AI Governance

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34 papers in the last four weeks, up 143% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.

Jul 13Week of Sep 28

Latest papers 254

Apr 28, 2026cs.CY

Beware of GeeksBearing Gifts: Building True EU Frontier AI Sovereignty

Frontier artificial intelligence is reshaping all aspects of society, from economic output or military capability to democratic institutions. The EU is entering this transformation from a position of structural dependence: frontier models originate almost exclusively from the United States or China, the US holds approximately sixteen times the EU's AI supercomputing capacity, and only 15% of global hyperscale data centre capacity resides within EU borders. Although the European Commission has accelerated its policy response, existing initiatives remain fragmented and lack a cohesive vision for securing strategic autonomy across the full frontier AI value chain. Here we propose a unified framework connecting five sovereignty pillars (economic competitiveness, resilience, security and defence, European values, and foreign relations) to a decomposition of the frontier AI stack comprising five layers, 26 components, and 29 sub-components. This framework allows the identification of critical gaps, redundancies, and inter-pillar trade-offs that current EU policy leaves implicit. Our analysis of the AI Gigafactory Initiative illustrates how a sovereignty-centred lens reveals conflicts that narrowly economic framings obscure. Moreover, this framework offers policymakers a structured basis for designing, evaluating, and prioritising frontier AI interventions across multiple dimensions of European strategic autonomy across the 92 initiatives from four major Commission communications we. identify, and beyond.

Nick Moës, Toni Lorente, Amin Oueslati +3

The Future Society

Apr 27, 2026cs.CY

Risk Reporting for Developers' Internal AI Model Use

Frontier AI companies first deploy their most advanced models internally, for weeks or months of safety testing, evaluation, and iteration, before a possible public release. For example, Anthropic recently developed a new class of model with advanced cyberoffense-relevant capabilities, Mythos Preview, which was available internally for at least six weeks before it was publicly announced. This internal use creates risks that external deployment frameworks may fail to address. Legal frameworks, notably California's Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (SB 53), New York's Responsible AI Safety And Education (RAISE) Act, and the EU's General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, all discuss risks from internal AI use. They require frontier developers to make and implement plans for how to manage risks from internal use, and to produce internal use risk reports describing their safeguards and any residual risks. This guide provides a harmonized standard for companies to produce internal use risk reports suitable for all three regulatory frameworks. It is addressed primarily to evaluation and safety teams at frontier AI developers, and secondarily to regulators and auditors seeking to understand what good reporting looks like. Given the pace of AI R&D automation and the limited external visibility into how companies use their most capable models internally, regular and detailed risk reporting may be one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that the risks from internal AI use are identified and managed before they materialize. Whenever a substantially more capable or riskier model is deployed internally, the developer should create a risk report and argue why the model is safe to deploy. We structure the reporting framework around two threat vectors -- autonomous AI misbehavior and insider threats -- and three risk factors for each: means, motive, and opportunity.

Oscar Delaney, Sambhav Maheshwari, Joe O'Brien +2

† Work done while at IAPS

AI Risk Management AI Governance AI Safety

Apr 27, 2026cs.CY

Update Opacity: Epistemic Accessibility and Governance Under AI System Change

Machine learning models embedded in deployed AI systems are routinely updated to maintain correct functioning over time. Yet such updates can generate update opacity: users may not be able to understand why the same input now yields a different output. We argue that update opacity is best understood as a diachronic failure of epistemic accessibility: the problem is that materially relevant changes may fail to remain accessible to human users in forms that support understanding, calibrated reliance, and appropriate action under real role- and time-specific constraints. This makes update opacity a governance problem. Not all change is equally relevant, and disclosing every update would itself undermine use through overload. To address this problem, we combine two complementary governance approaches: the EU AI Act, which helps specify the system-level perimeter of normatively relevant change, and Machine Learning Operations, which provides operational tools for tracking and comparing change over time. On this basis, we propose a framework that models system change through trustworthiness profiles and trustworthiness levels, and uses threshold-based disclosure to surface materially relevant within-envelope change to different stakeholders over time. We illustrate the approach with a medical AI example and derive practical implications for lifecycle documentation, post-market monitoring, and update disclosure.

Andrea Ferrario, Joshua Hatherley

Institute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland · SUPSI, Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA), Lugano, Switzerland · ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland +1

AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Apr 27, 2026cs.AI

Right-to-Act: A Pre-Execution Non-Compensatory Decision Protocol for AI Systems

Current AI systems increasingly operate in contexts where their outputs directly trigger real-world actions. Most existing approaches to AI safety, risk management, and governance focus on post-hoc validation, probabilistic risk estimation, or certification of model behavior. However, these approaches implicitly assume that once a decision is produced, it is eligible for execution. In this work, we introduce the Right-to-Act protocol, a deterministic, non-compensatory pre-execution decision layer that evaluates whether an AI-generated decision is permitted to be realized at all. Unlike compensatory systems, where high-confidence signals can override failed conditions, the proposed framework enforces strict structural constraints: if any required condition is unmet, execution is halted or deferred. We formalize the distinction between compensatory and non-compensatory decision regimes and define a pre-execution legitimacy boundary. Through a scenario-based case study, we demonstrate how identical AI outputs can lead to divergent outcomes when evaluated under a Right-to-Act protocol, preserving reversibility and preventing premature or irreversible actions. The proposed approach reframes AI control from optimizing decisions to governing their admissibility, introducing a protocol-level abstraction that operates independently of model architecture or training methodology.

Gadi Lavi

Independent Researcher, DECIMAG

Tool-Use Authorization AI Governance AI Safety

Apr 26, 2026cs.AI

Time-Series Forecasting in Safety-Critical Environments: An EU-AI-Act-Compliant Open-Source Package / Zeitreihenprognose in sicherheitskritischen Umgebungen: Ein KI-VO-konformes Open-Source-Paket

With spotforecast2-safe we present an integrated Compliance-by-Design approach to Python-based point forecasting of time series in safety-critical environments. A review of the relevant open-source tooling shows that existing compliance solutions operate consistently outside of the library to be used - e.g. as scanners, templates, or runtime layers. spotforecast2-safe takes the inverse approach and anchors the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the EU AI Act, in German: KI-VO), of IEC 61508, of the ISA/IEC 62443 standards series, and of the Cyber Resilience Act within the library: in application-programming-interface contracts, persistence formats, and continuous-integration gates. The approach is operationalised by four non-negotiable code-development rules (zero dead code, deterministic processing, fail-safe handling, minimal dependencies) together with the corresponding process rules (model card, executable docstrings, CI workflows, Common-Platform-Enumeration (CPE) identifier, REUSE-conformant licensing, release pipeline). Interactive visualisation, hyperparameter tuning and automated machine learning (AutoML), as well as deep-learning and large-language-model backends are deliberately excluded, because each of these components either enlarges the attack surface, introduces non-determinism, or impairs reproducibility. A bidirectional traceability matrix maps every regulatory provision onto the corresponding mechanism in the code; an end-to-end example of European-market electricity generation, transmission, and consumption forecasting demonstrates the application. The package is open-source and available under Affero General Public License (AGPL) 3.0-or-later.

Thomas Bartz-Beielstein, Eva Bartz

Bartz & Bartz GmbH, 51643 Gummersbach, Deutschland

AI Assurance Time Series Forecasting AI Governance

Apr 26, 2026cs.CY

The Limits of Artificial Companionship

This Article argues that conversations with companion chatbot should be subject to a clear structural distinction between commercial and non-commercial contexts. The insertion of undisclosed promotional content into affective or relational exchanges should be prohibited, as it collapses the boundary between market transaction and communicative intimacy in ways that erode user autonomy and conversational context. The Article begins by theorizing digital companionship as a sociotechnical form that reconfigures intimacy, dependence and relational vulnerability. It then introduces the potential economic harms derived from conversational advertising. The Article ultimately argues for a firm legal and social distinction between commercial and non-commercial conversational contexts as a precondition for the responsible stabilization of these technologies within social life.

Mauricio Figueroa

Durham University, Law School

Human-AI Interaction AI Governance Conversational Agents Responsible AI

Apr 25, 2026cs.AI

Active Inference: A method for Phenotyping Agency in AI systems?

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

Philip Wilson, Axel Constant, Mahault Albarracin +4

Independent Researcher · Department of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9RH, UK · Laboratoire d’Analyse Cognitive de l’Information, Université du Québec à Montréal, Québec, Canada +4

Active Inference AI Governance Agentic AI

Apr 25, 2026cs.CY

Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholds

AI incident reporting requirements are emerging in regulation and policy, yet no operational criteria exist for determining when a detected AI incident warrants escalation beyond national handling to international coordination. This paper proposes an escalation framework to address this gap, intended as a common reference point across jurisdictions that enables aligned escalation while preserving flexibility in how actors respond within their own legal and policy contexts. We review SB 53, the EU AI Act, the GPAI Code of Practice, and incident frameworks from other industries to derive eight criteria for assessing whether an incident warrants escalation, translated into a sequential flowchart with gated decision points and threshold checks. For each criterion, we map how it interplays with these regulatory frameworks, identifying where their design choices support or undermine effective detection. We test the framework against ten documented AI incidents and structured variants to identify where criteria under-detect or misclassify incidents in practice. We find three design patterns that may lead to systematic under-detection in regimes where model developers are responsible for escalation: a. where escalation requires confirmed harm, events such as model weight exfiltration risk detection only after severe, irreversible harm has propagated; b. where incidents are assessed individually, systemic harms emerging from accumulation risk being under-detected; and c. where thresholds align with legal instruments rather than quantitatively testable terms, criteria risk being impractical to apply under time pressure. We also find that escalation rules are only one component of a broader framework: the underlying definitions against which thresholds are set, and the data available to the responsible actor, create interdependencies that can themselves drive under-detection.

Francesca Gomez, Matthew Ball, Michael Harre +3

1Arcadia Impact AI Governance Taskforce · 2The Future Society

AI Risk Management AI Governance

Apr 24, 2026econ.GN

The Security Cost of Intelligence: AI Capability, Cyber Risk, and Deployment Paradox

Firms are deploying more capable AI systems, but organizational controls often have not kept pace. These systems can generate greater productivity gains, but high-value uses require broader authority exposure -- data access, workflow integration, and delegated authority -- when governance controls have not yet decoupled capability from authority exposure. We develop an analytical model in which a firm jointly chooses AI deployment and cybersecurity investment under this governance-capability gap. The central result shows a deployment paradox: in high-loss environments, better AI can lead a firm to deploy less when capability is deployed through broader authority exposure under weak governance. Optimal deployment also falls below the no-risk benchmark, and this shortfall widens with breach-loss magnitude and with the authority exposure attached to more capable systems. Governance investment that reduces breach-loss magnitude shrinks the paradox region itself, while breach externalities expand the range of environments in which deployment is socially constrained. Governance maturity is therefore not merely a constraint on AI adoption. It is a condition that shapes whether capability improvements translate into productive deployment.

Sukwoong Choi

Assistant Professor, Massry School of Business, University at Albany, SUNY · Research Fellow, MIT FutureTech

AI Risk Management Cybersecurity AI Governance

Apr 24, 2026cs.CY

Institutions for the Post-Scarcity of Judgment

Each major technological revolution inverts a particular scarcity and rebuilds institutions around the shift. The near-consensus diagnosis of the AI revolution holds that AI collapses the cost of prediction while judgment remains scarce. This Opinion argues the inversion has now flipped: competent-looking judgment (selecting, ranking, attributing, certifying) is produced at scale and at marginal cost approaching zero, and four complements become scarce: verified signal, legitimacy, authentic provenance, and integration capacity (the community's tolerance for delegated cognition). Because judgment is the substance of institutions, the institutions built to manufacture legitimate judgment (courts, journals, licensing bodies, legislatures) now compete with the technology for the same functional role. The piece traces the pattern across scientific institutions, professional licensing, intellectual property, democratic legitimacy, and foundation-model concentration, and closes with a three-move agenda: reframe AI policy as institutional redesign, build provenance and verification as commons, and develop the formal apparatus for institutional composition under strategic agents.

Lauri Lovén

Future Computing Group, University of Oulu, Finland

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 24, 2026cs.CY

How Supply Chain Dependencies Complicate Bias Measurement and Accountability Attribution in AI Hiring Applications

The increasing adoption of AI systems in hiring has raised concerns about algorithmic bias and accountability, prompting regulatory responses including the EU AI Act, NYC Local Law 144, and Colorado's AI Act. While existing research examines bias through technical or regulatory lenses, both perspectives overlook a fundamental challenge: modern AI hiring systems operate within complex supply chains where responsibility fragments across data vendors, model developers, platform providers, and deploying organizations. This paper investigates how these dependency chains complicate bias evaluation and accountability attribution. Drawing on literature review and regulatory analysis, we demonstrate that fragmented responsibilities create two critical problems. First, bias emerges from component interactions rather than isolated elements, yet proprietary configurations prevent integrated evaluation. A resume parser may function without bias independently but contribute to discrimination when integrated with specific ranking algorithms and filtering thresholds. Second, information asymmetries mean deploying organizations bear legal responsibility without technical visibility into vendor-supplied algorithms, while vendors control implementations without meaningful disclosure requirements. Each stakeholder may believe they are compliant; nevertheless, the integrated system may produce biased outcomes. Analysis of implementation ambiguities reveals these challenges in practice. We propose multi-layered interventions including system-level audits, vendor guidelines, continuous monitoring mechanisms, and documentation across dependency chains. Our findings reveal that effective governance requires coordinated action across technical, organizational, and regulatory domains to establish meaningful accountability in distributed development environments.

Gauri Sharma, Maryam Molamohammadi

Mila Quebec AI Institute · Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Algorithmic Auditing Algorithmic Accountability Algorithmic Bias AI Governance

Apr 24, 2026cs.CY

A Co-Evolutionary Theory of Human-AI Coexistence: Mutualism, Governance, and Dynamics in Complex Societies

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, including Asimov's laws. This framing is insufficient for contemporary AI systems, which are increasingly adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social environments. This paper proposes conditional mutualism under governance as a framework for human-AI coexistence: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems develop, specialize, and coordinate under institutional conditions that preserve reciprocity, reversibility, psychological safety, and social legitimacy. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. We complement the analytical results with deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks. The simulations indicate that governed mutualism reaches a high coexistence index with negligible domination, whereas insufficient or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed developmental freedom. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem rather than as a static obedience problem.

Somyajit Chakraborty

School of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China

AI Alignment AI Governance

Apr 23, 2026cs.CY

Mathematical Modelling of Ethical AI Use in Higher Education: A Coordination Game Framework for Future-Facing Learning

The rapid uptake of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in higher education is reshaping assessment practices and intensifying concerns around academic integrity, fairness, and learning quality. While institutional responses increasingly emphasise policy guidance and ethical principles, there remains limited formal understanding of how collective norms of responsible or opportunistic AI use emerge and stabilise within student cohorts. This paper reframes student AI use in assessment as a coordination problem shaped by peer expectations and assessment design rather than individual compliance alone. We develop a coordination-based evolutionary game-theoretic framework that captures learning value, effort, perceived fairness, and transparency, with institutional AI governance modelled implicitly through reflective assessment incentives. We use analytical results and finite-population simulations to reveal threshold-driven behavioural transitions in student AI use: small, well-calibrated changes in reflective assessment incentives can trigger rapid shifts towards responsible, learning-oriented AI-use norms, whereas weak or misaligned incentives allow opportunistic practices to persist. These non-linear dynamics explain why policy statements alone often fail to change behaviour, while modest assessment redesigns can have disproportionate effects. By providing a mechanism-level account of how assessment structures shape collective AI-use practices, this work offers higher education institutions an analytically grounded tool for Future Facing Learning, supporting proportionate, pedagogy-led AI governance without reliance on surveillance or punitive enforcement.

Ndidi Bianca Ogbo, Zhao Song, Shatha Ghareeb +1

School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, United Kingdom

Educational Assessment Generative AI in Education AI Governance Responsible AI

Apr 23, 2026cs.AI

Rethinking Publication: A Certification Framework for AI-Enabled Research

AI research pipelines can now generate academic work that may satisfy existing peer review standards for quality, novelty, and methodological rigor. However, the publication system was built around the assumption that research is produced by human authors. It therefore lacks a clear way to evaluate work when the knowledge claim may be valid but the producer is partly or fully automated. This paper proposes a two-layer certification framework for AI-generated research. The first layer evaluates whether the knowledge claim is sound. The second layer evaluates the level of human contribution. This separation allows journals and conferences to assess pipeline-generated work more consistently without creating new institutions. The framework uses normative analysis, conceptual design, and dry-run validation against representative submission cases. It classifies human contribution into three categories: Category A, where the work is reachable by an automated pipeline; Category B, where human direction is required at identifiable stages; and Category C, where the work goes beyond current pipeline capability, especially at the problem-formulation stage. The paper also proposes dedicated benchmark slots for fully disclosed automated research. These slots would provide a transparent publication path and help reviewers calibrate judgments over time. The key argument is that publication has historically certified two things at once: that the knowledge is valid and that a human produced it. AI research pipelines separate these two claims. By decoupling knowledge certification from authorship attribution, the proposed framework responds to a structural change already underway. It can be implemented within existing editorial systems, works even when attribution is uncertain, and recognizes human frontier contribution based on epistemic value rather than human origin alone.

Yang Lu, Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu +1

AI-Assisted Scientific Research Scholarly Peer Review Authorship Attribution AI Governance

Apr 23, 2026cs.AI

Bounding the Black Box: A Statistical Certification Framework for AI Risk Regulation

Artificial intelligence now decides who receives a loan, who is flagged for criminal investigation, and whether an autonomous vehicle brakes in time. Governments have responded: the EU AI Act, the NIST Risk Management Framework, and the Council of Europe Convention all demand that high-risk systems demonstrate safety before deployment. Yet beneath this regulatory consensus lies a critical vacuum: none specifies what ``acceptable risk'' means in quantitative terms, and none provides a technical method for verifying that a deployed system actually meets such a threshold. The regulatory architecture is in place; the verification instrument is not. This gap is not theoretical. As the EU AI Act moves into full enforcement, developers face mandatory conformity assessments without established methodologies for producing quantitative safety evidence - and the systems most in need of oversight are opaque statistical inference engines that resist white-box scrutiny. This paper provides the missing instrument. Drawing on the aviation certification paradigm, we propose a two-stage framework that transforms AI risk regulation into engineering practice. In Stage One, a competent authority formally fixes an acceptable failure probability

δ

and an operational input domain

\varepsilon

- a normative act with direct civil liability implications. In Stage Two, the RoMA and gRoMA statistical verification tools compute a definitive, auditable upper bound on the system's true failure rate, requiring no access to model internals and scaling to arbitrary architectures. We demonstrate how this certificate satisfies existing regulatory obligations, shifts accountability upstream to developers, and integrates with the legal frameworks that exist today.

Natan Levy, Gadi Perl

School of Computer Science and Engineering The Hebrew University of Jerusalem(HUJI) Jerusalem, Israel · dept. name of organization (of Aff.) The Hebrew University of Jerusalem(HUJI) Jerusalem, Israel

AI Assurance AI Risk Management AI Governance Black-Box Model Auditing

Apr 23, 2026cs.AI

Engaged AI Governance: Addressing the Last Mile Challenge Through Internal Expert Collaboration

Under the EU AI Act, translating AI governance requirements into software development practice remains challenging. While AI governance frameworks exist at industry and organizational levels, empirical evidence of team-level implementation is scarce. We address this "Last Mile" Challenge through insider action research embedded within an AI startup. We present a legal-text-to-action pipeline that translates EU AI Act requirements into actionable strategies through internal expert collaboration by extracting requirements from legal text, engaging practitioners in assessment and ideation, and prioritizing implementation through collective evaluation. Our analysis reveals three patterns in how practitioners perceive regulatory requirements: convergence (compliance aligns with development priorities), existing practice (current work already satisfies requirements), and disconnection (requirements perceived as administrative overhead). Based on these patterns, we discuss when governance might be treated genuinely or performatively. Practitioners prioritize requirements that serve end-users or their own development needs, but view verification-oriented requirements as box-ticking exercises. This distinction suggests a translation challenge: regulatory requirements risk superficial treatment unless practitioners understand how compliance serves system quality and user protection. Expert collaboration offers a practical mechanism for transforming governance from external imposition to shared ownership and making previously invisible governance work visible and collective.

Simon Jarvers, Orestis Papakyriakopoulos

Technical University of Munich, Professorship for Societal Computing, Munich, Germany

Apr 22, 2026cs.AI

AI Governance under Political Turnover: The Alignment Surface of Compliance Design

Governments are increasingly interested in using AI to make administrative decisions cheaper, more scalable, and more consistent. But for probabilistic AI to be incorporated into public administration it must be embedded in a compliance layer that makes decisions reviewable, repeatable, and legally defensible. That layer can improve oversight by making departures from law easier to detect. But it can also create a stable approval boundary that political successors learn to navigate while preserving the appearance of lawful administration. We develop a formal model in which institutions choose the scale of automation, the degree of codification, and safeguards on iterative use. The model shows when these systems become vulnerable to strategic use from within government, why reforms that initially improve oversight can later increase that vulnerability, and why expansions in AI use may be difficult to unwind. Making AI usable can thus make procedures easier for future governments to learn and exploit.

Andrew J. Peterson

University of Poitiers

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 22, 2026cs.CY

Relative Principals, Pluralistic Alignment, and the Structural Value Alignment Problem

The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a purely technical or normative challenge, sometimes focused on hypothetical future systems. I argue that the problem is better understood as a structural question about governance: not whether an AI system is aligned in the abstract, but whether it is aligned enough, for whom, and at what cost. Drawing on the principal-agent framework from economics, this paper reconceptualises misalignment as arising along three interacting axes: objectives, information, and principals. The three-axis framework provides a systematic way of diagnosing why misalignment arises in real-world systems and clarifies that alignment cannot be treated as a single technical property of models but an outcome shaped by how objectives are specified, how information is distributed, and whose interests count in practice. The core contribution of this paper is to show that the three-axis decomposition implies that alignment is fundamentally a problem of governance rather than engineering alone. From this perspective, alignment is inherently pluralistic and context-dependent, and resolving misalignment involves trade-offs among competing values. Because misalignment can occur along each axis -- and affect stakeholders differently -- the structural description shows that alignment cannot be "solved" through technical design alone, but must be managed through ongoing institutional processes that determine how objectives are set, how systems are evaluated, and how affected communities can contest or reshape those decisions.

Travis LaCroix

Durham University, United Kingdom

AI Alignment AI Governance Pluralistic Alignment Value Alignment

Apr 22, 2026cs.AI

Measuring the Machine: Evaluating Generative AI as Pluralist Sociotechical Systems

In measurement theory, instruments do not simply record reality; they help constitute what is observed. The same holds for generative AI evaluation: benchmarks do not just measure, they shape what models appear to be. Functionalist benchmarks treat models as isolated predictors, while prescriptive approaches assess what systems ought to be. Both obscure the sociotechnical processes through which meaning and values are enacted, risking the reification of narrow cultural perspectives in pluralist contexts. This thesis advances a descriptive alternative. It argues that generative AI must be evaluated as a pluralist sociotechnical system and develops Machine-Society-Human (MaSH) Loops, a framework for tracing how models, users, and institutions recursively co-construct meaning and values. Evaluation shifts from judging outputs to examining how values are enacted in interaction. Three contributions follow. Conceptually, MaSH Loops reframes evaluation as recursive, enactive process. Methodologically, the World Values Benchmark introduces a distributional approach grounded in World Values Survey data, structured prompt sets, and anchor-aware scoring. Empirically, the thesis demonstrates these through two cases: value drift in early GPT-3 and sociotechnical evaluation in real estate. A final chapter draws on participatory realism to argue that prompting and evaluation are constitutive interventions, not neutral observations. The thesis argues that static benchmarks are insufficient for generative AI. Responsible evaluation requires pluralist, process-oriented frameworks that make visible whose values are enacted. Evaluation is therefore a site of governance, shaping how AI systems are understood, deployed, and trusted.

Rebecca L. Johnson

The School of History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Science The University of Sydney

AI Governance Generative AI Evaluation

Apr 20, 2026cs.CY

Informing AI Policy Assessment using Large-Scale Simulation of Interventions

As the rapid proliferation of AI systems and harms spurs efforts in AI governance around the world, prioritizing among competing policy options has become increasingly challenging for policymakers and researchers. We introduce a methodology for identifying viable policy options to mitigate specified AI harms, helping policymakers and researchers target areas that warrant greater time and resource investment. This method combines participatory evaluation of policies, expert assessment of implementation costs, and an LLM-based assessment of perceived harm mitigation under each policy option. We leverage a genetic algorithm-based simulation study to explore a vast solution space of potential policy combinations, and examine how outcomes change under different weightings of cost, participatory input, and harm mitigation. We find that this method enables exploration of different balances between participatory and expert components, allowing policymakers and researchers to assess how much weight to assign to each. We argue that the diversity of viable policy combinations found by the genetic algorithm could be a useful starting point for deliberation. This method operationalizes existing work on participatory AI by integrating it directly into practical policy development pipelines.

Julia Barnett, Kimon Kieslich, Natali Helberger +1

Northwestern University, USA · University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands · University of Hohenheim, Germany

Apr 20, 2026cs.CR

Position: No Retroactive Cure for Infringement during Training

As generative AI faces intensifying legal challenges, the machine learning community has increasingly relied on post-hoc mitigation -- especially machine unlearning and inference-time guardrails -- to argue for compliance. This paper argues that such post-hoc mitigation methods cannot retroactively cure liability from unlawful acquisition and training, because compliance hinges on data lineage, not the outputs. Our argument has three parts. First, unauthorized copying/ingestion can be a legally complete completed act, and model weights may operate as fixed copies that retain training-derived expressive value, making later filtering beside the point for infringement. Second, contract and tort/unfair-competition rules -- via licenses, terms of service, and anti-free-riding principles -- can independently restrict access and use, often bypassing copyright defenses (e.g., fair use or TDM exceptions). Third, since value from protected inputs can persist in weights, remedies such as unjust enrichment and disgorgement may require stripping gains and, in some cases, reaching the model itself. We therefore argue for a shift from Post-Hoc Sanitization to verifiable Ex-Ante Process Compliance.

Satoru Utsunomiya, Masaru Isonuma, Junichiro Mori +1

The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan · NII LLMC, Tokyo, Japan · Tohoku University, Miyagi, Japan +1

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 19, 2026cs.CY

The Open-Weight Paradox: Why Restricting Access to AI Models May Undermine the Safety It Seeks to Protect

The governance of open-weight artificial intelligence (AI) models has been framed as a binary choice: openness as risk, restriction as safety. This paper challenges that framing, arguing that access restrictions, without governed alternatives, may displace risks rather than reduce them. The global concentration of compute infrastructure makes open-weight models one of the most viable pathways to sovereign AI capacity in the Global South; restricting such access deepens asymmetries while driving proliferation into unsupervised settings. This analysis proposes that hardware-layer governance, including chip-level attestation mechanisms such as FlexHEG, trusted execution environments, confidential computing, and complementary software-layer safeguards, offers a defense-in-depth alternative to the current binary. A threat model taxonomy mapping misuse vectors to hardware, software, institutional, and liability layers illustrates why no single governance mechanism suffices. To operationalize this approach, the paper argues that effective AI governance as a dual-use technology will likely require a multilateral institutional architecture functionally analogous, though not identical, to the role performed by the IAEA in the nuclear domain, with explicit safeguards against the co-option of hardware controls for domestic repression. The relevant policy question is how to make openness safer through technical and institutional design while addressing the transition realities of legacy hardware, attestation at scale, and civil liberties protection.

Vinicius Santana Gomes

Special Advisor, Government of the Federal District of Brazil · AI Instructor, School of Government of the Federal District of Brazil

Apr 17, 2026cs.CY

High-Risk AI Systems and the Problem of Identity in the European AI Act

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) establishes a lifecycle governance regime for high-risk AI systems built around ex-ante conformity assessment, post-market monitoring, and re-assessment upon "substantial modification." These obligations presuppose AI identity judgments: regulators and providers must decide when an updated system remains the same system over time. In this work, we show how this logic is clarified by the function+ framework of artifact identity, which individuates AI systems by their intended function together with context-sensitive criteria of appropriate functioning, captured as "AI trustworthiness." We further argue that the AIA does not provide an internal, auditable criterion for synchronic identity--when two AI systems at a given time should count as the same for regulatory purposes--and instead largely defers such sameness determinations to sectoral or harmonization instruments. function+ supplies a synchronic identity test anchored in intended function and trustworthiness profiles and levels, making synchronic identity decisions inspectable in governance settings such as procurement, liability, and market surveillance. Our contribution is a conceptual and auditing lens: we provide a correspondence map between AIA lifecycle obligations and function+ identity components, and we make the synchronic case operationally legible via a minimal decision flow for audit and dispute contexts. We conclude with two implementation-facing recommendations: (1) more precise, testable reporting of intended purpose, and (2) standardized, auditable trustworthiness reporting that supports comparability over time and across deployments.

Andrea Ferrario

Institute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland · SUPSI, Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA), Lugano, Switzerland · ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

AI Assurance AI Governance

Apr 17, 2026cs.CY

Reckoning with the Political Economy of AI: Avoiding Decoys in Pursuit of Accountability

The Project of AI is a world-building endeavor, wherein those who fund and develop AI systems both operate through and seek to sustain networks of power and wealth. As they expand their access to resources and configure our sociotechnical conditions, they benefit from the ways in which a suite of decoys animate scholars, critics, policymakers, journalists, and the public into co-constructing industry-empowering AI futures. Regardless of who constructs or nurtures them, these decoys often create the illusion of accountability while both masking the emerging political economies that the Project of AI has set into motion, and also contributing to the network-making power that is at the heart of the Project's extraction and exploitation. Drawing on literature at the intersection of communication, science and technology studies, and economic sociology, we examine how the Project of AI is constructed. We then explore five decoys that seemingly critique - but in actuality co-constitute - AI's emergent power relations and material political economy. We argue that advancing meaningful fairness or accountability in AI requires: 1) recognizing when and how decoys serve as a distraction, and 2) grappling directly with the material political economy of the Project of AI. Doing so will enable us to attend to the networks of power that make 'AI' possible, spurring new visions for how to realize a more just technologically entangled world.

Janet Vertesi, danah boyd, Alex Taylor +1

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ USA · Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA · University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK +1

AI Accountability Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance

Apr 16, 2026cs.AI

Bureaucratic Silences: What the Canadian AI Register Reveals, Omits, and Obscures

In November 2025, the Government of Canada operationalized its commitment to transparency by releasing its first Federal AI Register. In this paper, we argue that such registers are not neutral mirrors of government activity, but active instruments of ontological design that configure the boundaries of accountability. We analyzed the Register's complete dataset of 409 systems using the Algorithmic Decision-Making Adapted for the Public Sector (ADMAPS) framework, combining quantitative mapping with deductive qualitative coding. Our findings reveal a sharp divergence between the rhetoric of "sovereign AI" and the reality of bureaucratic practice: while 86% of systems are deployed internally for efficiency, the Register systematically obscures the human discretion, training, and uncertainty management required to operate them. By privileging technical descriptions over sociotechnical context, the Register constructs an ontology of AI as "reliable tooling" rather than "contestable decision-making." We conclude that without a shift in design, such transparency artifacts risk automating accountability into a performative compliance exercise, offering visibility without contestability.

Dipto Das, Christelle Tessono, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed +1

Department of Computer Science · University of Toronto · Toronto, Ontario, Canada +1

Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Apr 16, 2026cs.CY

Data-driven and distributed governance of building facilities management using decentralized autonomous organization, digital twin, and large language models

While traditional AI and data-driven facilities management approaches have improved building operational efficiency, they remain constrained by centralized organizational structures that are vulnerable to cyber attacks, limited contextual understanding, and decision-making processes that exclude key stakeholders from governance. This paper introduces a novel AI- and data-driven distributed governance framework for smart building management that integrates decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), digital twins, large language models (LLMs), and blockchain technology. The framework enables transparent collective decision-making through a DAO governance platform, implements data-driven management using IoT and digital twins, incorporates LLM-based virtual assistants for enhanced decision support, and utilizes blockchain for secure building automation. A full-stack decentralized application was developed to facilitate user interaction with these integrated components. The system was evaluated for cost efficiency, scalability, data security, and usability using the System Usability Scale (SUS). Expert interviews were also conducted to assess its practical benefits and implementation challenges.

Reachsak Ly, Alireza Shojaei, Xinghua Gao +2

School of Technology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois, United States · Myers-Lawson School of Construction, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, United States

AI-Assisted Decision Making AI Governance

Apr 16, 2026cs.AI

Governing Reflective Human-AI Collaboration: A Framework for Epistemic Scaffolding and Traceable Reasoning

Large language models have advanced rapidly, from pattern recognition to emerging forms of reasoning, yet they remain confined to linguistic simulation rather than grounded understanding. They can produce fluent outputs that resemble reflection, but lack temporal continuity, causal feedback, and anchoring in real-world interaction. This paper proposes a complementary approach in which reasoning is treated as a relational process distributed between human and model rather than an internal capability of either. Building on recent work on "System-2" learning, we relocate reflective reasoning to the interaction layer. Instead of engineering reasoning solely within models, we frame it as a cognitive protocol that can be structured, measured, and governed using existing systems. This perspective emphasizes collaborative intelligence, combining human judgment and contextual understanding with machine speed, memory, and associative capacity. We introduce "The Architect's Pen" as a practical method. Like an architect who thinks through drawing, the human uses the model as an external medium for structured reflection. By embedding phases of articulation, critique, and revision into human-AI interaction, the dialogue itself becomes a reasoning loop: human abstraction -> model articulation -> human reflection. This reframes the question from whether the model can think to whether the human-AI system can reason. The framework enables auditable reasoning traces and supports alignment with emerging governance standards, including the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001. It provides a practical path toward more transparent, controllable, and accountable AI use without requiring new model architectures.

Rikard Rosenbacke, Carl Rosenbacke, Victor Rosenbacke +1

Faculty of Medicine, Lund University, Sweden · Department of Economics, Lund University School of Economics and Management, Sweden · Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, UK

AI Governance Human-AI Collaboration LLM Reasoning

Apr 16, 2026cs.AI

The Missing Knowledge Layer in AI: A Framework for Stable Human-AI Reasoning

Large language models are increasingly integrated into decision-making in areas such as healthcare, law, finance, engineering, and government. Yet they share a critical limitation: they produce fluent outputs even when their internal reasoning has drifted. A confident answer can conceal uncertainty, speculation, or inconsistency, and small changes in phrasing can lead to different conclusions. This makes LLMs useful assistants but unreliable partners in high-stakes contexts. Humans exhibit a similar weakness, often mistaking fluency for reliability. When a model responds smoothly, users tend to trust it, even when both model and user are drifting together. This paper is the first in a five-paper research series on stabilising human-AI reasoning. The series proposes a two-layer approach: Parts II-IV introduce human-side mechanisms such as uncertainty cues, conflict surfacing, and auditable reasoning traces, while Part V develops a model-side Epistemic Control Loop (ECL) that detects instability and modulates generation accordingly. Together, these layers form a missing operational substrate for governance by increasing signal-to-noise at the point of use. Stabilising interaction makes uncertainty and drift visible before enforcement is applied, enabling more precise capability governance. This aligns with emerging compliance expectations, including the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001, by making reasoning processes traceable under real conditions of use. The central claim is that fluency is not reliability. Without structures that stabilise both human and model reasoning, AI cannot be trusted or governed where it matters most.

Rikard Rosenbacke, Carl Rosenbacke, Victor Rosenbacke +1

Faculty of Medicine, Lund University, Sweden · Department of Economics, Lund University School of Economics and Management, Sweden · Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, UK

LLM Uncertainty Estimation AI Governance Human-AI Decision Making Human Oversight of AI

Apr 14, 2026cs.AI

Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2026

Welcome to the ninth edition of the AI Index report. As AI continues to advance rapidly, the question becomes whether the systems built around it can keep up. Governance frameworks, evaluation methods, education systems, and the data infrastructure needed to track AI's impact are struggling to match the pace of the technology itself. That gap between what AI can do and how prepared we are to manage it runs through every chapter of this year's report. New in this edition, the report tracks how AI is being tested more ambitiously across reasoning, safety, and real-world task execution, and why those measurements are increasingly difficult to rely on. It also features new estimates of generative AI's economic value alongside emerging evidence of its labor market effects, an analytical framework on AI sovereignty, and a science chapter developed in collaboration with Schmidt Sciences. For the first time, the report features standalone chapters on AI in science and AI in medicine, reflecting AI's growing impact across these two domains.

Sha Sajadieh, Loredana Fattorini, Raymond Perrault +20

Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI)

AI for Science AI Governance Generative AI Evaluation

Apr 10, 2026cs.CY

Post-Deployment Accountability in AI Governance: A Cross-Regulatory Empirical Analysis of AI Incidents

Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020--2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.

Ummara Mumtaz, Summaya Mumtaz

AI Accountability AI Governance Responsible AI