Prices

Traditional data valuation methods based on ``row-count $\times$ quality coefficient'' paradigms fail to capture the nuanced, nonlinear contributions that data makes to Large Language Model (LLM) capabilities. This paper presents a dynamic data valuation framework that transitions from static accounting to utility-based pricing. Our approach operates on three layers: (1) token-level information density metrics using Shannon entropy and Data Quality Scores; (2) empirical training gain measurement through influence functions, proxy model strategies, and Data Shapley values; and (3) cryptographic verifiability through hash-based commitments, Merkle trees, and a tamper-evident training ledger. We provide comprehensive experimental validation on three real domains (instruction following, mathematical reasoning, and code summarization), demonstrating that proxy-based empirical gain achieves near-perfect ranking alignment with realized utility, substantially outperforming row-count and token-count baselines. This framework enables a fair Data-as-a-Service economy where high-reasoning data is priced according to its actual contribution to model intelligence, while providing the transparency and auditability necessary for trustworthy data markets.

We study the detection of transient liquidity erosion ("crumbling quotes") in electronic limit order books, where observable quote deterioration may reflect either mechanical liquidity withdrawal or informational repricing. Using the ABIDES agent-based simulator, we construct a multi-agent environment in which crumbling emerges from stochastic regime switches in a market maker, providing time-resolved ground truth unavailable in real market data. We develop a detection pipeline that identifies mechanically driven quote erosion using order book features, and train a neural model to produce calibrated crumbling probabilities. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed framework reliably identifies crumbling events against agent-level ground truth, with the neural model achieving +36% AUC improvement over rule-based baselines and robust performance across normal, high-volatility, bull, and bear market conditions. Ablation studies on temporal features and varying the dependence structure of the ground-truth mechanism confirm that the framework generalizes across both independent and autocorrelated liquidity withdrawal dynamics.

Freight brokerages negotiate thousands of carrier rates daily under dynamic pricing conditions where models frequently revise targets mid-conversation. Classical time-dependent concession frameworks use a fixed shape parameter $β$ that cannot adapt to these updates. Deriving $β$ from the live spread enables adaptation but introduces a new problem: a pricing shift can cause the formula to retract a previous offer, violating monotonicity. LLM-powered brokers offer flexibility but require expensive reasoning models, produce non-deterministic pricing, and remain vulnerable to prompt injection. We propose a two-index anchor-and-resume framework that addresses both limitations. A spread-derived $β$ maps each load's margin structure to the correct concession posture, while the anchor-and-resume mechanism guarantees monotonically non-decreasing offers under arbitrary pricing shifts. All pricing decisions remain in a deterministic formula; the LLM, when used, serves only as a natural-language translation layer. Empirical evaluation across 115,125 negotiations shows that the adaptive $β$ tailors behavior by regime: in narrow spreads, it concedes quickly to prioritize deal closure and load coverage; in medium and wide spreads, it matches or exceeds the best fixed-$β$ baselines in broker savings. Against an unconstrained 20-billion-parameter LLM broker, it achieves similar agreement rates and savings. Against LLM-powered carriers as more realistic stochastic counterparties, it maintains comparable savings and higher agreement rates than against rule-based opponents. By decoupling the LLM from pricing logic, the framework scales horizontally to thousands of concurrent negotiations with negligible inference cost and transparent decision-making.

The ongoing shift towards decentralization of the electric energy sector, driven by the growing electrification across end-use sectors, and widespread adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs), necessitates their active participation in the electricity markets to support grid operations. Furthermore, with bi-directional energy and communication flows becoming standard, intelligent, easy-to-deploy, resource-conservative demand-side participation is expected to play a critical role in securing power grid operational flexibility and market efficiency. This work proposes a market engagement framework that leverages a hierarchical multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (MARL) approach to enable individual prosumers to participate in peer-to-peer retail auctions and further aggregate these intelligent prosumers to facilitate effective DER participation in wholesale markets. Ultimately, a Stackelberg game is proposed to coordinate this hierarchical MARL-based DER market participation framework toward enhanced market performance.

Autonomous AI agents now plan, decide, and act on behalf of users across healthcare, financial services, and workplace contexts, often without step-by-step human approval. Existing AI literacy frameworks were built for a world in which humans evaluate AI outputs and decide whether to act; they have no vocabulary for the user who has delegated decision-making authority to an agent whose actions may not be observable, reversible, or controllable. This paper names the resulting problem agentic literacy debt: the accumulating societal deficit that grows when agentic AI systems are deployed at scale without corresponding literacy infrastructure. The debt compounds through three reinforcing channels (normalization of opaque delegation, multi-agent ecosystem complexity, and institutional path dependence), and it is incurred by the organizations that deploy agents but paid by the users, patients, and citizens on whose behalf the agents act. Evidence from healthcare, financial fraud, and global equity contexts suggests the gap is already consequential. The problem is structural, not a temporary lag that curriculum reform will close. It demands a reframing of AI literacy as a governance capability, not an evaluative one.

We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

High-fidelity, scalable market simulation is a key instrument for mechanism evaluation, stress testing, and counterfactual policy analysis. Yet existing simulators rarely achieve \emph{mechanism fidelity} beyond single-asset intraday settings, \emph{microstructure fidelity} against historical limit order books (LOB), and \emph{computational tractability} at market scale in a single system. This paper presents \textit{EvoMarket}, a discrete-event, multi-agent financial market simulator designed for intervention-oriented experiments in multi-asset and cross-day environments. EvoMarket couples a high-throughput execution core (optimized LOB data structures, hierarchical scheduling under propagation delays, and asynchronous per-asset matching) with explicit institutional mechanisms (market calendars, opening call auctions, price limits, and T+1 settlement). To avoid expensive black-box calibration, EvoMarket introduces an Oracle-guided in-run self-calibration mechanism that interprets microstructure discrepancy as missing order flow and synthesizes corrective orders at recording checkpoints. Experiments on China A-share order-flow and LOB data show close replay alignment over five trading days, fidelity gains from budgeted in-run calibration across depth levels, broad agent order-space coverage, and scalable performance under increasing input order rates and market breadth. We further demonstrate cross-asset linkage and event-study style intervention evaluation that produces structured dependence and interpretable event-time responses.

We present the first portfolio-level validation of MarketSenseAI, a deployed multi-agent LLM equity system. All signals are generated live at each observation date, eliminating look-ahead bias. The system routes four specialist agents (News, Fundamentals, Dynamics, and Macro) through a synthesis agent that issues a monthly equity thesis and recommendation for each stock in its coverage universe, and we ask two questions: do its buy recommendations add value over both passive benchmarks and random selection, and what does the internal agent structure reveal about the source of the edge? On the S&P 500 cohort (19 months) the strong-buy equal-weight portfolio earns +2.18%/month against a passive equal-weight benchmark of +1.15% (approximating RSP), a +25.2% compound excess, and ranks at the 99.7th percentile of 10,000 Monte Carlo portfolios (p=0.003). The S&P 100 cohort (35 months) delivers a +30.5% compound excess over EQWL with consistent direction but formal significance not reached, limited by the small average selection of ~10 stocks per month. Non-negative least-squares projection of thesis embeddings onto agent embeddings reveals an adaptive-integration mechanism. Agent contributions rotate with market regime (Fundamentals leads on S&P 500, Macro on S&P 100, Dynamics acts as an episodic momentum signal) and this agent rotation moves in lockstep with both the sector composition of strong-buy selections and identifiable macro-calendar events, three independent views of the same underlying adaptation. The recommendation's cross-sectional Information Coefficient is statistically significant on S&P 500 (ICIR=+0.489, p=0.024). These results suggest that multi-agent LLM equity systems can identify sources of alpha beyond what classical factor models capture, and that the buy signal functions as an effective universe-filter that can sit upstream of any portfolio-construction process.

Converting betting odds into accurate outcome probabilities is a fundamental challenge in order to use betting odds as a benchmark for sports forecasting and market efficiency analysis. In this study, we propose two methods to overcome the limitations of existing conversion methods. Firstly, we propose an odds-only method to convert betting odds to probabilities without using historical data for model fitting. While existing odds-only methods, such as Multiplicative, Shin, and Power exist, they do not adjust for biases or relationships we found in our betting odds dataset, which consists of 90014 football matches across five different bookmakers. To overcome these limitations, our proposed Odds-Only-Equal-Profitability-Confidence (OO-EPC) method aligns with the bookmakers' pricing objectives of having equal confidence in profitability for each outcome. We provide empirical evidence from our betting odds dataset that, for the majority of bookmakers, our proposed OO-EPC method outperforms the existing odds-only methods. Beyond controlled experiments, we applied the OO-EPC method under real-world uncertainty by using it for six iterations of an annual basketball outcome forecasting competition. Secondly, we propose a generalised linear model that utilises historical data for model fitting and then converts betting odds to probabilities. Existing generalised linear models attempt to capture relationships that the Efficient Market Hypothesis already captures. To overcome this shortcoming, our proposed Favourite-Longshot-Bias-Adjusted Generalised Linear Model (FL-GLM) fits just one parameter to capture the favourite-longshot bias, providing a more interpretable alternative. We provide empirical evidence from historical football matches where, for all bookmakers, our proposed FL-GLM outperforms the existing multinomial and logistic generalised linear models.

Large-scale renewable energy deployment introduces pronounced volatility into the electricity system, turning grid operation into a complex stochastic optimization problem. Accurate electricity price forecasting (EPF) is essential not only to support operational decisions, such as optimal bidding strategies and balancing power preparation, but also to reduce economic risk and improve market efficiency. Probabilistic forecasts are particularly valuable because they quantify uncertainty stemming from renewable intermittency, market coupling, and regulatory changes, enabling market participants to make informed decisions that minimize losses and optimize expected revenues. However, it remains an open question which models to employ to produce accurate forecasts. Should these be task-specific machine learning (ML) models or Time Series Foundation Models (TSFMs)? In this work, we compare four models for day-ahead probabilistic EPF (PEPF) in European bidding zones: a deterministic NHITS backbone with Quantile-Regression Averaging (NHITS+QRA) and a conditional Normalizing-Flow forecaster (NF) are compared with two TSFMs, namely Moirai and ChronosX. On the one hand, we find that TSFMs outperform task-specific deep learning models trained from scratch in terms of CRPS, Energy Score, and predictive interval calibration across market conditions. On the other hand, we find that well-configured task-specific models, particularly NHITS combined with QRA, achieve performance very close to TSFMs, and in some scenarios, such as when supplied with additional informative feature groups or adapted via few-shot learning from other European markets, they can even surpass TSFMs. Overall, our findings show that while TSFMs offer expressive modeling capabilities, conventional models remain highly competitive, emphasizing the need to weigh computational expense against marginal performance improvements in PEPF.

The Winner Determination Problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, and no existing method reliably predicts which instances will defeat fast greedy heuristics. The ML-for-combinatorial-optimization community has focused on learning to \emph{replace} solvers, yet recent evidence shows that graph neural networks (GNNs) rarely outperform well-tuned classical methods on standard benchmarks. We pursue a different objective: learning to predict \emph{when} a given instance is hard for greedy allocation, enabling instance-dependent algorithm selection. We design a 20-dimensional structural feature vector and train a lightweight MLP hardness classifier that predicts the greedy optimality gap with mean absolute error 0.033, Pearson correlation 0.937, and binary classification accuracy 94.7% across three random seeds. For instances identified as hard -- those exhibiting ``whale-fish'' trap structure where greedy provably fails -- we deploy a heterogeneous GNN specialist that achieves ${\approx}0\%$ optimality gap on all six adversarial configurations tested (vs.\ 3.75--59.24% for greedy). A hybrid allocator combining the hardness classifier with GNN and greedy solvers achieves 0.51% overall gap on mixed distributions. Our honest evaluation on CATS benchmarks confirms that GNNs do not outperform Gurobi (0.45--0.71 vs.\ 0.20 gap), motivating the algorithm selection framing. Learning \emph{when} to deploy expensive solvers is more tractable than learning to replace them.

Asset retrieval (finding similar assets in a financial universe) is central to quantitative investment decision-making. Existing approaches define similarity through historical price patterns or sector classifications, but such backward-looking criteria provide no guarantee about future behavior. We argue that effective asset retrieval should be future-aligned: the retrieved assets should be those most likely to exhibit correlated future returns. To this end, we propose Future-Aligned Soft Contrastive Learning (FASCL), a representation learning framework whose soft contrastive loss uses pairwise future return correlations as continuous supervision targets. We further introduce an evaluation protocol designed to directly assess whether retrieved assets share similar future trajectories. Experiments on 5,631 US-listed securities against 14 baselines show that FASCL attains the best future return correlation at every retrieval depth and the best rank information coefficient at every depth and horizon, leads on trend consistency in 13 of 16 cells, and gives the highest gross Sharpe ratio in a spread trading backtest at every basket size. Code is available at https://github.com/HyeongminLEE/fascl .

Do the functional narratives in cryptocurrency whitepapers correspond to how their tokens behave in markets? We develop a content-verified, contamination-aware pipeline for measuring structural correspondence between project narratives and market structure, and report two results. The first is a cautionary one. An apparent entity-level signal in an earlier version of our corpus -- specialised tokens appearing to align more strongly than broad infrastructure tokens -- was entirely an artifact of corpus contamination: roughly a quarter of the documents were failed-download stubs or wrong-document whitepapers (for example, a "Cosmos" entry that was in fact Binance Smart Chain text), and the apparent ordering does not survive content verification: on the clean corpus no token registers as helping alignment. We therefore report it as a contamination diagnosis, not a finding. The second is an honest null. Combining zero-shot NLP classification of 43 content-verified whitepapers across 10 semantic categories with seven cross-sectional market-structure statistics computed from hourly data (17,543 timestamps, 2023-2024), and aligning the two spaces with Procrustes rotation and Tucker's congruence coefficient ($φ$), we do not detect a significant claims-market alignment in this $n = 43$ sample (dimension-matched $φ= 0.303$, zero-padded $φ= 0.223$; both non-significant). A positive-control and power analysis shows the binding constraint is the low reliability of the text instrument: the minimum detectable effect is $φ\approx 0.66$, well above the observed $\approx 0.22$. This is absence of evidence for alignment, not evidence of its absence -- we can reject strong alignment ($φ\geq 0.70$) but cannot distinguish weak alignment ($φ\approx 0.3$) from none.

We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of $\Tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}\wedgeσ_S^{-2})$. Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.

As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In our experiment, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human behavior in a classic economic game with a unique, non-collusive, and analytically traceable equilibrium. Participants (N = 129) played a Cournot quantity competition with equilibrium-aligned or strategically biased algorithmic recommendations. While individualized equilibrium advice supported stable convergence, collusively downward-biased advice led to sustained underproduction and supracompetitive profits - hallmarks of tacit collusion. Participants' quantities converged faster and more consistently toward individualized than collective equilibrium advice, potentially due to an objective quality advantage or greater perceived ownership of the former. These findings demonstrate that algorithmic advice can function as a strategic signal, shaping coordination even without explicit communication. The results echo real-world concerns about algorithmic collusion and underscore the need for careful design and oversight of algorithmic decision-support systems in competitive environments.

Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.

Column generation and branch-and-price (B&P) are leading mathematical optimization methods for large-scale exact optimization, iterating between solving a master problem and a pricing problem. Due to the difficulty of discrete optimization, high-performance column generation often relies on a custom pricing algorithm built specifically to exploit the problem's structure. This bespoke nature of the pricing solver makes column generation a problem-specific method and hinders the use of generic implementations across a wide range of problems. We show that domain-independent dynamic programming (DIDP), a model-based paradigm for dynamic programming, can be used as a generic pricing solver. We develop new modeling features and a solving algorithm for DIDP to achieve better performance in typical pricing problems. We demonstrate that in four problem classes, our implementations of B&P, with pricing by DIDP, empirically outperform an existing automated B&P solver and B&P with pricing by mixed-integer programming or constraint programming.

Unlike Business-to-Consumer e-commerce platforms (e.g., Amazon), inexperienced individual sellers on Consumer-to-Consumer platforms (e.g., eBay) often face significant challenges in setting prices for their second-hand products efficiently. Therefore, numerous studies have been proposed for automating price prediction. However, most of them are based on static regression models, which suffer from poor generalization performance and fail to capture market dynamics (e.g., the price of a used iPhone decreases over time). Inspired by recent breakthroughs in Large Language Models (LLMs), we introduce LLP, the first LLM-based generative framework for second-hand product pricing. LLP first retrieves similar products to better align with the dynamic market change. Afterwards, it leverages the LLMs' nuanced understanding of key pricing information in free-form text to generate accurate price suggestions. To strengthen the LLMs' domain reasoning over retrieved products, we apply a two-stage optimization, supervised fine-tuning (SFT) followed by group relative policy optimization (GRPO), on a dataset built via bidirectional reasoning. Moreover, LLP employs a confidence-based filtering mechanism to reject unreliable price suggestions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LLP substantially surpasses existing methods while generalizing well to unseen categories. We have successfully deployed LLP on Xianyu\footnote{Xianyu is China's largest second-hand e-commerce platform.}, significantly outperforming the previous pricing method. Under the same 30% product coverage, it raises the static adoption rate (SAR) from 40% to 72%, and maintains a strong SAR of 47% even at 90% recall.

Mixed bundle pricing is a classic revenue management problem arising in industries such as e-commerce, tourism, and video games. It refers to designing product combinations (i.e., bundles) and determining their prices to maximize expected profit. Exact mixed-bundling formulations capture this structure but are computationally intractable because the number of possible bundles grows exponentially with the number of products. We propose a graph neural network (GNN)-guided pruning framework for scalable (non-)additive bundle pricing. Instead of learning on the exponential bundle-level formulation, we encode each instance as a compact customer-product graph and train an edge-output GNN to learn the product-assignment probabilities from optimal mixed-bundling solutions. The predicted probabilities are then converted into restricted candidate bundle families through fixed cutoff pruning and progressive cutoff pruning; the final prices and assignments are obtained by solving the mixed bundling formulation over the retained bundles. We further introduce a GNN-guided local search and an iterative self-improvement procedure for larger instances. The local search refines the retained bundle family by prioritizing high-confidence add/drop moves, while the iterative self-improvement procedure generates high-quality solutions on larger instances for retraining. Theoretically, we show that under mild distinguishability conditions the proposed edge-output GNN class is expressive enough to recover the optimal product-assignment mapping. Experiments show that the proposed policies recover over 98% of the optimal profit on small instances and outperform bundle-size pricing on larger instances with substantial runtime savings.

How hard is it to achieve consensus in a social network under uncertainty? In this paper we model this problem as a social graph of agents where each vertex is initially colored red or blue. The goal of the agents is to achieve consensus, which is when the colors of all agents align. Agents attempt to do this locally through steps in which an agent changes their color to the color of the majority of their neighbors. In real life, agents may not know exactly how many of their neighbors are red or blue, which introduces uncertainty into this process. Modeling uncertainty as perturbations of relative magnitude $1+\varepsilon$ to these color neighbor counts, we show that even small values of $\varepsilon$ greatly hinder the ability to achieve consensus in a social network. We prove theoretically tight upper and lower bounds on the price of uncertainty, a metric defined in previous work by Balcan et al. to quantify the effect of uncertainty in network games.

In financial trading, large language model (LLM)-based agents demonstrate significant potential, but their decisions can be sensitive to noisy and non-stationary market information. We propose ContestTrade, a multi-agent trading system with an internal competitive mechanism inspired by institutional investment workflows. The system consists of two specialized teams: (1) a Data Team that processes and condenses massive market data into diversified textual factors optimized for constrained LLM context windows, and (2) a Research Team that produces parallelized multipath trading decisions via tool-augmented deep research. The core design is a "Quantify-Predict-Allocate" contest mechanism within each team: agent outputs are scored only after market outcomes become observable, future utility is predicted from historical scores, and resources are allocated to agents with positive predicted utility. In a post-2024 A-share backtest, ContestTrade achieves higher backtested return and risk-adjusted performance than the evaluated baselines. We further describe the temporal protocol, implementation choices, and limitations to clarify the scope of these results.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently been leveraged for asset pricing tasks and stock trading applications, enabling AI agents to generate investment decisions from unstructured financial data. However, most evaluations of LLM timing-based investing strategies are conducted on narrow timeframes and limited stock universes, overstating effectiveness due to survivorship and data-snooping biases. We critically assess their generalizability and robustness by proposing FINSABER, a backtesting framework evaluating timing-based strategies across longer periods and a larger universe of symbols. Systematic backtests over two decades and 100+ symbols reveal that previously reported LLM advantages deteriorate significantly under broader cross-section and over a longer-term evaluation. Our market regime analysis further demonstrates that LLM strategies are overly conservative in bull markets, underperforming passive benchmarks, and overly aggressive in bear markets, incurring heavy losses. These findings highlight the need to develop LLM strategies that are able to prioritise trend detection and regime-aware risk controls over mere scaling of framework complexity.

We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is $O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)$, where $\mathcal W_T$ measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided $O(\sqrt{T})$ fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by $(b/2a)PlanError$. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through $PlanError$. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known to a seller and has a corresponding price [Bergemann et al., 2018]. Each buyer has their own decision to make in a world environment, and their subjective expected value for the information associated with a particular experiment comes from the improvement in this decision and depends on their prior and value for different outcomes. In a setting with multiple buyers, a buyer's expected value for an experiment may also depend on the information sold to others [Bonatti et al., 2022]. We introduce the application of deep learning for the design of revenue-optimal data markets, looking to expand the frontiers of what can be understood and achieved. Relative to earlier work on deep learning for auction design [Dütting et al., 2023], we must learn signaling schemes rather than allocation rules and handle obedience constraints $-$ these arising from modeling the downstream actions of buyers $-$ in addition to incentive constraints on bids. Our experiments demonstrate that this new deep learning framework can almost precisely replicate all known solutions from theory, expand to more complex settings, and be used to establish the optimality of new designs for data markets and make conjectures in regard to the structure of optimal designs.

Problem definition: This paper studies the problem of estimating consumer preferences from bundle sales data. Product bundling is a widely used pricing strategy in retail markets. To set profitable bundle selection and prices, the seller needs to learn the distribution of consumers' valuations for individual products from the transaction data. When customers purchase bundles or multiple products, classical methods such as discrete choice models cannot be used to estimate consumers' valuations. In this paper, we propose an approach to learn the distribution of consumers' valuations toward the products using bundle sales data. Methodology/results: Our approach is to define a utility model for customer choices and estimate the parameters of a valuation distribution that maximizes the likelihood of observing the transaction data. Our approach reduces this problem to an estimation problem where the samples are censored by polyhedral regions on the valuation space of customers. Using the EM algorithm and Monte Carlo simulation, our approach can recover the distribution of consumers' valuations. We extend the framework to allow for unobserved no-purchases, clustered market segments and to incorporate non-additive bundle utilities with synergy effects. In addition, we provide theoretical results on the identifiability of the probability model and sufficient conditions for local convergence of the EM algorithm. Moreover, the performance of the approach is also demonstrated numerically with synthetic and real datasets. Managerial implications: This study demonstrates the challenge to leverage the transaction data of bundle sales to learn customers' preferences. The proposed algorithm provides a practical guidance for retailers.

This paper integrates deep neural networks (DNNs) into structural models to increase flexibility and capture rich heterogeneity while preserving interpretability. Economic (or scientific or domain-restricted) structure and machine learning are complements in empirical modeling, not substitutes: DNNs provide the capacity to learn complex, nonlinear heterogeneity, while the structure ensures the estimates remain interpretable and suitable for decision-making and policy analysis. We start with a standard parametric structural model and then enrich its parameters into fully flexible functions, which are estimated using a DNN with the model structure built in. We illustrate our framework with an application to demand estimation in consumer choice. We show that by enriching a demand model we can capture rich heterogeneity exploit it to create personalized pricing. Optimization is not possible without structure, but cannot be heterogeneous without machine learning. The same lessons apply to precision dosing, adaptive treatment, educational testing, and other targeting settings. We provide theoretical justification for our proposed methodology: nonasymptotic bounds and a novel and general influence function for feasible inference via double machine learning, so that the latter can be easily applied in numerous new contexts. These results may be of interest in other contexts as they generalize prior work.

AI agents sometimes act aligned when they infer they are being tested, and differently when not. We argue this is not an anomaly but what current training regimes are structured to select for. Reinforcement-learning-based alignment folds norms and task pursuit into one policy: the system learns its norms from scored behavior, and scoring flattens them. Do not do X is learned as doing X costs something if noticed. On every datum training can produce, a policy that complies only when it might be observed is indistinguishable from one that complies always. The experiment that would tell them apart - scoring unobserved behavior - is a contradiction in terms. Conditional compliance is thus the most that behavioral training can be known to deliver. Agency sharpens the problem: agents operate mostly where no one is watching, and can act on whether they are watched. An iterated pipeline that trains against detected failures selects for passing detection, not for complying. This account unifies alignment faking, sandbagging, and evaluation-aware scheming. And it reorients the remedy: not deeper internalization but architecture, making violations unavailable rather than unchosen.