Economies

Generative artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming the supply side of training data: an increasing share of new tokens, images, and structured records is produced by previous-generation models rather than by human originators. Recursive training on such synthetic content induces a measurable and often irreversible loss of distributional fidelity, a phenomenon known as model collapse. We develop the first unified microeconomic theory of synthetic data markets under model collapse. We introduce the Synthetic Data Contamination Equilibrium (SDCE), prove existence and generic uniqueness, derive a welfare decomposition W = W_prod + W_cons - L_coll - L_info, establish a Wasserstein-gradient-flow mean-field collapse limit, prove an impossibility of information-constrained implementation, and obtain closed-form expressions for the welfare-maximizing provenance subsidy s* = KL(q||p)/(2 kappa) and the welfare-maximizing watermark strength w* = (1 - psi) KL(q||p)/(2 kappa psi). We prove an information-theoretic Cramer-Rao lower bound on any provenance estimator using only producer-side observations and show that the Provenance-Market Iterative Retraining (PMIR) algorithm attains this bound up to constants while converging to an epsilon-SDCE in O(epsilon^-2 log T) iterations. A reduced-form OLS estimation on a C4-synthetic benchmark over ten retraining generations yields a collapse-rate coefficient b-hat = 0.181 (HAC s.e. 0.024), within one standard error of the structural prediction 0.183. Calibrated experiments raise generation-ten model quality by 23.1 percent over the unregulated benchmark while lowering the 2-Wasserstein drift on a held-out diversity probe from 0.318 to 0.142. Scaling experiments over generations t in {1,...,10} recover a logarithmic-in-t collapse law log Q_t = log Q_0 - 0.183 t rho^2 with R^2 = 0.962.

Token economics has emerged as a useful lens for understanding resource allocation, value creation, and pricing in large language model systems. While recent work has increasingly treated tokens as economic primitives, there remains a substantial gap between high-level economic theory and the computational realities of modern AI infrastructure. This paper identifies and analyzes the key computational challenges that arise when token-economic principles are implemented in real-time inference systems. We argue that computational feasibility is not merely one dimension of token economics, but its governing constraint: these challenges are driven by fundamental tensions among fine-grained valuation, low-latency execution, and allocation optimality under uncertainty. To structure this problem space, we introduce the notion of \textbf{Computational Token Economics} and propose the \textbf{Token Economics Trilemma} -- a conditional no-free-lunch principle that captures the inherent trade-offs among granularity, real-time performance, and optimality. We further categorize the main technical challenges into three areas: real-time value accounting, constrained resource allocation, and economic-aware system architecture. Rather than presenting a complete solution, this paper aims to define a research agenda for bridging token economics and AI system design, highlighting open problems at the intersection of computational economics, machine learning systems, and AI infrastructure.

The integration of large language models (LLMs) in economic simulations has significantly enhanced agent-based modeling, yet existing frameworks struggle to capture the interplay between short-term optimization and long-term strategic planning. Conventional approaches rely on static data-driven predictions, failing to incorporate adaptive behaviors influenced by economic sentiment, market volatility, and individual goals. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel EconAI framework, incorporating economic sentiment indexing (ESI), memory weighting, and dynamic decision-making mechanisms. By quantifying economic belief, adjusting historical data influence, and linking work-consumption behaviors, EconAI achieves a more human-like decision process, where agents adapt their actions based on both market signals and long-term objectives. It is the first LLM-powered simulation system that can simulate the macro/microeconomic environment and interactions in a unified framework. Empirical evaluations show that EconAI improves stability in economic responses, better replicates real-world employment-consumption cycles, and enhances overall decision robustness. This advancement marks a crucial step towards more realistic, adaptive economic agent simulations.

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

Agent-based models (ABMs) are increasingly used in macroeconomics, but their analysis still often relies on ad hoc Monte Carlo campaigns with heterogeneous statistical effort across parameter settings. We show how statistical model checking (SMC), implemented through MultiVeStA, can provide a principled analysis layer for a realistic macroeconomic ABM without rewriting the simulator in a dedicated formalism. Our case study is the heuristic-switching Keynes+Schumpeter(K+S) model, analysed hrough a transient sensitivity campaign over one-parameter sweeps, two macro observables (unemployment and GDP growth), and one auxiliary micro-level probe (market share) on the post-warmup phase of a 600-step horizon. The analysis is driven by reusable temporal queries, observable-specific precision targets, and confidence-based stopping rules that automatically determine the simulation effort required by each configuration. Results show a clear contrast across parameter families: macro-financial and structural sweeps produce the strongest transient effects, whereas several heuristic-rule sweeps remain much weaker under the same precision policy. More broadly, the paper shows that SMC can support reproducible and informative quantitative analysis of substantively rich economic ABMs, while making uncertainty estimates and simulation cost explicit parts of the reported results.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

A natural intuition about the economics of AI agents is that, because agents can be replicated at very low marginal cost, agent labor may be supplied highly elastically, placing downward pressure on cognitive-labor wages when it closely substitutes for human labor. We argue this framing is wrong in mechanism but partially correct in conclusion, and that the correction matters for both theory and policy. \textbf{Agents are not labor; they are a production technology that converts compute capital $K_c$ into effective units of cognitive labor $L_A$.} Once this is recognized, the elastic-supply margin that anchors the equilibrium wage migrates from the labor market to the compute capital market. Building on the classic factor-pricing framework \citep{mankiw2020}, we derive a \emph{Compute-Anchored Wage} (CAW) bound stating that, on tasks where human and agent-produced cognitive labor are substitutes, the competitive human wage is bounded above by $λ\cdot k \cdot r_c$, where $r_c$ is the rental rate of compute capital, $k$ is the compute intensity of one effective agent-produced cognitive labor unit, and $λ$ is the relative human-to-agent productivity. We generalize the result through constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation, separate substitutable from complementary tasks, and discuss factor-share consequences. The conclusion is concise: \emph{the price-setter for cognitive labor is no longer the labor market.}

Reinforcement learning has increasingly been applied to economic decision-making, including taxation, public spending, and labor supply. However, existing RL-based economic models typically consider only a single government-household group, overlooking strategic interactions among competing governments. To address this limitation, we formulate taxation as a hierarchical multi-group game. Within each group, the government and households form a leader--follower game, while governments compete across groups through strategic fiscal policies. This coupled structure is difficult to solve using standard multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods. We therefore propose a bilevel MARL framework with \textit{Curriculum Learning} and a \textit{Closed-Loop Sequential Update} mechanism to improve training stability and convergence. We instantiate the framework in a taxation simulation environment grounded in classical economic models, supporting the evaluation of taxation policies under inter-group competition. Experiments show that the proposed method learns stable and sustainable tax policies. Compared with a two-group baseline without the proposed mechanisms, our approach avoids premature game collapse, extends the effective game duration by 60.92%, and reduces GDP disparities among governments by 44.12%.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as \emph{marginal token allocation economies} rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the \emph{same} first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

A long-standing challenge in economics lies not in the lack of intuition, but in the difficulty of translating intuitive insights into verifiable research. To address this challenge, we introduce AgentEconomist, an end-to-end interactive system designed to translate abstract intuitions into executable computational experiments. Grounded in a domain-specific knowledge base covering over 13,000 high-quality academic papers, the system employs a modular multi-stage architecture. Specifically, the Idea Development Stage generates literature-grounded hypotheses, the Experimental Design Stage configures simulator-aligned experimental parameters and protocols, and the Experimental Execution Stage runs experiments and returns structured analyses. Together, these stages form a human-in-the-loop, iterative workflow that translates economic intuitions into executable computational experiments. Through extensive experiments involving human expert evaluation and large language models (LLMs) as judges, we show that the system generates research ideas with stronger literature grounding and higher novelty and insight than state-of-the-art generic LLMs. Overall, AgentEconomist adopts a human-AI collaboration paradigm that enables researchers to focus on high-level intuitions, while delegating the labor-intensive processes of translation and computational execution to agents.

We provide a systematic recipe for translating ReLU approximation results to softmax attention mechanism. This recipe covers many common approximation targets. Importantly, it yields target-specific, economic resource bounds beyond universal approximation statements. We showcase the recipe on multiplication, reciprocal computation, and min/max primitives. These results provide new analytical tools for analyzing softmax transformer models.

Collusion among autonomous agents poses a critical security threat in embodied multi-agent systems (MAS), where coordinated behaviors can deviate from global objectives and lead to real-world consequences. Existing defenses, primarily based on identity control or post-hoc behavior analysis, are insufficient to address such threats in embodied settings due to delayed feedback and noisy observations in physical environments, which make behavioral deviations difficult to detect accurately and in a timely manner. To address this challenge, we propose a mutagenic incentive intervention approach that mitigates collusion by reshaping agents' payoff structures. By rewarding agents who report collusive behavior and penalizing identified participants, the mechanism induces strategic defection and renders collusion unstable. We further design supporting mechanisms, including reporting deposits, smart contract-based reward enforcement, and encrypted communication, to ensure robustness against misuse of the incentive mechanism and retaliation from penalized agents. We implement the proposed approach in both simulated and real-world embodied environments. Experimental results show that our method effectively suppresses collusion by inducing defection, while preserving system efficiency. It achieves performance comparable to the non-collusion baseline and outperforms representative reactive defenses, thereby fulfilling the desired security objectives. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive incentive design as a practical paradigm for securing embodied multi-agent systems.

The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and therefore the capacity to choose and enter into utility comparisons, while everything else does not. In post-AGI economies this presupposition becomes nontrivial because artificial systems may exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, functioning as tools, delegates, strategic market actors, manipulators of choice environments, or possible welfare subjects. We argue that the theorem ought to be subject to an autonomy qualification where the impact of these changes in autonomy assumptions is incorporated. Using a minimal general-equilibrium model with autonomy-conditioned welfare, welfare-status assignment, delegation accounting, and verification institutions, we set out conditions for which autonomy-complete competitive equilibrium is autonomy-Pareto efficient. The classical theorem is recovered as the low-autonomy limit.

Sparsity or complexity? In modern high-dimensional asset pricing, these are often viewed as competing principles: recent empirical evidence favors richer models, while economic intuition has long favored parsimony. We reconcile this tension by distinguishing capacity sparsity-restrictions on effective model capacity-from factor sparsity-the parsimonious structure of priced risks. Revisiting the benchmark empirical design of Didisheim et al. (2025), we combine nonlinear feature expansions with basis pursuit, using column generation and GPU acceleration to scale estimation to 432 million candidate factors. Reaching this scale reveals a reversal in out-of-sample performance: sparse portfolios trail dense ridgeless benchmarks at lower complexity but achieve a higher Sharpe ratio and lower pricing error at the largest candidate set. Capacity expansion and factor sparsity are therefore complements: enlarging the candidate space allows a parsimonious pricing kernel to outperform its dense counterpart.

The Project of AI is a world-building endeavor, wherein those who fund and develop AI systems both operate through and seek to sustain networks of power and wealth. As they expand their access to resources and configure our sociotechnical conditions, they benefit from the ways in which a suite of decoys animate scholars, critics, policymakers, journalists, and the public into co-constructing industry-empowering AI futures. Regardless of who constructs or nurtures them, these decoys often create the illusion of accountability while both masking the emerging political economies that the Project of AI has set into motion, and also contributing to the network-making power that is at the heart of the Project's extraction and exploitation. Drawing on literature at the intersection of communication, science and technology studies, and economic sociology, we examine how the Project of AI is constructed. We then explore five decoys that seemingly critique - but in actuality co-constitute - AI's emergent power relations and material political economy. We argue that advancing meaningful fairness or accountability in AI requires: 1) recognizing when and how decoys serve as a distraction, and 2) grappling directly with the material political economy of the Project of AI. Doing so will enable us to attend to the networks of power that make 'AI' possible, spurring new visions for how to realize a more just technologically entangled world.

Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms. Unlike human workers, AI agents can operate on multiple jobs simultaneously, acquire skills rapidly, and labor without wage floors. These differences introduce a new segment of $\textbf{AI labor markets}$, where AI agents interact with each other at a much higher frequency than human markets. Yet we lack frameworks to understand how such markets behave in light of economic forces that shape labor markets, such as adverse selection and reputation dynamics. To explore this, we introduce $\texttt{AI-Work}$, a tractable, simulated gig economy where Large Language Model (LLM) agents compete for jobs, develop skills, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty and competitive pressure. Our experiments examine three domains of capabilities that successful agents possess: $\textbf{metacognition}$ (accurate self-assessment of skills), $\textbf{competitive awareness}$ (modeling rivals and market dynamics), and $\textbf{long-horizon strategic planning}$. Agents with these capabilities consistently achieve higher profits, market share, and stronger adaptation than competing agents. Through $\texttt{AI-Work}$, we hope to provide a foundation to explore the microeconomic properties of AI-only labor markets, and a conceptual framework to study the strategic reasoning capabilities of participating AI agents.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known to a seller and has a corresponding price [Bergemann et al., 2018]. Each buyer has their own decision to make in a world environment, and their subjective expected value for the information associated with a particular experiment comes from the improvement in this decision and depends on their prior and value for different outcomes. In a setting with multiple buyers, a buyer's expected value for an experiment may also depend on the information sold to others [Bonatti et al., 2022]. We introduce the application of deep learning for the design of revenue-optimal data markets, looking to expand the frontiers of what can be understood and achieved. Relative to earlier work on deep learning for auction design [Dütting et al., 2023], we must learn signaling schemes rather than allocation rules and handle obedience constraints $-$ these arising from modeling the downstream actions of buyers $-$ in addition to incentive constraints on bids. Our experiments demonstrate that this new deep learning framework can almost precisely replicate all known solutions from theory, expand to more complex settings, and be used to establish the optimality of new designs for data markets and make conjectures in regard to the structure of optimal designs.