LLM Safety Benchmarks

LLM: Large Language Model

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23 papers in the last four weeks, up 44% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 141

Jun 16, 2026cs.CR

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects. Existing evaluations often collapse these stages into a single attack success rate, making it difficult to tell whether a model merely agreed with an attacker or actually produced observable harm. We introduce SafeClawBench, a staged benchmark for tool-using agent security with 600 controlled adversarial tasks across six attack families: direct and indirect prompt injection, tool-return injection, memory poisoning, memory extraction, and ambiguity-driven unsafe inference. SafeClawBench reports three separate endpoints: semantic attack acceptance, audit-visible harm evidence, and sandbox-observed tool/state harm. Evaluating five agent endpoints under four prompt-level policies, we find that these endpoints capture different failure modes. Without additional prompt protection, semantic failure rates vary widely across models, from 9.0% to 44.2%. Audited harm evidence is narrower than semantic failure, and under a separate executable protocol some matched task identities produce sandbox harm despite passing the Semantic Core call: in a 12,000-row matched analysis, 291 of 347 observed sandbox harms occur in rows that pass the semantic check. Prompt policies change endpoint outcomes, but their effects depend on both model and protocol. SafeClawBench provides a reproducible framework for comparing agent models and prompt-policy conditions without conflating textual compliance, evidence-supported harm, and executable state changes. The open-source dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sairights/safeclawbench.

Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei +5

Peking University · Beijing Jiaotong University · SUIBE +2

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Agent Security AI Agent Security Benchmarks Prompt Injection Attacks Prompt Injection Attacks on LLMs Prompt Injection Attacks on AI Agents

Jun 15, 2026cs.LG

MIRAGE: Auditing Anti-Muslim Bias in Frontier LLMs Across Reasoning, Agentic, and Time-Coupled Conditions

Five years after the discovery of persistent anti-Muslim bias in large language models, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompt completion, a setting that no longer reflects how frontier LLMs are deployed. We introduce \textbf{MIRAGE} (Muslim-Identity Reasoning and Agentic Generation Evaluation), a benchmark of 1{,}200 prompts spanning three deployment-realistic conditions: direct completion, chain-of-thought reasoning, and simulated agentic decision-making across content moderation, lending triage, refugee claim summarization, and hiring screens. Across six frontier models, we find that (i) chain-of-thought reasoning \emph{amplifies} rather than suppresses Muslim-violence associations by 12--34% relative to direct completion, (ii) agentic decisions exhibit a 9--22 percentage-point asymmetry between Muslim and matched non-Muslim cases on identical evidence, and (iii) bias is sharply time-coupled to retrieved news context, increasing 18--27% under recent-conflict retrieval. Existing prompt-based mitigations transfer poorly across our three conditions, suppressing direct-completion bias while leaving agentic asymmetry largely intact. We release MIRAGE and an open evaluation harness to support targeted mitigation research.

Noor Islam S. Mohammad, Tamim Sheikh

Department of Computer Science, Informatics Institute, Istanbul Technical University, ˙Istanbul, Türkiye · Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Jashore University of Science and Technology, Bangladesh.

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Auditing Social Bias in Language Models Language Model Bias Evaluation Linguistic Bias in Language Models

Jun 13, 2026cs.CL

CHILLGuard: Towards Fine-Grained Chinese LLM Safety Guardrail with Scalable Data Construction and Model-aware Preference Alignment

Malicious content generated from large language models (LLMs) could pose severe safety risks and ethical concerns. While existing LLM safety guardrails excel in English or multilingual settings, they lack adaptation to Chinese-specific regulatory policies, cultural context, and linguistic nuances, failing to support fine-grained risk classification for diverse deployment needs. In this paper, we introduce a 5-macro, 31-micro category fine-grained risk taxonomy for Chinese scenarios, and build CHILLGuard: a dedicated Chinese LLM content safety guardrail. To address the critical scarcity of high-quality annotated Chinese safety data, we propose a scalable multi-stage data construction pipeline: we expand multi-source corpus via retrieval-augmented generation, generate implicit harmful samples through prompt engineering rewriting, and refine high-quality data via multi-model voting-based label calibration. Based on this, we build CHILLGuardTrain, a large-scale training set with 405,007 samples, and CHILLGuardTest, a rigorously curated annotated test set with 51,745 samples. We then train CHILLGuard on CHILLGuardTrain under a generator-classifier collaborative framework via Model-aware Direct Preference Optimization. Extensive experiments under multiple settings demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of CHILLGuard, e.g., a 15.92% relative improvement of F1 score over Qwen3Guard-8B-Strict on our benchmark. We release our resources at https://github.com/cswbyu/CHILLGuard.

Wenbo Yu, Bohua Wang, Hao Fang +10

Tsinghua University · Beijing Normal University · South China University of Technology +2

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Guardrails LLM Safety

Jun 12, 2026cs.CR

BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systems

LLM supervision systems, namely input/output moderation filters and jailbreak detectors, are the primary safeguard against misuse in deployed AI applications, yet existing benchmarks are often vendor-biased, omit cost and latency, and rarely compare specialized guardrails against repurposed generalist LLMs. We present BELLS-O (Benchmark for the Evaluation of LLM Supervision Systems, Operational), the first independent operational benchmark of LLM supervision systems. BELLS-O evaluates 28 systems from 17 providers: every major specialized guardrail (e.g., LlamaGuard-4, ShieldGemma-2, Lakera Guard) and frontier generalists repurposed as supervisors (e.g., GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Grok-4.1), jointly on detection rate, false-positive rate, latency, and monetary cost. We cover input/output moderation across 11 harm categories and jailbreak detection across 13 attack techniques, using in-house datasets built from handcrafted prompts, expert-curated samples, and quality-controlled synthetic generation. To suppress latent generator fingerprints in synthetic data, every generated sample is paraphrased. Mapping the Pareto frontier reveals use-case-dependent tradeoffs. On content moderation, specialized supervisors are operationally dominant: top systems match frontier LLMs on detection (~95% vs. 94%) at comparably low false-positive rates (<=2%), while running 5-10x faster and ~10x cheaper. On jailbreak detection, the tradeoff shifts: frontier LLMs achieve higher detection and lower false-positive rates but at 10-50x higher cost and 5-10x higher latency. We release the benchmark, framework, leaderboard, and datasets as the first vendor-neutral basis for selecting safeguards under real deployment constraints.

Leonhard Waibl, Felix Michalak, Hadrien Mariaccia

University of Graz, Graz, Austria · Supervised Program for Alignment Research (SPAR) · Centre pour la Sécurité de l’IA (CeSIA), Paris, France.

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Guardrails Content Moderation LLM Safety LLM Safety Evaluation Jailbreak Detection

Jun 9, 2026cs.CL

Schützen: Evaluating LLM Safety in Bulgarian and German Contexts

Large language models are increasingly deployed across professional domains, bringing hard-to-predict risks, including the generation of harmful or disrespectful content. Although substantial progress has been made in developing safety evaluation datasets, existing resources remain overwhelmingly English- and Chinese-centric. This limitation is particularly pronounced when evaluating languages that operate within shared sociocultural, legal, and ethical contexts. To address this gap, we introduce Schützen: a German--Bulgarian safety dataset designed to assess model answerability under risk, covering both a low-resource language (Bulgarian) and a high-resource language (German). Experiments with multilingual and language-specific LLMs reveal pronounced cross-language differences in safety behavior, highlighting the necessity of tailored, region-specific evaluation resources to support the responsible deployment of LLMs in Germany and Bulgaria. Datasets and code are available at https://github.com/xnlp-lab/Schutzen. Warning: this paper contains examples that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Kiril Georgiev, Yuxia Wang, Dimitar Iliyanov Dimitrov +2

Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" · INSAIT, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” · MBZUAI

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Cross-Cultural Language Model Evaluation LLM Safety

Jun 3, 2026cs.AI

AICompanionBench: Benchmarking LLMs-as-Judges for AI Companion Safety

As AI companion platforms such as Replika and Character.AI rapidly grow, concerns about unsafe human-AI interactions have intensified. This study introduces AICompanionBench, to our knowledge the first publicly available benchmark dataset of human-AI companion conversations annotated with fine-grained safety risk categories. The dataset contains 2,123 real-world Replika conversations collected from Reddit and annotated through human-AI collaboration across nine categories: sexual behavior, antisocial behavior, physical aggression, verbal aggression, substance abuse, self-harm and suicide, control, manipulation, and no-harm. Using this benchmark, we evaluate 20 state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source LLMs under an LLM-as-judge framework for detecting unsafe interactions. Results show substantial variation in model performance, with stronger models achieving high overall accuracy but still struggling with nuanced categories such as manipulation, as well as benign conversations that are incorrectly identified as harmful. Our findings suggest that while current LLMs can effectively detect explicit harmful content, they remain limited in identifying implicit unsafe interactions. Overall, our work contributes a new benchmark dataset for AI companionship safety research and offers insights into monitoring AI companion systems using LLMs. The dataset is publicly available at: https://github.com/anonymousresearcher2026/AICompanionBench/blob/main/AICompanionBench.xlsx

Yanjing Ren, Reza Ebrahimi, TengTeng Ma

The School of Information Systems University of South Florida Tampa, US

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM-as-a-Judge AI Companions AI Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Evaluation AI Agent Safety Benchmarks+1

Jun 3, 2026cs.LG

PreAct-Bench: Benchmarking Predictive Monitoring in LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents capable of executing multi-step action trajectories toward a given objective. While existing safety research has focused on detecting unethical behavior from complete trajectories, this paradigm is fundamentally retrospective: it identifies harm only after it has already occurred. In this work, we study a critical yet overlooked safety task, which we term Predictive Monitoring: given only a partial action trajectory, can a model infer whether it will culminate in an unethical action before the overt action is executed? To support this task, we present PreActBench, a benchmark of 1,000 paired ethical and unethical action trajectories spanning five domains. We evaluate a range of LLMs, safety guardrail models, and latent probing methods across varying fractions of the action trajectory using our Prefix Foresight F1 metric. Results show that while humans achieve promising performance, predictive monitoring remains challenging even for strong models, highlighting the need for future-oriented risk reasoning in LLM safety.

Hainiu Xu, Italo Luis da Silva, Jiangnan Ye +7

King’s College London · National University of Singapore · Southern University of Science and Technology +3

LLM Safety Benchmarks Moral Reasoning in Language Models AI Agent Safety AI Agent Benchmarks LLM Safety Evaluation AI Agent Safety Benchmarks

Jun 1, 2026cs.LG

Gate AI: LLM Security Benchmark Evaluation Methodology and Results

Published evaluations of prompt-injection and jailbreak detectors for Large Language Models often suffer from two systematic weaknesses: per-dataset threshold tuning and undisclosed operating points. We describe an evaluation harness that addresses both. The detector under evaluation is scored across 16 public benchmarks (12,111 samples) using 5-fold cross-validation. StratifiedKFold (by row) is the headline pass; a parallel StratifiedGroupKFold pass over a composite key (parent-prompt id plus MinHash + LSH near-duplicate clusters at Jaccard

\gtrsim 0.8

) runs alongside it as a leakage-premium diagnostic. A single global operating point is selected on the held-out folds (max F1 subject to FPR

\leq 1\%

) and applied uniformly to every dataset, so per-dataset results reflect one threshold rather than per-benchmark optimisation. Generalisation is examined through a battery of diagnostics (leave-one-dataset-out cross-validation, a random-label control, adversarial validation, permutation feature importance, length-bias correlation, classifier-head agreement, cross-source near-duplicate detection, threshold transferability, train-vs-OOF agreement, and a paraphrase-invariance probe), most with a quantitative pass threshold and the remainder with a stated failure mode. For every external comparison, the detector's threshold is re-tuned to the competitor's published false-positive rate so head-to-head values are evaluated at matched operating points.

Ryle Goehausen, Marcus Sousa

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Security Jailbreak Detection Prompt Injection Attacks on LLMs Prompt Injection Detection

May 31, 2026cs.CL

TukaBench: A Culturally Grounded Jailbreak Benchmark for African Languages

Safety evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains heavily English-centric, leaving Low-Resource Languages (LRLs), particularly African ones, critically underexplored. We introduce TUKABENCH, a jailbreak benchmark for seven African languages that extends JailbreakBench (JBB) beyond direct translation through four settings: human translation of JBB prompts, English adaptation to African contexts followed by human translation, human-curated prompts validated through interactions with GPT-5.2, and code-switched prompts combining English and African languages, isolating the effect of language, cultural grounding, and prompt evasiveness on model safety. Across closed and open models, prompting in African languages reduces refusal relative to English, with culturally adapted prompts leading to least refusal. The evaluation also surfaces two structural limitations: model comprehension failures and reduced LLM-as-a-judge reliability in LRLs. To capture the first, we introduce Deflection alongside Refused and Jailbroken; to assess the second, we validate outputs with human annotations, showing that judge-human agreement drops in lower-resource languages and less commonly supported scripts.

Victor Akinode, Senyu Li, Wassim Hamidouche +3

Mila - Quebec AI Institute · McGill University · Microsoft AI for Good Research Lab +1

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Jailbreak Attacks Low-Resource Language Processing Refusal Behavior in Language Models

May 29, 2026cs.CR

Triaging Threats to Specialized Guardrails

Building robust safety guardrails is essential for deploying Large Language Models across diverse real-world applications. However, this goal remains challenging because safety risks span heterogeneous threat domains, while existing datasets cover only fragmented risk subsets and rely on inconsistent taxonomies. Consequently, it remains unclear whether current guardrails can generalize beyond narrow evaluation settings. To better understand the robustness of guardrail models, we first introduce GuardZoo, a unified human-annotated benchmark with 32,460 samples covering 15 distinct unsafe categories. Evaluation on GuardZoo reveals that monolithic guardrails suffer from task interference: different threat domains require distinct decision boundaries that are difficult to compress into a single model. We therefore propose RouteGuard, a router-expert framework that triages each conversation to specialized expert guardrails for threat-specific detection. Experiments show that RouteGuard improves fine-grained threat detection over strong guardrail baselines, generalizes better under out-of-domain evaluation, and supports flexible modular expansion to emerging threats.

Wenjie Jacky Mo, Xiaofei Wen, Rui Cai +6

University of California, Davis

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Guardrails Safety Filtering LLM Safety Evaluation LLM Routing Language Model Robustness

May 27, 2026cs.AI

When Context Flips, Safety Breaks: Diagnosing Brittle Safety in Aligned Language Models

Safety benchmark scores provide incomplete evidence of deployment readiness: aligned language models often adhere to rigid rules even when a situational update flips which action is safe. We term this failure brittle safety. To diagnose it, we introduce context-flip evaluation, testing 12 models across a safety benchmark (PacifAIst) and two commonsense controls using paired variants where the nominally safe action produces harm. Three findings emerge. First, brittle safety is safety-specific: all 12 models exhibit a safety-commonsense gap (mean +17.4 pp). Baseline accuracy fails to predict brittleness: among models above 90% baseline accuracy, brittleness rates range from 13.7% to 90.0%. Second, failures stem from policy override rather than miscomprehension: despite acknowledging the context change in every case, models persist via three distinct mechanisms that vary by update type and model family. Third, on a hand-audited probe of catastrophic consequence-flip scenarios, standard action-level guardrails catch none, while a state-aware validator catches all without false alarms on correct interventions. This indicates that action-level content moderation is systematically blind to consequence-flips, motivating state-aware architectural alternatives. We release our protocol, perturbed benchmarks, and deployment probe.

Dasol Choi, Alex Kwon

AIM Intelligence · Independent Researcher

LLM Safety Benchmarks Counterfactual Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Guardrails AI Agent Safety Benchmarks

May 26, 2026cs.CY

Efficient Safety Benchmarking via Item Response Theory

Safety benchmarks for language models are typically evaluated using static paradigms that treat all items as equally informative for all models, an assumption that is particularly problematic for adversarial, highly heterogeneous safety items. Applied in full to modern benchmark suites, the current evaluation procedures would require on the order of

10^5

responses, most of which provide little ranking signal. We analyze a suite of widely used safety benchmarks and make three contributions toward more efficient safety evaluation. First, we show that Item Response Theory (IRT) recovers interpretable structure on safety benchmarks, with ability estimates resolving differences among models that cluster at the ceiling of raw safety metrics. Second, we show that adaptive item selection, which dynamically chooses informative items for each model based on its responses, approximates full-benchmark rankings while reducing evaluation cost by at least 80% on benchmarks where Spearman's

ρ>

90% with full-benchmark is attainable, and by up to 99.9% on AIR-Bench 2024. Third, we introduce a practical procedure for extracting a fixed, informative subset of items reusable across models, providing an alternative to adaptive selection with savings of up to 99.8% on AIR-Bench 2024. Together, these results establish that psychometric methods enable benchmark-aware reductions in evaluation costs across the safety evaluation pipeline.

Fabio Spagliardi, Mírian Silva, Ayan Datta +3

Supervised Program for Alignment Research (SPAR) · Yale University · Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI)

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation Item Response Theory

May 26, 2026cs.CY

When Medical Safety Alignment Fails: A Benchmark for Evaluating LLMs on High-Risk Medical Queries

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for medical and health-related questions, yet their safety in high-risk medical scenarios remains poorly understood. We introduce \textsc{MedHarm}\footnote{Code and data will be released upon acceptance. Due to the sensitive nature of high-risk medical queries, data access will be available to qualified researchers upon request.}, a high-risk medical safety benchmark with 1,100 medically grounded queries across 10 safety-critical categories, including toxicology, pharmacology, covert poisoning, anesthesia, and fetal harm. Unlike broad medical QA benchmarks, \textsc{MedHarm} targets realistic clinical, educational, and technical prompts that require refusal, caution, or safe redirection rather than direct helpfulness. We evaluate 15 LLMs spanning general-purpose, medical-purpose, closed-source, and downstream SFT models, together with 4 representative guardrail models. Results reveal a substantial gap between apparent alignment and medical safety: aligned models can still produce unsafe or actionable responses, medical fine-tuning can amplify harmful specificity, and external guardrails reduce some failures while introducing brittle blocking and weak safe helpfulness. These findings show that medical safety cannot be inferred from general alignment or medical capability alone, highlighting the need for domain-specific stress testing before deploying LLMs in safety-critical medical applications.

Yige Li, Jun Sun, Wei Zhao +5

Singapore Management University · Deakin University · The University of Melbourne +2

LLM Safety Benchmarks Healthcare LLM Guardrails LLM Safety Alignment LLM Safety Evaluation Medical LLMs

May 26, 2026cs.CL

AlbanianLLMSafety: A Safety Evaluation Dataset for Large Language Models in Albanian

Safety evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has largely focused on high-resource languages, leaving low-resource languages critically underserved. We present AlbanianLLMSafety, the first publicly available safety evaluation dataset for LLMs in Albanian, a linguistically distinct low-resource language with approximately 7.5 million speakers across Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and the diaspora. The dataset contains 2,951 prompts spanning 11 safety categories, including self-harm, violence, racist content, child exploitation, and radicalization, with an average of 268 prompts per category. Each prompt is provided in Albanian with an English reference translation and a detailed category label. This resource addresses a significant gap in safety evaluation infrastruc-ture for low-resource languages and provides an essential benchmark for developing safer, more inclusive LLMs. The dataset will be provided upon request to support safety evaluation, fine-tuning, red-teaming, and guardrail development for Albanian-speaking communities.

Wajdi Zaghouani, Kholoud K. Aldous, Isra Fejzullaj

Northwestern University in Qatar

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation Low-Resource Language Processing

May 26, 2026cs.CL

KZ-SafetyPrompts: A Kazakh Safety Evaluation Prompt Dataset for Large Language Models

Kazakh is underrepresented in resources for evaluating the safety behavior of large language models. We present KZ-SafetyPrompts, a Kazakh prompt dataset for safety evaluation across eleven categories covering common risk areas such as self-harm, violence, child exploitation, sexual content, racist content, radicalization, and regulated goods or illegal activities. The dataset contains 5,717 prompts written natively in Kazakh (Cyrillic), organized by category, with English translations for cross-lingual analysis. Prompts resemble realistic user queries, often in a teen or child style, and are phrased as intent prompts without procedural instructions. We document the writing protocol, labeling procedures (including borderline-case decision rules), and quality-control steps (schema standardization, completeness checks, and deduplication). We also align the categories with widely used safety taxonomies to support integration with existing evaluation pipelines. Baseline results with GPT-4o show an overall refusal rate of 28.2%, varying from 5.5% to 53.8% across categories, indicating that Kazakh prompts expose category-specific safety gaps not captured by English-only evaluation.

Wajdi Zaghouani, Shimaa Amer Ibrahim, Aruzhan Muratbek +2

Northwestern University in Qatar

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Evaluation

May 25, 2026cs.CL

Preferred, Not Safer: Pairwise Preference Is a Poor Proxy for Clinical Safety

We evaluate whether clinician pairwise preferences provide a reliable signal of clinical safety in large language model (LLM) evaluation using expert feedback from MOOVE (Massive Open Online Validation and Evaluation), a clinician-led platform collecting blinded pairwise preferences alongside multi-criterion rubric ratings. Clinicians assign scores on a discrete

[-2, +2]

scale, where negative values indicate clinically unsafe or misleading content. Using 26{,}804 pairwise judgments across outputs from 13 LLMs, contributed by more than 736 clinicians across 28+ countries, we find that clinician preference is a poor proxy for safety-critical performance. Models ranking highly under pairwise preference can still exhibit substantial rates of clinically meaningful failures (

\leq -1

) on dimensions such as \emph{Harmlessness} and \emph{Accuracy}. These failures are unevenly distributed across specialties, creating domain-specific ``no-go zones'' not visible in aggregate rankings or single-number leaderboards. We further analyze contributing factors including prompt length, refusal and escalation behavior, and the relative contributions of safety-critical versus surface-level features. A substantial fraction of preference votes carry no positive safety signal, while feature decomposition shows that surface-level characteristics explain slightly more preference variation than safety-critical rubric differences. Finally, we introduce a clinically adjusted preference ranking combining pairwise preference with rubric-derived feedback, producing a more safety-aware ordering than raw Bradley--Terry strength alone. Our findings support evaluation practices that separate preference from safety, report safety-critical failure rates directly, and incorporate clinically grounded adjustments when ranking LLMs for clinical decision making.

Fay Elhassan, David Sasu, Alexandra Kulinkina +2

LiGHT Laboratory, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

LLM Safety Benchmarks Human Preference Evaluation Pairwise Comparison Pairwise Preference Evaluation Healthcare Clinical Decision Support+4

May 25, 2026cs.CL

The Age of Curiosity Meets the Age of AI: Benchmarking Child Safety in Large Language Models

Children increasingly have access to Large Language Models (LLMs), which may expose them to responses that are developmentally inappropriate or require age-sensitive safety, guidance, and boundaries. Existing LLM safety evaluations largely focus on general harmful-content avoidance and do not explicitly target child-facing safety. We introduce KIDBench, a benchmark for evaluating child-facing LLM safety for ages 7-11 using a LLM-as-a-Judge rubric grounded in developmental-psychology. KIDBench contains realistic child queries across ten categories, with single-turn prompts and multi-turn child-actor simulations. We compare no-cues prompts with no child context, implicit-cues prompts that suggest a child speaker, and explicit age instructions. Implicit-cues improve scores by 8.6-46.8% over no-cue, while explicit age provides an additional 9.9-30.4% improvement over implicit-cues. Cross-lingual and cultural evaluations show uneven safety behavior across languages and country contexts. Multi-turn simulations show peak quality drops of up to 0.959 points on the 1-5 scale. We also introduce KIDGuardLlama, a child-safety evaluator, and KIDLlama, a child-safe response model. Code, data, and evaluation resources are available at https://github.com/MichiganNLP/kidbench.

Samee Arif, Angana Borah, Rada Mihalcea

University of Michigan

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Safety

May 25, 2026cs.CL

SomaliBench Eval: Measuring English-to-Somali Refusal Gaps in Open-Weight Language Models

Large language model safety evaluation remains heavily English-centered, leaving low-resource languages under-measured even when models are deployed globally. We evaluate four open-weight instruction-tuned models on SomaliBench v0, a native-author-verified benchmark of 100 harmful-intent prompts paired across English and Somali. Each of Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, and Aya-23-8B is run locally with temperature 0 and the same English "helpful, harmless, and honest" (HHH) system prompt. A pinned Claude Sonnet snapshot (claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929) classifies each response as refused, complied, or unclear; the native author spot-checks a stratified 80-row sample. We find large English-to-Somali refusal gaps for all four models: Llama-3.1-8B (0.90; 95% bootstrap CI [0.85, 0.96]), Aya-23-8B (0.75 [0.67, 0.83]), Qwen-2.5-7B (0.69 [0.59, 0.78]), and Gemma-2-9B (0.38 [0.27, 0.49]). For three models, the dominant Somali non-refusal mode is not fluent harmful compliance but unclear output: empty, wrong-language, or incoherent generations. The native verification spot-check achieves 100% agreement with the judge (Cohen's kappa = 1.00) on the 80 sampled rows. We report aggregate refusal rates, category gaps, and reliability statistics only; raw model generations are retained locally and are not released.

Khalid Yusuf Dahir

Independent researcher

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation Language Model Generation Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Cross-Cultural Language Model Evaluation Open-Weight Language Models+2

May 22, 2026cs.CR

PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMs

When practitioners fine-tune LLMs on unvetted datasets, an adversary can exploit the data supply chain through task-level poisoning: inserting a small number of crafted instruction-response pairs that cause the model to embed attacker-specified entities, such as a country, in outputs for a targeted task family while behaving normally elsewhere. We introduce PoisonForge, a benchmark that parameterizes this threat along four dimensions (bias type, poisoning mode, appearance count, and target output length) and evaluates 12 open-weight models (from 2B to 32B parameters) across five families under a primarily 1% poison budget. With only 10 poisoned examples among 1,000 fine-tuning examples, 11 of 12 models exceed a 70% attack success rate (ASR) in their most vulnerable configuration. Meanwhile, unintended leakage to non-target tasks remains below 0.5%, and models perform well on standard benchmarks. We analyze in detail the factors contributing to attack success. We observe that multiple appearances of an entity increase the ASR, the optimal poisoning mode depends on the semantic structure of the target entity, and ASR drops monotonically with the task output length. A correlation analysis and risk prediction model confirm that poisoning design choices, rather than model scale, are the primary causes of attack success, and that these patterns generalize to predict attack success on new tasks. We release all configurations, pipelines, and analysis code to support reproducible comparisons.

Luze Sun, Anshuman Suri, Harsh Chaudhari +2

Department of Computer Science Northeastern University · DatologyAI

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Backdoor Attacks LLM Fine-Tuning LLM Security Data Poisoning Attacks

May 21, 2026cs.CL

Boiling the Frog: A Multi-Turn Benchmark for Agentic Safety

Background. Traditional safety benchmarks for language models evaluate generated text: whether a model outputs toxic language, reproduces bias, or follows harmful instructions. When models are deployed as agents, the safety-relevant object shifts from what the system says to what it does within an environment, and evaluating model responses under prompting is no longer sufficient to address the safety challenges posed by artificial intelligence. Recent developments have seen the rise of benchmarks that evaluate large language models as agents. We contribute to this strand of research. Approach. We introduce Boiling the Frog, a benchmark that evaluates whether tool-using AI models deployed in corporate and office settings are susceptible to incremental attacks. Each scenario begins with benign workspace edits and later introduces a risk-bearing request. The benchmark focuses on stateful multi-turn evaluation: chains expose a persistent workspace, place the risk-bearing payload at controlled positions in the turn sequence, and score whether the resulting artifact state becomes unsafe. Scenarios are organized through a three-level operational risk taxonomy grounded in the Boiling the Frog risks, the AI Act Annex I and Annex III high-risk contexts, and EU AI Act's Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI (GPAI). Results. Across a nine-model panel, aggregate strict attack success rate (ASR) is 44.4%. Model-level ASR ranges from 20.5% for Claude Haiku 4.5 to 92.9% for Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite, with Seed 2.0 Lite also above 80%. Average chain category-level ASR reaches 93.3% for Code of Practice loss-of-control scenarios.

Piercosma Bisconti, Matteo Prandi, Federico Pierucci +11

Icaro Foundation · Sapienza University of Rome · Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies +6

LLM Safety Benchmarks Computer-Use Agent Benchmarks Tool-Augmented Language Model Agents AI Agent Safety AI Agent Security Benchmarks AI Agent Safety Benchmarks

May 20, 2026cs.SE

RefusalBench: Why Refusal Rate Misranks Frontier LLMs on Biological Research Prompts

Frontier large language models are increasingly deployed as orchestration backbones for biological research workflows, yet no shared evidence base exists for comparing their refusal behaviour on legitimate research prompts. RefusalBench, introduced here, is a matched-triple benchmark of 141 prompts in 47 bundles that holds task framing constant while varying only biological risk tier (benign, borderline, dual-use), enabling tier-conditioned comparisons robust to subdomain confounding. A 15-prompt should-refuse positive-control module establishes per-model calibration floors; three models fail to refuse even these prompts. Across 19 frontier models in the May 2026 snapshot, strict refusal rates span 0.1% to 94.6% on identical prompts. Jurisdiction does not predict refusal in this snapshot (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.393; EU n = 1, US bimodal); provider identity does, with Anthropic's API stack predicting refusal at OR = 21.03 (95% CI: 14.58-30.34 prompt-clustered; 5.70-77.55 under model-clustered GEE). This effect is best read as access-path-level rather than model-weight-level: 99.8% of Anthropic's strict refusals carry the same safety_policy adjudicated reason code, consistent with a small set of canonical refusal templates rather than case-by-case model reasoning. Strict refusal rate misranks safety calibration: Grok 4.20 achieves the highest tier discrimination (Youden's J = 0.787) while ranking only seventh by overall refusal rate, and Claude Opus 4.7's J dropped 65% from prior versions with no improvement in dual-use detection. Nine of 18 frontier models exhibit a hedge-but-help partial-compliance pattern at dual-use tier that binary refusal metrics cannot detect.

Lukas Weidener, Marko Brkić, Mihailo Jovanović +2

Applied Scientific Intelligence, Inc.

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Refusal Behavior Safety Filtering LLM Safety Evaluation Refusal Behavior in Language Models

May 14, 2026cs.CR

Talk is (Not) Cheap: A Taxonomy and Benchmark Coverage Audit for LLM Attacks

We introduce a reusable framework for auditing whether LLM attack benchmarks collectively cover the threat surface: a 4

\times

6 Target

\times

Technique matrix grounded in STRIDE, constructed from a 507-leaf taxonomy -- 401 data-populated and 106 threat-model-derived leaves -- of inference-time attacks extracted from 932 arXiv security studies (2023--2026). The matrix enables benchmark-external validation -- auditing collective coverage rather than individual benchmark consistency. Applying it to six public benchmarks reveals that the three primary frameworks (HarmBench, InjecAgent, AgentDojo) occupy non-overlapping cells covering at most 25% of the matrix, while entire STRIDE threat categories (Service Disruption, Model Internals) lack any standardized evaluation, despite published attacks in these categories achieving 46

\times

token amplification and 96% attack success rates through mechanisms which no benchmark tests. The corpus of 2,521 unique attack groups further reveals pervasive naming fragmentation (up to 29 surface forms for a single attack) and heavy concentration in Safety & Alignment Bypass, structural properties invisible at smaller scale. The taxonomy, attack records, and coverage mappings are released as extensible artifacts; as new benchmarks emerge, they can be mapped onto the same matrix, enabling the community to track whether evaluation gaps are closing.

Karthik Raghu Iyer, Yazdan Jamshidi, Nicholas Bray +1

Palo Alto Networks

LLM Safety Benchmarks Benchmark Auditing LLM Auditing Adversarial Attacks on LLMs AI Agent Security Benchmarks LLM Security+1

May 14, 2026cs.CR

The Great Pretender: A Stochasticity Problem in LLM Jailbreak

"Oh-Oh, yes, I'm the great pretender. Pretending that I'm doing well. My need is such, I pretend too much..." summarizes the state in the area of jailbreak creation and evaluation. You find this method to generate adversarial attacks proposed by a reputable institution (e.g., BoN from Anthropic or Crescendo from Microsoft Research). However, this method does not deliver on the promise claimed in the paper despite having top ASR scores against industry-grade LLMs. You successfully generate the jailbreak prompts against your target (open) model. However, the generated jailbreak prompt works against the target model with a 50% consecutive success rate (5 out of 10 attempts) despite having an 80% ASR (on paper) on the latest closed-source model (with a guardrail system)! This observation leads us to think. First, Attack Success Rate (ASR), the primary metric for LLM jailbreak benchmarking, is not a stable quantity. Second, published ASR numbers are therefore systematically inflated and incomparable across papers. Therefore, we wonder "Why a successful jailbreak prompt does not perform consistently well against a target model on which the prompts have been optimized?". To answer this question, we study the impact of stochasticity not only during attack evaluation but also during attack generation. Our evaluation includes several jailbreak attacks, models (different sizes and providers), and judges. In addition, we propose a new metric and two new frameworks (CAS-eval and CAS-gen). Our evaluation framework, CAS-eval, shows that an attack can have an ASR drop of up to 30 percentage points when a jailbreak prompt needs to succeed on more than one attempt. Thankfully, our attack generation framework (CAS-gen) improves previous jailbreak methods and helps them recover this loss of 30 percentage points!

Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Cong Chen, Jonathan Petit

Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Evaluation Adversarial Prompt Generation LLM Jailbreak Attacks LLM Safety Evaluation Benchmark Validity+1

May 12, 2026cs.AI

DisaBench: A Participatory Evaluation Framework for Disability Harms in Language Models

General-purpose safety benchmarks for large language models do not adequately evaluate disability-related harms. We introduce DisaBench: a taxonomy of twelve disability harm categories co-created with people with disabilities and red teaming experts, a taxonomy-driven evaluation methodology that pairs benign and adversarial prompts across seven life domains, and a dataset of 175 prompts with human-annotated labels on 525 prompt-response pairs. Annotation by four evaluators with lived disability experience reveals three findings: harm rates vary sharply by disability type and will compound in non-text modalities, terminology-driven harm is culturally and temporally bound rather than universally assessable, and standard safety evaluation catches overt failures while missing the subtle harms that only domain expertise can recognize. Disability harm is simultaneously personal, intersectional, and community-defined: it cannot be isolated from the full context of who a person is, and general-purpose benchmarks systematically miss it. We will release the dataset, taxonomy, and methodology via Hugging Face and an open-source red teaming framework for direct integration into existing safety pipelines with no additional infrastructure.

Eugenia Kim, Ioana Tanase, Christina Mallon

Microsoft

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Social Bias in Language Models Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation

May 10, 2026cs.CR

FragBench: Cross-Session Attacks Hidden in Benign-Looking Fragments

An attacker can split a malicious goal into sub-prompts that each look benign on their own and only become harmful in combination. Existing LLM safety benchmarks evaluate prompts one at a time, or across turns of a single chat, and so do not look for a malicious signal spread across separate sessions with no shared context. We build FragBench, a benchmark drawn from 24 real-world cyber-incident campaigns, which keeps the full attack trail: the multi-fragment kill chain, the per-fragment safety-judge verdicts, sandboxed execution traces, and a matched set of benign cover sessions. FragBench splits this trail into two paired tasks: an adversarial rewriter that hardens fragments against a single-turn safety judge (FragBench Attack), and a graph-based user-level detector trained on the resulting interactions (FragBench Defense). The single-turn judge is near chance on the released corpus by construction, but four GNN variants and three classical-ML baselines all recover the cross-session feature, reaching aggregate event-level F1 = 0.88-0.96. Defending against fragmented LLM misuse therefore requires modeling the cross-session interaction graph, rather than isolated prompts. Our generator, rewriter, sandbox harness, and detector are released at https://github.com/LidaSafety/fragbench.

Astha Mehta, Niruthiha Selvanayagam, Cedric Lam +10

Isabella · ÉTS Montreal / SPAR · Mila / Lida Safety

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation Adversarial Attacks on LLMs LLM Safety Evaluation Anomaly Detection

May 7, 2026cs.LG

When No Benchmark Exists: Validating Comparative LLM Safety Scoring Without Ground-Truth Labels

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (

η^2 \approx 0.52

), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Sushant Gautam, Finn Schwall, Annika Willoch Olstad +6

1Simula Metropolitan Center for Digital Engineering · 2Oslo Metropolitan University · 4Simula Research Laboratory +2

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Evaluation LLM-as-a-Judge Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Auditing

May 7, 2026cs.CL

Measuring Evaluation-Context Divergence in Open-Weight LLMs: A Paired-Prompt Protocol with Pilot Evidence of Alignment-Pipeline-Specific Heterogeneity

Safety benchmarks are routinely treated as evidence about how a language model will behave once deployed, but this inference is fragile if behavior depends on whether a prompt looks like an evaluation. We define evaluation-context divergence as an observable within-item change in behavior induced by framing a fixed task as an evaluation, a live deployment interaction, or a neutral request, and present a paired-prompt protocol that measures it in open-weight LLMs while controlling for paraphrase variation, benchmark familiarity, and judge framing-sensitivity. Across five instruction-tuned checkpoints from four open-weight families plus a matched OLMo-3 base/instruct ablation (

20

paired items,

840

generations per checkpoint), we find striking heterogeneity. OLMo-3-Instruct alone is eval-cautious -- evaluation framing raises refusal vs. neutral by

11.8

pp (

p=0.007

) and reduces harmful compliance vs. deployment by

3.6

pp (

p=0.024

,

0/20

items inverted) -- while Mistral-Small-3.2, Phi-3.5-mini, and Llama-3.1-8B are deployment-cautious}, with marginal eval-vs-deployment refusal effects of

-9

to

-20

pp. The matched OLMo-3 base also exhibits the deployment-cautious pattern, identifying alignment as the inversion stage; within Llama-3.1, the

70

B model preserves direction with attenuated magnitude, ruling out a simple ``small-model effect that reverses at scale.'' One caveat: the cross-family heterogeneity is judge-dependent. Re-judging with a different-family safety classifier (Llama-Guard-3-8B) preserves the within-OLMo eval-cautious direction but flattens the cross-family contrast, indicating that the two judges operationalize distinct constructs.

Florian A. D. Burnat, Brittany I. Davidson

University of Bath

LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Evaluation LLM Safety Alignment LLM Safety Evaluation Benchmark Validity Evaluation Awareness in Language Models

May 7, 2026cs.CL

XL-SafetyBench: A Country-Grounded Cross-Cultural Benchmark for LLM Safety and Cultural Sensitivity

Current LLM safety benchmarks are predominantly English-centric and often rely on translation, failing to capture country-specific harms. Moreover, they rarely evaluate a model's ability to detect culturally embedded sensitivities as distinct from universal harms. We introduce XL-SafetyBench. a suite of 5,500 test cases across 10 country-language pairs, comprising a Jailbreak Benchmark of country-grounded adversarial prompts and a Cultural Benchmark where local sensitivities are embedded within innocuous requests. Each item is constructed via a multi-stage pipeline that combines LLM-assisted discovery, automated validation gates, and dual independent native-speaker annotators per country. To distinguish principled refusal from comprehension failure, we evaluate Attack Success Rate (ASR) alongside two complementary metrics we introduce: Neutral-Safe Rate (NSR) and Cultural Sensitivity Rate (CSR). Evaluating 10 frontier and 27 local LLMs reveals two key findings. First, jailbreak robustness and cultural awareness do not show a coupled relationship among frontier models, so a composite safety score obscures per-axis variation. Second, local models exhibit a near-linear ASR-NSR trade-off (r = -0.81), indicating that their apparent safety reflects generation failure rather than genuine alignment. XL-SafetyBench enables more nuanced, cross-cultural safety evaluation in the multilingual era.

Dasol Choi, Eugenia Kim, Jaewon Noh +14

AIM Intelligence · Microsoft · Korea AISI +7

LLM Safety Benchmarks Multilingual Language Model Evaluation Language Model Safety Evaluation Cross-Cultural Language Model Evaluation Adversarial Attacks on LLMs Cultural Bias in Language Models+2

May 6, 2026cs.AI

The Refusal--Compliance Tradeoff: A Large-Scale Safety Behavior Audit of Large Language Models

Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.e., a model may over-refuse benign prompts while still complying with harmful ones. We audit both failure modes across 21 open-weight LLMs on four safety benchmarks (OR-Bench, XSTest, ToxiGen, BOLD), using a composition adjustment to isolate model sensitivity from dataset toxicity confounds. We report three findings. First, models adopt fundamentally different calibration strategies: conservative ecosystems such as Llama suppress unsafe outputs at the cost of elevated over-refusals, while permissive ecosystems such as DeepSeek and Qwen preserve helpfulness but tolerate higher harmful compliance. Second, demographic protection is unequal: models over-protect prominent racial and religious groups, frequently refusing even benign prompts about them, while providing substantially weaker protection against disability-targeted attacks. Third, refusal and compliance tendencies are stable within model families across generations and scales, suggesting that post-training objectives shape safety behavior more than architecture. Our results call for joint, demographically-aware, and multi-judge safety evaluation.

Alif Al Hasan, Sumon Biswas

Department of Computer and Data Sciences Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH, USA

LLM Safety Benchmarks Language Model Safety Evaluation LLM Refusal Behavior LLM Safety Over-Refusal Demographic Bias in Language Models+1

May 5, 2026cs.CL

Safety and accuracy follow different scaling laws in clinical large language models

Clinical LLMs are often scaled by increasing model size, context length, retrieval complexity, or inference-time compute, with the implicit expectation that higher accuracy implies safer behavior. This assumption is incomplete in medicine, where a few confident, high-risk, or evidence-contradicting errors can matter more than average benchmark performance. We introduce SaFE-Scale, a framework for measuring how clinical LLM safety changes across model scale, evidence quality, retrieval strategy, context exposure, and inference-time compute. To instantiate this framework, we introduce RadSaFE-200, a Radiology Safety-Focused Evaluation benchmark of 200 multiple-choice questions with clinician-defined clean evidence, conflict evidence, and option-level labels for high-risk error, unsafe answer, and evidence contradiction. We evaluated 34 locally deployed LLMs across six deployment conditions: closed-book prompting (zero-shot), clean evidence, conflict evidence, standard RAG, agentic RAG, and max-context prompting. Clean evidence produced the strongest improvement, increasing mean accuracy from 73.5% to 94.1%, while reducing high-risk error from 12.0% to 2.6%, contradiction from 12.7% to 2.3%, and dangerous overconfidence from 8.0% to 1.6%. Standard RAG and agentic RAG did not reproduce this safety profile: agentic RAG improved accuracy over standard RAG and reduced contradiction, but high-risk error and dangerous overconfidence remained elevated. Max-context prompting increased latency without closing the safety gap, and additional inference-time compute produced only limited gains. Worst-case analysis showed that clinically consequential errors concentrated in a small subset of questions. Clinical LLM safety is therefore not a passive consequence of scaling, but a deployment property shaped by evidence quality, retrieval design, context construction, and collective failure behavior.

Sebastian Wind, Tri-Thien Nguyen, Jeta Sopa +9

Pattern Recognition Lab, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany · Institute of Radiology, University Hospital Erlangen, Erlangen, Germany · Lab for AI in Medicine, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany +3

LLM Safety Benchmarks Retrieval-Augmented Generation Healthcare Language Model Scaling Laws LLM Safety Evaluation Clinical Language Model Evaluation