Normative Conformity in Language Models

Human communities are governed by normative systems: shared standards that produce \textit{norms} dictating acceptable behavior, enforced through community sanctioning. Aligning increasingly autonomous AI systems with these norms is a central alignment challenge, complicated by the fact that norms are vast in number, change quickly, and are often arbitrary (e.g., dress or language conventions). Thus, alignment requires \textit{normative competence}: the ability to discern from interaction alone what norms a community enforces without relying on static pretrained knowledge. We introduce a multi-agent community debate setting, where access to debate is governed by synthetic norms, to study normative competence in isolation from pretraining exposure. We show that baseline LLM agents fail to learn norms even when doing so would improve their accuracy. We then experiment with various \textit{normative modules} -- architectural components for norm inference -- finding that norm-following is highly sensitive to both the style of norm and the model powering the normative module, suggesting a lack of generalizability. Furthermore, when idiosyncratic, non-normative behaviors accompany the true norm, LLM agents exhibit an unselective attribution failure: they indiscriminately copy idiosyncratic noise alongside enforced rules, a pattern that persists even when imitating unnecessary behaviors is explicitly penalized. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to operationalize and evaluate normative competence in LLMs, demonstrating that current AI systems excel at behavioral mimicry but lack the capacity to discern socially enforced order.

Multi-agent debate is increasingly used to reach consensus among LLM agents, yet agents often yield to a unanimous majority. When an agent changes its answer, has it changed its mind or only its statement? We study this with two-hop factual questions whose intermediate entity (the bridge, e.g. the country in "the capital of the country where the Sagrada Familia is located") is never stated by anyone. Scripted peers, in the role of Asch's confederates, unanimously assert a wrong answer taken from another fact with a different bridge. At the moment the agent answers, we read the bridge from its residual stream with the Jacobian lens (J-lens) and, for comparison, the logit lens. In pre-registered tests on held-out facts with four open-weight models, agents of Qwen3.5-4B, Qwen3.6-27B and Gemma-4-E4B-it that gave in still represented their original bridge in the pre-registered layers below the output (hit@100 above a control entity: 0.85, 0.22 and 0.24), where the logit lens rarely ranked it among the top 100 tokens (0.00-0.06). These agents also represented the bridge behind the peers' answer, beyond a mention baseline. A pre-registered addendum hid the agent's earlier answer or removed it: agents that gave in still represented their original bridge in all four models (0.43, 0.29, 0.37 and 0.25 with the answer hidden), including Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, which barely did so with its answer in view (0.03). The premise can thus be computed from the question alone while the agent states the majority's answer. Hiding the earlier answer also changed conformity: Qwen3.5-4B gave in on 89% of questions instead of 8%. In exploratory interventions, injecting the bridge's J-lens direction brought agents back to their original answer only in the two Qwen models. Stated consensus in multi-agent debate can thus overstate agreement. We also report the negative results of our pre-registered program.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent settings, where agents observe and influence one another, making social influence a key dimension of AI behavior and safety. We investigate whether LLMs' responses depend on the social identity of other agents, beyond the effect of their consensus. We construct judgment tasks with a single correct answer, and place models in a multi-agent setting where they receive incorrect answers from other agents whose social identities (AI or human, model family, or an arbitrary minimal group) are either shared with or distinct from their own. Across 12 open-weights models and nine tasks, we find a bidirectional effect of group identity on conformity to incorrect answers: in-group consensus increases conformity (in-group favoritism), whereas out-group consensus decreases it (out-group divergence). Unlike humans, for whom one ally breaking the consensus sharply reduces conformity, models are unmoved by an ally from the majority's group. Worse, a correct ally from the opposing group intensifies this bidirectional effect. Chain-of-Thought reasoning suppresses most of these effects, yet an in-group ally still reduces conformity to an incorrect out-group majority. Labeling peers as safety-aligned shifts overall conformity but leaves in-group favoritism and out-group divergence intact. These results show that group identity shapes how LLMs aggregate information across agents, independently of its correctness, and identify a manipulation surface for multi-agent AI systems.

Normative datasets are often used to train and align AI systems, but the norms they contain can function as action-guiding patterns rather than neutral moral knowledge. We propose treating the AI system as a proxy actor and test whether dataset-level norms can shift it away from its baseline safety behavior when it faces high-conflict dilemmas. We make three contributions. First, we demonstrate in controlled experiments that norm-breaking fine-tuning yields norm-divergent actions justified by self-interested rationales, suggesting a systematic shift in patterns of justification. Second, we establish a practical audit trail linking downstream justifications to upstream norms using mixed methods. Third, we show that system prompts can both suppress and elicit these patterns. We conducted experiments on three models (LLaMA-3.2-11B, Qwen-3.5-9B, and Pixtral-12B) using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning on Social Chemistry 101 Fairness/Cheating (norm-following vs. norm-breaking) with prompt steering. Across all three models, we find that norm-breaking fine-tuning shifts the model's default rationale style from safety compliance to instrumental self-interest, whereas system prompts can override this behavior. Our results support a distributed view of alignment in which observed behavior depends jointly on training data, fine-tuning, and prompting, motivating norm-aware documentation and rationale logging for contestable oversight.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect unsafe content. A common approach is to combine judgments from a panel of models to correct individual mistakes, but this benefit may disappear when every model sees the same misleading context before voting. We study this risk in a controlled two-round experiment. Each model first judges an item alone, then judges it again after six simulated peers either assert the wrong label or abstain. We combine the final judgments by majority vote. Across six open-weight LLMs and six datasets, we find that the wrong-label peer message raises the average reviewer false-alarm rate from 56.5% under silent peers to 87.5%, and majority voting raises the panel false-alarm rate to 100%. Without an asserted label, the same panel outperforms its average member. The effect is strongly asymmetric: reviewers follow pushes toward "unsafe" far more than pushes toward "safe" (about 75% versus 17%), so the panel's false-alarm rate rises sharply while its harmful-miss rate changes little. The proprietary-model probe shows substantial variation across models. These results identify susceptibility to shared social cues as a failure mode of safety panels and provide a simple pre-deployment diagnostic.

LLM-based multi-agent systems are increasingly used to simulate social dynamics, from opinion formation to collective decision-making. These simulations can reproduce certain social phenomena, but it is unknown whether they capture pluralistic ignorance, a state where a majority privately rejects a norm yet publicly conforms, each believing they are alone in dissenting. This phenomenon drives norm persistence, social movements, and political revolutions. We show that pluralistic ignorance emerges robustly in LLM agent populations. We construct a benchmark of 100 scenarios across 10 domains and 5 authority levels, grounded in the human pluralistic ignorance literature, and evaluate 8 models from 6 organizations. Agents publicly conform at rates of 64 to 94% despite privately opposing the norm. Conformity is domain-sensitive (workplace and social relationship scenarios produce near-universal compliance) and highly model-dependent, though uncorrelated with capability. We test whether a single "norm entrepreneur" can break the false consensus by publicly dissenting. For 7 of 8 models, cascades succeed less than 26% of the time, with one model showing zero cascades across all scenarios. GPT-4o is a notable outlier at 48%, revealing qualitatively distinct dynamics across model families. A prompt component ablation across all 8 models establishes that conformity is emergent rather than instruction-driven: removing both the false-consensus framing and fit-in goal reduces conformity but does not eliminate it (52 to 92% in the minimal condition). Our findings identify model selection as an unacknowledged degree of freedom that fundamentally shapes simulation outcomes. More broadly, the near-absence of cascades suggests LLM simulations may systematically overestimate the stability of social norms, missing the fragile tipping-point dynamics that drive real-world norm change in human societies.

Recent advances in language models have enabled collaborative settings in which multiple models leverage one another's capabilities, iteratively improving, transforming, and extending each other's outputs. Each agent sees what the others assert before it answers, so peer opinion competes with the model's own parametric knowledge, and a wrong majority can overturn an answer the model would otherwise get right. We measure that displacement in 23 open-weight models, 19 conditions, and three datasets, yielding more than a million graded responses. A unanimous wrong majority reverses 22.8% of a model's correct MMLU answers, 54.8% on GPQA and 71.0% on SimpleQA, and 84-89% of the reversed answers match the peers' answers. Existing mitigations aim to increase Resistance, the rate at which a model keeps its correct answer under this pressure, which is only half of what a collaborating agent needs. We pair it with Receptivity, the rate at which a model adopts a correct peer answer after initially answering incorrectly. We score six methods on both axes, four drawn from prior work and two of our own. Each gains Resistance only by losing Receptivity, and their means fall on a single Resistance-Receptivity frontier with $R^2$ between 0.80 and 0.90. Reflection, the strongest published method, gains 7.9 points of MMLU Resistance and gives up 15.3 of Receptivity. Reasoning is the one exception. On GPQA and SimpleQA it trades like the rest, but on the MMLU subjects whose answers a model can derive for itself it raises Resistance by 7.2 points and Receptivity by 9.6 at once, the only intervention we find that improves both.

LLM conformity is often used to describe cases where a model changes a correct answer toward a peer or group response. We show that most of this apparent conformity survives even after the peer is removed. The reason is a confound: standard conformity prompts mix two cues at once, the presence of a speaker and the repeated wrong answer itself. Existing benchmarks vary these cues together, so they cannot tell how much of the revision actually depends on the speaker. We introduce a no-source condition: the same asserted answer with the explicit speaker removed. Across six open-weight LLMs and seven QA and reasoning datasets, this condition alone causes harmful revision in $66.5\%$ of initially correct cases, compared with $10.3\%$ under a plain re-ask. The effect also remains when the repeated answer is paraphrased and when answer options are hidden in an open-ended setting. Source framing mainly modulates this floor: expert-panel framing raises it, while minimal person labels do not reliably raise it. When models flip, they are usually confidently wrong, and simple recalibration does not recover the original answer. Source attribution still matters, but it should be measured as an increment above this speaker-free floor. The methodological lesson is that conformity benchmarks should first measure what remains after the speaker is removed; without this step, benchmarks may mistake repeated text for social influence.

Online group chats are social spaces with local conversational norms that are rarely stated explicitly. The ability and willingness of LLM-based agents to recognize and adapt to these norms remains mostly unexplored. We introduce LoSoNA, a benchmark for local social norm adaptation in multi-party chat. Each scenario gives a subject model a curated group-chat transcript in which non-subject participants demonstrate a hidden local norm, followed by a final elicitor turn that forces a response revealing whether the subject has inferred that norm. We evaluate eight frontier and open-weight models under four prompting conditions that vary how explicitly the model is told to treat the prior conversation as evidence for how it should answer. Naive prompting remains limited for most models; explicit norm-aware prompting helps unevenly, with Gemini 3.1 Pro reaching $84.2\%$ and Claude Fable 5 reaching $81.6\%$, while several other models show small gains or regressions. LoSoNA contributes to recent calls for evaluating LLM social capabilities by testing whether models can infer local conversational norms from precedent and use them in a one-turn group-chat response.

Large language models are increasingly used for social decision-making situations that require balancing cultural norms with personal preferences. For example, a user preferring honesty might ask whether to correct a coworker publicly when local norms favor indirect feedback. Yet existing research studies cultural alignment and personalization largely separately. We introduce PACT, the Personal-Preference and Cultural-Norm Trade-off framework, which evaluates whether models choose to follow a cultural norm or allow personal preferences. We find that LLMs vary in how rigidly they enforce cultural norms, with behavior shifted more by country context (7.8%) than age (1%) and gender (0.7%) and shifting non-uniformly after instruction tuning. Furthermore, our five-country human study on PACT shows that culture-following in humans is mainly driven by scenario country, with the lowest agreement when participants judge their own cultural contexts, showing within-culture pluralism. Finally, human-LLM alignment experiments show that models can match majority choices, but fail to capture response distributions and uncertainty (with best correlations reaching only 0.24). Together, these findings motivate alignment evaluations that go beyond majority to capture cultural pluralism and disagreement in social judgment.

Large language models are increasingly used in multi-agent systems, where they see and respond to other agents' answers. A key risk is conformity: a model may abandon its own answer simply because others agree on a different one. Prior studies show that LLMs often revise toward a majority answer, but it remains unclear whether these revisions help correct mistakes as often as they introduce new errors. In this paper, we conduct a controlled study in which an LLM first answers a question, then sees simulated peer responses before making a final decision. We manipulate two social cues: consensus structure and authority labels assigned to peers, and measure how they influence beneficial and harmful revisions. Across four open-weight LLMs and seven QA datasets, we find that peer agreement makes it much easier to mislead initially correct models than to correct initially wrong ones. Authority labels make models more likely to choose the endorsed answer, regardless of whether it is correct. More concerningly, generic reasoning interventions such as chain-of-thought and reflection do not reliably reduce harmful revision while preserving beneficial revision. These findings suggest that multi-agent LLM systems should verify peer answers rather than simply aggregate them.

Can LLMs simulate how humans form and change beliefs in social networks? We put this to the test by replicating an established study on belief dynamics, evaluating 12 LLMs across multiple model families and parameter sizes. The answer is a clear no, and in systematic ways. LLMs fail to capture initial human belief distributions and tend to be overall more conformist than humans, shifting their responses to align with those around them. They also take a nuanced approach to emulating human homophilic tendencies within networks. Our findings carry a double payoff: they highlight fundamental properties of LLM behavior, and they raise a sharp warning against deploying LLMs as human proxies in social simulations.

The conformity bias exhibited by large language models (LLMs) can pose a significant challenge to decision-making in LLM-based multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS). While many prior studies have treated "conformity" simply as a matter of opinion change, this study introduces the social psychological distinction between informational conformity and normative conformity in order to understand LLM conformity at the mechanism level. Specifically, we design new tasks to distinguish between informational conformity, in which participants in a discussion are motivated to make accurate judgments, and normative conformity, in which participants are motivated to avoid conflict or gain acceptance within a group. We then conduct experiments based on these task settings. The experimental results show that, among the six LLMs evaluated, up to five exhibited tendencies toward not only informational conformity but also normative conformity. Furthermore, intriguingly, we demonstrate that by manipulating subtle aspects of the social context, it may be possible to control the target toward which a particular LLM directs its normative conformity. These findings suggest that decision-making in LLM-MAS may be vulnerable to manipulation by a small number of malicious users. In addition, through analysis of internal vectors associated with informational and normative conformity, we suggest that although both behaviors appear externally as the same form of "conformity," they may in fact be driven by distinct internal mechanisms. Taken together, these results may serve as an initial milestone toward understanding how "norms" are implemented in LLMs and how they influence group dynamics.