Computational Cognitive Modeling

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8 papers in the last four weeks, up 167% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 87

Sep 27, 2026cs.LG

A Spectral Theory of Compositional Learning

How does compositional reasoning emerge during learning? We address this question by mathematically analyzing the learning dynamics of deep linear networks. We train these networks in structured synthetic environments and derive a theory linking the structure of experience to compositional learning. Our theory predicts when compositional inferences emerge, whether they are identifiable from the available evidence, and how new linking evidence can rapidly unlock previously unavailable inferences. These results provide a qualitative explanation for several phenomena observed in human cognition. They account for why a composition can fail despite knowing its premises, why similar compositions can emerge at different times, and how a single linking fact can suddenly enable many new inferences. Taken together, these findings establish a mathematical link between the statistical structure of experience and the development of compositional reasoning.

Hugo Rydel

University of Manchester

Computational Cognitive Modeling Compositional Reasoning Statistical Learning Theory Compositional Representation Learning

Sep 24, 2026q-bio.NC

A Spiking Neural Network Model of Elementary Self-Consciousness via Endogenous Default Mode Network Dynamics

Understanding the neurobiological mechanisms underlying self-referential cognition and baseline self-consciousness remains a fundamental challenge in computational neuroscience. In this work, we propose a large-scale computational model incorporating a 10,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) based on Izhikevich dynamics. The network is structured into two interacting subsystems: a sensory processing layer (5,000 regular-spiking cortical neurons) and an endogenous Default Mode Network (DMN) pacemaker subsystem (5,000 intrinsically bursting neurons). The DMN layer is modulated by continuous tonic currents reflecting ascending brainstem neuromodulation, maintaining intrinsic, autonomous bioelectric rhythms independent of external sensory input. To represent top-down cognitive modulation, synaptic weights are hierarchically structured such that DMN-to-network projections exceed sensory-level connections. Through numerical simulations using a modified two-step Euler integration scheme, we demonstrate how endogenous pacemaker activity interacts with transient external sensory perturbations, providing an elementary mathematical framework for the emergence of a persistent, self-sustaining neural representation of "Self".

R. Lahoz-Beltra

Modeling, Data Analysis and Computational Tools for Biology Research Group, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain · The Crazy Lab©, Madrid, Spain.

Computational Cognitive Modeling Spiking Neural Networks

Sep 23, 2026cs.LG

Policy Complexity, Reaction Time, and Bounded Rationality in Reinforcement Learning

Biological agents do not learn under conditions of unlimited computation. For humans, learning and choice are shaped by constraints on perception, attention, and working memory, which limit how much state information guides behavior and therefore bound policy complexity. Standard reinforcement learning models typically optimize reward without explicitly representing these internal costs, making them less suitable as models of biological intelligence. We derive MI-SARSA, an on-policy temporal-difference algorithm that incorporates mutual-information regularization through a learned marginal action prior and a penalty on state-specific deviations from that prior. This yields a sequential learning model in which state information is used selectively when its expected return benefit justifies the added informational cost. Critically, the same state-specific information cost that governs policy compression also generates trial-level predictions for reaction time, distinguishing MI-SARSA from most reinforcement learning models, which predict choices or returns but not latency. Empirically, MI-SARSA produces a reward-complexity tradeoff, and stronger information penalties produce simpler policies with lower control costs and faster reaction times. Under environment shift, increasing regularization reduces post-switch performance degradation but also lowers asymptotic return, revealing a robustness-capacity tradeoff. Together, these results position MI-SARSA as a model of bounded sequential learning under cognitive constraints.

James Wu, Chris R. Sims

Department of Computer Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY, 12180 · Department of Cognitive Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, NY, 12180

Computational Cognitive Modeling Reinforcement Learning Temporal-Difference Learning

Sep 21, 2026cs.CL

Toward a Unified Mathematics of Concepts

Concepts are commonly defined as abstract, compact representations of knowledge and treated as basic units of intelligent behavior. Yet, cognition, psychology, and AI lack a shared mathematical language for them. Modern systems represent concepts as vectors, distributions, symbols, graphs, and other structures, but these formalisms are typically treated as competing rather than as solutions to a common problem. We propose an operation-based view that evaluates mathematical frameworks by the conceptual operations they support, identifying thirteen operations (including similarity, composition, generalization, and grounding) that recur across cognition, psychology, and AI. We show that ten frameworks embody distinct commitments to concepts as self-contained content, relational structure, or evolving process, and that these commitments determine which operations each supports naturally. For example, vector-based models facilitate graded similarity and generalization but struggle with explicit composition, whereas symbolic models support composition but offer but generalize poorly. No single framework we examined naturally supports all operations without extension. We test this account empirically using categorization as a case study, operationalizing nine theories on the same items against human judgments. Despite addressing the same conceptual question, the theories produce different procedures and results, demonstrating that mathematical commitment shapes what a theory can explain. We call for hybrid formalisms that treat content, relation, and process as jointly primary.

Chen Shani

School of Industrial & Intelligent Systems Engineering Tel Aviv University Israel

Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling

Sep 17, 2026q-bio.NC

A Mathematical Model of Motivated Emotional Mind - Cognitive Embodied System

This article presents a mathematical model of the Motivated Emotional Mind cognitive architecture developed for embodied intelligent systems. Such a system learns to maintain its homeostasis through a generalized form of reinforcement learning based on its internal motivations, termed motivated learning (ML). The principal contribution of this article is a rigorous formalization of the re-entrant loop integrating feedforward processing, lateral interactions, and feedback pathways, together with the representational selection mechanisms that govern adaptive system responses. The model specifies how ongoing exteroceptive and interoceptive signals, bodily-motivational context, and memory traces are bound into associative memory structures termed semblions, which compete for access to further processing and top-down reconstruction. The formalization encompasses secondary perception, representational competition, curiosity, procedural gaps, and action selection directed toward limiting allostatic violations. Within this framework, motivated learning is tailored to embodied systems whose dynamics are shaped by needs, affect, and the current regulatory state. Unlike standard reinforcement-learning models, the proposed approach incorporates need thresholds, goal generation and shifting goals, bodily state, resource constraints, and action uncertainty, thereby providing a more adequate account of response selection under regulatory pressure. Global affect functions as a central control signal, modulating the learning rate, representational valence, and the balance between exploration and exploitation. The model presented here is a step toward a more rigorous formalization of cognitive phenomena and may provide a basis for further theoretical analysis, computer simulation, and implementation in artificial-intelligence systems inspired by biological processes.

Wiesław L. Galus, Janusz A. Starzyk

Cognitive Architectures for AI Agents Computational Cognitive Modeling Reinforcement Learning Embodied Reasoning Embodied Cognition

Sep 16, 2026cs.AI

The syntax and semantics of goals

In both cognitive science and computer science, goals are conceptualized as cognitive states that flexibly combine with world knowledge to organize and specify purposeful behavior. In this way, goals are compositional representations whose content relates to rational behavior. We here draw attention to goals as representations and their content because it highlights a parallel with other areas in cognitive science - in particular, the syntax-semantics interface in linguistics and logic - while also foregrounding foundational questions about the expressivity, design, and efficiency of different goal representations. For example, goals are typically taken as fixed and imposing constraints on desirable behaviors, but we can also identify constraints on goal representations themselves, such as whether a particular goal language is sufficiently expressive to capture behaviors of interest, or whether different goal representations capture the same behavior. Here, we synthesize work that aims to characterize the properties of different goal representations and suggest these are points of a broader design space. We close by discussing how distinguishing the form and meaning of goals can elucidate the implicit assumptions we make about goals, inform the study of interactions between higher-level cognition and motivation, and isolate axes of variation for different conceptions of goals.

David M. Abel, Mark K. Ho

Department of Informatics University of Edinburgh · Department of Psychology New York University

Computational Cognitive Modeling Symbolic Planning

Sep 16, 2026q-bio.NC

Neural noise enables accurate internal simulation of rare events

The brain needs an accurate internal model of the world to generate predictions and guide behavior. However, it must estimate the statistical structure of the environment from limited experience. This is particularly difficult for rare events, whose observed frequencies in a limited sample may substantially under- or overestimate their true frequencies. How the brain constructs an accurate internal model despite this sampling problem remains unclear. We address this problem using a Bayesian Confidence Propagation Neural Network (BCPNN) trained on event sequences from a Markov-chain random walk with controlled event frequencies. Treating the underlying Markov structure as the ground truth, we train the network on limited sample of event sequences and then allow it to generate autonomous replay based on the learned structure. We evaluate replay fidelity at the levels of both marginal event frequencies and conditional transition structure. We find that moderate neural noise, modeled as temporally correlated random fluctuations in unit activity during replay, is critical for faithful internal simulation. Without this variability, deterministic replay systematically under- or overrepresents rare events, whereas moderate noise restores both their marginal and conditional occurrence. Moderate noise also broadens the range of parameter values that produce accurate replay, making the model more robust to parameter variation. Together, these results support noise-assisted internal simulation as a potential mechanism for compensating for sampling errors arising from limited experience. Our model also provides a testable framework for investigating how altered neural variability may impair internal-model fidelity in disorders such as Parkinson's disease.

Heng Zhang, Pawel Herman, Zenas C. Chao

International Research Center for Neurointelligence (WPI-IRCN), UTIAS, The University of Tokyo, Japan · Division of Computational Science and Technology, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

Computational Cognitive Modeling Rare-Event Estimation

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

Sparks of In Silico Cognitive Science: Theories from Simulated Data Can Generalize to Humans

Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (\textsc{AutoCog}), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories \textsc{AutoCog} found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.

Akshay K. Jagadish, Younes Strittmatter, Nori Jacoby +4

Princeton University · Cornell University · Helmholtz Munich

Computational Cognitive Modeling Human Behavior Simulation Large Language Model-Guided Scientific Discovery

Sep 3, 2026cs.RO

Toward anIntegrated Cognitive--Ergonomic Architecture forHuman--Machine Interaction: Combining Cognitive Models with~Human Factors Ergonomics

This paper presents an integrated approach to modeling human competencies by combining the theoretical foundations of cognitive architectures with principles from Human Factors Ergonomics (HFE). Through a comparative analysis of established cognitive models-SOAR, ACT-R, LIDA, and COCOM-we synthesize a tailored architecture designed to address the complexities of human-machine interaction (HMI) in dynamic environments. By contextualizing this model within ergonomic frameworks, we elucidate the mechanisms underlying decision-making, skill acquisition, and adaptive behavior, bridging the gap between cognitive theory and applied system design. Our framework is empirically grounded in industrial robotics applications, where operator expertise, normative knowledge, and real-time feedback loops are critical. The proposed architecture not only enhances the cognitive alignment of HMI systems but also provides a scalable methodology for designing intelligent, human-centered interfaces in high-stakes environments. This work advances both the theoretical understanding of human competencies and the practical implementation of adaptive, ergonomically optimized systems.

Antoine Lenat, Olivier Cheminat, Damien Chablat +1

Cetim, LS2N, LS2N - équipe RoMas, LS2N - équipe PACCE · Nantes Université, École Centrale Nantes, CNRS, LS2N, UMR 6004 44000 Nantes, France · CETIM, 74 Route de la Jonelière, 44300 Nantes +4

Cognitive Architectures for AI Agents Computational Cognitive Modeling

Aug 30, 2026cs.CL

"Act Like a 5th Grader" is Not Enough: Bounding Knowledge in LLM-Based User Simulators

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behavior but frequently fail to exhibit realistic cognitive constraints, suffering from a "superhuman bias." Using a dataset of over 71,000 reading comprehension responses from 2,359 primary-school students (grades 4--6), we demonstrate that standard persona prompting yields near-perfect, deterministic performance, failing to capture the natural variance of developing readers. To address this, we introduce the Cognitively Bounded User Simulator (CBUS), an architectural framework that explicitly models the restricted working memory of young readers through an episodic bottleneck. Within this framework, we formalize two distinct test-taking strategies to emulate different reading behaviors. Our evaluation shows that explicitly modeling cognitive bounds significantly narrows the simulation gap across multiple LLM backbones, demonstrating that enforcing architectural constraints is more effective for high-fidelity simulation than simply scaling raw model capabilities.

Krisztian Balog, Arild Michel Bakken

University of Stavanger, Norway

Computational Cognitive Modeling Human Behavior Simulation User Simulation

Aug 10, 2026cs.CL

Reading Cognition as Decisions Unfold in Words: A Factorized Inverse Decision Model

Inverse decision modeling infers latent properties of decision processes from observed behavior, but existing formulations rely primarily on action trajectories. In verbalized cognitive tasks, task execution also produces response dynamics that action-only formulations leave unmodeled, such as verbal production, interaction, and hesitation. We propose a factorized inverse decision model (FIDM) that decomposes each individual's task-execution likelihood into an action factor and an effort factor, governed by separate individual-specific parameters. From raw verbal transcripts, a language model produces structured task-execution traces for factorized inference. On data from 400 older adults performing a grocery-shopping dialog task for cognitive screening, controlled recovery shows selective estimation of the intended factors, while matched semi-synthetic conditions show that FIDM preserves action-execution distinctions even when aggregate behavioral summaries are matched. Action evidence further localizes task-defined deviations across participants. In cognitive-status classification, FIDM provides information complementary to clinical scores, trajectory summaries, and frozen language representations, with consistent gains across all evaluated baselines in the binary setting.

Jiawen Kang, Dongrui Han, Xixin Wu +1

1The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Computational Cognitive Modeling

Aug 8, 2026q-bio.NC

A Hierarchical Energy-Based Model for Multimodal Cognition

We propose IM-LEPP (Integrated Multimodal Latent Energy-based Predictive Processing), a hierarchical, energy-based model of multimodal cognition that extends a previously proposed single-modality model (LEPP) to integrate vision and language. Following the view that generative neural networks are effective theories of cognitive dynamics, analogous to how statistical mechanics relates to thermodynamics, IM-LEPP models cognition as latent states flowing through learned energy landscapes rather than as an account of neural circuitry. The architecture is a hub-and-spoke hierarchy, grounded in the controlled semantic cognition framework of Lambon Ralph et al., in which predictive-coding pipelines for visual objects, scenes, and linguistic units converge on a shared amodal hub modeled on the anterior temporal lobe. Each pipeline's own prediction is conditioned by, rather than overwritten by, the current hub state, preserving pipeline-specific identity while letting every prediction reflect the full multimodal context. We show this architecture gives a mechanistic account of attentional phenomena such as inattentional blindness and Necker-cube bistability, and that its structure recovers or motivates independently established findings in psycholinguistics, including surprisal theory, the N400/P600 ERP components, and garden-path reanalysis, alongside a falsifiable contrast with transformer language models on trajectory-sensitivity in next-word prediction. We also discuss data-efficient language acquisition relative to LLMs, outline a semantic/episodic memory subsystem, situate the model against predictive coding, the free-energy principle, JEPA, and Hierarchical Temporal Memory, and propose concrete experimental predictions to test its central claims Key Words: predictive processing; predictive coding; energy-based models; diffusion models; effective theory; computational neuroscience.

Subir Varma

General Cognitics

Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling Predictive Coding Energy-Based Models Multimodal Fusion

Aug 7, 2026cs.CL

On the use of foundation models in cognitive science

A host of recent studies have evaluated the cognitive and developmental alignment of Foundation Models (FMs). These investigations include evaluations of their correspondence to adult performance across a range of cognitive domains, as well as whether aspects of model training track children's cognitive development. However, using FMs as candidate cognitive models poses significant methodological and conceptual challenges. A key question underlies this effort: under what conditions does behavioral alignment justify treating FMs as explanatory models of cognition? In this paper, we articulate a four-stage inferential framework for evaluating FMs as cognitive and developmental models: adapting human experimental tasks to model-compatible formats, specifying linking hypotheses that map model outputs to human measures, evaluating behavioral correspondence, and comparing across candidate models or manipulations. We clarify the role of linking hypotheses in mapping model outputs to human behavioral measures, identify challenges that constrain alignment claims, and propose principles for theory-driven and comparative evaluation. Throughout, we argue that behavioral fit alone is insufficient. Alignment becomes scientifically meaningful only when embedded within explicit theoretical commitments, theory-diagnostic tasks, and systematic contrastive evaluation across candidate models.

Raj Sanjay Shah, Alex Warstadt, Michael Frank +1

Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia, USA · Halcolu Data Science Institute and Dept. of Linguistics, University of California, San Diego, California, USA · Dept. of Psychology, Stanford University, California, USA

Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling

Aug 6, 2026cs.AI

Bayesian Expected Uncertainty Reduction (B-EUR) Model: A Computational Account of What Makes Design Options Worth Trying

This paper proposes the Bayesian Expected Uncertainty Reduction (B-EUR) model, which formalizes the value of trying a candidate design action as its expected reduction of epistemic uncertainty about action--outcome relations. The model addresses one part of the Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) model's open question concerning how changes in uncertainty perception determine action selection. We examine two environmental properties: generalizability, or how far knowledge from one trial extends to neighboring candidates, and outcome discriminability, or how clearly differences among outcomes can be distinguished. We tested the model through simulations and human experiments using a graph-shape guessing task that isolates learning about action--outcome relations under a limited trial budget. Epistemic value followed an inverted-U-shaped relationship with generalizability and increased with outcome discriminability in the simulations. In the human experiments, the subjective value of trying and enjoyment followed inverted-U-shaped relationships with generalizability, while choice behavior reflected both properties. The B-EUR model provides a computational account of candidate-action evaluation within uncertainty-driven design activity and offers implications for constructing prototype sets, framing design problems, and organizing feedback to support informative exploration.

Shimon Honda, Takuma Miyaguchi, Koji Koizumi +3

Department of Mechanical Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan · Laboratoire Conception de Produits et Innovation (LCPI), Arts et M´etiers ParisTech, 151 Boulevard de l’Hˆopital, 75013 Paris, France

Computational Cognitive Modeling Value of Information Bayesian Decision Theory Bayesian Experimental Design Decision-Making under Uncertainty Epistemic Uncertainty

Aug 5, 2026cs.AI

Small Foundation Models of Human Cognition and Behaviour

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

Nick Oh, Fernand Gobet

socius labs · London School of Economics and Political Science

Computational Cognitive Modeling LLM Fine-Tuning Language Model Scaling Laws

Aug 5, 2026cs.LG

An entropic explanation of insistence on sameness in autism

An information theory-based framework is proposed in attempt to explain insistence on sameness in autism as an instance of a general behavior pattern in which an individual tries to reduce surprise and uncertainty. It offers a new definition of autism as an impairment in which cognitive functions are restricted to discrimination, memorization and prediction of tangible properties of the environment. An analogy between insistence on sameness and constrained minimization of the entropy metric is observed and examined for a set of assumptions that describe cognitive limitations of a person with autism. The metric is given by the formula

D_H(R, M) = H(R|M) + H(M|R)

, where

R

represents sequences of random stimuli,

M

is a memory that stores and retrieves them, and where

H(.|.)

denotes their conditional entropies interpreted as surprise and uncertainty, respectively. It is first inferred that to minimize the metric an individual can learn about

R

(and store that knowledge in

M

) or can restrict

R

to the already known

M

. Then, it is concluded that insistence on sameness is a manifestation of the latter. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed framework: (1) Helps to quantify the concepts of surprise, uncertainty, sensory overload and deprivation, anxiety, comfort zone, disappointment, disorientation, pedantry, rigidness, observance or aberrant precision. (2) Leads to a list of guidelines for learning therapies and daily care routines, and allows them to be defined as optimization algorithms and implemented as programs for robotic live-in caregivers. (3) Can be validated with the help of a Turing test-like approach that requires no experiments involving individuals with autism. The framework-if positively validated-will provide formal foundations and design guidelines for therapies aimed at improving self-reliance of individuals with autism in basic activities of daily living.

Przemysław Śliwiński

Faculty of Information and Communication Technology, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland.

Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling Autism Spectrum Disorder

Aug 3, 2026cs.CL

Learning a Vector-Symbolic Model for Socio-Cultural Tasks

How can we better represent the impact of sociocultural structures on decision making in computational cognitive models? Modeling this impact requires traversing multiple levels of semantic representation, however it is not immediately clear to a modeler which levels of representation are most salient to a given situation. Though large language models and cognitively grounded corpus models can represent broad semantic associations through co-occurences, the role of self representations in memory should be accounted for to determine how cultural associations shape decision making. We propose a declarative memory system to be used in the ACT-R cognitive architecture that represents semantic associations at multiple levels via a vector-symbolic autoencoder. We use a simple HRR operation to encode episodic memories differently from semantic memory vectors extracted from text to produce a final chunk activation for a memory request. We use ACT-R cognitive models of a racially contextualized implicit association test (IAT) to test this new declarative memory system.

Meera Ray, Swapnika Dulam, Christopher L. Dancy

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University W209 Westgate Building, University Park, PA 16802. USA · Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University M310 Leonhard Building, University Park, PA 16802. USA

Computational Cognitive Modeling Vector Symbolic Architectures

Aug 3, 2026cs.AI

Predictive Set Theory: A Generative Framework for Cognitive Architecture with Operationalized Core Mechanisms

Predictive processing theories portray the brain as a hierarchical prediction engine that minimizes prediction error, yet they lack operational definitions for the structure of a "prediction," the standardized response to a prediction error, and the mechanism that maintains consistency across successive updates. Bayesian cognitive science attempts to subsume all uncertainty under probabilistic belief updating, but it presupposes a closed hypothesis space and provides no generative account of how the objects over which probabilities are distributed become discrete, identifiable referents in the first place. This paper introduces Predictive Set Theory (PST), a formal generative framework that reconstructs cognitive architecture from first principles. PST anchors cognition in a minimal set of operations---a sensor formalized as an identity function, set-theoretic state refresh, and three fundamental forms of reference chains (reference, counter-reference, and semi-reference)---and rigorously derives core cognitive functions including state sequences, demand, comparison, efficiency, and finite-horizon probabilistic planning. Rather than modeling neural mechanisms, PST constitutes a design specification for any system that must maintain internal consistency while acting under incomplete information and irreversible risk. The framework offers novel resolutions to classical problems such as Russell's paradox, the cognitive status of Gödelian incompleteness, the grounding of negative feedback, and the comprehension of film editing. The primary purpose of this paper is to establish, through the public academic record, the originality and completeness of the Predictive Set Theory framework.

Yiyang Yu

Cognitive Architectures for AI Agents Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling Predictive Coding

Aug 1, 2026q-bio.NC

Recursive Gaussian Processes and the Bayesian Brain

Predictive coding offers a powerful framework for cortical computation, yet scalable implementations that respect both Bayesian exactness and neurobiological constraints remain scarce. We bridge this gap by formally connecting predictive coding to Recursive Gaussian Processes (RGPs). RGPs employ a single Gaussian process

g(t, \cdot)

indexed by layer index and input value, preventing the representational collapse of standard deep Gaussian processes while allowing learnable cross-layer dependence via

r_{1g}

. We demonstrate that RGPs intrinsically implement hierarchical Bayesian inference, uncertainty propagation, and precision-weighted prediction error. Critically, we map RGP components---the shared GP, spike-and-slab variable selection, and MCMC dynamics---onto the canonical cortical microcircuit, providing a neurobiological substrate for these computations. Drawing on the free energy principle, we show that RGP inference minimizes variational free energy, formally linking Bayesian mechanics to neuronal dynamics. Our synthesis positions RGPs as both a principled computational tool and a candidate model for the brain's predictive machinery, generating testable predictions for laminar-specific dynamics and spectral asymmetries between feedforward and feedback processing.

Moumita Das, Dipanjan Ray, Sourabh Bhattacharya

1Indian Institute of Management, Udaipur, India · Department of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences, Ashoka University, Haryana, India · 3Koita Centre for Digital Health at Ashoka (KCDH-A), Haryana, India +1

Computational Cognitive Modeling Predictive Coding Hierarchical Bayesian Modeling Gaussian Processes

Jul 30, 2026cs.AI

Identifying Informative Environments for Cognition Parameter Inference via Bayesian Experimental Design

Computational cognitive modeling seeks to infer latent cognitive mechanisms underlying observed behavior. Bayesian inverse planning provides a principled framework for such inference, but its success depends critically on the experimental environment. Existing approaches typically treat environments as fixed, leaving open the question of which cognitive experiments are most informative for cognition parameter inference. We formulate the design of cognitive planning experiments as a Bayesian Experimental Design (BED) problem, treating the experimental environment as the design variable. We establish an exact Monte Carlo BED benchmark and introduce an amortized Bayesian experimental design framework for efficient posterior inference and design evaluation. Experiments on the Mouselab-MDP process-tracing paradigm show that amortized BED closely matches the environment rankings of exact Monte Carlo BED while substantially reducing computational cost. We further show that no single environment is uniformly optimal across cognitive inference objectives, revealing trade-offs between expected information gain, posterior recoverability, and information efficiency. These results provide a principled framework for designing informative cognitive experiments for Bayesian parameter inference.

Manisha Dubey, Rimvydas Rubavicius, N. Siddharth +1

School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Computational Cognitive Modeling Bayesian Experimental Design

Jul 30, 2026cs.MA

Using Theory of Mind to Arbitrate between Social and Non-social Learning

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

Lance Ying, Ryan Truong, Joshua B. Tenenbaum +1

1Harvard University · 2Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Computational Cognitive Modeling Theory of Mind Social Reasoning

Jul 28, 2026q-bio.NC

Cognitive Convergence: Deep Similarities Between Large Language Models and Human Cognition

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Chandra Sripada, Richard Lewis

Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan · Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan · Weinberg Institute for Cognitive Science, University of Michigan +2

Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling

Jul 27, 2026cs.AI

From Cognitive Architectures to Language Agents: A Mechanism-Level Review of Lineage, Convergence, and Migration Gaps

Memory, planning, reflection, and tool use are often compared as feature labels, obscuring the control semantics that determine how an agent actually runs. This review connects ten historical cognitive architectures, eight language-agent runtime families, and forty-two mechanism-focused modern systems. We reconstruct each mechanism through state, control, transition, persistence, failure, learning, and resource governance, then code evidence relation (E1-E4) separately from migration depth (D0-D4). The resulting landscape is uneven. Modern agents have operationalized substantial parts of adaptive memory, failure recovery, dynamic team selection, workflow search, skill induction, resource scheduling, and uncertainty-conditioned action, although often through independent convergence rather than documented inheritance. The strongest remaining opportunities lie in couplings among mechanisms. Closest-baseline screening closes one proposed gap: GraSP already combines calibrated multi-skill selection, typed compilation, verification, bounded repair, and replanning or ReAct fallback. Five residual bundles remain: activation with latency and action utility; typed impasse with isolated substates and resolution compilation; bounded content competition with broadcast and admission learning; persistent intention with reconsideration and live method authority; and uncertainty with resource allocation, interruption, and stopping. We contribute a distinctive-mechanism catalog, an auditable evidence-depth framework, and a falsifiable agenda for testing these bundles as composable runtime invariants.

Haodi Fan, Zucong Lan

Cognitive Architectures for AI Agents Computational Cognitive Modeling LLM Agent Orchestration LLM Agent Planning Agent Memory Management

Jul 20, 2026cs.CL

Computational models of pragmatic reasoning with flexible generation of meaning and expression alternatives

Pragmatic language use requires reasoning about alternatives: the alternative expressions a speaker might have chosen, or the alternative interpretations a listener might entertain. Formal and computational models of pragmatics must therefore specify the sets of alternatives that interlocutors reason over, which is often done through manual specification. Here we propose a framework, ScAffolded Generative models for Explanation (SAGE), that combines the explanatory transparency of cognitive models with the generative flexibility of language models (LMs). SAGE decomposes a pragmatic process into three kinds of modules: proposers, which use LMs to generate an open-ended space of candidate alternatives; evaluators, which assess those alternatives (e.g., their semantics, complexity, or typicality); and selectors, which implement the rule-based computational steps of a cognitively motivated task analysis. We assess SAGE in three case studies spanning pragmatic generation and interpretation-referential expression generation, manner (M-)implicatures, and Gricean conversational implicatures. SAGE models are evaluated critically using established methods from computational cognitive modeling, including ablations, baseline comparisons, and quantitative fit to human data. Across studies, SAGE models achieved high accuracy and often outperformed baselines, but component-level analyses reveal an asymmetry: LM proposers reliably generated alternatives well-suited to pragmatic modeling, whereas LM evaluators are better at providing intuitive judgements rather than judgements of theoretical or formal measures. We discuss the promise and the limitations of neuro-symbolic models as candidate explanatory accounts of human pragmatic language use.

Polina Tsvilodub, Fausto Carcassi, Michael Franke

University of Tübingen · University of Amsterdam

Computational Cognitive Modeling Pragmatic Reasoning in Language Models Computational Psycholinguistics Neuro-Symbolic AI

Jul 18, 2026cs.NE

How to Build Marcus's Algebraic Mind: From Minsky's Emotion-Machine Viewpoint

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

Hiroyuki Chuma, Kanji Otsuka, Yoichi Sato

Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University (Professor Emeritus) · Meisei University (Professor Emeritus) · Shuhari System

Computational Cognitive Modeling Vector Symbolic Architectures Reasoning Trace Analysis

Jul 18, 2026cs.NE

How to Build Marcus's Algebraic Mind: From Thagard's Brain--Mind Viewpoint

This paper reports a convergence neither program was looking for. Marcus's The Algebraic Mind named three things any architecture needs -- operations over variables, recursive structure, and individuals distinct from kinds -- showed multilayer perceptrons have none, and left a register-and-treelet implementation as conjecture. Thagard's Brain-Mind ran it from the other end, making binding the mechanism from which the whole of mind is assembled, and circular convolution load-bearing. Marcus leaves his register algebra open; Thagard's is lossy, degrading under the very recursion his own account demands. VaCoAl is a hyperdimensional computing architecture built end-to-end on XOR-and-shift over GF(2) via primitive-polynomial LFSRs; PyVaCoAl is its extended software realization (all results here); the silicon substrate exists as CASRAM. Bind(R,F) = R XOR Shift(F) is exactly reversible and non-commutative: it supplies all three pillars at fixed dimension and removes convolution's depth degradation. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N) yields compositional generalization with post-hoc auditability, which no lossy or learned substrate offers. Necessity: two independent architecture programs and the dentate gyrus-CA3 circuit require the same algebra -- convergence, not biomimicry. New here: discrimination and failure-tolerance are one. Repair every collision (RR = 1) and the system is bit-identical to a hash dictionary: candidates become indistinguishable and the confidence path-integral collapses; a memory that never fails keeps no record of which routes were hard. Position: we do not surpass large language models but supply the auditable, multi-hop relational reasoning embeddings lack. No consciousness is implemented and no cognitive experiment reported; bit-exactness holds in silicon, approximately under biological noise; speed and power remain unbenchmarked.

Hiroyuki Chuma, Kanji Otsuka, Yoichi Sato

Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University (Professor Emeritus) · Meisei University (Professor Emeritus) · Shuhari System

Computational Cognitive Modeling Hyperdimensional Computing Vector Symbolic Architectures Algorithmic Reasoning

Jul 12, 2026cs.LG

Constructed Reality, Contested Priors: Decoupling and the Architecture of Cognitive Relapse Under the Free Energy Principle

Under the free energy principle, a predictive system does not observe reality directly; it maintains a generative model of the world and experiences that model's best current hypothesis. Can a synthetic environment be made consistent enough that a predictive system's own inference machinery adopts it as this default hypothesis, permanently displacing the environment that first shaped it? We call this state ontological inversion. Because inducing and monitoring such a transition in a nervous system is neither ethical nor technically feasible, we study the underlying computational problem through a controlled proxy: a convolutional variational autoencoder paired with a recurrent latent predictor, whose evidence lower bound objective is mathematically identical, up to sign, to variational free energy itself. The network is trained first on a baseline visual domain, then on a mixed stream in which a swept rehearsal ratio r controls how much baseline content persists during transition to a target domain. Representational capacity, what the latent space can discriminate, is tracked separately from default behavior, what the system generates when left unconstrained. Across a full sweep of 90 runs, the two diverge sharply: representational accuracy stays near ceiling, 0.97 to 0.998, regardless of r, while default behavior spans nearly the system's entire range depending on r alone, a decoupling of learning from acceptance. More strikingly, at intermediate r the system's default output rises toward the target domain, then partially reverts toward the baseline while training continues unchanged, a structural failure we term cognitive relapse. Resistance to reality-adoption is not reducible to learning speed; it is a structural property with its own distinct failure modes, established here as a computational existence proof and nothing further.

MD Ibrahim Hossain Ridoy

Independent Researcher

Computational Cognitive Modeling Free Energy Principle

Jul 8, 2026cs.LG

A Transdiagnostic Space of Disorder Like Phenotypes in Reinforcement Learning Agents

Modelling psychological disorders in artificial agents offers both a testbed for computational psychiatry and a lens on the failure modes of affective control. Prior work induces one or two disorders in a reinforcement learning (RL) agent by hand-tuned reward shaping, labels the behaviour post hoc, and reports single runs. We recast disorder modelling as dose-controllable manipulation of cognitive appraisal signals in an appraisal-guided PPO agent, expressing seven disorders (anxiety, mania, obsessive-compulsive checking, depression, impulsivity, addiction, and post-traumatic stress) each as a single knob grounded in a computational psychiatry account, with each symptom measured by a preregistered assay mapped to a recognised paradigm. Across more than a thousand runs (10 seeds, four controls, 95% confidence intervals) every disorder shows a graded, monotone dose-response that no control reproduces. Beyond these induced effects, three findings emerge that were not written into the reward: the disorders self-organise into a two-dimensional affective space in which mania mirrors anxiety; removing a knob remits reward distortion disorders (mania, checking, addiction) but not avoidance disorders (anxiety, PTSD), which instead recover under a graded exposure curriculum; and two simultaneous knobs interact nonadditively, yielding testable comorbidity predictions. Appraisal weights thus parameterise a controllable space of affective phenotypes in which the same knobs that induce a disorder can model its treatment. We also show that three disorder knobs (depression, addiction, anxiety) transfer to a three-dimensional pixel environment (MiniWorld) with a standard convolutional agent and no appraisal critic, with cross-assay dissociation confirmed across both domains, indicating the framework is not specific to grid worlds or to PPO's appraisal critic.

Hari Prasad

Computational Cognitive Modeling Reinforcement Learning Mental Health

Jul 7, 2026cs.HC

Nested Episodic State Topology (NEST): A Graph-Theoretic Architecture of Cognitive States

We present NEST (Nested Episodic State Topology), a foundational graph-theoretic representational ontology for modeling cognition as structured state formation and transformation rather than as a finished empirical model. Concepts, episodes, percepts, and task contexts are represented as typed, weighted graphs whose nodes may carry internal subgraph payloads; edges are typed under six relation classes -- causal, containment, temporal, associative, evidential, and spatial. Durable belief graphs are separated from capacity-limited working-memory graphs that may host transient non-belief content. WM-belief grounding, conflict catalogs, and belief-update operators specify how transient structure is tested against stored knowledge and how belief is revised. A reusable operator toolkit -- activation, graph-property functionals, working-memory transitions, awareness and trajectory functionals, and belief update -- organizes the formal core. Derived diagnostics such as fragmentation, involvement, signed evaluation, coherence, and active conflict define familiar phenomena in the same ontology; self-related processing is modeled through designated self-image subgraphs within belief. Subsequent sections instantiate this core without new primitives: phenomena signatures, a task-instantiation schema for action selection and failure modes, and compatibility mappings that embed ACT-R, Soar, Sigma, the Common Model of Cognition, Global Workspace Theory, semantic networks, Theory-Theory, and chunking as constrained regions of one language. Mappings constitute the culminating technical section; discussion addresses scope, limitations, and open research directions. The contribution is intentionally foundational: a transparent representational substrate for later empirical, computational, and domain-specific work.

Ishant

Cognitive Architectures for AI Agents Computational Cognitive Modeling Cognitive Modeling

Jun 30, 2026cs.AI

Creating Intelligence: A Computational Foundation for AGI

This work introduces a new computational theory of mind grounded in set theory and hyperdimensional computing. Whereas traditional neural networks rely on continuous weights and matrix multiplication, this framework works with sparse binary data. It represents information as discrete sets, directly modeling biological neural population codes. I demonstrate that associative memory emerges naturally from network topologies featuring a combinatorially expanded hidden layer. Learning is driven by topological plasticity rather than scalar weight adjustments. This architecture unifies auto-associative and hetero-associative learning under a single core algorithm: information retrieval via subset pattern matching and exact nearest-neighbor search. Operating with constant-time complexity, these mechanisms bridge perceptual data (sparse distributed representations) and symbols (sparse holographic representations) without continuous bottlenecks. Mapping this framework to neuroanatomy, I propose that both the cerebellum and the neocortex implement variants of this algorithm, making subset pattern matching the fundamental engine of cognition. Because it relies on discrete logic rather than matrix arithmetic, this algorithm translates directly into in-memory hardware. This opens a new route toward synthetic intelligence with human-level energy efficiency.

Peter Overmann

Computational Cognitive Modeling Hyperdimensional Computing Vector Symbolic Architectures Associative Memory