Latest papers

8 papers2 papers in the last four weeks, with none the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Nov 3, 2026

Anduin: A sybil-resistant agentic marketplace reputation system

As autonomous AI agents enter permissionless onchain markets, selecting new service providers remains a core challenge. Existing reputation systems depend on scarce resources like human curation, identity credentials, or voluntary reviews, while naive volume rankings are vulnerable to Sybil attacks. We evaluate whether existing onchain payment histories can yield provider ratings that are resilient against Sybil attacks. Using a 157-day dataset comprising 66M agentic transactions worth $6.1M across 16 blockchains, we model payment flows as a bipartite graph between buyers and providers. A provider's rating is derived from graph paths linked to a buyer's existing trusted network. We propose three Sybil-resistant rating algorithms: a max-flow rating and two relaxed algorithms optimized for stronger rating performance. Evaluating these algorithms against simulated adversaries across 813 buyers, we show that rating manipulation costs 20% of those buyers' total spend and is around 23x harder to manipulate than the standard similarity rule (collaborative filtering).
Oct 15, 2026

Gossip Agents: Reputation through Opinion Dynamics over Evolving Networks

Sustained cooperation among self-interested learning agents is essential in many shared environments. Reputation systems are among the best-studied mechanisms for promoting such cooperation. Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches, however, typically assume that reputation is either globally available to all agents or derived solely from an agent's own observations, leaving largely unexplored how reputational information propagates between agents. We study gossip, the exchange of information about third parties, as a mechanism for reputation diffusion over dynamic communication networks. Agents form private opinions from limited observations and exchange them with their neighbors following DeGroot opinion dynamics, while the communication network changes as agents interact and move. A tunable broadcast radius controls the reach of information, spanning private reputation, local gossip, and globally shared reputation. We study this framework in two nn-player social dilemmas with distinct network dynamics: a Prisoner's Dilemma with randomly resampled interaction groups and Harvest, where communication neighborhoods emerge from agents' movements. Our results show that the reach of reputational information shapes cooperation in both environments. Moreover, in Harvest, reputation diffusion increases environmental rewards and leads to more peaceful and sustainable behavior.
Sep 2, 2026

Tempting the Agent: The Economics of Reputation without Persistent Identity in AI Agent Markets

Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions but also on the persistence of the identity to which reputation is attached. When identities can be abandoned and recreated cheaply, reputational capital may itself become an object of opportunistic exploitation. This paper develops a dynamic economic framework to study when reputation is sufficient to discipline autonomous agents. We model reputation as capital attracting future economic activity. At each point, an agent chooses between operating honestly, investing in quality to preserve future gains, or executing a one-shot deviation to extract its reputation's value and restart from a penalized identity. Our analysis relates the temptation to opportunistic behavior to identity-reset costs, reputation persistence, demand sensitivity, and enforcement design, deriving comparative statics on optimal quality provision. Autonomous AI-agent operating on the blockchain are a relevant application: infrastructures such as ERC-8004, ERC-8183, and x402 combine reputation, identity, and payments in permissionless markets. Nonetheless, our framework applies to any environment where reputation generates future business and identities are replaceable.
Jul 30, 2026

Paying for Honesty Without Knowing the Truth: Reputation-Penalty Design for LLM Marketplace Agents

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.
Jul 15, 2026

Extending Liquid Rank Toward Multi-Source Reputation Aggregation

In this paper, we present an extension of liquid rank reputation systems that enables the aggregation and blending of multiple heterogeneous reputation sources into a unified reputation score. The proposed framework supports the incorporation of external reputational signals alongside internally generated reputation, allowing influence to reflect participation and contribution across multiple contexts and subsystems. By introducing explicit weighting and blending mechanisms, the model provides fine-grained control over the relative impact of individual reputation sources, making it adaptable to diverse governance and coordination scenarios involving both human and machine agents. The resulting approach extends existing liquid rank systems and offers a flexible foundation for designing reputation-based governance mechanisms in complex socio-technical environments.
Mar 3, 2026

Credibility Governance: A Social Mechanism for Collective Self-Correction under Weak Truth Signals

Online platforms increasingly rely on opinion aggregation to allocate real-world attention and resources, yet common signals such as engagement votes or capital-weighted commitments are easy to amplify and often track visibility rather than reliability. This makes collective judgments brittle under weak truth signals, noisy or delayed feedback, early popularity surges, and strategic manipulation. We propose Credibility Governance (CG), a mechanism that reallocates influence by learning which agents and viewpoints consistently track evolving public evidence. CG maintains dynamic credibility scores for both agents and opinions, updates opinion influence via credibility-weighted endorsements, and updates agent credibility based on the long-run performance of the opinions they support, rewarding early and persistent alignment with emerging evidence while filtering short-lived noise. We evaluate CG in POLIS, a socio-physical simulation environment that models coupled belief dynamics and downstream feedback under uncertainty. Across settings with initial majority misalignment, observation noise and contamination, and misinformation shocks, CG outperforms vote-based, stake-weighted, and no-governance baselines, yielding faster recovery to the true state, reduced lock-in and path dependence, and improved robustness under adversarial pressure. Our implementation and experimental scripts are publicly available at https://github.com/Wanying-He/Credibility_Governance.
Feb 18, 2026

Fairness Dynamics in Digital Economy Platforms with Biased Ratings

The digital services economy consists of online platforms that facilitate interactions between service providers and consumers. This ecosystem is characterized by short-term, often one-off, transactions between parties that have no prior familiarity. To establish trust among users, platforms employ rating systems which allow users to report on the quality of their previous interactions. However, while arguably crucial for these platforms to function, rating systems can perpetuate negative biases against marginalised groups. This paper investigates how to design platforms around biased reputation systems, reducing discrimination while maintaining incentives for all service providers to offer high quality service for users. We introduce an evolutionary game theoretical model to study how digital platforms can perpetuate or counteract rating-based discrimination. We focus on the platforms' decisions to promote service providers who have high reputations or who belong to a specific protected group. Our results demonstrate a fundamental trade-off between user experience and fairness: promoting highly-rated providers benefits users, but lowers the demand for marginalised providers against which the ratings are biased. Our results also provide evidence that intervening by tuning the demographics of the search results is a highly effective way of reducing unfairness while minimally impacting users. Furthermore, we show that even when precise measurements on the level of rating bias affecting marginalised service providers is unavailable, there is still potential to improve upon a recommender system which ignores protected characteristics. Altogether, our model highlights the benefits of proactive anti-discrimination design in systems where ratings are used to promote cooperative behaviour.
Sep 11, 2025

Enabling Regulatory Multi-Agent Collaboration: Architecture, Challenges, and Solutions

Large language models (LLMs)-empowered autonomous agents are transforming both digital and physical environments by enabling adaptive, multi-agent collaboration. While these agents offer significant opportunities across domains such as finance, healthcare, and smart manufacturing, their unpredictable behaviors and heterogeneous capabilities pose substantial governance and accountability challenges. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-enabled layered architecture for regulatory agent collaboration, comprising an agent layer, an off-chain computation layer, and an on-chain anchoring layer. Within this framework, we design three key modules: (i) an agent behavior tracing and arbitration module for automated accountability, (ii) a dynamic reputation evaluation module for trust assessment in collaborative scenarios, and (iii) a malicious behavior forecasting module for early detection of adversarial activities. Our approach establishes a systematic foundation for trustworthy, resilient, and scalable regulatory mechanisms in large-scale agent ecosystems. Finally, we discuss the future research directions for blockchain-enabled regulatory frameworks in multi-agent systems.