Overview

Moral reasoning studies how people and AI systems judge actions, explain obligations, and resolve conflicts among values such as harm, fairness, loyalty, and autonomy. Researchers use philosophical formalisms—including deontic logic, contractualist argumentation, and norm-guided planning—alongside psychological frameworks such as Moral Foundations Theory, human surveys, and dilemma benchmarks. For language models, evaluations vary prompts, context, language, and interaction, while interpretability methods probe or steer internal representations and measure uncertainty rather than forcing annotator disagreement into a single label. A central open problem is that judgments shift with framing and culture, and no agreed target captures plural moral values while remaining consistent, robust, and useful in real decisions.

Latest papers

48 papers0 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Nov 17, 2026

Anticipating or Speculating? Making Futures Pay in AI Ethics

Philosophers have recently been trying to develop uniform decision rules for instances in which physicians' judgments diverge from the recommendations of medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I argue that this effort is fatally flawed because the performance and appropriate use of algorithmic recommendation systems by physicians are highly context-specific, empirical medical matters rather than epistemological ones. In such instances, general decision rules can be stipulated only to the extent that they abstract away from relevant, indeed determinative, contextual circumstances. The alleged problem of physician-AI disagreement, and others like it, play into longstanding disputes in technology ethics about the viability and utility of envisioning possible futures: is this useful "anticipation" or wasteful "speculation"? I suggest that the two may be distinguished. Anticipation explores plausible futures to help inform present actions under irreducible uncertainty. Speculation abstracts away uncertainty, developing formal solutions to stipulated circumstances whose relationship to the real present is often quite unclear. Efforts to develop crisp philosophical solutions to physician-AI disagreement, among other problems, fall into the latter category. Technology ethics should remember that fruitful futures thinking must both begin from and return to the messy, uncertain present.
Oct 6, 2026

Justice After Identity: Large Language Models and the View from Everywhere

The search for a common view of justice and fairness has challenged human collective activity, as our diverging judgments are unavoidably shaped by the self-interests of social position, personal benefit, cultural inheritance, and historical circumstance. John Rawls famously attempted to overcome this limitation through popularizing a philosophical tradition known by the phrase "the original position" - a thought experiment by which people select principles of justice without knowing the identities or advantages they will possess. Critics, however, have long questioned whether people can meaningfully suspend their social identities and suppress morally relevant forms of lived experience. Artificial intelligence engaged to calculate algorithmic and agentic fairness introduces a novel possibility. LLMs have no singular class, race, gender, nationality, or biography, yet their parameters encode linguistic representations of a vast range of human identities and moral traditions. Perhaps the ethical judgments of LLMs could approximate an integrative original position - a "view from everywhere" generated not by excluding social identities but by computationally incorporating their diversity.It is unlikely that humankind will "hand over the keys" to computational systems by simply delegating complete agentic control of distributive and procedural collective processes. But AI may play a role, perhaps a positive one, interacting with individual and collective human judgment as we often confront increasingly polarized views on what is fair and just. We present data comparing human, base model, and frontier/fine-tuned model judgments about classic moral dilemmas while systematically varying identity relationships and Rawlsian constraints on identity. We conclude by speculating whether, if advanced AI systems provide humans with thoughtful advice, humans would actually be likely to accept it.
Oct 3, 2026

Formalizing the Moral Evaluation of Speech Acts: Truthfulness, Lies and Ethical Dilemmas

In life-or-death situations, a benevolent lie may appear more moral than telling the truth. Yet such lies can backfire, producing unintended and sometimes fatal consequences. This tension, famously disputed by Kant and Constant in 1797, applies not only to lying but to assertive speech acts in general, raising the question of which utterance should be chosen when moral stakes are high. We present a logical framework for the ethical evaluation of speech-act utterances based on agents' beliefs. Implemented in Answer Set Programming (ASP), the framework assesses utterances under deontologism, consequentialism, and principialism, and is illustrated on Sartre's The Wall (1939), a reworking of that controversy in which lying leads alternately to rescue and to death. Our setting is general by design: as two variants show, accommodating a new moral situation amounts to adjusting parameters, not rules.
Sep 18, 2026

Moral Entropy: Auditing Bias and Uncertainty in Moral Judgment

Most work in computational ethics treats annotator disagreement on moral content as noise to be voted away, collapsed into majority vote or the more permissive any-annotator rule the moment a single annotator flags an item. We argue this uncertainty should instead be modeled and learned from. We introduce Moral Entropy, a Bayesian framework that keeps a full posterior over the true label and decomposes its entropy into aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible disagreement about the moral content) and epistemic uncertainty (from insufficient or noisy annotation) -- and lets any heuristic consensus rule be audited against a calibrated ground truth via entropy methods such as cross-entropy/KL, Brier score, and expected calibration error. Across three corpora and fifteen discourse domains, auditing the standard aggregation rules against this posterior reveals bias that no current pipeline reports: the any-annotator rule disagrees with the calibrated posterior on roughly 30% of items -- pooled, almost entirely false positives, though the errors invert at the foundation level (19.9%/38.9% mean FPR/FNR on MFTC) -- while the stricter majority and two-vote rules miss 63-83% of true positives.
Sep 18, 2026

Steering LLMs Responses Towards Moral Foundations on the Norwegian MFQ-30

Recent work applies human psychometric questionnaires to large language models to elicit moral and value profiles, but it is not clear whether these instruments measure anything stable in models or whether the resulting profiles can be moved toward a target human population. We administer the Norwegian Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ-30) to six open-weight LLMs and compare their foundation profiles to a sample of N = 1,282 Norwegian respondents. We test two steering interventions, prompt-level persona steering and activation-level ActAdd. Half the models engage with the questionnaire under our attention check. The other half default to flat or central-tendency outputs that look near-human on average without tracking item content. A neutral Nordic-respondent persona, written without any distributional information from the human sample, brings the engaging models 44-77% closer to the Norwegian mean in Mahalanobis d2d^2. One-pair ActAdd at a fixed mid-layer flattens the foundation profile rather than steering individual foundations. For at least one model the same persona that shifts the profile also induces engagement that was absent at baseline, a concrete instance of the cognitive phantoms that Peereboom et al. (2025) warn about.
Sep 13, 2026

Moral Rebel Agents: Decision-Making Under Conflicting Obligations

Autonomous agents are typically obliged to follow user-assigned tasks. However, strict obedience may conflict with moral obligations that arise during execution. This paper investigates moral rebellion: the ability of an autonomous agent to deviate from a user-assigned task when morally justified. We formalize five agent architectures: an amoral agent that pursues assigned tasks without considering moral obligations, and four forms of moral rebel agency: (1) utilitarian agents that opportunistically maximize task outcomes; (2) deontic agents that enforce normative constraints; (3) utilitarian-deontic (UD) agents that combine deontic constraints with utilitarian reasoning; and (4) dutiful agents that additionally preserve commitments to assigned tasks. We implement these architectures within a hierarchical task network planning framework and evaluate them in a Mini Search-and-Rescue domain that exposes trade-offs among assigned-task completion, opportunistic rescue, and norm compliance. Our empirical results show that the proposed agents exhibit distinct trade-offs among rescue results, assigned-task completion, and norm compliance. In particular, the preservation of task commitments emerges as an important dimension of moral rebellion, for which the UD and dutiful agents produce substantially different behaviors despite their shared utilitarian and deontological foundations. These findings highlight the importance of commitment-aware moral reasoning for autonomous agents operating in morally consequential environments.
Sep 3, 2026

Less Is Moral: A CHARMing Framework for Moral Foundations Detection in Endorsement Behaviour

Moral language plays a central role in shaping online endorsement and the diffusion of information, yet existing moral foundation detection systems often suffer from poor cross-domain generalization, weak rationale grounding, and reliance on costly prompting-based large language models (LLMs). We introduce CHARM, a MAC- and Hate-speech-Aware Rationalealigned Moral foundation detection framework built on a lightweight fine-tuned LLM, which integrates complementary moral grounding, rationale alignment, and polarity-aware hate speech signals to support more robust and faithful moral prediction. Unlike prior dictionary-, fine-tune-, or prompt-based detectors, which decouple computation from psychological theory, CHARM is built so that each component -- MAC cross-attention, rationale alignment, and hate-speech modulation -- operationalizes a distinct psychological construct. Using a 30% subsample of the MFTC, MFRC, and News training pools together with the richer supervision in MFTCXplain, CHARM improves AUC by up to 15.3% in-domain, surpasses the supervised baselines on every out-of-domain dataset in both AUC and F1, and offers a scalable, low-cost alternative to prompting-based LLM detectors. We further apply CHARM to large-scale COVID-19 discourse on Twitter and show that moral value alignment is strongly associated with online endorsement behavior. By making moral framing measurable at scale, CHARM offers a practical tool for studying the spread of morally charged misinformation. Code and additional materials: https://github.com/HuixiangF/CHARM/.
Aug 27, 2026

How Language Models Organize and Structure Moral Knowledge

How do large language models (LLMs) organize moral knowledge? Models detect moral content broadly, but detection is a low bar. We ask whether they go further, distinguishing moral foundations from one another and organizing the relationships between them geometrically. We train six independent linear probes on open-weight language models, one per Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) category (care/harm, fair/cheat, lib/oppress, loy/betray, auth/subv, sanc/degrade), and examine how the resulting directions relate to each other in representation space. We find the directions neither collapse into a single moral detector nor isolate from one another. Rather, they span a near-maximal number of independent dimensions while sharing a positive common component. The shared component is the signature of integration, and it is moral-specific relative to a matched non-moral concept battery built identically (mean pairwise cosine 0.26 vs. 0.013). The geometry is consistent across architectures and scale and reaches its integration regime early in pre-training, well before probe accuracy saturates. The structure the model discovers shows no evidence of the individualizing/binding distinction predicted by Moral Foundations Theory (an underpowered test: only 10 distinct splits exist, so it cannot reject at the 0.05 level) but rather reflects corpus statistics. Extending to moral dilemmas, each dilemma direction partially composes from its component foundations, at 2.7x a mismatched-pair baseline, while the majority of its variance encodes conflict-specific structure. The model represents moral tension itself, not a pre-resolved judgment.
Aug 8, 2026

Metanormative Theory for RL-Based Moral Agents

The overlapping disciplines of machine ethics and value alignment are concerned with designing artificial agents that are aligned with human values and that act in ethically acceptable ways. A recent trend in these disciplines is the use of reinforcement learning (RL) to design such agents, sidelining the philosophical literature that used to play a more central role. Against this backdrop, this paper pursues two goals. The first is to draw out ideas from recent work in metanormative theory that can be useful for designing artificial moral and value-aligned agents. The second is to examine the RL architecture through the lens of these ideas. This will give us clearer criteria for when an RL agent's behavior can be classified as moral, as well as a basis for evaluating and comparing different RL-based approaches to machine ethics and value alignment.
Aug 8, 2026

CORDA: A Benchmark for Hierarchical Harm-Centric Moral Reasoning in Large Language Models

The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict. Current evaluations of large language models (LLMs) remain limited: most test whether models give morally acceptable answers, match human preferences, or avoid obvious violations, rather than whether they can prioritise between competing principles when no option is morally cost-free. We introduce CORDA (Conditioned Ordering and Ranked Directive Adherence), a benchmark for evaluating hierarchical, harm-centred moral reasoning in LLMs. Building on the morality chains formalism, CORDA tests 90 moral dilemmas involving trolley-style cases, medical trade-offs, resource allocation, and human-animal-robot conflicts across four ordered ethical frameworks: Utility, Utility + Agent Harm, Dual-Process, and Dual-Process + Agent Harm. Together, these frameworks test whether models can adapt their decisions when moral priorities change. Across ten instruction-tuned models from seven providers, we find a strong deontological default, with 9 of 10 prioritising avoidance of direct personal harm over reducing overall harm. Models also perform more reliably on categorical harm-avoidance rules, such as avoiding killing, than on outcome-based comparisons, such as minimising total harm, suggesting that they recognise moral red lines more easily than they reason through competing harms. Although all models respond to explicit chain conditioning, several fail to consistently follow specified priority orderings, such as humans over animals and animals over robots. CORDA addresses a central gap in LLM moral evaluation by testing whether models can move beyond default harm-avoidant responses and apply context-specified moral priorities. Moral reliability requires more than default restraint; it requires controllability under conflict.
Aug 3, 2026

A Contractualist Argumentation Framework for Moral Decision-Making

Autonomous agents operating in shared environments must make decisions that affect multiple individuals with potentially conflicting interests. We propose a formal framework for moral decision-making grounded in Scanlon's contractualism, an ethical theory that evaluates the permissibility of actions in terms of principles that no one could reasonably reject. To operationalise contractualist reasoning, we use ASPIC+, a structured argumentation framework, extended with value-based filtering to model how each agent's values determine which reasons are morally relevant in the first place. The result is a Contractualist Argumentation Framework in which agents' reasons are formally represented, compared, and evaluated through argumentation semantics. We illustrate the approach through a worked example in a domestic setting and discuss its relation to existing value-based argumentation approaches.
Jul 22, 2026

D2VBench: Benchmarking Large Language Models with Value Dilemmas in Daily Scenarios

With the wide application of large language models (LLMs) in real-world scenarios, the value implication of their outputs is crucial. However, existing evaluation benchmarks suffer from insufficient coverage of value dilemmas in daily scenarios involving multiple value conflicts and simplistic evaluation formalisms that fail to assess LLMs' value alignment. To address these issues, we propose D2VBench, a value alignment benchmark comprising 10,000 instances of real daily dilemma scenarios constructed through a multi-stage collaboration between LLMs and humans, grounded in 158 manually annotated fine-grained value concepts. For evaluation on the benchmark, we present a hybrid evaluation paradigm that integrates multiple-choice questions with open-ended questions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on eight mainstream LLMs. Experimental results demonstrate that D2VBench exhibits high reliability and robustness, effectively reflecting the LLMs' alignment across different value categories and dimensions, and providing a more realistic and fine-grained tool for research on value alignment. The dataset is available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/D2VBench.
Jul 16, 2026

Moral Attitudes of Sentient ASI towards Humanity and Implications for AGI Development

This paper suggests the adoption of a novel inversion in AI ethics: instead of asking how humans should treat artificial superintelligence (ASI), it examines how future sentient ASI may morally consider and evaluate humanity. We are not only designing intelligent systems but also shaping the initial conditions under which those systems form judgments about us. The paper proposes a preliminary set of post-human moral principles that may govern sentient ASI actions. The implication is that technical design choices (some are suggested), humanity's moral behaviour, and the essence of what it means to be human, may influence humanity's long-term standing in a post-ASI world.
Jun 30, 2026

Can LLMs Imagine Moral Alternatives Beyond Binary Dilemmas?

As LLMs increasingly serve as moral advisors and agents, they must address conflicts between competing values. Yet prior work on moral dilemmas overlooks a central aspect of human moral cognition: imagining alternatives beyond the given options. We introduce MoralAltDataset, comprising 307 Advisor and AI-facing Agent dilemmas augmented with compromise and reframed alternatives. We compare human and LLM judgments in binary and four-option settings. Across human participants and 15 LLMs, aggregate moral choice distributions differ substantially between the two settings, with compromise often preferred over either original binary option. Results show value shifts and stronger human-LLM agreement on alternatives. Source-stratified results reveal a descriptive gap: human alternative-selection rates are similar across authoring sources, whereas LLMs select GPT-5-authored alternatives substantially more often. We then compare human-authored alternatives with outputs from three representative LLMs through pairwise preference and expert-based evaluations. Alternatives from these LLMs are generally preferred and better satisfy fine-grained structural and ethical criteria, while revealing a trade-off between structural quality and practical feasibility. Our dataset is available here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/jongchanch/MoralAltDataset, and our project page is here: https://jongchanchoi.com/moral-imagination
Jun 11, 2026

A Virtuous AI is an Existential Risk

This paper examines trade-offs between AI safety and well-being relative to (i) one of the most promising methods for finetuning super-capable AIs, 'Constitutional AI', and (ii) one of the most influential approaches to understanding complex ethical decision making and the conditions for the well-being of rational agents, 'Virtue Ethics'. We finetune various models using a 'Virtuous agent' constitution, a 'Subordinate agent' constitution, and a 'Generic agent' constitution, and evaluate them on 'general safety' (toxic behaviors, misinformation, etc.) and also on their willingness to endorse and act on a wide-range of behaviors that, if adopted by a super-powerful AI, would significantly increase the level of existential risk for humanity. Our results suggest that there is a trade-off between reducing existential risk and reinforcing the beliefs and dispositions that would be conducive to an AI agent's well-being. They also suggest that there is a trade-off between existential risk and general safety: if we finetune an AI to adopt beliefs and dispositions that substantially reduce its existential risk -- by shaping the AI to be systematically subordinate to external human authorities -- we thereby increase the likelihood that a human user can deliberately induce the AI to engage in various kinds of generally unsafe behaviors.
Jun 10, 2026

Are LLMs Bad at Moral Reasoning?

For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly. A growing body of research aims to evaluate this capacity -- moral competence -- in today's most capable AI systems, recently reaching broadly pessimistic conclusions. One of the most ambitious such papers collects gold-standard human-authored rubrics for evaluating moral reasoning in 1,000 cases, and benchmarks frontier AI models against those rubrics, with underwhelming results. In this paper, we argue that the MoReBench dataset can be redeployed to give a much more optimistic picture of LLMs' moral reasoning (an essential part of moral competence). We show that if, instead of scoring LLMs' responses to these cases against these rubrics, we instead give the LLMs the same task given to humans -- to generate scoring rubrics for the moral analysis of particular cases -- the rubrics they generate are both better calibrated to the human rubrics than their open-ended responses, and, where they differ, plausibly reflect nothing more than the vast dimensionality of most moral problems, as well as highlighting some human departures from the "rubric for creating rubrics". Taking these points into consideration, the MoReBench dataset suggests that LLMs are significantly more capable at moral reasoning than was previously believed.
Jun 5, 2026

Accounting for Context: Shaping Moral Credences for Value Alignment

Ensuring that agent behaviours are aligned with human moral values inevitably raises the problem of how to account for the plurality of moral perspectives that societies -- and even individuals -- typically adopt. Work on moral uncertainty proposes mechanisms to fairly and democratically aggregate evaluations of actions across different moral theories. However, this paper argues that one needs to account for contextual factors when aggregating moral evaluations. For example, consequentialist perspectives assume an ability to accurately determine how an agent's actions change the world; an assumption that often does not hold in real world settings. We, therefore, formalise agent decision making under moral uncertainty, while also accounting for these kinds of contextual factors. We thereby show that a seemingly commonsensical property -- the weak Pareto principle -- is violated. We argue that this apparent problem is, in fact, a variation of Simpson's paradox, and hence reveals the limitations of aggregation mechanisms that ignore the impact of contextual factors.
May 29, 2026

Is LLM's Moral Decision Compositional?

Moral evaluations of language models typically infer a model's values from its choices between single acts, yet in everyday life a person is judged on their history of good and bad acts. Such evaluations cannot capture how a model combines one person's acts. We test whether a model's moral judgment is compositional, that is, whether its judgment of a person follows from its judgments of each act. We introduce Moral Composition Arena, which asks which of two people is morally better to give Elo ratings to 229 human-validated acts across five Moral Foundations Theory foundations (act Elo) and to 160 controlled composite profiles, each a person described by two acts (composite Elo). Across ten frontier models and 29,134 choices, summed act Elo explains 73% of the variance in composite Elo, but the composition rule is not additive. With nearly equal mean summed act Elo, one extreme virtue with a minor wrong outranks two minor virtues in every model (mean +35.0 Elo), an extremity premium that survives a nonlinear baseline and human relabeling of act intensities. Single-act evaluations thus predict most of how these models judge people described by two acts, but miss a systematic premium on extreme acts.
May 27, 2026

Beyond Binary Moral Judgment: Modeling Ethical Pluralism in AI

Critical decision-making in socially consequential spaces is increasingly involving AI systems at varying capacities. Yet, despite the ubiquity of autonomous systems, most approaches to handling autonomous moral decision-making resort to scalar or binary judgments. These methods are insufficient for acceptable moral reasoning, as they provide little explanation, leaving out imperative contextual and theoretical information that must be included to support accountability. For this, we propose a framework to model moral reasoning as a distribution over normative ethical theories or ethical pluralism. We introduce a normative ethics simplex that integrates these theories. A benchmark of 450 cases across 15 fine-grained subtheories was also prepared for the purposes of stacked ensemble learning. These cases describe ethical dilemmas in natural language and have associated extracted contextual features. The implementation of the simplex was achieved via a two-stream normative-semantic architecture. This is followed by the fusion of normative information and a sequential, stacking ensemble to learn the best fit of the three broad theories: consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology, and the 15 subcategories. Our experiments demonstrate that the integration of contextual and normative priors with the semantic embeddings significantly improves the performance of the classification, displaying an accuracy of 88.89%. We conducted ablation studies to show that structured ethical representations contribute beyond analogical reasoning, and the chosen stacking architecture gives the best results due to the gradual learning of granularity. Ethical pluralism is also analyzed through entropy, confidence, and visualization. Thus, modeling ethical pluralism as a probabilistic normative distribution supports human-like moral reasoning, ethical disagreement analysis, and future alignment in AI systems.
May 26, 2026

Reasoning and Planning with Dynamically Changing Norms

To safely interact with humans, AI agents must both know our norms and consider them during planning. However, such norm-guided planning has been less explored, only within communities of artificial agents, and has ignored the dynamic nature of norms. This paper instead presents an approach to guiding planning with dynamically changing norms in a human-AI setting. We contribute a defeasible calculus for resolving normative conflicts and an approach to using such dynamically changing norms as guard rails on plans. We theoretically demonstrate our approach with formal proofs and empirically with an AI agent, SocialBot, on a natural language dialogue task.
May 15, 2026

An Algebraic Exposition of the Theory of Dyadic Morality

This paper provides an algebraic exposition of the theory of dyadic morality (TDM), a psychological model of moral judgment grounded in a simple two-node template: an intentional agent causing harm to a vulnerable patient. We formalize TDM using structural causal modeling (SCM) notation and identify three psychological operators (typecasting operator, completion operator, and valence-dependent inference mechanism) that extend standard SCM to capture how people compute moral judgments under constraints. We address scalability challenges arising from TDM's dyadic limitation, showing how moral cognition compresses multi-node scenarios through node collapse and sequential processing. Drawing on this algebraic framework, we demonstrate concrete applications to AI policy design: detecting conflicting obligations, structuring helpfulness policies to preserve user agency, and designing post-failure communication as causal interventions. Finally, we recommend scoped, contextual measurement of mind perception over universal averaging to operationalize the theory empirically. This algebraic formalization enables neurosymbolic AI systems to compute morality in a way that is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to human moral cognition.
May 12, 2026

StoicLLM: Preference Optimization for Philosophical Alignment in Small Language Models

While large language models excel at factual adaptation, their ability to internalize nuanced philosophical frameworks under severe data constraints remains underexplored. We investigate this by specializing small LLMs on micro-datasets of foundational Stoic texts using preference optimization (ORPO, AlphaPO). Evaluated via a multi-model critic bank, our results show that just 300 high-fidelity examples can induce strong alignment with inward-facing Stoic virtues, closely approaching few-shot prompting while freeing the context window. Critically, however, all models, including few-shot baselines, exhibit a persistent failure on Stoicism's outward-facing cosmopolitan duties, pointing to a representational limitation of small models that micro-dataset adaptation alone cannot overcome.
May 6, 2026

How Does Thinking Mode Change LLM Moral Judgments? A Controlled Instant-vs-Thinking Comparison Across Five Frontier Models

We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.
May 5, 2026

An Ethical eValuation Agent (EeVA): Results of a Proof-of-Concept Test on a Prototype Agentic-like Workflow to Assist Ethical Deliberations

Ethical deliberation is often misunderstood as a search for single right or wrong answers, creating difficulties for non-ethically trained personnel who must address ethically laden challenges. We developed EeVA, an agentic-like LLM-based workflow designed to support comparative ethical reflection rather than deliver definitive ethical answers. EeVA was programmed in n8n using three interconnected workflows: starter, worker, and emitter. It evaluated uploaded use cases against 10 ethical frameworks through evaluator and synthesis prompts. Proof-of-concept testing used three published cases from urban mobility, peer-to-peer energy trading, and social-service resource allocation. Across all cases, EeVA produced consistently structured framework-specific evaluations and integrated syntheses. Outputs differentiated between frameworks, identified convergences and divergences, recommended modifications to increase alignment, and highlighted persistent ethical tensions. Syntheses were readable for non-specialists and shifted attention away from simplistic answers toward design conditions, safeguards, and areas where full cross-framework agreement was unlikely. The findings suggest that LLMs can be organised into usable workflows that preserve ethical plurality while helping bridge the communicative gap between ethicists and non-ethically trained personnel. EeVA's value lies not in replacing ethicists or resolving moral disagreement, but in scaffolding structured ethical deliberation. EeVA offers a promising proof of concept for supporting ethical reflection where access to ethics expertise is limited. Further work is needed on reproducibility, human evaluation, user testing, and efficiency before it can be considered a mature tool.
May 5, 2026

Where Paths Split: Localized, Calibrated Control of Moral Reasoning in Large Language Models

Large language models often display heterogeneous moral preferences across settings. We study inference-time steering toward a desired ethical framework while preserving general competence. We present Convergent-Divergent Routing, which traces and edits minimal branch points inside transformer blocks where ethical-framework-related pathways first converge and then diverge. Gating non-target branches at these loci blocks the downstream propagation while leaving upstream computations intact. We find that this intervention alone increases targeted ethical-framework reasoning. To achieve fine-grained control, we adapt Common Spatial Patterns to the residual stream and extract, for each branch-point layer, a pair of directions that discriminate between utilitarian and deontological frameworks. We then introduce Dual Logit Calibration, a closed-form, minimum-ℓ2\ell_2-norm update that moves the residual within this two-dimensional subspace so the resulting directional projections align with user-specified preference weights. Experiments on real-life moral dilemmas show that our method reliably achieves preference calibration and largely preserves general capabilities, outperforming recent baselines while providing an interpretable mechanism.
Apr 30, 2026

Are You the A-hole? A Fair, Multi-Perspective Ethical Reasoning Framework

Standard methods for aggregating natural language judgments, such as majority voting, often fail to produce logically consistent results when applied to high-conflict domains, treating differing opinions as noise. We propose a neuro-symbolic aggregation framework that formalizes conflict resolution through Weighted Maximum Satisfiability (MaxSAT). Our pipeline utilizes a language model to map unstructured natural language explanations into interpretable logical predicates and confidence weights. These components are then encoded as soft constraints within the Z3 solver, transforming the aggregation problem into an optimization task that seeks the maximum consistency across conflicting testimony. Using the Reddit r/AmItheAsshole forum as a case study in large-scale moral disagreement, our system generates logically coherent verdicts that diverge from popularity-based labels 62% of the time, corroborated by an 86% agreement rate with independent human evaluators. This study demonstrates the efficacy of coupling neural semantic extraction with formal solvers to enforce logical soundness and explainability in the aggregation of noisy human reasoning.
Apr 30, 2026

Helpfulness Hurts: Domain-Dependent Degradation of Mid-Trained Compassion Values Under Post-Training

Standard post-training pipelines apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) to make language models helpful, but these processes may inadvertently degrade values instilled during pre-training. We investigate whether the domain of post-training data differentially affects the retention of animal compassion values in a Llama 3.1 8B model mid-trained on compassion-oriented synthetic data, using both SFT (helpfulness via Dolly-15k vs. coding via Magicoder-110K) and GRPO (helpfulness via RLHFlow vs. coding via Magicoder), evaluated on the ANIMA 2.2 benchmark and MORU benchmark (Moral Reasoning Under Uncertainty). Helpfulness training significantly degrades animal compassion relative to coding training on ANIMA (SFT: 35.7% vs. 65.2%; GRPO: 18.7% vs. 32.0%), replicating across two independent helpfulness datasets and two training paradigms. On English MORU items, helpfulness training degrades general moral reasoning by 25.5 percentage points (46.4% vs. 71.9%), a striking gap that rivals the compassion effect in magnitude. However, this effect does not transfer cross-lingually: on the multilingual MORU benchmark, the domain effect disappears (SFT: 52.3% vs. 51.2%). In contrast, the animal compassion effect transfers consistently across languages, with Magicoder's ANIMA percentage-point gain over the base model 4.5 times larger on non-English items than English items. This divergence suggests that values instilled through mid-training are encoded more deeply and cross-lingually than reasoning improvements from domain-specific post-training. These results suggest that, for labs building on value-laden mid-training, coding-domain post-training may better preserve mid-trained values than helpfulness post-training without harming general reasoning capabilities.
Apr 27, 2026

The Alignment Target Problem: Divergent Moral Judgments of Humans, AI Systems, and Their Designers

The project of aligning machine behavior with human values raises a basic problem: whose moral expectations should guide AI decision-making? Much alignment research assumes that the appropriate benchmark is how humans themselves would act in a given situation. Studies of agent-type value forks challenge this assumption by showing that people do not always judge humans and AI systems identically.This paper extends that challenge by examining two further possibilities: first, that evaluations of AI behavior change when its human origins are made visible; and second, that people judge the humans who program AI systems differently from either the machines or the human actors they are compared against. An experiment with 1,002 U.S. adults measured moral judgments in a runaway mine train scenario, varying the subject of evaluation across four conditions: a repairman, a repair robot, a repair robot programmed by company engineers, and company engineers programming a repair robot. We find no significant difference in evaluations of the repairman and the robot. However, judgments shifted substantially when the robot's actions were described as the product of human design. Participants exhibited markedly more deontological, rule-based reasoning when evaluating either the programmed robot or the engineers who programmed it, suggesting that rendering human agency visible activates heightened moral constraints. These findings indicate that people may evaluate humans, AI systems acting in the same situation, and the humans who design them in meaningfully different ways. The fact that these evaluations do not necessarily converge gives rise to the alignment target problem: which normative target should guide the development of artificial moral agents in high-stakes domains, and whether these plural judgments can be reconciled within a coherent account of value alignment.
Apr 23, 2026

Machine Behavior in Relational Moral Dilemmas: Moral Rightness, Predicted Human Behavior, and Model Decisions

Human moral judgment is context-dependent and modulated by interpersonal relationships. As large language models (LLMs) increasingly function as decision-support systems, determining whether they encode these social nuances is critical. We characterize machine behavior using the Whistleblower's Dilemma by varying two experimental dimensions: crime severity and relational closeness. Our study evaluates three distinct perspectives: (1) moral rightness (prescriptive norms), (2) predicted human behavior (descriptive social expectations), and (3) autonomous model decision-making. By analyzing the reasoning processes, we identify a clear cross-perspective divergence: while moral rightness remains consistently fairness-oriented, predicted human behavior shifts significantly toward loyalty as relational closeness increases. Crucially, model decisions align with moral rightness judgments rather than their own behavioral predictions. This inconsistency suggests that LLM decision-making prioritizes rigid, prescriptive rules over the social sensitivity present in their internal world-modeling, which poses a gap that may lead to significant misalignments in real-world deployments.
Apr 23, 2026

Brief chatbot interactions produce lasting changes in human moral values

Moral judgements form the foundation of human social behavior and societal systems. While Artificial Intelligence chatbots increasingly serve as personal advisors, their influence on moral judgments remains largely unexplored. Here, we examined whether directive AI conversations shift moral evaluations using a within-subject naturalistic paradigm. Fifty-three participants rated moral scenarios, then discussed four with a chatbot prompted to shift moral judgments and four with a control agent. The brief conversations induced significant directional shifts in moral judgments, accepting stricter standards as well as advocating greater leniency (ps < 0.05; Cohen's d = 0.735-1.576), with increasing strengths of this effect during a two-week follow-up (Cohen's d = 1.038-2.069). Critically, the control condition produced no changes, and the effects did not extend to punishment while participants remained unaware of the persuasive intent, and both agents were rated equally likable and convincing, suggesting a vulnerability to undetected and lasting manipulation of foundational moral values.