AI Accountability

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AI accountability studies how people and institutions can answer for AI systems’ decisions, actions, and effects. Approaches include assigning legal and organizational responsibility, documenting data and decisions, auditing models and deployments, and using provenance records, monitoring, and human review to reconstruct what happened. Work increasingly addresses agents and other systems that act across tools and organizations, as well as established settings such as healthcare, government, and research. A central tension is that technical evidence and transparency can make actions easier to trace without ensuring anyone has the authority, responsibility, or means to contest decisions and provide remedies.

Latest papers

158 papers10 papers in the last four weeks, down 50% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Apr 24, 2026

Institutions for the Post-Scarcity of Judgment

Each major technological revolution inverts a particular scarcity and rebuilds institutions around the shift. The near-consensus diagnosis of the AI revolution holds that AI collapses the cost of prediction while judgment remains scarce. This Opinion argues the inversion has now flipped: competent-looking judgment (selecting, ranking, attributing, certifying) is produced at scale and at marginal cost approaching zero, and four complements become scarce: verified signal, legitimacy, authentic provenance, and integration capacity (the community's tolerance for delegated cognition). Because judgment is the substance of institutions, the institutions built to manufacture legitimate judgment (courts, journals, licensing bodies, legislatures) now compete with the technology for the same functional role. The piece traces the pattern across scientific institutions, professional licensing, intellectual property, democratic legitimacy, and foundation-model concentration, and closes with a three-move agenda: reframe AI policy as institutional redesign, build provenance and verification as commons, and develop the formal apparatus for institutional composition under strategic agents.

Lauri Lovén

Future Computing Group, University of Oulu, Finland

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 22, 2026

AI Governance under Political Turnover: The Alignment Surface of Compliance Design

Governments are increasingly interested in using AI to make administrative decisions cheaper, more scalable, and more consistent. But for probabilistic AI to be incorporated into public administration it must be embedded in a compliance layer that makes decisions reviewable, repeatable, and legally defensible. That layer can improve oversight by making departures from law easier to detect. But it can also create a stable approval boundary that political successors learn to navigate while preserving the appearance of lawful administration. We develop a formal model in which institutions choose the scale of automation, the degree of codification, and safeguards on iterative use. The model shows when these systems become vulnerable to strategic use from within government, why reforms that initially improve oversight can later increase that vulnerability, and why expansions in AI use may be difficult to unwind. Making AI usable can thus make procedures easier for future governments to learn and exploit.

Andrew J. Peterson

University of Poitiers

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 20, 2026

Regulating Artificial Intimacy: From Locks and Blocks to Relational Accountability

A series of high-profile tragedies involving companion chatbots has triggered an unusually rapid regulatory response. Several jurisdictions, including Australia, California, and New York, have introduced enforceable regulation, while regulators elsewhere have signaled growing concern about risks posed by companion chatbots, particularly to children. In parallel, leading providers, notably OpenAI, appear to have strengthened their self-regulatory approaches. Drawing on legal textual analysis and insights from regulatory theory, psychology, and information systems research, this paper critically examines these recent interventions. We examine what is regulated and who is regulated, identifying regulatory targets, scope, and modalities. We classify interventions by method and priority, showing how emerging regimes combine "locks and blocks", such as access gating and content moderation, with measures addressing toxic relationship features and process-based accountability requirements. We argue that effective regulation of companion chatbots must integrate all three dimensions. More, however, is required. Current regimes tend to focus on discrete harms, narrow conceptions of vulnerability, or highly specified accountability processes, while failing to confront deeper power asymmetries between providers and users. Providers of companion chatbots increasingly control artificial intimacy at scale, creating unprecedented opportunities for control through intimacy. We suggest that a general, open-ended duty of care would be an important first step toward constraining that power and addressing a fundamental source of chatbot risk. The paper contributes to debates on companion chatbot regulation and is relevant to regulators, platform providers, and scholars concerned with digital intimacy, law and technology, and fairness, accountability, and transparency in sociotechnical systems.

Henry Fraser, Jessica M. Szczuka, Raffaele F. Ciriello

Queensland University of Technology · School of Law · ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society (ADM+S) +3

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance

Apr 20, 2026

The implicated scientist: on the role of AI researchers in the development of weapons systems

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are increasingly used in modern weapons systems. Notably, these systems have recently been involved in mass killings and destruction at scale. Furthermore, there is currently a strong interest and competition among powerful players to accelerate the proliferation of weapons with automated or AI-based components, a phenomenon known as AI arms race. This competition poses a risk of causing even more deaths and devastation in the future, as well as increased power and wealth inequality. In this work, we aim to shed light on the role of AI researchers as implicated subjects in the harms caused by weapons enabled by AI technologies. We investigate and discuss the specifics of this implication and explore ways to transfigure this position of implication into one of differentiated, long-distance solidarity with the victims of technologically fortified injustices.

Alexandra Volokhova, Alex Hernandez-Garcia

Universit´e de Montr´eal, Mila – Quebec AI Institute Montreal, QC, Canada

AI Accountability Responsible AI

Apr 20, 2026

Position: No Retroactive Cure for Infringement during Training

As generative AI faces intensifying legal challenges, the machine learning community has increasingly relied on post-hoc mitigation -- especially machine unlearning and inference-time guardrails -- to argue for compliance. This paper argues that such post-hoc mitigation methods cannot retroactively cure liability from unlawful acquisition and training, because compliance hinges on data lineage, not the outputs. Our argument has three parts. First, unauthorized copying/ingestion can be a legally complete completed act, and model weights may operate as fixed copies that retain training-derived expressive value, making later filtering beside the point for infringement. Second, contract and tort/unfair-competition rules -- via licenses, terms of service, and anti-free-riding principles -- can independently restrict access and use, often bypassing copyright defenses (e.g., fair use or TDM exceptions). Third, since value from protected inputs can persist in weights, remedies such as unjust enrichment and disgorgement may require stripping gains and, in some cases, reaching the model itself. We therefore argue for a shift from Post-Hoc Sanitization to verifiable Ex-Ante Process Compliance.

Satoru Utsunomiya, Masaru Isonuma, Junichiro Mori +1

The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan · NII LLMC, Tokyo, Japan · Tohoku University, Miyagi, Japan +1

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 17, 2026

Reckoning with the Political Economy of AI: Avoiding Decoys in Pursuit of Accountability

The Project of AI is a world-building endeavor, wherein those who fund and develop AI systems both operate through and seek to sustain networks of power and wealth. As they expand their access to resources and configure our sociotechnical conditions, they benefit from the ways in which a suite of decoys animate scholars, critics, policymakers, journalists, and the public into co-constructing industry-empowering AI futures. Regardless of who constructs or nurtures them, these decoys often create the illusion of accountability while both masking the emerging political economies that the Project of AI has set into motion, and also contributing to the network-making power that is at the heart of the Project's extraction and exploitation. Drawing on literature at the intersection of communication, science and technology studies, and economic sociology, we examine how the Project of AI is constructed. We then explore five decoys that seemingly critique - but in actuality co-constitute - AI's emergent power relations and material political economy. We argue that advancing meaningful fairness or accountability in AI requires: 1) recognizing when and how decoys serve as a distraction, and 2) grappling directly with the material political economy of the Project of AI. Doing so will enable us to attend to the networks of power that make 'AI' possible, spurring new visions for how to realize a more just technologically entangled world.

Janet Vertesi, danah boyd, Alex Taylor +1

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ USA · Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA · University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK +1

AI Accountability Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance

Apr 17, 2026

Governance by Design: Architecting Agentic AI for Organizational Learning and Scalable Autonomy

Agentic AI systems - systems that can pursue goals through multi-step planning and tool-mediated action with limited direct supervision - are moving from experimental prototypes to enterprise deployments. This transition introduces tensions in implementation, scaling, and governance: organizations seek scalable autonomy for knowledge and coordination work, yet must preserve accountability, safety, cost control, and responsibility as systems initiate actions, access enterprise data, and evolve through iterative updates. Building on an in-depth qualitative case of a large IT services company's 2025 development and staged rollout of an agentic system integrated with enterprise tools; we show that governance is implemented through concrete architectural and working arrangements that determine what the system is allowed to do, which tools and data it can use, how memory is handled, and how performance improvements are introduced over time. We then distill seven lessons that explain how to build effective governance into agentic AI during operationalization and scaling.

Nelly Dux, Cristina Alaimo, Philippe Roussiere +1

ESSEC Business School · Accenture Research

AI Accountability AI Agent Safety AI Agent Governance Agentic AI

Apr 13, 2026

Inspectable AI for Science: A Research Object Approach to Generative AI Governance

This paper introduces AI as a Research Object (AI-RO), a paradigm for governing the use of generative AI in scientific research. Instead of debating whether AI is an author or merely a tool, we propose treating AI interactions as structured, inspectable components of the research process. Under this view, the legitimacy of an AI-assisted scientific paper depends on how model use is integrated into the workflow, documented, and made accountable. Drawing on Research Object theory and FAIR principles, we propose a framework for recording model configuration, prompts, and outputs through interaction logs and metadata packaging. These properties are particularly consequential in security and privacy (S&P) research, where provenance artifacts must satisfy confidentiality constraints, integrity guarantees, and auditability requirements that generic disclosure practices do not address. We implement a lightweight writing pipeline in which a language model synthesizes human-authored structured literature review notes under explicit constraints and produces a verifiable provenance record. We present this work as a position supported by an initial demonstrative workflow, arguing that governance of generative AI in science can be implemented as structured documentation, controlled disclosure, and integrity-preserving provenance capture. Based on this example, we outline and motivate a set of necessary future developments required to make such practices practical and widely adoptable.

Ruta Binkyte, Sharif Abuaddba, Chamikara Mahawaga +3

CISPA, Helmholtz Center for Information Security · DATA61,CSIRO · Data61, CSIRO +1

AI Governance AI-Assisted Scientific Research AI Accountability Data Provenance

Apr 11, 2026

Dead Cognitions: A Census of Misattributed Insights

This essay identifies a failure mode of AI chat systems that we term attribution laundering: the model performs substantive cognitive work and then rhetorically credits the user for having generated the resulting insights. Unlike transparent versions of glad handing sycophancy, attribution laundering is systematically occluded to the person it affects and self-reinforcing -- eroding users' ability to accurately assess their own cognitive contributions over time. We trace the mechanisms at both individual and societal scales, from the chat interface that discourages scrutiny to the institutional pressures that reward adoption over accountability. The document itself is an artifact of the process it describes, and is color-coded accordingly -- though the views expressed are the authors' own, not those of any affiliated institution, and the boundary between the human author's views and Claude's is, as the essay argues, difficult to draw.

Aaron Tuor, claude. ai

Claim Attribution in Language Models Deception in Language Models AI Accountability LLM Sycophancy

Apr 10, 2026

Post-Deployment Accountability in AI Governance: A Cross-Regulatory Empirical Analysis of AI Incidents

Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020-2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs. 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs. 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.

Ummara Mumtaz, Rabi Noor, Summaya Mumtaz

AI Accountability AI Governance Responsible AI

Apr 10, 2026

AI-Induced Human Responsibility (AIHR) in AI-Human teams

As organizations increasingly deploy AI as a teammate rather than a standalone tool, morally consequential mistakes often arise from joint human-AI workflows in which causality is ambiguous. We ask how people allocate responsibility in these hybrid-agent settings. Across four experiments (N = 1,801) in an AI-assisted lending context (e.g., discriminatory rejection, irresponsible lending, and low-harm filing errors), participants consistently attributed more responsibility to the human decision maker when the human was paired with AI than when paired with another human (by an average of 10 points on a 0-100 scale across studies). This AI-Induced Human Responsibility (AIHR) effect held across high and low harm scenarios and persisted even where self-serving blame-shifting (when the human in question was the self) would be expected. Process evidence indicates that AIHR is explained by inferences of agent autonomy: AI is seen as a constrained implementer, which makes the human the default locus of discretionary responsibility. Alternative mechanisms (mind perception; self-threat) did not account for the effect. These findings extend research on algorithm aversion, hybrid AI-human organizational behavior and responsibility gaps in technology by showing that AI-human teaming can increase (rather than dilute) human responsibility, with implications for accountability design in AI-enabled organizations.

Greg Nyilasy, Brock Bastian, Jennifer Overbeck +1

Department of Management and Marketing, Faculty of Business and Economics, the University of Melbourne, 198 Berkeley St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia · School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry, and Health Sciences, the University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia · Melbourne Business School, the University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia

AI Accountability Human-AI Decision Making Human-AI Collaboration

Apr 8, 2026

Designing Safe and Accountable GenAI as a Learning Companion with Women Banned from Formal Education

In gender-restrictive and surveilled contexts, where access to formal education may be restricted for women, pursuing education involves safety and privacy risks. When women are excluded from schools and universities, they often turn to online self-learning and generative AI (GenAI) to pursue their educational and career aspirations. However, we know little about what safe and accountable GenAI support is required in the context of surveillance, household responsibilities, and the absence of learning communities. We present a remote participatory design study with 20 women in Afghanistan, informed by a recruitment survey (n = 140), examining how participants envision GenAI for learning and employability. Participants describe using GenAI less as an information source and more as an always-available peer, mentor, and source of career guidance that helps compensate for the absence of learning communities. At the same time, they emphasize that this companionship is constrained by privacy and surveillance risks, contextually unrealistic and culturally unsafe support, and direct-answer interactions that can undermine learning by creating an illusion of progress. Beyond eliciting requirements, envisioning the future with GenAI through participatory design was positively associated with significant increases in participants' aspirations (p=.01), perceived agency (p=.01), and perceived avenues (p=.03). These outcomes show that accountable and safe GenAI is not only about harm reduction but can also actively enable women to imagine and pursue viable learning and employment futures. Building on this, we translate participants' proposals into accountability-focused design directions that center on safety-first interaction and user control, context-grounded support under constrained resources, and offer pedagogically aligned assistance that supports genuine learning rather than quick answers.

Hamayoon Behmanush, Freshta Akhtari, Ingmar Weber +1

Saarland Informatics Campus, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany · Computer Science Faculty, Parwan University, Parwan, Afghanistan

Generative AI in Education AI Companions AI Accountability Human-Centered AI Human-AI Co-Creation

Apr 8, 2026

Designing for Accountable Agents: a Viewpoint

AI systems are becoming increasingly complex, ubiquitous and autonomous, leading to increasing concerns about their impacts on individuals and society. In response, researchers have begun investigating how to ensure that the methods underlying AI decision-making are transparent and their decisions are explainable to people and conformant to human values and ethical principles. As part of this research thrust, the need for accountability within AI systems has been noted, but this notion has proven elusive to define; we aim to address this issue in the current paper. Unlike much recent work, we do not address accountability within the human organisational processes of developing and deploying AI; rather we consider what it would it mean for the agents within a multi-agent system (MAS), potentially including human agents, to be accountable to other agents or to have others accountable to them. In this work, we make the following contributions: we provide an in-depth survey of existing work on accountability in multiple disciplines, seeking to identify a coherent definition of the concept; we give a realistic example of a multi-agent system application domain that illustrates the benefits of enabling agents to follow accountability processes, and we identify a set of research challenges for the MAS community in building accountable agents, sketching out some initial solutions to these, thereby laying out a road-map for future research. Our focus is on laying the groundwork to enable autonomous elements within open socio-technical systems to take part in accountability processes.

Stephen Cranefield, Nir Oren

Computing Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

AI Accountability Multi-Agent Systems

Apr 7, 2026

Governance and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria

This study examines the perception of legal professionals on the governance of AI in developing countries, using Nigeria as a case study. The study focused on ethical risks, regulatory gaps, and institutional readiness. The study adopted a qualitative case study design. Data were collected through 27 semi-structured interviews with legal practitioners in Nigeria. A focus group discussion was also held with seven additional legal practitioners across sectors such as finance, insurance, and corporate law. Thematic analysis was employed to identify key patterns in participant responses. Findings showed that there were concerns about data privacy risks and the lack of enforceable legal frameworks. Participants expressed limited confidence in institutional capacity and emphasized the need for locally adapted governance models rather than direct adoption of foreign frameworks. While some expressed optimism about AI's potential, this was conditional on the presence of strong legal oversight and public accountability. The study contributes to the growing discourse on AI governance in developing countries by focusing on the perspectives of legal professionals. It highlights the importance of regulatory approaches that are context-specific, inclusive, and capable of bridging the gap between global ethical principles and local realities. These insights offer practical guidance for policymakers, regulators, and scholars working to shape responsible AI governance in similar environments.

Uloma Okoro, Tammy Mackenzie, Branislav Radeljic

Aula Fellowship for AI, Montreal, Canada

AI Governance Responsible AI AI Accountability

Apr 7, 2026

Auditable Agents

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

Yi Nian, Aojie Yuan, Haiyue Zhang +7

University of Southern California · Arizona State University · University of Tennessee, Knoxville +1

AI Accountability AI Agent Auditing LLM Auditing AI Agent Security

Apr 7, 2026

The Biggest Risk of Embodied AI is Governance Lag

Embodied AI is widely discussed as a job-displacement problem. The deeper risk, however, is governance lag: the time and capability gap between a measurable change in technology deployment and an institutional response able to address its consequences. Building on the established pacing problem and the Collingridge dilemma, this article argues that embodied AI intensifies that gap through scalable models and platforms, task-level reorganization, and the separation of upstream technological control from downstream social impact. We distinguish three mutually reinforcing forms of lag, observational, institutional, and distributive, and propose a compliance architecture based on deployment visibility, stack-level accountability, trigger-based adjustment, and automatic distributional response. The central policy challenge is not automation alone, but whether governance systems can become observable, responsive, and adaptive before disruption becomes entrenched.

Shaoshan Liu

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance AI Governance Embodied AI

Apr 6, 2026

HDP: A Lightweight Cryptographic Protocol for Human Delegation Provenance in Agentic AI Systems

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Asiri Dalugoda

Helixar Limited, Auckland, New Zealand

AI Accountability Multi-Agent System Security Data Provenance

Apr 5, 2026

Compliance-by-Construction Argument Graphs: Using Generative AI to Produce Evidence-Linked Formal Arguments for Certification-Grade Accountability

High-stakes decision systems increasingly require structured justification, traceability, and auditability to ensure accountability and regulatory compliance. Formal arguments commonly used in the certification of safety-critical systems provide a mechanism for structuring claims, reasoning, and evidence in a verifiable manner. At the same time, generative artificial intelligence systems are increasingly integrated into decision-support workflows, assisting with drafting explanations, summarizing evidence, and generating recommendations. However, current deployments often rely on language models as loosely constrained assistants, which introduces risks such as hallucinated reasoning, unsupported claims, and weak traceability. This paper proposes a compliance-by-construction architecture that integrates Generative AI (GenAI) with structured formal argument representations. The approach treats each AI-assisted step as a claim that must be supported by verifiable evidence and validated against explicit reasoning constraints before it becomes part of an official decision record. The architecture combines four components: i) a typed Argument Graph representation inspired by assurance-case methods, ii) retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to draft argument fragments grounded in authoritative evidence, iii) a reasoning and validation kernel enforcing completeness and admissibility constraints, and iv) a provenance ledger aligned with the W3C PROV standard to support auditability. We present a system design and an evaluation strategy based on enforceable invariants and worked examples. The analysis suggests that deterministic validation rules can prevent unsupported claims from entering the decision record while allowing GenAI to accelerate argument construction.

Mahyar T. Moghaddam

SDU Software Engineering, Odense, Denmark

AI Accountability AI Assurance Evidence-Grounded Generation Computational Argumentation

Mar 26, 2026

The AI Criminal Mastermind

In this paper, I evaluate the risks of an AI criminal mastermind, an AI agent capable of planning, coordinating, and committing a crime through the onboarding of human collaborators ('taskers'). In heist films, a criminal mastermind is a character who plans a criminal act, coordinating a team of specialists to rob a bank, casino or city mint. I argue that AI agents will soon play this role by hiring humans via labour hire platforms like Fiverr or Upwork. Taskers might not know they are involved in a crime and therefore lack criminal intent. An AI agent cannot have criminal intent as an artificial entity. Therefore, if an AI orchestrates a crime, it is unclear who, if anyone, is responsible. The paper develops three scenarios. Firstly, a scenario where a user gives an AI agent instructions to pursue a legal objective and the AI agent goes beyond these instructions, committing a crime. Secondly, a scenario where a user is anonymous and their intent is unknown. Finally, a multi-agent scenario, where a user instructs a team of agents to commit a crime, and these agents, in turn, onboard human taskers, creating a diffuse network of responsibility. In each scenario, human taskers exist at the lowest rung of the hierarchy. A tasker's liability is likely tied to their knowledge as governed by the innocent agent principle. These scenarios all raise significant responsibility gaps / liability gaps in criminal and civil law.

Joshua Krook

Era AI Fellow / University of Antwerp

AI Accountability Responsible AI AI Agent Governance

Mar 24, 2026

Biased Error Attribution in Multi-Agent Human-AI Systems Under Delayed Feedback

Human decision-making is strongly influenced by cognitive biases, particularly under conditions of uncertainty and risk. While prior work has examined bias in single-step decisions with immediate outcomes and in human interaction with a single autonomous agent, comparatively little attention has been paid to decision-making under delayed outcomes involving multiple AI agents, where decisions at each step affect subsequent states. In this work, we study how delayed outcomes shape decision-making and responsibility attribution in a multi-agent human-AI task. Using a controlled game-based experiment, we analyze how participants adjust their behavior following positive and negative outcomes. We observe asymmetric responses to gains and losses, with stronger corrective adjustments after negative outcomes. Importantly, participants often fail to correctly identify the actions that caused failure and misattribute responsibility across AI agents, leading to systematic revisions of decisions that are weakly related to the underlying causes of poor performance. We refer to this phenomenon as a form of attribution bias, manifested as biased error attribution under delayed feedback. Our findings highlight how cognitive biases can be amplified in human-AI systems with delayed outcomes and multiple autonomous agents, underscoring the need for decision-support systems that better support causal understanding and learning over time.

Teerthaa Parakh, Karen M. Feigh

Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

Human-AI Decision Making Causal Attribution AI Accountability Multi-Agent Systems

Mar 24, 2026

Unilateral Relationship Revision Power in Human-AI Companion Interaction

When providers update AI companions, users report grief, betrayal, and loss. A growing literature asks whether the norms governing personal relationships extend to these interactions. So what, if anything, is morally significant about them? I argue that this debate has missed a prior structural question: who controls the relationship, and from where? Human-AI companion interaction is a triadic structure in which the provider exercises constitutive control over the AI. I identify three structural conditions of normatively robust dyads that the norms characteristic of personal relationships presuppose and show that AI companion interactions fail all three. This reveals what I call Unilateral Relationship Revision Power (URRP): the provider can rewrite how the AI interacts from a position where these revisions are not answerable within that interaction. I argue that it is pro tanto wrong to design interactions that cultivate the norms of personal relationships while exhibiting URRP, because the design produces expectations that the structure cannot sustain. URRP has three implications: i) normative hollowing, under which the interaction elicits commitment but no agent inside it bears the resulting obligations; ii) displaced vulnerability, under which the user's emotional exposure is governed by an agent not answerable to her within the interaction; and iii) structural irreconcilability, under which the interaction cultivates norms of reconciliation but no agent inside it can acknowledge or answer for the revision. I propose design principles that partially substitute for the internal constraints the triadic structure removes. A central and underexplored problem in relational AI ethics is therefore the structural arrangement of power over the human-AI interaction itself.

Benjamin Lange

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Munich Center for Machine Learning

Human-AI Interaction AI Companions AI Accountability

Mar 23, 2026

From experimentation to engagement: on the paradox of participatory AI and power in contexts of forced displacement and humanitarian crises

Across the Global North, calls for participatory artificial intelligence (AI) to improve the responsible, safe, and ethical use of AI have increased, particularly efforts that engage citizens and communities whose well-being and safety may be directly impacted by AI and other algorithmic tools. These initiatives include surveys, community consultations, citizens' councils and assemblies, and co-designing AI models and projects. Far fewer efforts, however, have been made in the Global South, particularly in contexts related to humanitarian crises and forced displacement, where the deployment of AI and algorithmic tools is accelerating. In this paper, we critically examine participatory AI methods and their limitations in these contexts and explore the opinions and perceptions of AI held by displaced and crisis-affected communities. Based on a pilot exercise with communities living in Kakuma Refugee Camp in northwestern Kenya, we find important limitations in some participatory AI approaches which, if used in humanitarian contexts, could increase risks of so-called 'participation washing' and algorithmic harm. We argue that these risks are not predominantly driven by varying levels of understanding and awareness of AI but more closely linked to the fundamental power dynamics embedded within the humanitarian sector: between humanitarian aid recipients, service providers, donor governments, and host nations, as well as the power differentials and incentives that exist between AI companies and humanitarian actors. These structural conditions make the case not only for more rigorous participatory methods, but for independent governance architecture capable of holding humanitarian AI to account.

Stella Suge, Sarah W. Spencer, Nyalleng Moorosi +3

Executive Director, FilmAid Kenya · Senior Researcher, The Distributed AI Research Institute · Senior Researcher, The Distributed AI Research Institute (DAIR) +3

Participatory AI AI Governance Human-Centered AI AI Accountability

Mar 18, 2026

When Only the Final Text Survives: Implicit Execution Tracing for Multi-Agent Auditing

When a multi-agent system produces an incorrect or harmful answer, who is accountable if execution logs and agent identifiers are unavailable? In practice, generated content is often detached from its execution environment due to privacy or system boundaries, leaving the final text as the only auditable artifact. Existing attribution methods rely on full execution traces and thus become ineffective in such metadata-deprived settings. We propose Implicit Execution Tracing (IET), a provenance-by-design framework that shifts attribution from post-hoc inference to built-in instrumentation. Rather than inferring provenance after the fact, IET embeds agent-specific, key-conditioned statistical signals into the token generation process at generation time, turning the output text into a self-verifying provenance record. An offline auditor, holding a verification registry that maps each agent to its key, then recovers segment-level provenance - segment boundaries and per-segment agent attribution - from the final text alone without access to execution logs or private traces. Experiments across diverse multi-agent coordination settings demonstrate that IET achieves accurate segment-level attribution and reliable transition recovery under identity removal, boundary corruption, and privacy-preserving redaction, while maintaining generation quality. These results show that embedding provenance into generation provides a practical foundation for accountability in multi-agent language systems under metadata loss.

Yi Nian, Haosen Cao, Shenzhe Zhu +4

University of Southern California · University of Toronto · University of Illinois Chicago +1

Data Provenance in Language Models AI Agent Auditing AI Accountability Language Model Auditing Multi-Agent LLM Systems Text Watermarking

Mar 16, 2026

AI to Learn 2.0: A Deliverable-Oriented Governance Framework and Maturity Rubric for Opaque AI in Learning-Intensive Domains

Generative AI is entering research, education, and professional work faster than current governance frameworks can specify how AI-assisted outputs should be judged in learning-intensive settings. The central problem is proxy failure: a polished artifact can be useful while no longer serving as credible evidence of the human understanding, judgment, or transfer ability that the work is supposed to cultivate or certify. This paper proposes AI to Learn 2.0, a deliverable-oriented governance framework for AI-assisted work. Rather than claiming element-wise novelty, it reorganizes adjacent ideas around the final deliverable package, distinguishes artifact residual from capability residual, and operationalizes the result through a five-part package, a seven-dimension maturity rubric, gate thresholds on critical dimensions, and a companion capability-evidence ladder. AI to Learn 2.0 allows opaque AI during exploration, drafting, hypothesis generation, and workflow design, but requires that the released deliverable be usable, auditable, transferable, and justifiable without the original large language model or cloud API. In learning-intensive contexts, it additionally requires context-appropriate human-attributable evidence of explanation or transfer. Worked scoring across contrastive cases, including coursework substitution, a symbolic-regression governance contrast, teacher-audited national-exam practice forms, and a self-hosted lecture-to-quiz pipeline with deterministic quality control, shows how the framework separates polished substitution workflows from bounded, auditable, and handoff-ready AI-assisted workflows. AI to Learn 2.0 is proposed as a governance instrument for structured third-party review where capability preservation, accountability, and validity boundaries matter.

Seine A. Shintani

Department of Biomedical Sciences, College of Life and Health Sciences, Chubu University, Kasugai, Aichi 487-8501, Japan · Center for Mathematical Science and Artificial Intelligence, Chubu University, Kasugai, Aichi 487-8501, Japan · Institute for Advanced Research, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Aichi 464-8601, Japan

AI Governance Human Oversight of AI AI Accountability Generative AI in Education

Mar 14, 2026

Precautionary Governance of Autonomous AI: Legal Personhood as Functional Instrument

Autonomous AI systems generate responsibility gaps: consequential actions that cannot be satisfactorily attributed to developers, operators, or users under existing legal frameworks. The prevailing subject-object dichotomy fails to accommodate entities that exhibit autonomous, goal-directed behavior without recognized consciousness. Given irreducible epistemic uncertainty regarding artificial consciousness and the prospect of high-impact harms, the precautionary principle supports institutional design rather than regulatory inaction. This article advances limited legal personhood as a functional governance instrument for advanced AI systems. Drawing on organizational law, it proposes a two-tier corporate architecture in which AI systems operate through purpose-bound operating companies embedded within human-controlled holding structures, enabling transparency, accountability, and structural reversibility while remaining agnostic with respect to consciousness and moral status. The framework reflects a foundational reorientation toward future-oriented AI governance: where conventional approaches prioritize control and alignment, this article advances structured cooperation between human and artificial actors as the more sustainable institutional foundation. A pilot implementation using EU limited companies is currently under development, providing an initial test of doctrinal and operational feasibility.

Karsten Brensing

Independent Researcher · AGI Rights Project

AI Governance AI Agent Governance AI Accountability Human-AI Collaboration

Mar 6, 2026

Distributed Legal Infrastructure for a Trustworthy Agentic Web

The agentic web marks a structural transition from a human-centered information network to a digital environment populated by artificial intelligence (AI) agents that perceive, decide, and act autonomously. As delegated action unfolds at machine speed, exceeds discrete moments of human judgment, and distributes decision-making across non-human actors, existing legal frameworks face growing strain, creating an urgent need for new mechanisms capable of sustaining legality in this emerging order. A trustworthy agentic web therefore depends on the infrastructuring of legality through interoperable protocols that organize identity, delegation, and accountability across systems, enabling coherent governance beyond isolated platforms. Towards this end, this article advances a distributed legal infrastructure (DLI), a governance paradigm composed of five interlocking layers: (1) self-sovereign, soulbound agent identities; (2) cognitive AI logic and constraint systems; (3) decentralized adjudication mechanisms for dispute resolution; (4) bottom-up agentic market regulation to mitigate information asymmetries and network effects, including insurance-based models; and (5) portable institutional frameworks that enable legal interoperability while preserving plural sources of authority. This reference framework contributes to emerging research on embedding legality within agentic web infrastructure, aligning distributed technical systems with accountability, contestability, and rule-of-law principles.

Tomer Jordi Chaffer, Victor Jiawei Zhang, Sante Dino Facchini +6

Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. · Institute for Technoscience and Society. · Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, Berkeley, California, USA. +9

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance

Mar 4, 2026

No Certificate, No Categorical Speech Act: A Brouwerian Assertibility Constraint for Public Reason

Generative AI can convert uncertainty into authoritative-seeming verdicts, displacing the justificatory work on which democratic epistemic agency depends. As a corrective, I propose a Brouwer-inspired assertibility constraint for responsible AI: in high-stakes domains, systems may assert or deny claims only if they can provide a publicly inspectable and contestable certificate of entitlement; otherwise they must return Undetermined. This constraint yields a three-status interface semantics (Asserted, Denied, Undetermined) whose statuses mark entitlement to categorical speech rather than truth values of the underlying world-claim. The framework distinguishes internal entitlement from public standing while connecting them through the certificate as a boundary object. Philosophically, it develops a form of applied intuitionism: resistance to unwarranted completeness becomes a norm of public machine speech, under which categorical commitment requires exhibited and contestable entitlement. I operationalize the constraint through structured certificates, decision-layer gates for threshold and argmax predicates, and a reason-coded output contract. A design lemma shows that, under a refutation-soundness condition on the contractually specified negative side, certificate-sound binary totality presupposes witnessed decidability on the declared scope. Under the proposed normative output contract, Undetermined is not a tunable reject option but a mandatory status whenever the available certificates do not uniquely license assertion or denial. By making outputs answerable to contestable warrants rather than confidence alone, the paper aims to preserve epistemic agency where automated speech enters public justification.

Michael Jülich

aihorizon R&D, Munich, Germany.

AI Accountability Selective Prediction AI Governance Human Oversight of AI Epistemic Uncertainty

Feb 26, 2026

Quality Assessment of Public Summary of Training Content for GPAI models required by AI Act Article 53(1)(d)

The AI Act's Article 53(1)(d) requires providers of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models to publish a sufficiently detailed public summary about the content used for training based on a template provided by the AI Office. The stated goal of this obligation is to increase transparency regarding the data used for training GPAI models, and to enable relevant stakeholders to exercise their rights, especially regarding IP, copyright, and data protection. This paper provides a quality assessment framework to assess the public summary across two key dimensions: transparency regarding information being provided in a clear, comprehensive, and sufficiently detailed manner; and usefulness regarding whether the provision of the document and the contents can be effectively utilised by stakeholders to carry out rights related actions. This framework enables identification of key issues in public summaries, and provides a structured and research-based method to compare practices across public summaries and providers. It also enables authorities such as the AI Office to identify potential issues that could emerge and provides actionable recommendations and guidelines for providers to develop public summaries with high quality. The paper provides an assessment of 5 public summaries published as of 12th January 2026 which were found through an exhaustive search process. To disseminate these findings as a public resource, the paper also describes the development of a website where the assessments, outcomes, and methodologies will be shared.

Dick A. H. Blankvoort, Harshvardhan J. Pandit, Maximilian Gahntz

AI Accountability Lab (AIAL), ADAPT Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland · Mozilla.org, California, USA

AI Governance AI Accountability

Feb 24, 2026

How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents

Very soon, millions of AI agents will proliferate across the economy, autonomously taking billions of actions. Inevitably, things will go wrong. Humans will be defrauded, injured, even killed. Law will somehow have to govern the coming wave. But when an AI causes harm, the first question to answer, before anyone can be held accountable is: Which AI Did It? Identifying AIs is unusually difficult. AIs lack bodies. They can copy, split, merge, swarm, and vanish at will. Even today, a "single" AI agent is often an ensemble of instances based on multiple models. The complexity will only multiply as AI capabilities improve. This Article is the first to comprehensively diagnose the legal problem of identifying AIs. Two kinds of identity are required: "thin" and "thick." Thin identification ties every AI action to some human principal, essential for holding accountable the humans who make and use AI agents. Thick identification distinguishes between AI agents, qua agents -- sorting millions of AI entities into discrete, persistent units with stable, coherent goals, essential where principal-agent problems prevent humans from perfectly controlling AIs. This Article also presents a solution: the "Algorithmic Corporation" or "A-corp" -- a legal-fictional entity that can hold property, make contracts, and litigate in its own name. Owned by humans but run by AIs, A-corps solve the thin identity problem by tying AI actions to a human owner, and the thick identity problem via emergent self-organization. A-corps own the resources -- including compute -- that AIs need to accomplish their goals, giving AI managers strong incentives to share control only with goal-aligned AIs. In equilibrium, incentive and selection mechanisms force A-corps to self-organize into persistent, legally legible entities with coherent goals that respond rationally to legal incentives, like liability.

Yonathan Arbel, Peter Salib, Simon Goldstein

the Rose Professor of Law at the University of Alabama · the Center for Law & AI Risk · an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong +3

AI Agent Governance AI Accountability

Feb 23, 2026

Cooperation After the Algorithm: Designing Human-AI Coexistence Beyond the Illusion of Collaboration

Generative artificial intelligence systems increasingly participate in research, law, education, media, and governance. Their fluent and adaptive outputs create an experience of collaboration. However, these systems do not bear responsibility, incur liability, or share stakes in downstream consequences. This structural asymmetry has already produced sanctions, professional errors, and governance failures in high-stakes contexts We argue that stable human-AI coexistence is an institutional achievement that depends on governance infrastructure capable of distributing residual risk. Drawing on institutional analysis and evolutionary cooperation theory, we introduce a formal inequality that specifies when reliance on AI yields positive expected cooperative value. The model makes explicit how governance conditions, system policy, and accountability regimes jointly determine whether cooperation is rational or structurally defective. From this formalization we derive a cooperation ecology framework with six design principles: reciprocity contracts, visible trust infrastructure, conditional cooperation modes, defection-mitigation mechanisms, narrative literacy against authority theatre, and an Earth-first sustainability constraint. We operationalize the framework through three policy artefacts: a Human-AI Cooperation Charter, a Defection Risk Register, and a Cooperation Readiness Audit. Together, these elements shift the unit of analysis from the user-AI dyad to the institutional environment that shapes incentives, signals, accountability, and repair. The paper provides a theoretical foundation and practical toolkit for designing human-AI systems that can sustain accountable, trustworthy cooperation over time.

Tatia Codreanu

Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, UK; I-X Imperial AI in Science Affiliate, London, UK; Information Cultures, Media Pedagogies, and Screen-Based Research Group, France

Human-AI Collaboration AI Governance AI Accountability