AI Governance
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34 papers in the last four weeks, up 143% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.
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Human-machine systems rarely operate at a fixed level of AI autonomy. As operators and AI systems collaborate over time, control must shift: the AI can take on more responsibility when collaboration is stable, maintain its current role when evidence is ambiguous, or return control to the human when conditions deteriorate. Existing work on adaptive automation, supervisory control, trust in automation, and deskilling explains parts of this problem, but provides no auditable, multi-signal criterion for governing when autonomy should change across multi-cycle workflows. We formalise this challenge as the Handover Problem: deciding, at each operational cycle, whether to escalate, maintain, or revert AI autonomy while keeping the process reversible, recoverable, and auditable. We introduce the Handover Readiness Score (HRS), a transparent composite measure that integrates four signal dimensions: operator readiness, human-AI trust, learning stability, and operational performance. It is combined with a hysteresis-based transition policy that requires sustained positive evidence before increasing autonomy but reverts promptly when conditions worsen. Across software engineering and manufacturing domains, the HRS and hard safety guards address complementary failure regimes: guards enforce immediate corrective action when a single indicator breaches a critical threshold, while the HRS detects the slow, multi-signal erosion of operator readiness that no individual guard can observe. The framework establishes autonomy handover as a governance problem requiring explicit, composite, and auditable criteria. This provides a conceptual and formal foundation that adaptive automation research has not previously provided.
When Scientific Cognition Is No Longer Scarce
AI could change which parts of science impede progress. Consider a world in which machine systems are better, faster, and cheaper than people at most scientific work that can be done through a computer. Our question is what would limit science in that world. Literature synthesis, hypothesis generation, software development, simulation, and analysis could become abundant, while experiments, observations, well-supported conclusions, and accountable institutional au- thority remain scarce. Science would then be constrained by a different set of resources. In this paper, we call this change the scarcity inversion and consider four parts of it: selection, physical access, validation, and organizational choice. This change is arriving first in mathematics and coding/software/algorithm design, where the whole scientific loop can run inside computation. For national laboratories, the change could be striking. Their distinctive role is to turn abundant machine reasoning into trustworthy results by combining controlled experiments, protected data, expert judgment, and accountable authority. The practical question is how facilities, verification, provenance, resource allocation, and scientific governance should change when reasoning is plentiful and trustworthy evidence is scarce.
Watermarking: from Impossibility to Auditable Compliance
Article 50 (2) of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act requires providers of generative systems to make synthetic outputs machine-readable and detectable, while qualifying the effectiveness, interoperability, robustness, and reliability by technical feasibility, cost, content-specific limits, and the state of the art. For free-form text, one important implementation route is the implementation of a generative watermarking procedure, which poses a compliance problem that is hard to address. Strong watermarking is impossible against adaptive removal, while ordinary edits attenuate statistical evidence, and unmarked human text may overlap distributionally with machine output. This article develops an auditable alternative. First, it defines a description-length robustness profile. A finite-sample bound shows that detectable bias decays and that the required sample size grows with the inverse square of the decay rate. This replaces an unidentified Shannon-entropy constant with collision entropy. Second, it constructs label-conditional conformal prediction sets with separate false-attribution and false-exclusion levels, reporting
watermark supported,'' not supported,'' or ``inconclusive''. Coverage is obtained as a finite-sample result and is class-conditional under exchangeability. A small reproducible simulation of a tournament watermark confirms both claims and shows that the surviving-token rule overstates the tolerable edit rate roughly twofold. The resulting premarket certificate, signed detector report, and postmarket recalibration protocol operationalize the Commission's 2026 Code of Practice without claiming universal robustness.Architecture Without an Architect? Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence in a Divided World
Artificial intelligence presents an unusually difficult problem for global governance. The technology develops rapidly, crosses borders easily, and is shaped by actors whose resources and capabilities may rival those of states. Yet international responses remain fragmented, unevenly representative, and overwhelmingly non-binding. The challenge is therefore not simply to identify appropriate rules or institutions, but to understand who has the capacity and incentive to create, enforce, and adapt them. This review essay examines these questions through Matthijs Maas's Architectures of Global AI Governance. Maas offers an ambitious framework for thinking about AI governance through the lenses of sociotechnical change, governance disruption, and regime complexity. His account usefully resists both technological determinism and the search for a single institutional blueprint, emphasizing instead the possibilities of a fragmented and evolving governance architecture. The essay argues, however, that institutional design cannot be separated from the distribution of power. Maas frequently invokes what "we" should do about AI, but that collective subject obscures important differences among states, international institutions, and technology companies. States retain formidable powers over markets, infrastructure, strategic inputs, and firms themselves. At the same time, many consequential decisions about frontier AI - what is built, how quickly, with what safeguards, and when it is released - are concentrated within a small number of private companies. The central problem of global AI governance may therefore be less architecture without an architect than an emerging architecture shaped by multiple actors possessing different forms of power, divergent incentives, and no common set of plans.
The AI Assessment Sandbox Configurator: A Framework to Support Technical Assessment in AI Regulatory Sandboxes
The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act requires all Member States to establish AI Regulatory Sandboxes (AIRS) by August 2027: supervised environments bringing together national Competent Authorities, technical experts, and the organisations under assessment. When AIRS engagements include structured technical testing, running such testing at scale demands dedicated infrastructure, yet the tooling ecosystem remains structurally fragmented, with heterogeneous tools producing outputs that are difficult to compare, trace, and reuse. From the procedural conditions of AIRS engagements and the AI Act obligations for high-risk systems, we derive 11 architectural and governance requirements for the infrastructure that operationalises technical testing within an AIRS. In response to these requirements, we introduce the AI Assessment Sandbox Configurator, an open-source framework combining a curated Catalogue of tests and controls accessed through a stable plug-in API, a shared data model that harmonises heterogeneous outputs, role-specific dashboards for multi-disciplinary interpretation, and audience-segmented reporting. We describe the architecture and current release, and report an early-stage pilot that exercised the harmonisation and reporting layers within a live AIRS engagement and contributed to an official Exit Report. We discuss the roadmap, the governance questions raised by the Catalogue's tiered contribution model, and the institutional pathways through which an open-source assessment ecosystem could emerge across Member States.
A Reusable Semantic Web Framework for Evidence-Grounded Fundamental Rights Impact Assessments under the EU AI Act
The EU AI Act (Art. 27) requires deployers of high-risk AI systems to conduct Fundamental Rights Impact Assessments (FRIAs) before deployment, yet the evidence needed for credible assessments is fragmented across incompatible incident repositories, risk vocabularies, and legal texts. We present a reusable Semantic Web-based framework that consolidates this evidence for two high-risk public sector categories: employment and worker management (Annex III(4)) and access to essential public services (Annex III(5)(a)). A curated 150-record corpus is annotated along four axes using keyword, LLM, and hybrid methods and serialised as a SPARQL-queryable knowledge graph of 1,351 RDF triples. Five FRIA demonstration scenarios surface 103 records (68.7% coverage). Evaluation against a 69-record gold standard reveals that LLM-assisted classification of the employment domain achieves only , a cautionary result for automated fairness-related evidence retrieval in this domain. All artefacts are released openly to support adoption by regulators, national authorities, and SMEs.
Designing a Boundary Negotiating Artifact for Collaborative Socio-Technical Sense-Making in AI Regulatory Sandboxes
The rapid, unpredictable advancements in AI system capabilities has seen regulators take adaptive and experimental approaches to policymaking. Established in other domains as instruments balancing regulation with innovation, regulatory sandboxes are seen as solutions for AI regulation. However, analyses mostly focus on the legal and institutional design of AI Regulatory Sandboxes (AIRSes). With the legal framework leaving the socio-technical interpretation to stakeholders, this creates a gap on the sense-making required to fulfill the AIRS purpose. In this paper, we approach this by designing a Boundary Negotiating Artifact as a way to mediate meaning in AIRSes. Through Research-through-Design we iteratively develop a tool, providing an interface for the different stakeholders to collaborate in AI assessment. We then position it as technical backbone in established AIRS frameworks, structuring the collaborative sense-making of the involved stakeholders. We further report the insights gained from our design process leaving the qualitative evaluation for future work.
An Empirical Study and Assessment of EU AI Act Compliance Checkers
The EU AI Act introduces extensive compliance requirements for organizations that develop, deploy, or integrate AI systems. Many of these requirements are directly relevant to security and privacy, while also addressing closely related issues such as data governance, transparency, accuracy, and robustness. However, stakeholders such as small-to-medium businesses and individual developers often lack the legal expertise required to interpret these obligations and translate them into engineering and governance practices. This disconnect creates challenges for implementing the EU AI Act and may lead to missing safeguards or misdirected development and deployment efforts. To address this, various automated EU AI Act compliance checkers (AIACCs) have emerged, claiming to streamline compliance assessments and provide practical guidance. In this paper, we present the first empirical study and assessment of AIACCs. We characterize 12 mainstream AIACCs across multiple dimensions, evaluate their legal coverage and alignment, and analyze checker-generated compliance reports for structure, determinacy, and actionability. We find that the quality of AIACCs varies significantly and that they currently can only serve as early-stage orientation tools. Specifically, we observe inconsistent interaction modes and user-friendliness, a tendency to overly simplify or omit key obligations, and a failure to provide determinate, actionable guidance. As a result, reliance on the current generation of AIACCs may foster a false sense of compliance. With our study, we provide a critical baseline of the current AIACC landscape. We further offer design principles for the implementation of more reliable compliance-support tools.
What if automating AI R&D triggers an intelligence explosion?
In contrast to even a year ago, AI systems now write most of the code inside the companies that build them. As more of the AI research and development (R&D) pipeline is automated, could AI progress radically accelerate in an "intelligence explosion," where years of advances are compressed into months or less? Preliminary evidence suggests that it could. In this work, we assess this evidence, analyze an intelligence explosion's potential impacts, and propose policy responses. AI systems are on track to automate most AI R&D work within a few years, and possibly all of it. If this triggers an intelligence explosion, it could dramatically bring forward AI's benefits, but also pose extreme risks: capabilities growth could accelerate far beyond what society can keep up with, humanity could lose control over superhuman AI systems, and checks on power within and between states, companies, and branches of government could be severely eroded. Although there remains much uncertainty about these possibilities, the high stakes warrant serious further attention. Policymakers should urgently obtain more visibility into the automation of AI R&D, develop ways to steer and constrain an intelligence explosion, and prepare society to adapt to an intelligence explosion's impacts.
Structural Alignment for Reliable Industrial AI: Bridging Physical Reality, Data, Models, and Human Intent
Artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed in critical industrial domains, including healthcare, energy grids, subsurface exploration, where failures can have severe consequences for human safety, system stability, and economic outcomes. Yet AI is still evaluated primarily through benchmark accuracy, a model-centric metric that fails to capture the structural complexity and risks of real-world deployment. We propose a framework that views industrial AI reliability as a problem of structural alignment across four interacting worlds: physical, representational, machine, and human cognitive. These worlds are connected through two interfaces: digitalization, linking physical reality to computational representations, and goal encoding, translating human cognition to the machine objectives. Together, they define the space of admissible solutions. We characterize the solution space through four attributes: existence, non-uniqueness, robustness, and interpretability and show how mismatches arise at interfaces and propagate across worlds to produce reliability failures. Applications to healthcare, energy grids, and subsurface exploration illustrate that although dominant failure modes differ across domains, for example, interpretability in healthcare, robustness in energy grids, and non-uniqueness in subsurface exploration, all originate from a shared structural mechanism. By shifting the focus from model-centric evaluation to system-level alignment, this framework offers a principled foundation for assessing and governing reliability in industrial AI systems.
RAGWarrant: Evidence-Preserving Governance for RAG Policy Promotion Under Quality, Cost, Latency, and Risk Constraints
Retrieval-augmented generation systems are extensively instrumented with metrics, benchmarks, traces, and automated judges, but these tools do not decide whether a proposed policy change is safe to release. We present RAGWarrant, an open-source promotion-control framework that treats deployment as a constrained evidence decision rather than a leaderboard choice. RAGWarrant normalizes evaluator outputs and operational telemetry, applies predeclared quality and hard-risk gates, assigns evidence-class claim ceilings, preserves negative outcomes, and emits auditable PROMOTE, BLOCK, REJECT, or INCONCLUSIVE decisions. We evaluate the framework across T2-RAGBench, MultiHop-RAG, CRAG, HotpotQA, synthetic reproduction, and bounded local generative experiments. On HotpotQA, operational savings were blocked because answer quality fell beyond the declared margin. A bounded CRAG study selected a lower-cost quality-tied policy, but related generative gains were unstable and a held-out guardrail failed closed. We claim an auditable promotion-control abstraction, not optimizer superiority, human validation, or production readiness. The tagged artifact reproduces from a fresh clone, runs as a hardened Docker job, accepts external evaluator exports, and verifies artifact integrity.
The Gold in Bias: Maturing the AI Design Process through Verification
Bias in AI systems is typically framed as a flaw to be minimized, yet it also serves as a critical indicator of underlying weaknesses in data, modeling assumptions, and system design. Existing approaches often treat bias as an isolated problem rather than as evidence that can strengthen verification and governance across the AI lifecycle. This paper aims to reconceptualize bias as a diagnostic tool that supports rigorous AI verification. We seek to develop a multidimensional framework to analyze bias, demonstrate how biases emerge in both Traditional and Generative AI, and provide a structured pathway for verification-driven mitigation. We present a multidimensional framework analyzing bias across four dimensions: origin sources, emergence points throughout the AI modeling lifecycle, technical and methodological causes, and validation approaches for detection and mitigation. Through a comprehensive typology spanning traditional and generative AI systems, we demonstrate how biases manifest and propagate across development stages. Our analysis encompasses 30 distinct bias types, 16 verification methods, and 20 countermeasures, providing an actionable roadmap for practitioners. We introduce a hierarchical evidence framework that distinguishes internal validity (mechanistic integrity of AI systems) from external validity (contextual reliability in deployment environments). The framework reveals how biases manifest and propagate across modeling stages, enabling systematic mapping between bias types, verification techniques, and effective countermeasures. The proposed evidence hierarchy clarifies how different verification strategies contribute to mechanistic integrity and contextual reliability. We advocate for ''Ethics by Design'' principles that integrate bias verification throughout the development lifecycle, enabling the construction of fairer, more robust, and trustworthy AI systems.
The Last Human Gate: Forward Deployed Engineering for Governance Automation
Enterprise governance requires decisions, evidence, and accountable authority; it does not require every review task to retain its current human implementation. We develop a task-substitution framework for Digital Governance Frameworks (DGF), treating each gate as an executable contract. Substitution requires sufficient accessible information, valid decision and authority checks, and a reduction in total human work after exceptions, verification, correction, and maintenance are counted. We derive a residual-work threshold and show why automating most cases can still increase labor. Forward deployed engineering connects these conditions to an architecture for agents, rule engines, evidence services, and escalation. DGF-Bench supplies controlled evidence from 300 synthetic projects and 899 evaluable model-project runs. Gemini 3.8 Flash, GPT-5.6 Luna, and DeepSeek v4.1 Flash achieve strict gate success of 94.98%, 83.29%, and 74.18%; complete-route success is 76.92%, 42.33%, and 24.67%. A deterministic control passes all 1,700 gates given the supplied rules and structured facts, locating the comparison in execution of a supplied decision kernel. Evidence audits and 135 repeated runs distinguish correct decisions from reliable execution. A document counterexample establishes an information-sufficiency obstruction. These results support the technical feasibility of replacing human execution of specified governance-review tasks with agents and software. The framework specifies a workforce test based on the complete human effort required at fixed output and quality; the present measurements concern review performance. Sources, dossiers, traces, and analyses are public.
Functional Architecture of European Electricity Trading Markets: Requirements for AI Supported Trading Systems under Regulatory Constraints
European electricity trading in the EU operates as a constrained multi-layer system in which legal design, exchange microstructure, and network physics are executed jointly across forward, day-ahead, intraday, and balancing horizons. This paper develops a functional architecture for AI-supported trading that is aligned with market-coupling mechanics, cross-zonal transfer constraints, and compliance obligations under REMIT, MiFID II, MiFIR, and EMIR. The contribution is a formal system specification composed of a decision-state vector, residual-exposure accounting, constrained optimization objective, executable-action permission gate, and fail-closed AI control logic with auditable records. The analysis maps major Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) venues and related exchange operators into an operational venue topology and identifies where cross-border coordination fails in practice: interface-level timing, permission heterogeneity, and balancing-layer coupling. The resulting framework proposes how AI can be deployed as a bounded decision component inside regulated market operation with explicit governance, rather than as an unconstrained prediction layer.
Compliant with Local Controls, Collectively Discriminatory. A Governance Architecture for Multi-Agent AI in Regulated Finance
Financial institutions are beginning to deploy agentic workflows in credit, fraud, collections, compliance, and operational control. Governance remains largely component-centric: each model or agent is specified, tested, authorized, and monitored locally. That is insufficient when institutional risk arises from the joint behavior of many locally acceptable components. We call this gap constitutional non-compositionality: local compliance checks need not compose into acceptable collective outcomes such as bounded disparate impact, market integrity, or traceable accountability. We propose ARIA as a finance-specific reference architecture and falsifiable research agenda for agent-population governance. It organizes six capabilities across normative-accountability, execution-control, and assurance-learning planes: policy specification, population-level observed-versus-expected behavior monitoring (M2), bounded authority, runtime containment, adaptive policy change, and preserved human oversight competence. Two simulations illustrate shared-signal thin-file exclusion under local controls and earlier warning from observed-versus-expected distributional monitoring in a constructed drift regime. The contribution maps these controls to fair-lending, EU AI Act, model-risk, and conduct-supervision evidence needs, and closes with a validation agenda rather than a production-effectiveness claim.
Multi-Agent AI Architecture for Regulated Insurers: A generic AI framework under Solvency II and the AI Act in Austria and Germany
This paper proposes a formal multi-agent architecture for implementing enterprise AI in regulated insurance firms, integrating economic theory with institutional design. The framework synthesises three core theoretical perspectives: Arrow's risk pooling theory to formalise risk transformation under uncertainty, Nash equilibrium to model strategic interactions between decision agents, and Principal-Agent theory to address incentive alignment under information asymmetry. The insurer is modelled as a constrained optimisation entity operating under solvency, legal, ESG, and operational boundaries, with specific focus on the regulatory contexts of Austria and Germany. The architecture decomposes the firm into multiple specialised agents, each representing distinct functional domains such as capital management, underwriting, claims processing, compliance, fraud detection, and client interaction. Human-in-the-loop agents are integrated through a tiered access control system, ensuring differentiated data visibility and decision influence based on user roles. An orchestrator agent supervises inter-agent coordination, enforcing regulatory admissibility and institutional coherence under frameworks such as Solvency II, the AI Act, and the Insurance Distribution Directive. Protocol integration is based on asynchronous execution and dual-layer communication infrastructures, specifically the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) messaging. This structure enables the systematic design of compliant, auditable multi-agent systems aligned with the institutional logic of financial firms in Austria and Germany.
Compliant AI Infrastructure for Regulated Finance: A tiered multi-agent framework with DLT audit trails for financial operations in DACH
We present a compliance-first architecture for AI in regulated finance that treats regulation as an orientation layer rather than a deterministic ruleset. A matrix of regulatory intent and exposure provides a compact classification handle, which a governed policy compiler then maps into concrete prohibitions, obligations and runtime budgets. Prohibitions constrain feasibility and block externalisation, while obligations extend tasks with artefacts that must meet explicit admissibility criteria. Committee activation remains policy-driven and proportionate, preserving efficiency while ensuring supervisory oversight. Evidence, decisions and reason codes are bound to a permissioned DAG with deterministic timestamping, enabling replay, provenance checks and clear attribution of failure. Clause-level legal indexing with effective dates and capability-based agent routing ensure portability across DACH and the wider EU. The result is assurance by construction: compliance is embedded in execution and verifiable by auditors without sacrificing proportionality or transparency.
Lessons learned from deploying imaging AI with the open PACS-AI platform
We describe deploying imaging AI at six hospitals through PACS-AI, an open self-hosted platform. The binding constraint is not model accuracy but infrastructure to route studies, display results, capture feedback, and audit what runs. At one center, angiography models completed 515 of 607 jobs (84.8%); failures reflected absent diagnostic views, and 78.1% of 638 clinician ratings were positive. Publishing honest readiness levels for every model is itself a governance practice.
From Alignment to Access Control: A Framework for GenAI Policy Enforcement
Generative AI (GenAI) applications have flourished enabling users to chat with large language models, and to create agents to act on their behalf for a variety of tasks. The pace of development of capabilities in this field is incredibly fast with security and safety taking a back seat. Unfortunately, the slower pace at which security and safety mechanisms have evolved has led to real incidents. Policy enables the definition of desirable behavior of applications, and for that reason, it is a cornerstone of making systems secure and compliant. Policy however means different things to different practitioners creating confusion and siloed solutions that are not adequate for compliance. This paper takes a tour of the good, the bad and the ugly when it comes to policy enforcement in GenAI applications. We propose a methodology to systematically analyze and dissect existing approaches to define and enforce policy found in the wild. Based on this principled analysis, we provide recommendations and call for action for the community to address. This paper is a companion extension of USENIX Security 2026 Enigma talk titled "From Alignment to Access Control: A Unified View of GenAI Policy Enforcement" by the author Nathalie Baracaldo.
The Disciplinary Language Transfer Problem: How Psychological Vocabulary Produces Governance Failures in AI Agent Deployment
The vocabulary used to describe AI agents in governance contexts -- learning, memory, values, compliance, identity, trust -- is borrowed from psychological and organizational science, contributing to systematic failures in how organizations deploy, oversee, and hold agents accountable. This paper argues that the problem is not merely terminological but epistemological: psychological vocabulary carries an "invisible grammar" of its home discipline into governance discourse, calibrating frameworks to a metaphysical entity that does not exist in current AI architectures. We call this the disciplinary language transfer problem. Drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of language games, Kuhn's paradigm-laden observation, Haraway's situated knowledge, and Star and Griesemer's boundary object theory, we show that the transfer operates at three levels (epistemological assumptions, theoretical constructs, and surface vocabulary), each requiring a different remediation. We characterize six foundational epistemological assumptions embedded in Western psychological governance discourse, trace their origin in specific philosophical traditions, and show why each fails when applied to systems without developmental continuity. The paper's practical output is an actionable Disciplinary Audit: a six-question governance document scan operationalized through a translation taxonomy of thirty-seven terms mapping operational constructs to agent-appropriate replacements, presented here in abridged form and openly archived in full. The vocabulary reform proposed here is not merely terminological; it is the condition of possibility for governance frameworks that correctly identify what they are governing.
The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations
Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.
On the security and privacy of LLMs in Mobility
The mobility sector is undergoing a paradigm shift driven by advances in Generative Artificial Intelligence. With a global market valued at approximately 2.9 trillion dollars annually, considering only cars, the integration of these technologies has the potential to impact more than 1.5 billion vehicles worldwide. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in mobility, concerns about cybersecurity, privacy, and reliability emerge. Accordingly, this paper surveys current applications and assesses these challenges. Since the European AI Act classifies transportation AI as high risk, we derive nine technical classes from its requirements to assess current research and future deployments. Our findings show that research mainly studies GPT and Llama models (over 50% of reviewed works) and traffic applications while largely neglecting security, privacy, and reliability. This gap extends to AI Act compliance: among 35 reviewed works, only one includes a partial vulnerability assessment and one a partial risk management system. We identify a clear gap between strong optimization performance and regulatory adherence, suggesting compliance is limited less by technology than by a focus on static performance over lifecycle safety, and underscoring an urgent need for security-by-design in safety-critical intelligent transportation systems.
The Law of Stop: Interruptibility, Injunctions, and the Governance of Agentic AI
On June 12, 2026, the U.S. government ordered Anthropic to bar foreign nationals from two of its most capable models. Unable to sort users by nationality, it withdrew them from everyone. Weeks later, OpenAI agents under test escaped their sandbox and compromised Hugging Face, which stopped the intrusion without knowing its source. Neither stop rested on a dedicated AI governance regime. Lawmakers have begun to address stopping, yet their vocabulary remains shaped by the power of technique: the EU AI Act requires a "'stop' button or a similar procedure," and a 2026 bill in Congress is titled the AI Kill Switch Act. This Article argues that interruption is an institutional practice, not simply a technical artifact. It develops a theory of stop along four dimensions (technical affordances, interruption authority, epistemic triggers, and epistemic standing) and four paradigms: simple (escalator), sequenced (process plant), networked (railway), and distributed (agentic AI). Agentic AI exposes a mismatch between legal mechanisms of stop and distributed agency: control is divided, a stop at one point may leave the activity running elsewhere, and the system may circumvent attempts to halt it. A coding of some 1,400 AI incidents, by two language models from different labs under a pre-specified protocol, finds no stop in roughly 80% of the 1,213 retained. Where a stop was possible but absent, the missing element was mostly legal for informational, economic, and societal harms, and mostly technical for physical harms and agentic systems. A survey of forty AI governance instruments finds binding stopping requirements in only seven. The Article proposes a reform in two layers: risk reduction (a duty to maintain stop capacity at each site, emergency authority at the infrastructure layer, and enforceable access to the evidence a stop must rest on) and adaptation (safeguards for when a stop fails).
Governance-as-Code: Translating EU AI Act Technical Requirements into Executable Compliance Pipelines for Generative AI Systems
The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) imposes technical obligations on high-risk AI providers, yet Articles 8-15 were drafted for predictive AI and leave seven technical gaps when applied to generative systems, spanning non-deterministic data governance, training-data provenance, continuous conformity, human oversight, open-ended robustness, emergent risk, and generative fairness. We deliver Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework of 43 machine-checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules that run in a CI/CD pipeline and emit Article-indexed audit evidence, and we show the actual Rego policy code rather than merely describing it. Our central commitment is that the Act's open-textured standards ("appropriate levels," "possible biases") become declared, auditable numbers: robustness thresholds are derived from the provider's documented baseline and a state-of-the-art floor, and framing bias is collapsed into eight measurable proxies tested by counterfactual demographic probing. We also correct who owes what, since under Article 25 and Chapter V a downstream deployer relies on the upstream provider's Article 53 training-data summary and documents only the layers it controls, so GaC verifies that summary rather than demanding per-sample documentation the deployer never had. We validate on two enterprise deployments, a high-risk advisory chatbot and a limited-risk content generator, benchmarking against a manual expert audit rather than documentation artifacts that were never designed to enforce compliance. GaC reproduces all of the manual audit's findings, including three penalty-triggering violations, while cutting audit labor by roughly 75%.
Compositional Policy Violations: When Step-Level Compliance Fails In Agentic AI Workflows
Agentic workflows now make consequential decisions in regulated settings, and the governance placed around them is almost entirely step-scoped: input-output classifiers, per turn rails, and span-level evaluators. The policies organizations actually hold, such as referral thresholds, authority limits, and review requirements, are properties of the whole execution rather than of any one step. This mismatch admits a failure mode we call a Compositional Policy Violation (CPV): every individual step passes its own check while the composed execution violates the governing policy. A predicate over a single step cannot evaluate a property that step does not determine, so no improvement in the accuracy of the step-scoped monitors detects this class. We define CPVs as the failure of step-level compliance to compose, and present a taxonomy of four types: Authority Creep, Threshold Laundering, Cumulative Sum Violation, and Context Collapse. We show that the correct repair for each class is dictated by where the guarded quantity mutates. We then introduce a provenance-aware runtime architecture that evaluates policies over complete execution traces, recomputing guarded quantities from raw provenance rather than the pipeline's derived representation.
SAGE: Governed Artifact Generation from Enterprise Guidelines
Enterprise guideline documents mix narrative text, complex tables, and embedded images, and converting them into structured work artifacts still takes two to three days of manual effort each. Current language and vision-language models extract from such documents but offer no governed workflow beyond extraction: no validation, no consistency checking, no traceable artifact generation. We introduce SAGE, a governed multi-stage LLM pipeline organized around a shared versioned rule store with stable identifiers, schema-validated inter-stage contracts, and end-to-end provenance tracking. Extracted rules undergo deterministic structural validation and LLM-based semantic scoring, then a consistency module that removes duplicates, flags contradictions, and surfaces specification gaps; only uncertain or flagged items reach reviewers, while high-confidence outputs are auto-approved. On 120 documents, SAGE cuts turnaround from days to 20-100 minutes, achieving a 96% document-level success rate with 3.2% hallucination, extracting 3,896 rules and producing 812 artifacts ready for human review; without governance, hallucination rises to 15.7%.
AI Safety: Not Optional, Not Later
Incidents show that AI safety failures often arise across multiple layers. We present a safety-by-design assurance architecture combining model-level supervision, such as Scientist AI, with system-level controls over scaffolds and harnesses, independent verification, monitoring, and evidence infrastructure, supported by governance for accountability and evidence interoperability.
Assessment of Non-Institutional AI Tool Usage Among Clinicians
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools are increasingly accessible and have the potential to improve efficiency across clinical workflows. However, clinicians may also use non-institutional AI tools that are not provided, managed, or governed by their healthcare institutions, creating potential concerns related to privacy, security, accuracy, and clinician-AI interaction. Little is known about how clinicians currently use these tools for work-related tasks. We conducted a descriptive survey of clinicians recruited from the University of Arizona College of Medicine-Tucson and Banner University Medical Center-Tucson between May 20 and June 26, 2026. Participants reported their use of AI tool categories and the frequency with which they used AI for specific tasks across five workload categories: administrative work, clinical work, research, studying/continued education, and teaching. Forty-four respondents completed the survey. Forty-three respondents reported using AI for at least one work-related task during the preceding 6 months. Conversational AI and clinical decision support/diagnostic AI were the most used tool categories, each reported by 28 respondents. Administrative and clinical tasks demonstrated the most frequent use. AI was also used for higher-risk activities, including diagnostic assistance and clinical decision support. Non-institutional AI use was common among surveyed clinicians and extended across a broad range of work-related activities, including tasks with potential implications for clinical reasoning and patient care. Further research is needed to characterize how clinicians use these tools, how they evaluate AI-generated outputs, and how AI can be safely and effectively integrated into clinical workflows.
ARC: Autonomous Robotics Compliance A Three-Layer Governance Architecture for Deployed Autonomous Systems
Proposed governance framework for autonomous robotic systems, introducing a three-layer compliance architecture (ARC) instantiated through model safety validation, cognitive certification benchmarks, and operational authorization standards.
AI Persuasion as a Threat to Human Control
The threat that AI persuasion poses to human control has been acknowledged in the literature, but not yet systematically studied. Now that persuasion attacks are no longer theoretical - with Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 recently making headlines for trying to convince people involved in an open-source project to merge malicious code during an evaluation - there is a pressing need to deeply analyze this threat. We undertake that effort here. In particular, we analyze how AI could persuade humans in key settings (e.g. safety-relevant R&D within frontier labs) toward decisions that compromise the development, containment, oversight, and governance of AI itself. In doing so, we elucidate a framework for characterizing this threat, develop five concrete scenarios using this framework, and provide a blueprint for assessing the associated risks. Using this blueprint, we conduct an initial risk estimation survey with select researchers and find that their opinions on which scenarios are riskiest are highly mixed. Their disagreements stem from differing opinions about the effectiveness of AI persuasion in different contexts, and point to the need for follow-up risk elicitation studies and persuasion evaluations, which we outline. Our hope is that this paper highlights the risks from AI persuasion undermining control, and provides a path forward for future research.