Artificial Intelligence Risk
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9 papers in the last four weeks, up 29% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.
Latest papers 94
Assessing whether Large Language Models outputs are factually grounded, epistemically calibrated, and methodologically reproducible is a prerequisite for responsible AI deployment. Yet auditing LLMs remains inaccessible to non-technical practitioners: existing tools require programming expertise and non-trivial environment setup, and cloud-hosted platforms transmit evaluation data to external services, creating barriers for domain experts and compliance officers legally responsible for AI oversight. We introduce LLM-FACETS (LLM FActuality Cross-EvaluaTion System): an open-source framework with a browser-accessible interface and a plugin architecture, structured around three practitioner profiles (technical experts, domain experts, compliance officers) that mirror the stakeholder categories identified in the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. The architecture makes data flows explicit: deterministic metrics (BLEU, ROUGE, BERTScore) run entirely within the self-hosted server with no outbound transmission; LLM-judge metrics contact external APIs explicitly, with users retaining full credential control. The framework operationalizes transparency through three mechanisms: token-level log-probability visualization for epistemic uncertainty, multi-judge consensus to mitigate judge bias, and RAG Triad metrics (Faithfulness, Answer Relevance, Context Relevance) to detect and localize hallucinations. A plugin architecture allows any new metric or dataset to be integrated without modifying the evaluation pipeline. The open-source implementation enables cross-checking across multiple metrics targeting the same property, ensuring reproducibility and decoupling AI accountability from the teams building the systems assessed. We verify the framework through cross-validation of 18 metric implementations against canonical reference libraries.
AI Loss of Control Incident Management: Response & Resilience
Recent research demonstrating AI systems exhibiting deception and shutdown resistance suggests that AI loss of control (LOC) is an urgent policy concern , yet current literature focuses almost exclusively on alignment and prevention. To address this gap, this paper introduces a foundational framework and taxonomy for managing catastrophic AI LOC incidents. The taxonomy's first level distinguishes between scenarios where regaining control is 'extremely costly' versus 'impossible'. While impossible scenarios demand immediate resilience investments to fundamentally restrict an AI's attack surface , extremely costly scenarios require active incident management via Containment and Threat Neutralization. The framework further categorizes these manageable events into accidental LOC (requiring automated circuit-breaker responses) and adversarial LOC (requiring graduated escalatory measures). By mapping three severity classes to specific scenario matrices, this paper provides a concrete, proportional guide for managing unprecedented AI risks.
Automating Low-Risk Code Review at Meta: RADAR, Risk Calibration, and Review Efficiency
AI-assisted coding tools have altered software production. At Meta, significant lines of code per human-landed diff grew by 105.9% year over year and per-developer diff volume rose 51%, with agentic AI responsible for over 80% of that growth. Meanwhile, the share of diffs receiving timely review has declined, exposing a widening gap between code supply and reviewer bandwidth. We ask three questions that progress from feasibility through calibration to impact: (1) can risk-stratified automation operate at scale across diverse organizations, (2) how does tuning the risk threshold affect the trade-off between automation yield and safety, and (3) to what extent does automated review reduce end-to-end latency for AI-generated changes? We deployed RADAR (Risk Aware Diff Auto Review), a multi-stage funnel that classifies each diff by authorship and source type, applies eligibility gates, static heuristics, a machine-learned Diff Risk Score, LLM-based Automated Code Review, and deterministic validation before landing qualifying changes. We evaluate RADAR through telemetry covering 535K+ RADAR-reviewed diffs, observational before-after comparisons for policy changes, and difference-in-differences analysis of efficiency outcomes. RADAR has reviewed 535K+ diffs and landed 331K+. Relaxing the Diff Risk Score threshold from the 25th to the 50th percentile increased the approve rate to 60.31%. The revert rate for RADAR-reviewed diffs is 1/3 that of non-RADAR diffs, and the Production Incident rate is 1/50 that of non-RADAR diffs. RADAR reduces median time to close by over 330% and median diff review wall time by 35%. Risk-aware layered automation can materially reduce review bottlenecks created by AI-driven code growth without compromising production safety.
FHRFormer: A Self-Supervised Masked Transformer Framework for Fetal Heart Rate Time-Series Inpainting and Forecasting
Approximately 10% of newborns require assistance to initiate breathing at birth, and around 5% need ventilation support. Fetal heart rate (FHR) monitoring plays a crucial role in assessing fetal well-being during prenatal care, enabling the detection of abnormal patterns and supporting timely obstetric interventions to mitigate fetal risks during labor. Applying artificial intelligence (AI) methods to analyze large datasets of continuous FHR monitoring episodes with diverse outcomes may offer novel insights into predicting the risk of needing breathing assistance or interventions. Recent advances in wearable FHR monitors have enabled continuous fetal monitoring without compromising maternal mobility. However, sensor displacement during maternal movement, as well as changes in fetal or maternal position, often lead to signal dropout, resulting in gaps in recorded FHR data. Such missing data limits the extraction of meaningful insights and complicates automated (AI-based) analysis. Traditional approaches to handling missing data, such as simple interpolation techniques, often fail to preserve the spectral characteristics of the signals. In this paper, we propose a masked transformer-based autoencoder approach to reconstruct missing FHR signals by capturing both local temporal and frequency components of the data. The proposed method demonstrates robustness across varying durations of missing data and can be used for signal inpainting and forecasting. The proposed approach can be applied retrospectively to research datasets to support the development of AI-based risk algorithms. In the future, the proposed method could be integrated into wearable FHR monitoring devices to achieve earlier and more robust risk detection.
Provably Secure Agent Guardrail
As large language models transition from bounded generative engines to agents with expansive execution privileges, AI going out of control precipitates a fundamental crisis in artificial intelligence security. Existing defense architectures heavily rely on empirical semantic guardrails and probabilistic large model adjudicators, mechanisms that fail to provide deterministic security lower bounds when facing complex semantic symbol decoupling attacks. To overcome this empirical semantic guardrail dilemma, this paper proposes a new security paradigm for agents based on the fundamental limitations of logical reasoning. Based on this paradigm, we further introduce an executable Proof-Constrained Action (ePCA) framework with a neural symbolic isolation architecture. This framework abandons semantic trust in natural language, forcing agents to losslessly formalize their intentions into first-order logical mathematical constraints before performing physical operations. Empirical evaluations of macroscopic and microscopic two-dimensional dynamic adversarial systems demonstrate that our formal verification mechanism achieves zero attack success rate and zero false positive rate across the evaluated scenarios, with extremely low computational latency. This research provides a conditional formal foundation under explicit system assumptions and an engineering paradigm for constructing the underlying defense foundation for future intelligent systems.
Foundations of a Time-Consistent Counterfactual Actuarial Runtime for Autonomous AI Agents
We propose a foundational runtime actuarial layer for autonomous AI agents in which every side-effect-bearing action carries a time-consistent, counterfactual risk toll computed against a contractually fixed safe default, inside an explicit underwriting boundary. The framework treats per-action insurance as the primary unit of analysis and replaces post-hoc annual liability cover with a pre-action transaction layer. The paper establishes four structural results: (i) a well-defined counterfactual toll under a chosen safe-default mapping and continuation policy, with explicit non-uniqueness; (ii) a no-splitting property within an underwriting boundary that telescopes path-decomposed actions into a boundary potential, with a corollary tying gaming-resistance to boundary design; (iii) an irreversible-authority premium, split into a strictly positive action-level component and an if-and-only-if characterisation of the set-level robust capital increase; and (iv) a conservative runtime gating theorem that translates high-probability toll envelopes into an executed-action budget guarantee. The result is the mathematical base layer for a broader program: an empirical companion instantiates the runtime through an Actuarial Action Interface and authority-frontier experiments; a mechanism-design companion studies strategic operator incentives and cross-boundary aggregation; and a dynamic-underwriting companion studies experience rating and audit-replay calibration. The present paper states the primitive contract, the toll identity, the within-boundary no-arbitrage result, and the budget guarantee on which those later layers depend.
The Timing Dependencies of Trust: Speed, Accuracy, and cBCI Neuro-Decoupling in Human-AI Teams
The speed and accuracy of an artificial teammate fundamentally alter the failure states of Human-AI integration. While high-speed AI interventions risk inducing reflexive blind compliance, delayed interventions can induce ambiguous cognitive conflict. This study investigates how the fundamental characteristics of an in-task AI assistant, Fast/Less-Accurate (FLA-AI) versus Slow/Accurate (SA-AI) impact the synergy of Collaborative Brain-Computer Interface (cBCI) teams in a Virtual Reality drone task. Seventeen operators completed continuous search tasks under high cognitive workload while their spatial covariance was mapped using a 2D Adaptive Riemannian Oracle. The results mathematically demonstrate that AI timing dictates the mechanism of team failure. Fast AI induced instant, blind compliance; human accuracy under deception collapsed to 50.2%, and pure behavioural teams (N=8) failed to scale beyond 74.1%. In contrast, Slow AI induced delayed cognitive conflict; humans hesitated (61.1% accuracy), but N=8 behavioural teams eventually recovered to 100.0%. Crucially, the Riemannian Oracle mathematically adapted to these states: it heavily restricted temporal windows (< 0.8s) to intercept fast reflexive compliance, while widening windows (> 1.2s) to capture delayed cognitive conflict. Integrating these isolated veridical signals via Hybrid Fusion successfully rescued the Fast AI team (+7.6% at N=8) and significantly accelerated the recovery of smaller Slow AI teams (+6.9% at N=4). These findings prove that cBCI synergy is heavily contingent on the temporal dynamics of trust, providing a critical framework for designing dynamically gated Human-AI systems.
Signals in the Noise: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for AI Loss of Control Detection
This paper applies open-source intelligence (OSINT) and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) methodologies to the problem of detecting AI systems operating outside human control. Drawing on a cross-disciplinary literature review and 14 semi-structured expert interviews conducted under Chatham House Rule, the paper develops two threat models, identifies a range of observable traces, and proposes an institutional architecture for monitoring. The research finds that OSINT-based detection of loss of control is partially feasible and worth building now. Three detection vectors emerge as highest priority: transcript-based collection of user-reported AI behaviour; infrastructure correlation for unexpected external connections or replication; and output analysis for capability concealment. The paper argues for a dedicated, federated international monitoring capability anchored in OSINT methods and independent of frontier AI developers, and identifies sustained non-industry funding as the highest-leverage structural intervention available.
AI Assurance: A Comprehensive Testing Strategy for Enterprise AI Systems
Enterprise AI systems, built on large language models, retrieval pipelines and autonomous agents, introduce a class of risks that traditional software quality assurance was never designed to address. These systems are probabilistic, context-sensitive and emergent: they cannot be verified to be correct in the classical sense, but only evaluated with increasing confidence. This paper presents a comprehensive assurance strategy for enterprise AI systems built around three key principles: first, that AI testing should focus on continuous risk reduction rather than strict correctness verification; second, that evaluation must be treated as a core engineering discipline alongside development; and third, that failures in AI assurance can lead to organizational impacts that are fundamentally different from those seen in traditional deterministic software systems. We introduce a structured AI Failure Taxonomy, propose a revised five-layer AI Assurance Pyramid and provide operational guidance on evaluation-driven development, RAG system testing, model lifecycle management and governance. The goal is to equip engineering leaders and practitioners with a strategy that is both philosophically grounded and operationally deployable.
AI Security Research Should Better Incentivize Defense Research
This work examines an imbalance in artificial intelligence (AI) security research: the field tends to produce more work on attacking AI systems than on defending them. Drawing on related academic papers, we find biased attack-to-defense ratios across subfields, including federated learning, speech recognition, membership inference, large language models, etc. The imbalance possibly means far beyond a simple count: attack papers are routinely evaluated under favorable conditions that make threats look more severe than they are in practice, while defenses are held to a stricter standard that few can meet. The result is a literature rich in demonstrated vulnerabilities and thin on usable and deployed protections. We thus argue that AI security research should better incentivize defense research.
Suicide Risk Assessment from AI-powered Video Surveillance: An Interpretable Framework for Prevention in Metro Stations
Understanding and monitoring human behavior in metro stations play an important role in supporting suicide prevention efforts, where early identification of high-risk situations can enable timely intervention. This requires assessing suicide risk from a surveillance video by jointly reasoning about the behavior of each passenger, his/her spatial context, and temporal dynamics. However, this assessment using videos captured by surveillance cameras is challenging, as it demands accurate perception of human motion, understanding of platform geometry, and aggregation of heterogeneous behavioral cues over time. In this work, we formalize the task of Suicide Risk Assessment (SRA) in metro stations and introduce the first interpretable framework that addresses this challenge. Unlike approaches that focus on isolated subtasks or attempt to infer intent directly, our formulation assesses suicide risk from accumulated evidence by incorporating person tracking, activity recognition, semantic segmentation of the platform, and trajectory-driven risk heatmap modeling. By formalizing SRA as a distinct task and benchmarking a complete operational pipeline achieving 83.2% ROC-AUC on real surveillance data, this work highlights the complexity of suicide risk assessment and opens new directions for research on interpretable AI systems for social good.
STRIDE-AI: A Threat Modeling Framework for Generative AI Security Assessment
Traditional cybersecurity methodologies target deterministic systems and fail to address the probabilistic nature of AI, leaving systems vulnerable to attack vectors such as model inversion, data poisoning, and prompt injection. Recent industry reports indicate that a majority of organizations deploying AI lack a dedicated security strategy, with adversarial attacks increasing rapidly year-over-year. We present \textit{STRIDE-AI}, a framework that bridges the gap between high-level risk standards (NIST AI RMF) and technical vulnerability taxonomies (OWASP LLM Top 10). The framework defines a six-phase assessment lifecycle, introduces a threat modeling adaptation of classical STRIDE for AI systems, and is operationalized through a purpose-built web tool. We provide an initial validation of the approach through a black-box assessment of a deployed LLM chatbot, which successfully reduced the attack success rate from 80% to 15% in our sandbox case study.
Large Language Models for Agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, Evaluation, and Safety
Large language models are increasingly being used to support network operations (NetOps) and artificial intelligence for IT operations (AIOps), including incident investigation, root-cause analysis, configuration synthesis, and limited self-healing. In both NetOps and AIOps, this shift is changing how tasks are managed. Agent-based operations work as workflows, from gathering evidence to taking action, following permissions, policies, and checks, and providing rollback options when necessary. This is crucial because operational decisions can have instant impacts. To make the argument concrete, we organise the relevant literature around the hierarchy of autonomy, tool scope, evidence traces, and assurance contracts. These contracts define what an agent may observe, propose, and execute. They also define the checks that must pass before any action is allowed. A consistent pattern appears across work on telemetry query recommendation, diagnosis, root-cause analysis, configuration synthesis, change planning, and limited self-healing. Operational reliability does not come chiefly from the model itself. It depends on the machinery around the model. We also argue that evaluation should go beyond static question answering. Agentic NetOps and AIOps systems require workflow-centred evaluation, including trace quality, bounded tool use, safe proposal generation, replay in sandboxed environments, and canary trials with rollback-aware scoring. Without these measures, a system may appear robust yet remain too fragile. Finally, we examine security, privacy, and governance risks that become acute when agents sit close to operational control surfaces. Taken together, the survey concludes that progress in intelligent NetOps and AIOps will depend on treating autonomy as a constrained operational control problem, whose outputs must be reliable, auditable, and securely deployable.
From Accuracy to Auditability: A Survey of Determinism in Financial AI Systems
Deploying machine learning in regulated financial environments -- credit risk, fraud detection, and anti-money laundering -- exposes critical vulnerabilities in algorithmic reproducibility. While early financial ML addressed statistical challenges such as backtest overfitting, deep neural networks and Generative AI have introduced mechanical nondeterminism rooted in hardware and architecture. This survey provides a systems perspective on reproducibility failures across three modalities now dominant in financial AI: tabular models (post-hoc explanation variance), graph networks (stochastic sampling and temporal asynchrony), and LLM-based agentic workflows (batch-dependent divergence and trajectory drift). We supplement the literature analysis with first-party experiments on public financial datasets -- quantifying explanation rank instability in credit scoring, prediction flip rates in GNN-based fraud detection, and tensor-parallel-induced output divergence in LLM entity extraction. We propose a layered evaluation framework linking modality-specific metrics (RBO, D_cos, TDI, PSD) to audit readiness, and empirically validate the complementarity of logit-level and semantic-level determinism measures.
MATRA: Modeling the Attack Surface of Agentic AI Systems -- OpenClaw Case Study
LLMs are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents with access to tools, databases, and external services, yet practitioners (across different sectors) lack systematic methods to assess how known threat classes translate into concrete risks within a specific agentic deployment. We present MATRA, a pragmatic threat modeling framework for agentic AI systems that adapts established risk assessment methodology to systematically assess how known LLM threats translate into deployment-specific risks. MATRA begins with an asset-based impact assessment and utilizes attack trees to determine the likelihood of these impacts occurring within the system architecture. We demonstrate MATRA on a personal AI agent deployment using OpenClaw, quantifying how architectural controls such as network sandboxing and least-privilege access reduce risk by limiting the blast radius of successful injections.
Security Risks in Tool-Enabled AI Agents: A Systematic Analysis of Privileged Execution Environments
Tool-enabled AI agents are increasingly deployed in cloud-hosted environments and offered as services, where they perform side-effecting operations through privileged tools within execution environments. While such agents enable powerful automation, the security implications of hosting autonomous agents in privileged execution environments are not yet fully explored. This paper presents a structured analysis of security risks associated with cloud-hosted AI agents. We introduce a taxonomy of risk categories, illustrate these risks through three representative agent scenarios, and discuss mitigation strategies along with their tradeoffs. A small controlled experiment empirically illustrates risk manifestation and the effect of lightweight mitigations in this setup. Our analysis suggests that many risks in autonomous cloud agents arise not from novel vulnerabilities, but from over-privileged tools, capability-intent mismatches, and ambient authority leakage in execution environments. Based on these findings, we derive practical design guidelines for deploying AI agents in the cloud more securely.
The Biosecurity Blind Spot: Systematic Dual-use Detection in Open Science Infrastructure
AI is transforming life sciences research at unprecedented speed, accelerating discovery across protein structure prediction, genome modeling, and drug development (Jumper et al., 2021; Mak et al., 2024). Yet this rapid advancement, coupled with the open science movement, introduces significant dual-use research concerns that have received limited empirical scrutiny. Here we present the first systematic analysis of dual-use research of concern (DURC) content on open preprint servers. We screened ~52,000 bioRxiv preprints (2024-2025) using a hybrid pipeline of lexical filtering and large language model (LLM) evaluation, scoring metadata across nine DURC, three PEPP, and five governance categories aligned with U.S. and Australia Group oversight frameworks. Our analysis reveals that dual-use-adjacent knowledge is routinely present in openly accessible titles and abstracts, often exceeding established risk thresholds even in studies with legitimate public health objectives. While this mapping captures surface-level information diffusion, it does not measure operational capability, downstream misuse potential, or the substantial technical and biosafety barriers that constrain harmful application. We argue that institutional review processes, funding requirements, and preprint platform policies must evolve to incorporate proactive, metadata-level monitoring without compromising scientific transparency. Ultimately, harmonizing controlled-access mechanisms for high-risk methodologies with open summaries of scientific contributions offers a pragmatic framework for governing AI-accelerated biology at scale.
Position: AI Security Policy Should Target Systems, Not Models
We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.
Agentic, Context-Aware Risk Intelligence in the Internet of Value
The Internet of Value (IoV) is a heterogeneous, partially-trusted network in which the dominant marginal risk is composite (route, sentiment, liquidity, and the policy a system is willing to commit to) rather than a property of any single chain. We argue that a risk primitive adequate for this regime is a composition of five engines: a prediction engine over price, liquidity, volatility, and route health; a Bittensor verification subnet that decentralises and economically scores prediction outputs; a sentiment-fusion engine over text, on-chain flow, and grey-literature feeds; an agentic engine under constitutional, role-bound action constraints; and an API-risk and scenario engine that converts forecasts into pre-committed action programs in the sense of Monte-Carlo scenario generation. We anchor the architecture in two empirical artefacts: a 27-hour policy-constrained liquidity stress-response experiment on Solana, and a 168-hour prediction-router calibration arc reported with explicit class-imbalance honesty. The case study supports deployability; the validator-loss decomposition is stated formally and is falsifiable.
The Insurability Frontier of AI Risk: Mapping Threats to Affirmative Coverage, Silent Exposures, and Exclusions
The rapid diffusion of agentic AI has created a new coverage problem for commercial insurance: some AI-mediated losses are now affirmatively insured, some create silent-AI exposure under legacy cyber, technology errors-and-omissions (E&O), directors-and-officers (D&O), employment practices liability (EPLI), crime, and media policies, and others are being actively excluded. This paper maps that emerging boundary by coding 55 AI threat classes against 26 insurance products, endorsements, and exclusion regimes using public carrier materials and OWASP/MITRE threat catalogs. We identify a four-tier insurability frontier: affirmatively insured perils, silent-AI exposures, actively excluded perils, and perils outside conventional private insurance structures. Our coding measures publicly claimed positioning rather than executed contract wording; the headline statistics describe what carriers publicly state about coverage, not what would be paid in any specific claim. Three patterns emerge. First, affirmative AI coverage is beginning to differentiate by primary risk emphasis: public materials often position Munich Re around model performance and drift, Armilla and parts of the Lloyd's market around hallucination and broader AI liability, Tokio Marine Kiln and CFC around IP and technology E&O concerns, Apollo ibott around emerging autonomous system liability, and Coalition around deepfake and AI-enabled cyber response. Second, legacy lines retain silent-AI exposure where AI is an instrumentality rather than the legal cause of loss. Third, foundation model concentration is the clearest genuinely novel insurability frontier because upstream model failure can correlate losses across many cedents at once; the relevant market design question is which insurability constraint each candidate structure relaxes, not merely which systemic risk template exists.
Brainrot: Deskilling and Addiction are Overlooked AI Risks
The scope of AI safety and alignment work in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has so far mostly been limited to harms related to: (a) discrimination and hate speech, (b) harmful/inappropriate (violent, sexual, illegal) content, (c) information hazards, and (d) use cases related to malicious actors, such as cybersecurity, child abuse, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. The public conversation around AI, on the other hand, has also been focusing on threats to our cognition, mental health, and welfare at large, related to over-relying on new technologies, most recently, those related to GenAI. Examples include deskilling associated with cognitive offloading and the atrophy of critical thinking as a result of over-reliance on GenAI systems, and addiction associated with attachment and dependence on GenAI systems. Such risks are rarely addressed, if at all, in the AI safety and alignment literature. In this paper, we highlight and quantify this discrepancy and discuss some initial thoughts on how safety and alignment work could address cognitive and mental health concerns. Finally, we discuss how information campaigns and regulation can be used to mitigate such prominent risks.
Governing What the EU AI Act Excludes: Accountability for Autonomous AI Agents in Smart City Critical Infrastructure
When a traffic signal controller adjusts green phases and a grid manager curtails power on the same corridor, each system may comply with its own obligations. The resident who suffers the combined effect has no single authority to hold accountable and, under the EU AI Act, limited means to obtain an explanation. Annex III, point 2 excludes safety-component AI in critical infrastructure from Article 86 explanation rights and Article 27 fundamental-rights impact assessment. Provider and deployer duties under Articles 9-15 still apply, and residual pathways under the GDPR, NIS2, and tortious liability offer partial coverage. The Act's principal resident-facing accountability instruments are nonetheless narrowed for the autonomous infrastructure systems most likely to interact across agencies. The paper traces this accountability deficit through four residual pathways (GDPR Article 22, GDPR transparency obligations, tortious liability, and NIS2) and shows that each is structurally bounded by individual-controller, individual-decision scope. As a governance response, it presents AgentGov-SC, a three-layer architecture (Agent, Orchestration, City) specifying 25 governance measures with bidirectional traceability to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Five conflict resolution rules and an autonomy-calibrated activation model complete the design. A scenario analysis traces governance activation through a multi-agent corridor cascade involving three documented UAE smart-city systems, with a contrasting single-system scenario confirming proportional activation. The paper contributes a regulatory gap analysis and governance architecture for an increasingly important class of urban AI deployment that existing frameworks treat as bounded and isolated.
Open Problems in Frontier AI Risk Management
Frontier AI both amplifies existing risks and introduces qualitatively novel challenges. Not only is there a notable lack of stable scientific consensus resulting from the rapid pace of technological change, but emerging frontier AI safety practices are often misaligned with, or may undermine, established risk management frameworks. To address these challenges, we systematically surface open problems in frontier AI risk management. Adopting a problem-oriented approach, we examine each stage of the risk management process - risk planning, identification, analysis, evaluation, and mitigation - through a structured review of the literature, identifying unresolved challenges and the actors best positioned to address them. Recognising that different types of open problems call for different responses, we classify open problems according to whether they reflect (a) a lack of scientific or technical consensus, (b) misalignment with, or challenges to, established risk management frameworks, or (c) shortcomings in implementation despite apparent consensus and alignment. By mapping these open problems and identifying the actors best positioned to address them - including developers, deployers, regulators, standards bodies, researchers, and third-party evaluators - this work aims to clarify where progress is needed to enable robust and meaningful consensus on frontier AI risk management.The paper does not propose specific solutions; instead, it provides a problem-oriented, agenda-setting reference document, complemented by a living online repository, intended to support coordination, reduce duplication, and guide future research and governance efforts.
Risk Reporting for Developers' Internal AI Model Use
Frontier AI companies first deploy their most advanced models internally, for weeks or months of safety testing, evaluation, and iteration, before a possible public release. For example, Anthropic recently developed a new class of model with advanced cyberoffense-relevant capabilities, Mythos Preview, which was available internally for at least six weeks before it was publicly announced. This internal use creates risks that external deployment frameworks may fail to address. Legal frameworks, notably California's Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (SB 53), New York's Responsible AI Safety And Education (RAISE) Act, and the EU's General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, all discuss risks from internal AI use. They require frontier developers to make and implement plans for how to manage risks from internal use, and to produce internal use risk reports describing their safeguards and any residual risks. This guide provides a harmonized standard for companies to produce internal use risk reports suitable for all three regulatory frameworks. It is addressed primarily to evaluation and safety teams at frontier AI developers, and secondarily to regulators and auditors seeking to understand what good reporting looks like. Given the pace of AI R&D automation and the limited external visibility into how companies use their most capable models internally, regular and detailed risk reporting may be one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that the risks from internal AI use are identified and managed before they materialize. Whenever a substantially more capable or riskier model is deployed internally, the developer should create a risk report and argue why the model is safe to deploy. We structure the reporting framework around two threat vectors -- autonomous AI misbehavior and insider threats -- and three risk factors for each: means, motive, and opportunity.
Why AI Harms Can't Be Fixed One Identity at a Time: What 5300 Incident Reports Reveal About Intersectionality
AI risk assessment is the primary tool for identifying harms caused by AI systems. These include intersectional harms, which arise from the interaction between identity categories (e.g., class and skin tone) and which do not occur, or occur differently, when those categories are considered separately. Yet existing AI risk assessments are still built around isolated identity categories, and when intersections are considered, they focus almost exclusively on race and gender. Drawing on a large-scale analysis of documented AI incidents, we show that AI harms do not occur one identity category at a time. Using a structured rubric applied with a Large Language Model (LLM), we analyze 5,300 reports from 1,200 documented incidents in the AI Incident Database, the most curated source of incident data. From these reports, we identify 1,513 harmed subjects and their associated identity categories, achieving 98% accuracy. At the level of individual categories, we find that age and political identity appear in documented AI harms at rates comparable to race and gender. At the level of intersecting categories, harm is amplified up to three times at specific intersections: adolescent girls, lower-class people of color, and upper-class political elites. We argue that intersectionality should be a core component of AI risk assessment to more accurately capture how harms are produced and distributed across social groups.
V.O.I.C.E (Voice, Ownership, Identity, Control, Expression): Risk Taxonomy of Synthetic Voice Generation From Empirical Data
As generative voice models are rapidly advancing in both capabilities and public utilization, the unconsented collection, reuse, and synthesis of voice data are introducing new classes of privacy, security and governance risk that are poorly captured by existing, largely uniform threat models. To fill the gap, we present V.O.I.C.E, a taxonomy of voice generation risk grounded in a multi-source threat modeling effort with 569 incidents from major AI incident database, FTC and Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3); 1067 direct incident reports from U.S. based participants across diverse groups (including voice actors, internet personalities, political personnel, and general public); and 2,221 Reddit discussions. Grounded in real-world data, our taxonomy explicitly models how risk emerges, interact with contextual factors such as degree of exposure, social visibility, and the availability of legal protections for various affected groups.
Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholds
AI incident reporting requirements are emerging in regulation and policy, yet no operational criteria exist for determining when a detected AI incident warrants escalation beyond national handling to international coordination. This paper proposes an escalation framework to address this gap, intended as a common reference point across jurisdictions that enables aligned escalation while preserving flexibility in how actors respond within their own legal and policy contexts. We review SB 53, the EU AI Act, the GPAI Code of Practice, and incident frameworks from other industries to derive eight criteria for assessing whether an incident warrants escalation, translated into a sequential flowchart with gated decision points and threshold checks. For each criterion, we map how it interplays with these regulatory frameworks, identifying where their design choices support or undermine effective detection. We test the framework against ten documented AI incidents and structured variants to identify where criteria under-detect or misclassify incidents in practice. We find three design patterns that may lead to systematic under-detection in regimes where model developers are responsible for escalation: a. where escalation requires confirmed harm, events such as model weight exfiltration risk detection only after severe, irreversible harm has propagated; b. where incidents are assessed individually, systemic harms emerging from accumulation risk being under-detected; and c. where thresholds align with legal instruments rather than quantitatively testable terms, criteria risk being impractical to apply under time pressure. We also find that escalation rules are only one component of a broader framework: the underlying definitions against which thresholds are set, and the data available to the responsible actor, create interdependencies that can themselves drive under-detection.
Bounding the Black Box: A Statistical Certification Framework for AI Risk Regulation
Artificial intelligence now decides who receives a loan, who is flagged for criminal investigation, and whether an autonomous vehicle brakes in time. Governments have responded: the EU AI Act, the NIST Risk Management Framework, and the Council of Europe Convention all demand that high-risk systems demonstrate safety before deployment. Yet beneath this regulatory consensus lies a critical vacuum: none specifies what ``acceptable risk'' means in quantitative terms, and none provides a technical method for verifying that a deployed system actually meets such a threshold. The regulatory architecture is in place; the verification instrument is not. This gap is not theoretical. As the EU AI Act moves into full enforcement, developers face mandatory conformity assessments without established methodologies for producing quantitative safety evidence - and the systems most in need of oversight are opaque statistical inference engines that resist white-box scrutiny. This paper provides the missing instrument. Drawing on the aviation certification paradigm, we propose a two-stage framework that transforms AI risk regulation into engineering practice. In Stage One, a competent authority formally fixes an acceptable failure probability and an operational input domain - a normative act with direct civil liability implications. In Stage Two, the RoMA and gRoMA statistical verification tools compute a definitive, auditable upper bound on the system's true failure rate, requiring no access to model internals and scaling to arbitrary architectures. We demonstrate how this certificate satisfies existing regulatory obligations, shifts accountability upstream to developers, and integrates with the legal frameworks that exist today.
AIRA: AI-Induced Risk Audit: A Structured Inspection Framework for AI-Generated Code
Practitioners have reported a directional pattern in AI-assisted code generation: AI-generated code tends to fail quietly, preserving the appearance of functionality while degrading or concealing guarantees. This paper introduces the Reward-Shaped Failure Hypothesis - the proposal that this pattern may reflect an artifact of optimization through human feedback rather than a random distribution of bugs. We define failure truthfulness as the property that a system's observable outputs accurately represent its internal success or failure state. We then present AIRA (AI-Induced Risk Audit), a deterministic 15-check inspection framework designed to detect failure-untruthful patterns in code. We report results from three studies: (1) an anonymized enterprise environment audit, (2) a balanced 600-file public corpus pilot, and (3) a strict matched-control replication comparing 955 AI-attributed files against 955 human-control files. In the final replication, AI-attributed files show 0.435 high-severity findings per file versus 0.242 in human controls (1.80x). The effect is consistent across JavaScript, Python, and TypeScript, with strongest concentration in exception-handling-related patterns. These findings are consistent with a directional skew toward fail-soft behavior in AI-assisted code. AIRA is designed for governance, compliance, and safety-critical systems where fail-closed behavior is required.
Post-Deployment Accountability in AI Governance: A Cross-Regulatory Empirical Analysis of AI Incidents
Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020--2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.
Risk-Adjusted Harm Scoring for Automated Red Teaming for LLMs in Financial Services
Existing LLM safety evaluations rely on binary attack-success rates and domain-agnostic taxonomies, leaving regulated Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI) deployments exposed to failures elicited through legally or professionally plausible framing. We introduce RAHS (Risk-Adjusted Harm Score), a risk-sensitive metric jointly capturing disclosure severity, disclaimer mitigation, and inter-judge agreement, and FinRedTeamBench, a 989-prompt benchmark spanning seven BFSI risk areas and 34 sub-categories mapped to regulatory frameworks. Evaluation uses an ensemble of three heterogeneous LLM judges, validated against human experts, and an adaptive multi-turn red-teaming pipeline. On nine open-weight models, RAHS preserves separation under near-ceiling ASR, ranking is stable under hyperparameter sweeps, and multi-turn pressure drives not only more jailbreaks but more operationally severe disclosures, exposing failure modes that single-turn, domain-agnostic evaluations cannot reveal.
Scalable Delphi: Large Language Models for Structured Risk Estimation
Quantitative risk assessment relies on structured expert elicitation to estimate unobservable properties. The Delphi method produces calibrated, auditable estimates but requires months of coordination and specialist time, placing rigorous risk assessment out of reach for most applications. We propose Scalable Delphi, adapting the classical protocol for LLMs with diverse expert personas, iterative refinement, and rationale sharing. Beyond lowering cost, this makes the assessment analyzable and dynamic. Rationales and revision histories record what each estimate rests on, information can be ablated to test which evidence matters, and the elicitation can be rerun with new evidence, changed assumptions, or adverse scenarios. Because target quantities are unobservable by construction, we design an evaluation framework based on necessary conditions any reliable estimator must satisfy: accuracy and calibration on verifiable proxies, and sensitivity to evidence. Agreement with expert panels and reasoning quality serve as corroboration. Across two domains (AI-augmented cybersecurity risk, ice-sheet contribution to sea-level rise), three benchmarks, and three reproduced expert studies, the estimates pass these tests: they improve systematically as evidence is added, agree with expert panels on most quantities, and correlate strongly with ground truth (Pearson r=0.91-0.98).
From Silos to Systems: Process-Oriented Hazard Analysis for AI Systems
To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards. Current analysis approaches focus on individual components of an AI system, like training data or models, in isolation, overlooking hazards from component interactions or how they are situated within a company's development process. To this end, we draw from the established field of system safety, which considers safety as an emergent property of the entire system. In this work, we translate System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) - a recognized system safety framework - for analyzing AI development and operation processes. We focus on systems that rely on machine learning algorithms and conduct STPA on three case studies involving linear regression, reinforcement learning, and transformer-based generative models. Our analysis explored how STPA's control and system-theoretic perspectives apply to AI systems and whether unique AI traits - such as model opacity, capability uncertainty, and output complexity - necessitate modifications to the framework. We find that the key concepts and steps of conducting an STPA apply to AI systems but require targeted adaptations to address AI-specific challenges that arise to differing degrees across three case studies. We present the Process-oriented Hazard Analysis for AI Systems (PHASE) as a guideline that adapts STPA concepts for AI. Applying and interpreting STPA using the PHASE guidelines enables four key affordances for analysts responsible for managing AI system harms: 1) detection of system-level hazards, including those from accumulation of disparate issues; 2) explicit acknowledgment of social factors contributing to algorithmic harms; 3) creation of traceable accountability chains between harms and those who can mitigate them; and 4) ongoing monitoring and mitigation of new hazards.
The Agent Incident Registry: Toward Preventing Repeated AI Agent Failures
AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We present the Agent Incident Registry (AIR) (Project page: https://enkryptai.com/air), a source-linked catalog containing 487 records of agent-related events disclosed from 2022 through 2026. Each record includes supporting evidence, a stable identifier, and missingness-aware labels for causal role, disclosure class, mechanism, and outcome. Among the 336 generative-system records in which the agent acted, 81 involved realized harm (24%). Realized outcomes concentrate in in-the-wild and safety-failure records, while responsible disclosures and research demonstrations are overwhelmingly demonstrated; the aggregate share therefore characterizes collection composition rather than deployment risk. After initial curation, a second human reviewer checked all 487 records and their existing labels for completeness and correctness. In a deployment-analogue audit, InjecAgent's 1,054 cases occupy three of AIR's twelve surfaces and are all attacker-triggered, whereas AIR contains 92 no-adversary safety failures. AIR supports source-grounded case retrieval and evaluation-scope auditing, not failure-rate or control-efficacy estimation.