Theory of Mind
Also known as ToM
Momentum
5 papers in the last four weeks, up 67% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.
Latest papers 53
True general intelligence requires not only a model of the physical world but also a social world model: the capacity to infer how individual mental states interact and crystallize into group-level outcomes. Despite notable progress in individual-level Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, existing multimodal large language models fail at this broader task. Collective behavior emerges non-linearly from social tensions, conformity dynamics, and structural constraints, meaning it cannot be recovered by merely summing individual intentions. We present GroupToM-Bench, the first multimodal benchmark for group-level ToM, built around a causal chain spanning micro-level BDI states (belief, desire, intention), meso-level group tension and structural constraints, and macro-level outcome prediction and mechanistic attribution. To probe this full arc, we develop a seven-level cognitive audit framework. Experiments reveal a gap between current models and human baselines, highlighting a failure to process social structures and non-linear collective dynamics.
A formal definition and meta-model for a machine theory of mind
This paper proposes, for the first time, a rigorous formal definition of the concept of Machine Theory of Mind, based on principles supported by evidence from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and uses the above as a lens to examine state-of-the-art and current efforts in the field, driving a potential agenda for further research there able to "crack" the problem. It also advances a general holistic meta-model for Machine Theory of Mind, and examines the state of the art when it comes to empirically benchmarking such models.
MindClaw: Closed-Loop Embodied Mental-State Reasoning for Precision Intervention
Theory of Mind (ToM) enables an agent to reason about another actor's beliefs, goals, and intentions, which is essential for human-centered embodied assistance. Existing ToM benchmarks have advanced text and multimodal mental-state recognition, but they mostly evaluate offline question answering or final action prediction. They do not fully test whether an embodied agent can stay connected to a changing environment, update actor-specific beliefs, decide when reasoning is needed, and intervene only when help is useful. Building on MindPower, we extend robot-centric ToM reasoning to a real-time closed-loop setting and introduce MindClaw, a framework for embodied mental-state reasoning with precision intervention. MindClaw connects multi-source inputs, belief memory, an embodied cognitive trigger skill, mental reasoning, and action generation, allowing the agent to output helpful actions at the right time while remaining silent when intervention is unnecessary. Experiments show that direct VLM baselines struggle with task awareness and intervention calibration, while MindClaw achieves the best overall performance, demonstrating the importance of trigger-skill optimization for closed-loop embodied ToM assistance.
MindZero: Learning Online Mental Reasoning With Zero Annotations
Effective real-world assistance requires AI agents with robust Theory of Mind (ToM): inferring human mental states from their behavior. Despite recent advances, several key challenges remain, including (1) online inference with robust uncertainty updates over multiple hypotheses; (2) efficient reasoning suitable for real-time assistance; and (3) the lack of ground-truth mental state annotations in real-world domains. We address these challenges by introducing MindZero, a self-supervised reinforcement learning framework that trains multimodal large language models (MLLMs) for efficient and robust online mental reasoning. During training, the model is rewarded for generating mental state hypotheses that maximize the likelihood of observed actions estimated by a planner, similar to model-based ToM reasoning. This method thus eliminates the need for explicit mental state annotations. After training, MindZero internalizes model-based reasoning into fast single-pass inference. We evaluate MindZero against baselines across challenging mental reasoning and AI assistance tasks in gridworld and household domains. We found that LLMs alone are insufficient; model-based methods improve accuracy but are slow, costly, and limited by backbone MLLM capacity. In contrast, MindZero enhances MLLMs' intrinsic ToM ability and significantly outperforms model-based methods in both accuracy and efficiency, showing that mental reasoning can be effectively learned as a self-supervised skill.
Dreaming Of Others: Latent Teammate Modeling In World Models For Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents must coordinate with partners whose internal policies and intentions are not directly observable. While world models such as Dreamer have demonstrated strong generalization and sample efficiency in single-agent settings, their application to MARL remains limited by an inability to handle teammate-induced uncertainty. We propose a new perspective: treat teammates as structured, learnable components within the agent's world model. We introduce an architecture that factorizes the latent state of a Dreamer-style recurrent state-space model (RSSM) into environment and teammate components, and learns an auxiliary Theory-of-Mind (ToM) head to infer latent embeddings of partner behavior such as character, intent, and predicted actions from partial trajectories. These teammate latents condition the actor and critic, enabling the agent to imagine and adapt to diverse collaborators. We outline how this approach can support zero-shot and few-shot coordination in partially observable settings and propose a set of benchmarks and evaluation protocols to assess its impact. This work positions world models as not only predictors of environmental dynamics, but as simulators of social behavior, opening new directions for generalizable, human-compatible AI.
UserHarness: Harnessing User Minds for Stronger Agent Theory-of-Mind
Understanding what a user believes and intends is central to building effective agent assistants. This ability is often evaluated through Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks, where success requires reasoning from the user's perspective. However, many existing approaches address ToM with complex pipelines that model behavior indirectly, without explicitly reconstructing the user's mental state. This misses the core structure of the problem: users act based on their beliefs, which are updated through observations of the environment; beliefs and intentions jointly determine actions, which in turn change the environment; and social reasoning often requires nested beliefs about what others believe or intend. We propose UserHarness, a simple framework that reframes ToM reasoning as explicit user-mind reconstruction. UserHarness decomposes the user's mental state, its relation to the external environment, and the actions that follow from it, enabling agents to track what the user observes, believes, intends, and does. Across five benchmarks, UserHarness reaches up to 95.94% macro accuracy, improving over existing inference methods by more than 15% relative and over the strongest prompt-only harness by about 20% relative. These results suggest that robust user understanding requires reasoning from the roots of the user's mind, positioning user harnessing as a promising foundation for more adaptive future assistants.
OmniToM: Benchmarking Theory of Mind in LLMs via Explicit Belief Modeling
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.
Think Thrice Before You Speak: Dual knowledge-enhanced Theory-of-Mind Reasoning for Persuasive Agents
Persuasive dialogue requires reasoning about others' latent mental states, a capability known as Theory of Mind (ToM). However, due to reliance on simple prompting strategies and insufficient ToM knowledge, existing LLMs often fail to capture the intrinsic dependencies among mental states, leading to fragmented representations and unstable reasoning. To address these challenges, we introduce the ToM-based Persuasive Dialogue (ToM-PD) task, grounded in the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) framework, which explicitly models the sequential dependencies among mental states in multi-turn dialogues. To facilitate research on this task, we construct a large-scale annotated dataset, ToM-based Broad Persuasive Dialogues (ToM-BPD), capturing fine-grained mental states and corresponding persuasive strategies. We further propose Think Thrice Before You Speak (TTBYS), a knowledge-enhanced stepwise reasoning framework that leverages both explicit and implicit prior experiences to improve LLMs' inference of desires, beliefs, and persuasive strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that Qwen3-8B equipped with TTBYS outperforms GPT-5 by 1.20%, 22.80%, and 16.97% in predicting desires, beliefs, and persuasive strategies, respectively. Case studies further show that our approach enhances interpretability and consistency in reasoning.
OSCToM: RL-Guided Adversarial Generation for High-Order Theory of Mind
Large Language Models (LLMs) perform well on many language tasks, but their Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning is still uneven in complex social settings. Existing benchmarks, including ExploreToM, do not always test the recursive beliefs and information asymmetries that make these settings difficult. This paper presents OSCToM (Observer-Self Conflict Theory of Mind), an approach for modeling nested belief conflicts in LLM-based ToM tasks. The key case is one in which an observer's view of another agent conflicts with the observer's own belief state. Such cases go beyond simple perspective-taking and require recursive, multi-layered reasoning. OSCToM combines reinforcement learning (RL), an extended domain-specific language, and compositional surrogate models to generate observer-self conflicts. In our experiments, OSCToM-8B gives the best overall result among the systems tested. It improves on the reported ExploreToM results on FANToM and remains competitive on Hi-ToM and BigToM. On the information-asymmetric FANToM benchmark, OSCToM reaches 76% accuracy, compared with the 0.2% reported by ExploreToM. The data-synthesis procedure is also 6x more efficient, indicating that targeted training data can help smaller models handle advanced cognitive reasoning. The project code is available at https://github.com/sharminsrishty/osct.
Beyond the Cartesian Illusion: Testing Two-Stage Multi-Modal Theory of Mind under Perceptual Bottlenecks
While Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities in general reasoning, their embodied spatial intelligence remains hampered by a "Cartesian Illusion" - a reliance on text-based probability distributions that lack grounded, 3D topological understanding. This limitation is starkly exposed in multi-agent environments, which demand more than just scene perception; they require second-order Theory of Mind (ToM). Specifically, an Agent A must be able to infer Agent B's belief about the environment, governed strictly by Agent B's physical orientation and sensory limitations. In this paper, we probe the limits of two-stage spatial inference in MLLMs through a novel audio-visual task: requiring Agent A to predict Agent B's estimation of A's relative location. To solve this, we propose an Epistemic Sensory Bottleneck module that abandons rigid, rule-based coordinate transformations. Instead, we introduce an Anchor-Based Embodied Spatial Decomposition Chain-of-Thought (CoT). This guides the MLLM through a "geometric-to-semantic" projection, forcing it to first establish B's local coordinate system and then dynamically weight visual and auditory modalities based on whether A falls within B's visual frustum. Extensive evaluations reveal that while current MLLMs fundamentally struggle with spatial symmetry and out-of-view ambiguities (establishing a rigorous zero-shot baseline of 42% accuracy), our sensory-bounded reasoning chain robustly outperforms pure egocentric and allocentric baselines. By systematically benchmarking these perceptual bottlenecks, our work exposes the current limits of MLLM spatial reasoning and establishes a foundational paradigm for epistemic, modality-aware inference in Embodied AI.
What Do You Think I Think? Accounting for Human Beliefs Using Second-Order Theory of Mind
Discrepancies between an agent's actual knowledge and what a person thinks the agent knows can hinder interactions. If an agent could detect such discrepancies, it could provide feedback to account for them and improve current and future interactions. Using the I-POMDP as a framework for a second-order Theory of Mind (ToM-2), this work endows an agent with the ability to model the evolution of a person's erroneous beliefs about an agent and the cognitive biases and heuristics (CBH) from which they arise. In doing so, the agent can detect when CBH might be at play during an interaction and adaptively generate feedback that accounts for them. An in-person user study shows how a ToM-2 learner can account for the effects of a teacher's CBH to significantly improve the informativeness of teacher actions, and subjective results suggest people find the ToM-2 learner's feedback more useful.
EnactToM: An Evolving Benchmark for Functional Theory of Mind in Embodied Agents
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.
MOTOR-Bench: A Real-world Dataset and Multi-agent Framework for Zero-shot Human Mental State Understanding
Understanding human mental states from natural behavior is crucial for intelligent systems in the real world. However, most current research focuses on predicting isolated mental state labels, lacking structured annotations of complex interpersonal interactions. To support structured analysis, we introduce MOTOR-Bench, a carefully-designed benchmark with a real-world dataset MOTOR-dataset, containing 1,440 multimodal video clips in collaborative learning scenarios, reflecting key real-world data challenges including natural class imbalance, visual noise, and domain-specific language. Each sample is labeled by educational experts based on self-regulated learning theory. We further evaluate several state-of-the-art multimodal large language models and multi-agent systems in a zero-shot setting on our MOTOR-Bench. However, their performance on this task remains limited, suggesting that existing methods still struggle with structured reasoning from observable behavior to deeper mental states. To address this challenge, we propose a reasoning multi-agent framework, named MOTOR-MAS. It coordinates multiple agents through a structured agent coordination mechanism to infer explicit behaviors, internal cognitions, and psychological emotions. Experimental results show that our MOTOR-MAS outperforms the best single-model benchmark by 15.93 points in Macro-F1 scores for the three labels of behavior, cognition, and emotion, and outperforms the general multi-agent benchmark by 10.2 points in internal cognition prediction.
Evaluating Generative Models as Interactive Emergent Representations of Human-Like Collaborative Behavior
Human-AI collaboration requires AI agents to understand human behavior for effective coordination. While advances in foundation models show promising capabilities in understanding and showing human-like behavior, their application in embodied collaborative settings needs further investigation. This work examines whether embodied foundation model agents exhibit emergent collaborative behaviors indicating underlying mental models of their collaborators, which is an important aspect of effective coordination. This paper develops a 2D collaborative game environment where large language model agents and humans complete color-matching tasks requiring coordination. We define five collaborative behaviors as indicators of emergent mental model representation: perspective-taking, collaborator-aware planning, introspection, theory of mind, and clarification. An automated behavior detection system using LLM-based judges identifies these behaviors, achieving fair to substantial agreement with human annotations. Results from the automated behavior detection system show that foundation models consistently exhibit emergent collaborative behaviors without being explicitly trained to do so. These behaviors occur at varying frequencies during collaboration stages, with distinct patterns across different LLMs. A user study was also conducted to evaluate human satisfaction and perceived collaboration effectiveness, with the results indicating positive collaboration experiences. Participants appreciated the agents' task focus, plan verbalization, and initiative, while suggesting improvements in response times and human-like interactions. This work provides an experimental framework for human-AI collaboration, empirical evidence of collaborative behaviors in embodied LLM agents, a validated behavioral analysis methodology, and an assessment of collaboration effectiveness.
SOTOPIA-TOM: Evaluating Privacy and Information Management in Multi-Agent Interaction with Theory of Mind
As LLM-based agents are increasingly interacting in multi-party settings, they need to properly handle information asymmetry, i.e., knowing when and to whom to disclose information is appropriate. Yet, existing benchmarks fail to measure this ability in realistic multi-party settings. Thus, we introduce SOTOPIA-TOM, a multi-dimensional benchmarking framework to evaluate LLM agents' ability to successfully navigate information asymmetric and privacy sensitive multi-party interactions. We create an interaction environment which enables both public (broadcast) and private (direct message) communication, and craft 160 human-reviewed scenarios across eight industry sectors, each involving 3 to 5 agents with partitioned private knowledge and channel-dependent sharing policies. To measure interaction abilities, we create a multi-dimensional evaluation framework to assess how well agents share useful information, seek missing details, coordinate efficiently, and protect privacy, which we also combine into a composite INFOMGMT metric. Results show that, across 6 LLM backbones and prompting strategies (vanilla, CoT-privacy, and ToM-based interventions), even the largest high-reasoning model (GPT-5) reaches only a 62% INFOMGMT score, which indicates persistent deficiencies in information seeking and privacy-aware decision-making. Additionally, ToM-based interventions more consistently improve the overall coordination-privacy balance (for example, relative to the vanilla baseline, ToM-Coach reduces critical privacy violations on GPT-4o from 9.9% to 2.2% while increasing the composite InfoMgmt score more than 2.5x from 15% to 40%). Overall, SOTOPIA-TOM exposes persistent limitations of current LLM agents in complex, information-asymmetric coordination and provides an extensible testbed for developing more privacy-aware, theory-of-mind capable multi-agent systems.
Does Theory of Mind Improvement Really Benefit Human-AI Interactions? Empirical Findings from Interactive Evaluations
Improving the Theory of Mind (ToM) capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for effective social interactions between these AI models and humans. However, the existing benchmarks often measure ToM capability improvement through story-reading, multiple-choice questions from a third-person perspective, while ignoring the first-person, dynamic, and open-ended nature of human-AI (HAI) interactions. To directly examine how ToM improvement techniques benefit HAI interactions, we first proposed the new paradigm of interactive ToM evaluation with both perspective and metric shifts. Next, following the paradigm, we conducted a systematic study of four representative ToM enhancement techniques using both four real-world datasets and a user study, covering both goal-oriented tasks (e.g., coding, math) and experience-oriented tasks (e.g., counseling). Our findings reveal that improvements on static benchmarks do not always translate to better performance in dynamic HAI interactions. This paper offers critical insights into ToM evaluation, showing the necessity of interaction-based assessments in developing next-generation, socially aware LLMs for HAI symbiosis.
StoryTR: Narrative-Centric Video Temporal Retrieval with Theory of Mind Reasoning
Current video moment retrieval excels at action-centric tasks but struggles with narrative content. Models can see \textit{what is happening} but fail to reason \textit{why it matters}. This semantic gap stems from the lack of \textbf{Theory of Mind (ToM)}: the cognitive ability to infer implicit intentions, mental states, and narrative causality from surface-level observations. We introduce \textbf{StoryTR}, the first video moment retrieval benchmark requiring ToM reasoning, comprising 8.1k samples from narrative short-form videos (shorts/reels). These videos present an ideal testbed. Their high information density encodes meaning through subtle multimodal cues. For instance, a glance paired with a sigh carries entirely different semantics than the glance alone. Yet multimodal perception alone is insufficient; ToM is required to decode that a character
smiling'' may actually be concealing hostility.'' To teach models this reasoning capability, we propose an \textbf{Agentic Data Pipeline} that generates training data with explicit three-tier ToM chains (intent decoding, narrative reasoning, boundary localization). Experiments reveal the severity of the reasoning gap: Gemini-3.0-Pro achieves only 0.53 Avg IoU on StoryTR. However, our 7B \textbf{Shorts-Moment} model, trained on ToM-guided data, improves +15.1% relative IoU over baselines, demonstrating that \textit{narrative reasoning capability matters more than parameter scale}.Don't Make the LLM Read the Graph: Make the Graph Think
We investigate whether explicit belief graphs improve LLM performance in cooperative multi-agent reasoning. Through 3,000+ controlled trials across four LLM families in the cooperative card game Hanabi, we establish four findings. First, integration architecture determines whether belief graphs provide value: as prompt context, graphs are decorative for strong models and beneficial only for weak models on 2nd-order Theory of Mind (80% vs 10%, p<0.0001, OR=36.0); when graphs gate action selection through ranked shortlists, they become structurally essential even for strong models (100% vs 20% on 2nd-order ToM, p<0.001). Second, we identify "Planner Defiance," a model-family-specific failure where LLMs override correct planner recommendations at partial competence (90% override, replicated N=20); Gemini models show near-zero defiance while Llama 70B shows 90%, and models distinguish factual context (deferred to) from advisory recommendations (overridden). Third, full-game evidence confirms inter-agent conventions (+128% over baseline, p=0.003) outperform all single-agent interventions, and individual belief-graph components must be combined to produce gains. Fourth, preliminary scaling analysis (N=10/cell, exploratory) suggests graph depth has diminishing returns: shallow graphs provide the best cost-benefit ratio, while deeper ToM graphs appear harmful at larger player counts (-1.5 pts at 5-player, p=0.029).
DialToM: A Theory of Mind Benchmark for Forecasting State-Driven Dialogue Trajectories
We introduce DialToM, an annotated Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmark built from naturalistic human-human dialogues using a multiple-choice evaluation framework. Concurrent with recent work showing a gap between explicit mental-state inference and applied ToM in synthetic settings~\cite{gu2024simpletom}, we establish a stricter \emph{State-Driven Diagnostic Probe} in which models must forecast state-consistent dialogue trajectories solely from isolated mental-state profiles without dialogue context. Our evaluation reveals a systematic reasoning asymmetry -- LLMs excel at inferring mental states (Literal ToM) but struggle to leverage them for social forecasting (Functional ToM). Crucially, a domain expert achieves 100% accuracy on this task, proving its validity and establishing a stark human-AI capability gap. Further, a teacher-student reasoning injection probe shows that Gemini 3 Pro -- which establishes the leading baseline -- possesses robust Functional ToM capabilities for context-free forecasting that are transferable to weaker models. DialToM, its evaluation code, and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/Stealth-py/DialToM.
PDDL-Mind: Large Language Models are Capable on Belief Reasoning with Reliable State Tracking
Large language models (LLMs) perform substantially below human level on existing theory-of-mind (ToM) benchmarks, even when augmented with chain-of-thought prompting or probabilistic belief updates. We argue that these failures primarily arise from unreliable implicit state tracking rather than limitations in high-level reasoning. We introduce PDDL-Mind, a neuro-symbolic framework that decouples environment state evolution from belief inference. By translating narrative descriptions into explicit states and actions expressed in Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL), and by verifying action-induced state transitions against a predefined domain, PDDL-Mind provides LLMs with a logically consistent and explicit representation of world states for ToM tasks. Experiments on MMToM-QA, MuMA and FanToM show that PDDL-Mind achieves over 5% absolute accuracy gain over the best existing state-of-the-art method on ToM benchmark questions.
Learning Dynamic Belief Graphs for Theory-of-mind Reasoning
Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning with Large Language Models (LLMs) requires inferring how people's implicit, evolving beliefs shape what they seek and how they act under uncertainty -- especially in high-stakes settings such as disaster response, emergency medicine, and human-in-the-loop autonomy. Prior approaches either prompt LLMs directly or use latent-state models that treat beliefs as static and independent, often producing incoherent mental models over time and weak reasoning in dynamic contexts. We introduce a structured cognitive trajectory model for LLM-based ToM that represents mental state as a dynamic belief graph, jointly inferring latent beliefs, learning their time-varying dependencies, and linking belief evolution to information seeking and decisions. Our model contributes (i) a novel projection from textualized probabilistic statements to consistent probabilistic graphical model updates, (ii) an energy-based factor graph representation of belief interdependencies, and (iii) an ELBO-based objective that captures belief accumulation and delayed decisions. Across multiple real-world disaster evacuation datasets, our model significantly improves action prediction and recovers interpretable belief trajectories consistent with human reasoning, providing a principled module for augmenting LLMs with ToM in high-uncertainty environment. https://anonymous.4open.science/r/ICML_submission-6373/
CoMMET: A Psychologically Grounded Benchmark for Evaluating Theory of Mind in Multimodal LLMs
Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to reason about the mental states of oneself and others-is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) become ubiquitous in real-world applications, validating their capacity for this level of social reasoning is essential for effective and natural interactions. However, existing benchmarks for assessing ToM in MLLMs are limited; most rely solely on text inputs and focus narrowly on belief-related tasks. In this paper, we propose a new multimodal benchmark dataset, CoMMET, a comprehensive mental states and moral evaluation task inspired by the Theory of Mind Booklet Task. CoMMET expands the scope of evaluation by covering a broader range of mental states and introducing multi-turn testing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first psychology-grounded benchmark to evaluate MLLMs across multiple mental states in a multimodal, open-ended, and multi-turn setting. Through a comprehensive assessment of MLLMs across different families and sizes, we analyze the strengths and limitations of current models and identify directions for future improvement.
LLMs and their Limited Theory of Mind: Evaluating Mental State Annotations in Situated Dialogue
What if large language models could not only infer human mindsets but also expose every blind spot in team dialogue such as discrepancies in the team members' joint understanding? We present a novel, two-step framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) both as human-style annotators of team dialogues to track the team's shared mental models (SMMs) and as automated discrepancy detectors among individuals' mental states. In the first step, an LLM generates annotations by identifying SMM elements within task-oriented dialogues from the Cooperative Remote Search Task (CReST) corpus. Then, a secondary LLM compares these LLM-derived annotations and human annotations against gold-standard labels to detect and characterize divergences. We define an SMM coherence evaluation framework for this use case and apply it to six CReST dialogues, ultimately producing: (1) a dataset of human and LLM annotations; (2) a reproducible evaluation framework for SMM coherence; and (3) an empirical assessment of LLM-based discrepancy detection. Our results reveal that, although LLMs exhibit apparent coherence on straightforward natural-language annotation tasks, they systematically err in scenarios requiring spatial reasoning or disambiguation of prosodic cues.