what derived state persists, which actions are authorized, or how updates change the system's authority. We develop an OS-centered privacy framework for on-device AI that treats privacy as an institutional accountability problem rather than a deployment attribute. The framework specifies a threat model, a six-part privacy risk taxonomy, privacy-by-architecture controls, and a four-level audit rubric. We demonstrate the rubric through a documentation-bounded comparison of Apple Intelligence/Foundation Models, Android AICore/Gemini Nano, and Microsoft Recall. Meaningful privacy in on-device AI depends on constrained information flow, bounded authority, visible user control, and auditable governance across the operating-system lifecycle.

Jonghyun Chung, Sanket Badhe

Google

Privacy Auditing AI Accountability AI Governance On-Device Inference

Jun 8, 2026cs.CY

Can Data Work be Reparative?

We present an ethnographic study of an alternative approach to data work, developed by a civic-tech initiative that builds datasets for training and benchmarking online safety systems. They aim to respond to online safety concerns from a feminist perspective, by building safety datasets collaboratively with those most impacted by online harms. In this paper, we examine how this approach aims to reorient data work as a site for repair and redress, and trace the struggles they encounter in the process. Specifically, we draw attention to the challenges and tensions involved in advancing just reward for data work and collective governance of AI datasets. Examining these challenges through an STS-informed lens of reparative justice and repair, we argue that the work of repairing data work (and AI) lies, fundamentally, in resetting the ties of accountability. At a time heightened emphasis on efforts like safety evaluations and red teaming to make AI more responsible, we highlight the need to confront foundational questions about how the humans involved in these efforts relate to the datasets and systems they help produce. A reparative lens demands that we interrupt prevailing norms of data work and place at their centre, not AI or datasets, but those most harmed by the neglect, oversight and exclusion animated in the current modes of dataset production. This, we argue, offers a bold vision for responsibility and contributes towards a critical agenda for building alternative futures of data and AI practice.

Srravya Chandhiramowuli, Ding Wang, Alex Taylor

University of Edinburgh, UK · Google Research, USA

AI Accountability Training Data Curation AI Governance

Jun 5, 2026cs.AI

Beyond Post-hoc Explanation: Toward Glassbox AI via Probabilistic Mediation

Large language models are rapidly becoming infrastructural components in high-stakes institutional settings, including public administration, legal reasoning, and healthcare, where opacity is not merely inconvenient but institutionally and legally untenable. Existing approaches to explainability are predominantly post-hoc, offering unstable, non-contestable accounts that have no formal relationship to the reasoning process that produced the output. We argue that the problem is not the absence of explanation but the absence of structured reasoning in the first place. This paper makes the case for a fundamentally different architecture, which we call the Glassbox Framework, in which Bayesian networks serve as transparent, ante-hoc mediation layers for generative models. Bayesian networks encode domain knowledge, causal assumptions, and probabilistic dependencies before inference occurs, enabling auditable reasoning traces, uncertainty quantification, and contestable outputs. We characterise the architecture of this framework and ground it in a benefit eligibility scenario, identifying the foundational challenges spanning semantic alignment, dynamic model construction, probabilistic grounding, and human governance that must be solved to realise it at scale. By shifting from post-hoc explanation to ante-hoc probabilistic mediation, this work outlines a principled path toward AI systems that are not only powerful but fundamentally accountable.

Manuele Leonelli

School of Science and Technology, IE University, Madrid, Spain

Explainable Artificial Intelligence AI Accountability Bayesian Networks LLM Interpretability

Jun 2, 2026cs.AI

Thinking Through Signs: PEEL as a Semiotic Scaffolding for Epistemically Accountable AI-Enabled Research

Large language models are reshaping research practice while quietly eroding researchers epistemic accountability. This commentary introduces PEEL - Protocols for Epistemically Engaged Literacy in AI, a working scaffolding that combines deterministic distant reading via Voyant Tools with LLM interpretation via Claude, grounded in Peircean semiotics and abductive reasoning. Applied to AI-generated condensations of three source texts, PEEL reveals systematic distortions in quantity, term frequency, and epistemic voice that are invisible without non-AI measurement -- and yields three design implications: deterministic instruments must accompany AI tools; fluency is not fidelity; epistemic authority must be designed in, not assumed.

Clarisse de Souza, Gabriel Barbosa, Simone Diniz Junqueira Barbosa +3

PUC-Rio, PUC-Behring Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Brazil · PUC-Rio, Brazil

LLM Evaluation AI Accountability LLM Auditing Summarization Evaluation

Jun 2, 2026cs.AI

From Control Boundary to Insurance Claim: Reconstructing AI-Mediated Losses Through the CER Framework

AI losses that arise through an insured organization's generative or agentic AI system require state reconstruction, not merely event reconstruction, because the relevant state changes as the system reasons, retrieves, calls tools, and acts. The relevant question is not only what loss occurred, but what the system was allowed to do, what it actually did, and whether that reconstructed loss can support insurance claim recovery. This paper addresses losses in which the insured's AI system is in the causal chain, including externally triggered failures such as prompt injection, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) poisoning, malicious tool output, credential misuse, and data poisoning. Specifically, this paper introduces CER, a use-case-level diagnostic for AI residual risk transfer. C (control boundary) asks whether the system had an enforceable operating envelope. E (evidence reconstruction) asks whether the system state and causal chain can be reconstructed from retained artifacts. R (insurance response) asks whether the reconstructed loss is insured: whether insurance coverage is available in the market and placed for the insured, together with the proof needed to support insurance claim recovery. The paper makes three contributions: it defines the AI-specific reconstruction problem, operationalizes that problem through CER, and specifies claim-grade evidence for AI reconstruction. Public examples include the reported PocketOS and Replit agentic database-deletion incidents and Moffatt v. Air Canada as an adjudicated output/reliance case. Keywords: AI systems; CER framework; residual risk transfer; agentic AI; generative AI; AI insurance; evidence reconstruction.

Alex Leung, Rex Zhang, Kentaroh Toyoda +1

AIFT

AI Accountability AI Risk Management AI Agent Governance

Jun 2, 2026cs.AI

Overlaying Governance: A Compositional Authorization Framework for Delegation and Scope in Agentic AI

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

Amjad Ibrahim, Yong Li

Huawei Heisenberg Research Center Germany

AI Accountability AI Agent Security AI Agent Governance Access Control Tool Access Control for LLM Agents Agentic AI

May 31, 2026cs.AI

GovAI-Pipe: A Layered AI Governance Pipeline for Citizen-Facing AI in Turkey's e-Government Gateway

Turkey's e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet) serves over 68 million registered users with more than 9,200 government services, and is increasingly integrating artificial intelligence into citizen-facing applications such as chatbot assistants and eligibility assessments. However, no structured technical governance infrastructure currently connects high-level AI policy frameworks, such as the EU AI Act, OECD AI Principles, and Turkey's own National AI Strategy, to the operational reality of deploying AI within a centralized e-government platform. We propose GovAI-Pipe, a four-layer governance pipeline designed using Design Science Research methodology that maps the AI model lifecycle to governance checkpoints: (1) pre-deployment validation for bias testing, explainability, and privacy impact assessment; (2) deployment governance for risk-tier classification and approval workflows; (3) runtime monitoring for drift detection, fairness tracking, and human-in-the-loop escalation; and (4) post-incident governance for audit trails, rollback, and citizen redress. Each layer is anchored to specific provisions of the EU AI Act, the GDPR data protection framework, and the National AI Strategy. We demonstrate the framework through two high-risk e-Devlet use cases, showing how GovAI-Pipe operationalizes governance principles as auditable, technical pipeline components.

Ahmet Kaplan

Department of Computer Science Istanbul Medipol University Istanbul, Türkiye

AI Accountability AI Risk Management AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

May 30, 2026cs.CR

Authenticity Debt and the Synthetic Content Threat Landscape: A Layered Framework for Trust, Provenance, and IP Governance in the Generative AI Era

Generative artificial intelligence has fundamentally changed how content is now produced. It has enabled how high-fidelity text, images, audio, and videos are created, modified, and redistributed at near-zero marginal cost. This shift exposes enterprises and ecosystems to a number of risks across four reinforcing authenticity layers -- authenticity, provenance, integrity, and accountability -- that traditional controls are inadequate to address in isolation. We introduce the concept of authenticity debt: the cumulative institutional liability that accumulates when organizations deploy AI-generated content without preserving verifiable origin, integrity, and accountability, deferring exposure that surfaces under regulatory, legal, or market scrutiny. This paper presents a comprehensive, multi-dimensional taxonomy of generative AI harms and attack vectors, surveys the capabilities and failure modes of technical controls including digital watermarking, provenance frameworks (C2PA, Adobe CAI), and detection technologies, and argues that no single mechanism is sufficient in open, adversarial, and evolving environments. Drawing on Zero Trust Architecture principles and enterprise governance frameworks, we propose a layered reference architecture that integrates cryptographic provenance, human-in-the-loop verification, and continuous governance to sustain defensible authenticity at scale. We further examine the regulatory landscape (EU AI Act, U.S.\ FTC, NIST AI RMF) and identify practical guiding principles for organizations seeking to build authenticity as institutional infrastructure rather than an afterthought.

Shubhashis Sengupta, Benjamin McCarty, Milind Savagaonkar +1

Accenture Services Pvt. Ltd.

AI Accountability Data Provenance AI Governance

May 30, 2026cs.AI

Acting with AI: An Interaction-Based Framework for Agentic Tort Liability

Agentic AI systems can plan over multiple steps, use tools, and execute tasks over time. When such systems cause harm, tort law struggles to allocate responsibility because the harmful path may be neither fully chosen by the user nor specifically foreseen by the developer. This paper proposes an interaction-based framework for agentic torts, drawing on Michael Bratman's planning theory and on the common law's treatment of human-human concerted action. We distinguish three interaction types: autonomous drift, pure tool use, and collaborative planning. Pure tool cases remain governed by ordinary product-defect and warning doctrines; collaborative planning cases map onto the independent contractor control test, professional malpractice, and negligent misrepresentation; autonomous drift maps onto frolic and detour under respondeat superior and strict product liability. The framework treats the stateful interaction log as the primary evidentiary trace, allowing courts to infer where the human-AI trajectory departed from the authorized undertaking and where liability should attach. We resolve four incident-anchored cases, situate the account alongside strict-liability and insurance-based proposals, note its relationship to regulatory oversight, and propose a ``Reasonable Agent'' standard built around constraint verification, epistemic transparency, runtime grounding, and forensic logging.

Yiheng Yao

Stanford University

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance Agentic AI

May 29, 2026cs.AI

LLM-FACETS: A Privacy-Preserving Framework for Evaluating LLM Transparency and Accountability

Assessing whether Large Language Models outputs are factually grounded, epistemically calibrated, and methodologically reproducible is a prerequisite for responsible AI deployment. Yet auditing LLMs remains inaccessible to non-technical practitioners: existing tools require programming expertise and non-trivial environment setup, and cloud-hosted platforms transmit evaluation data to external services, creating barriers for domain experts and compliance officers legally responsible for AI oversight. We introduce LLM-FACETS (LLM FActuality Cross-EvaluaTion System): an open-source framework with a browser-accessible interface and a plugin architecture, structured around three practitioner profiles (technical experts, domain experts, compliance officers) that mirror the stakeholder categories identified in the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. The architecture makes data flows explicit: deterministic metrics (BLEU, ROUGE, BERTScore) run entirely within the self-hosted server with no outbound transmission; LLM-judge metrics contact external APIs explicitly, with users retaining full credential control. The framework operationalizes transparency through three mechanisms: token-level log-probability visualization for epistemic uncertainty, multi-judge consensus to mitigate judge bias, and RAG Triad metrics (Faithfulness, Answer Relevance, Context Relevance) to detect and localize hallucinations. A plugin architecture allows any new metric or dataset to be integrated without modifying the evaluation pipeline. The open-source implementation enables cross-checking across multiple metrics targeting the same property, ensuring reproducibility and decoupling AI accountability from the teams building the systems assessed. We verify the framework through cross-validation of 18 metric implementations against canonical reference libraries.

Tom Lucas, Alessio Buscemi, Alfredo Capozucca +2

Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), Luxembourg, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, and Scriptor Artis, France · Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), Luxembourg · University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg +1

LLM Evaluation AI Accountability LLM Auditing LLM Reliability