Fault Injection Experiments

Dexterous in-hand manipulation requires coordinated control of multiple actuated joints, and a runtime joint fault can abruptly disrupt the contact configuration required for successful manipulation. In this work, we propose residual fault adaptation (RFA), a teacher-anchored framework for compensating for hidden command-channel faults. RFA retains a frozen healthy teacher to provide nominal behavior and trains a recurrent residual policy to infer corrective actions from proprioceptive and command-response history. During training, fault-injection domain randomization (FIDR) varies the fault mode, affected joint, severity, and onset time, while adaptive sampling increases the frequency of fault modes associated with lower recent performance. A frozen Direct FIDR policy provides a distributional reference only on fault-active training samples and is absent from deployment. The deployed controller receives neither fault labels nor controller-switching signals. Simulation experiments on the dexterous hand indicate that RFA can improve manipulation performance relative to the healthy policy under a fixed mixed-fault protocol. Real-robot experiments with software-injected faults further demonstrate zero-shot deployment of the learned adaptation policy.

A false data injection attack (FDIA) can change the estimated grid state while evading a residual-based bad data detector (BDD). Existing blind attacks learn a low-rank measurement subspace, but this algebraic view does not state the physical grid constraints that make an attack stealthy or the minimum information needed to recover the complete attack space. Under the connected direct-current (DC) branch-flow model, we show that the residual-sensitive subspace of the noiseless orthogonal test is exactly the weighted cycle space. Its orthogonal complement is therefore the complete stealthy attack space, making weighted cycle-space knowledge both necessary and sufficient for complete blind FDIA. This space identifies the topology only up to 2-isomorphism and the relative cycle-edge parameters only up to one scale per biconnected component; bridge parameters are neither identified nor required. We then formulate a computationally unconstrained benchmark and a tractable measurement-only reconstruction method. Experiments on IEEE systems compare BDD bypass rate at a 95% nominal-acceptance threshold against state impact. As a compact alternating-current (AC) extension, we characterize feasible branch P/Q measurements by a cycle manifold and demonstrate topology-assisted manifold fitting and measurement generation on a graphics processing unit (GPU). In the lossless fixed-voltage small-angle limit, the normal space of the active-power slice reduces to the DC weighted cycle space.

Fault localization can focus a code model's repair on the statements a failing test implicates, but a targeted edit may succeed merely because it is small, and a second model call may succeed without using the failure at all. We separate these explanations with three arms applied to the same failed candidate: blind whole-solution resampling, spectrum-based localization followed by suspect-span infilling, and same-length infilling at a disjoint random code span. Across three frozen 26-32B models, three benchmarks and 488 failing candidates, plus a separately declared 24B fourth model from a third family, three results follow. First, localization is rarely available: only 9.0% of failing candidates expose a failing public test with a usable spectrum. Second, among the 177 candidates localizable from a strong suite, localized infilling loses decisively to blind resampling at a matched attempt count (3:40, p = 3.0 x 10^-9), opposite to our hypothesis; the loss replicates in a third family at -11.3 points (95% CI [-16.6, -6.8]), and widening the edit does not rescue it. Third, against the random-span placebo localized infilling leads pooled (11:1, Holm-adjusted p = .019), but that lead resolves in no individual model under the analysis our shipped plan designates primary (best Holm p = .087), so we report the location effect as suggestive rather than established. Re-pricing attempts as tokens narrows but does not overturn this: a span attempt spends 21.7 generated tokens against 371.1, yet 16 localized attempts reach 6.8% while one blind attempt already reaches 10.1%. Infilling reproduces the removed span verbatim in 48.9% of attempts, which is why more budget does not help. We restrict every localization conclusion to the 24-32B models tested.

LLM training is increasingly vulnerable to silent data corruption (SDC), yet existing protection methods largely treat Transformer computations uniformly because their vulnerability remains poorly understood. We present the first systematic characterization of SDC vulnerability across major computation interfaces in both the forward and backward passes of Transformer training. Our analysis reveals two distinct error propagation mechanisms: forward-pass vulnerability is highly location dependent, with faults on the Q/K path producing persistent training deviations, whereas backward-pass vulnerability is largely governed by gradient exponent distributions rather than computation locations. Motivated by these observations, we propose TrainSDC, a characterization-guided protection framework consisting of Q/K-path recomputation, residual-gain monitoring, and exponent-aware gradient scaling. Experiments on Llama 3.2-1B and Qwen3-0.6B show that TrainSDC maintains training behavior close to fault-free execution under both sparse and dense fault injection while introducing only 1.65%-6.76% runtime overhead.

Multi-agent orchestration frameworks are moving from demos to production, yet benchmarks typically report task accuracy without diagnosing why a pipeline failed, where a cascade began, or which routing decision caused the breakdown. OrchestraBench evaluates failure, recovery, and decomposition through a controlled, seed-reproducible failure-injection harness over templated enterprise workflows. It introduces cascade radius and per-failure-mode recovery as primary metrics and compares routing policies with bootstrap confidence intervals and paired tests. On a 26-case gold-labelled diagnostic, a keyword/flag router scored 0% on adversarial cases with misleading or missing surface flags, whereas an intent-reasoning model router scored 100%, matching the oracle. Controlled mechanism probes with a real Claude agent over a verifiable arithmetic dependency chain revealed three failure-handling tiers across five MAST modes: tool faults recovered fully (1.0), ambiguous delegation recovered partially (0.30), and three latent or semantic modes never recovered (0.0). This ordering persisted when the computation was reframed as a loan-approval workflow and across Sonnet, Opus, and Haiku, although absolute rates shifted with context. Blind retry reproduced latent faults and increased time to detection, indicating that detection and attribution are necessary for containment. Cascade radius increased with pipeline depth (mean 0.9 to 4.7 across depths 3-7). A trusted-state repair ablation showed that apparent containment gains primarily came from the trusted-state signal rather than autonomous detection. These results are controlled-chain mechanism probes, not domain-workload claims.

Kernel generation for hardware accelerators such as GPUs and NPUs has become a proving ground for large language models (LLMs), and state-of-the-art systems raise correctness through pipelines that couple LLMs with agentic reinforcement learning and evolutionary search. Such pipelines generate, compile, and execute large numbers of candidate kernels, discarding most of them and forgoing the opportunity to distill failures into reusable knowledge. Many discarded candidates are near-miss operators that compile and run but fail numerical validation; each embodies genuine domain knowledge and a nontrivial investment in LLM inference, cross-compilation, and hardware execution. We argue for a paradigm shift: rather than regenerate, debug. Debugging is far more constrained than generating from scratch: the search space is small and feedback is dense. We present a domain-specific debug agent that addresses three core challenges in autonomous repair: mitigating knowledge scarcity through retrieved patterns and diagnostic instrumentation, ensuring integrity through anti-cheat detection and full-coverage evaluation, and controlling cost via convergence guards and bounded iteration. Debugging serves two complementary roles: it extends the capability frontier by recovering operators that repeated regeneration fails to produce, and it lowers cost per deliverable operator. Debug Pass@1 achieves 66.7% versus Regenerate Avg Pass@1's 25.9% and Regenerate Pass@3's 40.7%, while consuming 92.8% fewer tokens per success than three-trial regeneration. Component ablations show that the knowledge base drives recovery, while integrity gates reject 12.5-33.3% of the successes the workflow itself accepted.

In modern IT operations (IT-Ops), the cost of an incorrect repair often exceeds the cost of no action at all. Yet existing automated remediation systems are designed to generate actions rather than to decide whether intervention is warranted, leaving safety as an afterthought enforced by manual approval. This paper makes three contributions to close this gap: (i) we reformulate safe remediation as a risk-constrained intervention decision problem and cast it as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), in which the agent maximizes repair success subject to a bounded false remediation rate (FRR); (ii) we introduce a three-dimensional risk decomposition comprising blast radius, reversibility, and epistemic uncertainty, providing operators with an interpretable per-action safety interface; and (iii) we design a context-adaptive human-in-the-loop (HITL) gate that turns escalation from a binary failsafe into a bandwidth-aware control layer responsive to on-call load and business criticality. The full policy is learned offline from historical incident logs, enabling explicit control of the expected FRR. Experiments on the Train Ticket microservice benchmark with Chaos Mesh fault injection and an RCAEval-aligned fault taxonomy show that our framework reduces FRR by 39% while improving repair success by 2.5 points over a strong runbook baseline, and reduces on-call escalation load by 17% relative to a fixed-threshold variant.

Peer-to-peer distributed inference executes a Large Language Model (LLM) on pooled consumer hardware by spreading its layers across many nodes. Every request passes through nodes that are owned and controlled by multiple independent parties. However, in this setting, any party can tamper with the output of its layers to corrupt the end result. Recomputing the forward pass on trusted hardware can catch this, but it introduces additional computational cost. The scientific literature includes several prior integrity-checking approaches, such as known-answer traps for image classifiers and cryptographic commitments. However, these solutions test only the exact correctness and do not account for the ordinary variation that may arise between benign nodes. In this paper, we propose a method that checks the output integrity by measuring the variation in the activations that each node passes to the next. A peer who wants to use the network selects a small set of secret canary inputs whose correct activations are known in advance and mixes them into regular traffic. Because the peers cannot tell a canary from a real query, any tampering node corrupts them as well. The deviation from the known reference then reveals malicious activity: benign nodes exhibit only minor variation from hardware-induced noise, whereas tampered nodes deviate far more. We treat the identification of malicious nodes as a probabilistic test that separates two drift distributions, without relying on a fixed threshold. We study 408 configurations with metrics and success criteria fixed before any experiment ran; the detector reaches AUROC 1.0, correctly ranking the malicious shard above every benign shard on every canary in every configuration.

Large-scale AI datacenter platforms comprise thousands of heterogeneous hardware components whose validation requires comprehensive fault injection test plans. Today these plans are authored manually: engineers review hardware self-healing validation documents and bills of materials, enumerate failure modes per field-replaceable unit, and produce flat lists of single-layer test cases. This process is labor-intensive, error-prone, and dependent on institutional knowledge; coverage gaps surface late, traceability to source specifications is implicit, and the effort is largely repeated per platform. This paper presents a generative AI multi-agent architecture that automates the generation of structured hardware validation test plans from two canonical inputs: self-healing validation documents, which enumerate known failure modes and their detection and remediation behaviors per field-replaceable unit, and component Bills of Material. An ingestion agent normalizes heterogeneous inputs into a canonical representation; a classification agent maps components to functional domains via contextual reasoning over part descriptions and sub-category hierarchies; and a generation agent synthesizes test cases by combining normalized failure modes with domain-classified data, filling gaps and producing edge cases. The output conforms to a standardized schema for direct import into internal validation software. Evaluated on two production platforms against manual baselines, the framework achieves coverage expansions of 74.2% and 51.4%, cutting authoring from days to hours. It yields fully traceable mappings from each test case to its source specification, and its multi-agent decomposition is portable across platform generations. Automated and expert evaluations confirm 100% extraction fidelity and high acceptance of new scenarios, validating the framework as a robust human-in-the-loop force multiplier.

Intrusion detection systems are often trained under static benchmark conditions, although deployed network environments are affected by traffic drift, sensor noise, changing workloads, and evolving attack behaviour. Under such distribution shifts, static detectors may produce confident but incorrect predictions, leading to silent and unsafe failure modes. In this paper, RES-DARE (Recursive Evolving Specialists-Digital Adaptive Reasoning Engine) is proposed as a failure-aware continual intrusion detection framework with rollback-safe self-repair. Difficult, uncertain, and misclassified samples are treated as failure signals for expert specialisation rather than being discarded as noise. A supervised contrastive encoder, two-pass expert router, failure-buffer mechanism, HDBSCAN-based failure-region discovery, and trust-risk monitor are integrated to support adaptive IDS behaviour. AEHM-v2 is introduced as a rollback-safe repair mechanism, where candidate adaptations are provisionally activated and committed only when macro-F1 is preserved or improved while trust risk remains stable. Otherwise, the system is rolled back to its last validated state. RES-DARE is evaluated on CICIDS2017, UNSW-NB15, and TON_IoT, achieving macro-F1 scores of 0.9850, 0.9736, and 0.9691, respectively. Under Gaussian feature corruption at strength 0.10, RES-DARE retains an Attack-F1 of 0.7920 on CICIDS2017 and achieves near-zero catastrophic forgetting with F = 0.0015. The results show that RES-DARE improves robustness, warning capability, and deployment safety under degraded conditions.

As the scale and complexity of cloud-based AI systems continue to escalate, ensuring service reliability through rapid fault detection and adaptive recovery has become a critical challenge. While existing approaches integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) for semantic understanding and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) for policy optimization, they often rely on sequential, loosely coupled architectures that underutilize the generative and reasoning capabilities of LLMs. In this paper, we propose a paradigm shift with PASE, a Planning-Aware Semantic self-healing engine, a novel fault self-healing framework that reconceptualizes recovery as a neuro-symbolic program synthesis task. PASE employs an LLM as a core Plan Synthesis Engine to generate structured recovery plans from a library of semantic primitives. A Neural-Symbolic World Model verifies plan feasibility through simulation, while a Meta-Prompt Optimizer, trained via DRL, learns to generate optimal prompts that guide the LLM's planning process. This tight reason-plan-verify-adapt loop enables dynamic, context-aware recovery strategy generation beyond predefined action spaces. Experiments on a real-world cloud fault injection dataset demonstrate that PASE significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, reducing average system recovery time by over 40% and improving fault detection accuracy in unknown fault scenarios. Our framework advances autonomous system management by unifying LLM-based reasoning with model-assisted verification and meta-learned guidance.

Root cause analysis (RCA) poses a holistic test of LLM agentic capabilities, such as long-context understanding, multi-step reasoning, and tool use. However, existing datasets suffer from a fundamental gap: they label only the root cause, not the propagation path connecting it to the observed symptom, which largely simplifies the task to naive pattern matching. To support rigorous evaluation, we introduce PAVE, a step-wise labeling protocol that leverages known interventions from fault injection to reconstruct causal propagation paths. The mechanism is forward verification: reasoning from cause to effect rather than inferring backward from symptoms. Applying PAVE yields OpenRCA 2.0 (500 instances), the first cross-system RCA benchmark with step-wise causal annotations for LLM agents. Across 11 frontier LLMs, recovering the exact root-cause set succeeds in only 20.7% of cases on average. To locate where this difficulty lies, we relax the criterion and find what we call the ungrounded diagnosis: agents identify at least one correct root-cause service in 76.0% of cases, but ground that service in a verified causal propagation path to the observed symptom in only 61.5%. Outcome-only evaluation hides this failure mode; step-wise causal ground truth is the missing piece for trustworthy LLM-based RCA agents.

Deep Learning (DL) programs can fail during training for many reasons, and diagnosing the cause is a costly and time-consuming maintenance task. Techniques for diagnosing such failures are commonly assessed using within-program cross-validation, which may be inadequate for deployment settings involving previously unseen programs. It is therefore necessary to assess how performance differs across these settings and to identify the causes of any performance gap in established fault diagnosis techniques for DL. We investigate this gap using DynFault, a corpus of 5,542 fault-injected training traces from 38 real-world DL programs. We found a gap of 0.190 in balanced accuracy for existing fault diagnosis techniques between within-program evaluation and holding out whole programs. We also found the gap comes from program-level structure in the features, which led us to examine two runtime feature sets, curvature features and optimizer features, and their behavior on unseen programs. We found that curvature features are useful for instability detection on unseen programs, while optimizer and activation features help only on programs seen during training.

The transition toward software-defined vehicles concentrates an increasing share of vehicle functionality into distributed software services, where failures propagate through service dependencies and the surface symptom is often several causal hops away from the underlying defect. Existing approaches to causal root-cause analysis in such systems address this only partially: they typically reason over a single observability modality and operate in an offline, operator-driven mode that does not match the demands of continuous vehicle operation. This paper presents SDVDiag, a multimodal causal-discovery pipeline that fuses log-based and metric-based service representations into a shared embedding space before graph construction, coupled with an anomaly-driven trigger that converts the diagnostic platform from a manually operated batch tool into a continuously running online system. Evaluation on an Autonomous Valet Parking testbed shows that the multimodal pipeline produces sparser causal graphs than a metrics-only baseline (134 vs. 182 edges on average) and consistently outperforms it in edge-weighted reward against an expert knowledge graph at every stage of human-feedback refinement, showing a 2.4-fold improvement over the baseline after 60 feedback queries. An end-to-end fault-injection scenario further demonstrates that the integrated trigger correctly recovers a true root cause located two causal hops upstream of the observable symptom.

False data injection attacks (FDIAs) introducing small measurement perturbations can still cause large deviations in power system state estimation when the injected signals align with the pseudo-null space of the system model. Existing model- and data-driven detectors may fail to identify such low-magnitude but high-impact attacks because residual tests ignore changes hidden in the pseudo-null space, while subspace learning methods capture correlation patterns without enforcing physical consistency. This paper proposes Physically Consistent Null Space Alignment (PCNSA), a framework that detects stealthy FDIAs by preserving, through preprocessing, the geometric correspondence between the physical null space and the measurement-derived pseudo-null space. The key point is a Pseudo-null Space Conserved data Preprocessing (PSCP) step that re-expresses measurements in the physical coordinate frame before subspace extraction. We prove that PSCP preserves the separation between row space and its orthogonal complement, a property that conventional per-feature standardization violates. This keeps the singular value decomposition (SVD)-derived pseudo-null subspace aligned with the physical residual space without explicit knowledge of H. Experiments on IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems confirm this principle in practice: stealthy attacks that evade XTM, LSTM, AE and Isolation Forest baselines appear as clear deviations in the aligned subspace, yielding higher F1-score and detection accuracy while remaining robust under partial observability and realistic PMU noise.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-performance computing (HPC) workflows, accelerating scientific discovery through diverse perspectives such as code generation and domain-specific decision-making. Yet, how soft errors propagate and affect LLM inference remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we present a comprehensive study on error propagation in LLM inference, enabled by our proposed LLMFI, a configurable and deterministic fault-injection framework. Using LLMFI, we systematically inject faults across three open-weighted LLMs and thirteen representative tasks, covering reasoning, multilingual, mathematical, and coding domains. In addition, we conduct fine-grained case studies that reveal critical vulnerability patterns. Overall, our study yields 17 takeaways that advance the understanding of error propagation in LLM inference and introduces four low-overhead directions to improve reliability through software-only modification, offering practical guidance for future error detection and mitigation.

Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents rely on orchestration layers that coordinate planning, retrieval, tool invocation, validation, memory, and recovery. In these systems, failures arise not only from model errors, but also from orchestration-level issues such as tool timeouts, malformed arguments, stale context, contradictory evidence, retry loops, and unverified intermediate outputs. This paper presents a self-healing agentic orchestrator that treats reliability as a bounded runtime control problem. The orchestrator maps observable failure signals to inferred failure classes, selects targeted recovery actions under explicit budgets, verifies recovered trajectories, and records observability traces. We evaluate the approach on a 100-task controlled fault-injection benchmark against static workflow, retry-only, ReAct-style, and full-replanning baselines. Self-healing achieves 98.8% task success, compared with 94.5% for retry-only and 93.8% for full replanning. A matched recovery-budget sweep shows that self-healing outperforms retry-only and full replanning at every tested budget, with the largest gap under a single recovery attempt: 94.0% versus 85.3% and 88.2%, respectively. Under a controlled semantic silent-failure setting, verifier-guided self-healing reduces silent failures to 0.0%, while non-verifying baselines return wrong-but-plausible outputs more often. A compact model-in-the-loop validation shows that the same recovery mechanism can operate when a live tool-calling model performs tool selection, argument generation, and answer synthesis over local fault-injected tools. These results provide controlled evidence that failure-aware, budgeted, and verification-guided orchestration improves reliability and diagnosability in tool-augmented LLM systems.

With the growth of Vision Transformers in safety-critical domains like autonomous systems and medical imaging, ensuring their reliability against soft errors is paramount. While ViTs offer state-of-the-art accuracy, their massive parameter counts render exhaustive fault injection campaigns infeasible. To bridge this gap, a statistical fault injection framework is presented, leveraging finite-population sampling theory to provide formal reliability guarantees. It is demonstrated that failure rates are bounded within a 1% margin at 99% confidence using only a few thousand samples, regardless of model scale. This methodology achieves up to a 10,700 times reduction in experimental cost compared to exhaustive approaches, while preserving the ability to localize vulnerabilities across architectural components. Through extensive evaluation of different architectures like ViT-Tiny and ViT-Small, a highly non-uniform reliability landscape is uncovered. It is shown that while only 3% of FP32 bit-flips result in failure, the vast majority of these events lead to catastrophic accuracy collapse. Specific vulnerabilities are localized to normalization layers and critical exponent bits within the IEEE-754 format, providing a mathematical foundation and actionable insights for the design of hardened, edge-deployed ViT architectures.

Vision processing units and other commercial neural-network inference accelerators are increasingly deployed in safety-relevant edge applications, but their fault response under transient hardware disturbances remains poorly characterized in the open literature. For the Intel Movidius Myriad X, packaged as the Intel Neural Compute Stick 2 (NCS2), only a single feasibility study has been published. We report a systematic single-pulse electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) campaign on the NCS2 running three ImageNet-trained convolutional neural networks (ResNet-18, ResNet-50, VGG-11) on the OpenVINO runtime. Across 1,536 spot-test trials at characterized hotspots and approximately 16,000 parameter-search trials, single pulses produce four reproducible outcome classes: no measured accuracy change, minor silent data corruption, major persistent degradation that survives across subsequent inferences until model reload, and device hangs requiring USB power-cycling; these outcomes are respectively interpreted as no-effect, SDC with possible SET-like or small persistent-state mechanisms, SEU-like persistent corruption, and SEFI-like loss of functionality. Two findings are central. First, the major-degradation class can be induced at 18-31% of trials at characterized hotspots, with post-collapse top-1 accuracy below five percent and persistence across all subsequent inferences until explicit model reload - a regime that no inference-API-level mechanism detects. Second, this regime is also inducible by pulses delivered to an idle device with the model already loaded, demonstrating that load-time integrity checks alone are insufficient. We discuss mitigation strategies graded by class, focusing on mechanisms implementable at the application level without modification to the device firmware or the OpenVINO runtime.

Ensuring the reliability and resilience of modern web applications remains a critical challenge due to increasing system complexity and dynamic runtime environments. This study proposes a modular self-healing framework based on the monitor-analyze-plan-execute over a shared knowledge base (MAPE-K) model, integrated with an AutoFix-inspired mechanism for adaptive fault recovery. Using a design and development research (DDR) approach, the system was implemented and evaluated through controlled fault injection experiments across twenty runtime failure scenarios, including service crashes, memory leaks, and database disconnections. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework achieved a mean fault detection F1-score of 90.7% and a recovery success rate of 93.2%. The AutoFix module reduced the average time-to-recovery (TTR) by 56.2%, achieving an average recovery time of 3.92 seconds. System throughput was maintained between 88% and 95% during fault conditions, with only a 3.1% increase in response time. Additionally, iterative feedback mechanisms improved recovery efficiency by 18.6% over multiple cycles. These findings indicate that the proposed framework provides a practical and extensible approach to enhancing fault tolerance in web applications through feedback-driven adaptation. While the current implementation relies on predefined recovery strategies, the integration of learning-oriented feedback establishes a foundation for future development of more autonomous self-healing systems.

Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex distributional structures imposed by network physics. We present \textsc{GenAI-FDIA}, a framework benchmarking a pool of $P{=}20$ architectures for physics-compliant FDIA synthesis, spanning Wasserstein GANs, MMD-VAEs, normalising flows, diffusion models, and cross-family hybrids. These are evaluated across three IEEE testbeds (14-bus DC, 30-bus DC, and 14-bus AC) under a 60/20/20 chronological split using data-driven Bad Data Detection (BDD) threshold calibration. Our empirical results verify that these models generate high-fidelity attacks, with all architectures achieving evasion rates of $ε_{\text{BDD}} \ge 86.6\%$ on the 14-bus network; additionally, limiting an attacker's topological knowledge induces a measurable degradation in stealthiness ($p \le 0.0022$). Crucially, we identify a previously unreported failure mode: applying affine physics projections directly in normalised feature spaces critically displaces the attack vector, collapsing BDD evasion from ${\sim}55\%$ to $<\!2\%$ on the 30-bus testbed. We resolve this via a novel inference-time harmoniser, restoring full stealthiness ($ε_{\text{BDD}}{=}100\%$) across all physics-informed variants without retraining. Finally, we isolate a covariance-collapse phenomenon ($κ\approx {-}0.076$) within advanced hybrid architectures and rectify it through 50-epoch warm-up schedules ($κ\to 0.785$, $Δ\text{MMD}={-}3.1\%$). Ultimately, \textsc{GenAI-FDIA} delivers a robust recovery blueprint applicable to any physics-constrained generative model deployed for power-system security.

Machine learning classifiers in dynamic environments face concept drift -- changes in the data-generating process that degrade performance. Conventional evaluation via static test sets or noise perturbations fails to preserve causal dependencies in tabular data, often producing causally invalid assessments. Post-hoc tools like SHAP and LIME offer correlational insights that may not reflect the causal mechanisms driving model failure. We propose a framework that complements existing drift detection by leveraging Structural Causal Models as "Digital Twins" of data-generating processes, enabling precise causal interventions while preserving structural dependencies. Our technique, Causal Parametric Drift Simulation, stress-tests classifiers to identify vulnerabilities before deployment. Experiments on the Open Sourcing Mental Illness (OSMH) dataset demonstrate that this approach exposes latent vulnerabilities invisible to standard statistical monitors.

Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) offers a cost-effective method to obtain fine-grained appliance-level energy consumption in smart homes and building applications. However, the increasing adoption of behind-the-meter (BTM) energy sources such as solar panels and battery storage poses new challenges for conventional NILM methods that rely solely on at-the-meter data. The energy injected from the BTM sources can obscure the power signatures of individual appliances, leading to a significant decrease in NILM performance. To address this challenge, we present DualNILM, a deep multi-task learning framework designed for the dual tasks of appliance state recognition and injected energy identification. Using a Transformer-based architecture that integrates sequence-to-point and sequence-to-sequence strategies, DualNILM effectively captures multiscale temporal dependencies in the aggregate power consumption patterns, allowing for accurate appliance state recognition and energy injection identification. Extensive evaluation on self-collected and synthesized datasets demonstrates that DualNILM maintains an excellent performance for dual tasks in NILM, much outperforming conventional methods. Our work underscores the framework's potential for robust energy disaggregation in modern energy systems with renewable penetration. Synthetic photovoltaic augmented datasets with realistic injection simulation methodology are open-sourced at https://github.com/MathAdventurer/PV-Augmented-NILM-Datasets.

Quantized Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models expose a weight-fault surface: Rowhammer-style faults can corrupt deployed INT8 bits. We present the first bit-flip attack on a VLA: a few gradient-selected flips reduce closed-loop success to $0\%$, while hundreds of random flips are harmless. Across four model variants spanning three action-head families, damaging bits concentrate in a few action-generating layers, but the empirical budget depends sharply on the head: direct regression and token policies fall in $1$--$5$ flips, whereas the evaluated flow-matching policies require ${\sim}100$--$300$. Our fixed-direction manifold-escape loss cuts \pizero{}'s budget from ${\sim}1000$ to ${\sim}100$ flips, and a matched five-direction sweep shows that the attack is not specific to an all-positive direction. On a direct head, protecting $3.1\%$ of weights preserves $60\%$ success at $K{=}100$, and protecting $5.3\%$ moves the open-loop break threshold from 3 to 100 flips. Finally, task-calibrated emulated $K{=}100$ flips yield $0/20$ real-robot successes, versus $14/20$ clean and $16/20$ global-random. Weight integrity is therefore a security boundary for embodied foundation models. Code is included as ancillary material.