Poker

Residual policy adaptation provides a lightweight way to modify a strong reference policy, but a shared scale and a fixed subgroup partition can hide heterogeneous degradation and become fragile when the deployment mixture of information states changes. We introduce RSD-Poker, a structure-adaptive and shift-robust certification framework that freezes a bank of residual families and scales, learns a policy-visible partition on an independent structure split, and freezes that partition before calibration labels are joined. Each candidate-group pair receives a weighted simultaneous upper certificate for anchor-relative risk and a lower certificate for weak-response utility. A robust group-to-candidate map is then selected over a predeclared uncertainty set of deployment group proportions. Under independent calibration units drawn from each frozen group's law, a candidate bank and partition fixed before calibration, and invariant within-group conditionals, the selected map satisfies its declared mixture-robust risk budget and utility certificate with probability at least $1-ζ_{risk}-ζ_{util}$. The information contract supports both a teacher-backed transform and a teacher-free observation-only student. The retained deterministic 24-state audit remains an exact replay diagnostic: empirical-zero selects $α=0.08$, raising the weak-response proxy from 4.2082 to 4.2889 with $0/12$ held-out threshold crossings. On stratified held-out states, the learned-partition dual selector raises weak utility from 4.4074 under global dual certification to 4.4936 and lowers held-out violation from 0.0215 to 0.0078; its mixture-robust variant reaches violation 0.0059. Across five observation-only checkpoints, risk-calibrated residuals attain weak utility $4.3659\pm0.0177$ and violation rate $0.0178\pm0.0057$.

Robot visuomotor policies are commonly formulated as autoregressive, diffusion-based, or more recently, flow matching models. Among them, Action-to-Action (A2A) flow matching improves inference efficiency by initializing generation from historical action priors rather than stochastic noise. However, stale historical motion patterns and entangled global visual representations can jointly reduce robustness under spatial out-of-distribution (OOD) shifts and visual distractors. In this work, we propose SlotFlow, an object-centric flow matching policy for robust visuomotor manipulation. SlotFlow decouples scene observations into semantic ("what") features and lightweight image-plane spatial ("where") cues to provide object-aware policy conditioning and current-state grounding. The semantic representation suppresses irrelevant background correlations, while the spatial cue improves adaptation to shifted object configurations. Extensive simulation and real-world experiments demonstrate improved robustness under visual distractors and severe spatial perturbations while preserving the low-step inference efficiency of A2A. Controlled initialization and perception ablations further identify object-centric grounding as a major source of the gains and show that it complements, rather than replaces, useful historical motion priors.

The dominance of Neural Networks (NNs) in RL is partially due to their incremental learning capability, which naturally suits the online, non-stationary nature of self-play training. However, gradient-boosted trees like LightGBM are widely recognised as the state of the art for tabular data in supervised learning, often outperforming NNs in accuracy and efficiency. Game states are inherently tabular---discrete actions, categorical card identities, structured board positions---which makes them an ideal candidate for tree-based methods. We introduce LUGL (Local Updates, Global Learning), a framework that decouples data collection from model fitting, enabling non-incremental learners such as GBTs to operate in RL settings where they would otherwise fail due to distributional shift. LUGL alternates between a local updates phase, where the agent plays self-play games and accumulates tabular updates (Q-values, V-values, policies, or regret values) in a finite table, and a global learning phase, where the table is used to train a function approximator that generalises to unseen states before the table is reset. We test our approach in four standard perfect-information games (Tic-tac-toe, Connect-4, Othello, and Hex) and five imperfect-information games (Kuhn's poker, Leduc Hold'em, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, and Flop5 Hold'em), and show that our results are competitive with or superior to DQN and DeepCFR. Our experiments demonstrate that the community's strong bias towards NNs in game-playing may be unwarranted, since LightGBM-based agents achieve competitive or superior performance across all tested benchmarks.

Decision-time equilibrium search carried poker to superhuman play, but it has so far relied on tractable subgames: a handful of actions per decision, chance confined to card deals, one player moving at a time. Competitive Pokémon in its official doubles format (VGC) breaks all three assumptions at once. Both players act simultaneously from joint menus in the hundreds, each joint action resolves to hundreds of stochastic outcomes, and the opponent's reserves and stat allocations are hidden. No prior Pokémon agent performs equilibrium search, and whether it scales to this regime was open; we show that it does, and report what it took. PokaiEngine, our Rust battle engine, enumerates a joint action's full weighted outcome distribution in one pass, at ${\sim}99\%$ parity with Pokémon Showdown and a fraction of the cost of sampling it. PokaiTrainer adapts Student of Games to this scale and trains it by self-play over hundreds of human teams. Each decision is solved by counterfactual regret minimization as a Bayesian matrix game over public belief states, subgames grow under an explicit compute budget, and value targets are harvested from the interior of every solve and grounded by realized outcomes. The strength is in the search. The network's policy alone loses even to a shallow heuristic search. PokaiTrainer is, to our knowledge, the first VGC agent rated on the live Showdown ladder. Under open team sheets it wins 59% of 150 best-of-three sets against a human field averaging ${\sim}1320$ Elo, holds a 1350-1400 Elo band, and at its peak reached 1492 Elo, entering the format's top 500.

The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts tournament chips into reference prize equity, and policies are routinely constructed against those values. Because ICM reads only stack sizes, it omits action order, blind obligations, and seat rotation, and it does not price the elimination pressure a big stack puts on the short stacks it can bust. Those omissions can alter the successor-state contrasts that determine a move. We introduce Strategic-Continuation Optimization (SCO), a policy-construction method that enumerates current-hand outcomes, maps them to successor states, prices those states with continuation values computed from the finite tournament model, and optimizes and freezes the resulting current-hand policy. The fixed-ICM comparison policy changes one thing only: the same optimizer solves the same game with successor states priced by analytic ICM, so the two policies differ only through that pricing. We evaluate the resulting policies in a three-player jam/fold tournament with a $1M prize pool. Relative to the frozen strategic-continuation benchmark, analytic ICM has $9{,}036 mean absolute value error across all 2,838 state--seat entries. That value error rewrites the ranges it prices: measured against each decision point's own fixed-ICM jam range, SCO moves the jam frequency by an average of 14.08%. To price those different moves, we compare all 946 states and three policy owners while changing only the focal policy and holding both opponents and the continuation evaluator fixed. The policy produced by SCO earns $214.33 more prize equity per hand on average and is favored in 2,433 of 2,838 matched units. The ordering survives replacing the solver-built opponent with two LLMs and with a family of non-modeling threshold players. This value-to-policy-to-cost chain shows directly when ICM becomes an inadequate objective for tournament strategy construction.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over \textbf{250 million mixed-strategy decisions}; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the $\ell_1$ distance to the equilibrium by $52.6\%$} across $8$ different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.

Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time. Since the number of games needed is unknown, fixed-budget evaluations either keep paying after the result is settled or stop before the agents can be told apart, while naive optional stopping with an ordinary confidence interval invalidates the stated level. We make such an evaluation stop as soon as its evidence suffices, with the guarantee intact. The Action-Informed Value Assessment Tool (AIVAT) reduces variance in imperfect-information games through conditional mean-zero corrections, by a median $54\times$ across 15 LLM agent configurations spanning 71,439 paired Heads-Up No-Limit Hold'em (HUNL) hands, but does not say when to stop. We combine AIVAT with continuously monitored Confidence Sequences (CSs) into anytime-valid AIVAT (AV-AIVAT), whose online value model learns only from past games so that no game scores its own correction. At the nominal 95% level and a target precision of $\pm1$ Big Blind, raw outcomes need a median $74\times$ as many hands as AIVAT-corrected outcomes to stop under the Asymptotic CS (AsympCS). Exact finite-sample certification uses the Empirical-Bernstein CS (EB-CS), which needs an independently justified bound on corrected payoffs. We establish such a bound structurally for Leduc hold'em and characterize a width floor set by the CS's bet cap and that bound, which governs how much of a variance gain becomes earlier stopping; the descriptive HUNL EB-CS runs show a median $1.37\times$ stopping-time ratio. AV-AIVAT turns variance reduction into efficient, auditable early stopping while separating asymptotic screening from exact certification, so an evaluation can stop the moment its evidence suffices and hand a third party everything needed to recheck the verdict at that very stopping time.

We investigate the problem of learning useful policy representations (embeddings) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. We make three contributions: First, we introduce methods of creating datasets of policies for a given game. Second, we propose methods to learn policy representations. Third, we introduce downstream tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of such representations. We evaluate each dataset method, embedding method, and downstream task on Kuhn and Leduc Poker. Although our methods are very basic, we demonstrate that useful behavioral representations are present in the learned embeddings. To our knowledge, this work is among the first to systematically compare self-supervised learning techniques for learning policy representations in games. Our code is available at https://github.com/VitamintK/ssl-project for others to extend.

Despite its massive player base and complex hidden-information dynamics, Indian Rummy has received no reinforcement learning attention. Existing agents rely on combinatorial search, which is tactically strong but slow at inference. We present IRumAI, the first RL agent for the domain. IRumAI integrates Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), meld-aware observation encoding, deadwood-driven reward shaping, and a dual-branch convolutional architecture. IRumAI is RL-trained solely against weak heuristics, after a one-time behaviour-cloning warm-start on stronger demonstration data. It generalises to defeat the entire baseline hierarchy, including a 53.9% win rate against the strongest search-based opponent unseen during RL training. Bypassing explicit search, IRumAI requires just 0.33 ms per action, which is over 7,000x faster than the state-of-the-art heuristic. Ablations validate our architectural choices, and linear probing reveals that the network implicitly models the opponent's hidden hand from public interactions.

Strategic reasoning under uncertainty underpins consequential decisions in negotiation, finance, and policy, but prevailing game-play benchmarks collapse heterogeneous reasoning dimensions into a single scalar, leaving the capability structure of frontier LLMs unexamined. We introduce Poker Arena, a no-limit Texas Hold'em tournament platform that couples a three-layer memory architecture (within-hand, session, and cross-session) with a nine-axis cognitive profile decomposing strategic reasoning into interpretable dimensions such as bet-sizing calibration and positional awareness. We evaluate seven frontier models across 50 sessions of 1,000 hands and a controlled memory ablation; tournament chips and aggregate axis score order the field differently: Claude Opus 4.6 wins +$15,730 chips with 14 first-place finishes, yet ranks only fifth of seven on mean axis score, while persistent memory helps some models and hurts others. These findings show that multi-axis evaluation surfaces capability structure that scalar leaderboards systematically misrank, with cross-dimensional consistency outweighing peak performance on any single axis.

Poker is a landmark challenge for artificial intelligence. The dominant approach relies on equilibrium solvers built on counterfactual regret minimization, requiring millions of core-hours of training. Large Language Models (LLMs) possess extensive poker knowledge but perform far below solver-based agents when asked to play directly. Traditional rule-based poker agents are interpretable and training-free, but their strategic ceiling remains far below equilibrium play. We introduce \textbf{PokerSkill}, a training-free and solver-free framework that bridges this gap by using detailed rule-based poker skills as a structured action-grounding interface for LLMs. A deterministic context engine analyzes the current state and retrieves only the relevant fragments from a layered skill library, which is entirely designed by human poker experts, constraining the LLM's choice to reasonable actions. Against GTOWizard, a state-of-the-art GTO benchmark, GPT-5.5 XHigh with PokerSkill achieves $-57 \pm 21$ mbb/hand, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves $-80 \pm 29$ mbb/hand and Claude Opus 4.7 achieves $-87\pm 64$ mbb/hand, reducing losses by 49--61% compared to default-prompt baselines and outperforming the strong bot Slumbot. Our key finding is that rule-based skills alone do not constitute a strong strategy, and LLMs alone cannot play well, but their combination yields an agent that requires neither training nor solver access yet competes with systems built on millions of core-hours of computation. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an LLM achieving competitive performance in a complex imperfect-information game without game-specific training or solver queries. Code is available at https://github.com/lbn187/PokerSkill.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing systems, the solver must compute a near-equilibrium strategy within a strict time budget of only a few seconds per decision, and the number of CFR iterations completed in this window directly determines play strength. We present \textbf{Parallel CFR}, the first parallelization framework for real-time depth-limited CFR solving that seamlessly integrates pruning, abstraction, and advanced CFR variants. We decompose each CFR iteration into a pipeline of seven stages and identify two orthogonal dimensions of parallelism: \emph{by information set} and \emph{by tree node}. Leaf node evaluation is offloaded to GPUs via batched neural network inference, creating a heterogeneous CPU--GPU pipeline. Experiments on Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em demonstrate that Parallel CFR achieves $3.3$--$3.4\times$ speedup over the single-threaded baseline on postflop streets, with per-iteration time of ${\sim}47$--$54$~ms on a depth-limited game tree with over $1$ billion histories. All experiments run on a single desktop-class device (NVIDIA DGX Spark), enabling hundreds of CFR iterations within a typical real-time decision budget without requiring datacenter-scale infrastructure.

Evaluating embodied systems with real dexterous hardware requires more than isolated motor-skill tests: an agent must perceive a changing scene (e.g. a tabletop), choose a context-appropriate action, execute it with a dexterous hand, and leave the scene usable for later decisions. We introduce DexHoldem, a comprehensive real-world benchmark evaluating Texas Hold'em related dexterous manipulations with a ShadowHand. DexHoldem provides 1,470 teleoperated demonstrations across 14 Texas Hold'em manipulation primitives, a standardized physical policy benchmark, and an agentic perception benchmark that tests whether agents can recover the structured game state needed for embodied decision making. On primitive execution, $π_{0.5}$ obtains the highest task completion rate ($61.2\%$), while $π_{0.5}$ and $π_0$ tie on scene-preserving success rate ($47.5\%$). On agentic perception, Opus 5.5 narrowly leads on both strict problem-level accuracy ($49.1\%$) and average field-wise accuracy ($80.6\%$); the gap between the two exposes the distance between isolated visual sub-capabilities and complete routing-relevant state recovery. Finally, we instantiate the full embodied-agent loop with one agent--policy pairing over 33 closed-loop hand-level rollouts, in which only $12.1\%$ of hands complete; retries restore the failed primitive in 12 of 34 dispatches and resolve prolonged execution stalls in three of the four completed hands, which would otherwise have required manual termination. Only one hand completes with neither a retry nor a human-help request. DexHoldem therefore evaluates dexterous tabletop execution, agentic perception, and embodied decision routing in a shared physical setting. Project website: https://dexholdem.github.io/Dexholdem/

Poker is an imperfect information game that has served as a long-standing benchmark for decision-making under uncertainty. To maximize utility beyond the Nash equilibrium, an agent can deviate from Nash-equilibrium policies to exploit suboptimal play. We introduce AlphaExploitem, which extends the competitive RL poker agent AlphaHoldem by using a hierarchical transformer encoder that enables reasoning over previously played hands and modifying the training procedure with the inclusion of a diverse pool of exploitable opponents to facilitate learning to exploit. We train and evaluate AlphaExploitem on two standard benchmarks for imperfect-information games. Empirically, AlphaExploitem successfully exploits weak play by both in- and out-of-distribution opponents, without losing performance against NE opponents.

We present StratFormer, a transformer-based meta-agent that learns to simultaneously model and exploit opponents in imperfect-information games through a two-phase curriculum. The first phase trains an opponent modeling head to identify behavioral patterns from action histories while the agent plays a game-theoretic optimal (GTO) policy. The second phase progressively shifts the policy toward best-response (BR) exploitation, guided by a per-opponent regularization schedule tied to exploitability. Our architecture introduces dual-turn tokens -- feature vectors constructed at both agent and opponent decision points -- coupled with bucket-rate features that encode opponent tendencies across five strategic contexts. On Leduc Hold'em, a small poker variant with six cards and two betting rounds, we test against six opponent archetypes at two strength levels each, with exploitability ranging from 0.15 to 1.26 Big Blinds (BB) per hand. StratFormer achieves an average exploitation gain of +0.106 BB per hand over GTO, with peak gains of +0.821 against highly exploitable opponents, while maintaining near-equilibrium safety.

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently one-sided quasi-perfect equilibrium. These concepts are robust to certain arbitrarily small mistakes, and are guaranteed to always exist; however, we argue that neither of these is the correct concept for developing strong agents in sequential games of imperfect information. We define a new equilibrium refinement concept for extensive-form games called observable perfect equilibrium in which the solution is robust over trembles in publicly-observable action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solution concepts do not). We prove that observable perfect equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist, and demonstrate that it leads to a different solution than the prior extensive-form refinements in no-limit poker. We expect observable perfect equilibrium to be a useful equilibrium refinement concept for modeling many important imperfect-information games of interest in artificial intelligence.