Program Analysis

Static malware detection for Windows Portable Executable files demands a careful balance between detection effectiveness, computational efficiency, and analytical interpretability. This paper introduces Delphi Scanner, a static malware detection system for Windows PE files that balances efficiency with behavioral interpretation. It uses a convolutional neural network (CNN) to model Windows API sequences to classify PE and a decoupled interpretation layer based on a rule-based layer to categorize APIs into high-level malicious capabilities. Evaluated on over 190,000 Windows PE files, the system achieves 95.35% accuracy with a 1.53~MB model footprint. Robustness experiments on 5,647 out-of-distribution MalwareBazaar samples, paired packed and unpacked executables, and three adversarial manipulation strategies confirm generalization beyond the training distribution and resistance to functionality-preserving evasion techniques. Overall, these results demonstrate that API sequence-based static analysis offers a practical, interpretable, and efficient foundation for malware triage in local deployment scenarios.

Advances in large language models (LLMs) fuel the quest for scalable methods to assess the security of generated and security-sensitive software. Static analysis is widely adopted as a scalable, reproducible, and inexpensive security gate, but cannot directly observe runtime exploit behaviour. Vulnerabilities dependent on adversarial inputs, execution context, or exploit chaining may evade static checks while remaining exploitable in practice, yet passing static analysis is often treated as evidence of secure behaviour. This paper introduces the Static-Pass Dynamic-Fail (SPDF) phenomenon and a three-stage agentic pipeline combining static scanning, LLM-driven Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) reasoning, and autonomous exploit verification in isolated Docker containers. We evaluate 1,355 Python samples from SecurityEval, RedCode, and CyberNative datasets. Of the 654 samples producing no findings under the composite Bandit-Semgrep gate, the LLM detection stage identified 394 candidate vulnerabilities across 235 files. Dynamic verification confirmed or partially confirmed exploitability in 95 files, yielding an inclusive pipeline rate of 14.53% (roughly 1 in 7 statically clean samples). This rate represents the proportion of Bandit-Semgrep-clean samples for which the pipeline identified a candidate vulnerability and obtained runtime evidence supporting exploitability. Outcomes varied by dataset: among candidate file--CWE pairs, confirmed exploitability was 33.7% for RedCode, 28.6% for CyberNative, and 5.4% for SecurityEval. Several frequently confirmed classes, including CWE-338 and CWE-916, were flagged by neither Bandit nor Semgrep. These findings indicate that static-analysis success and runtime security are hierarchical layers of software assurance rather than interchangeable measures, and have the potential to reshape how AI-generated and security-sensitive code is evaluated.

Autonomous vehicles depend on large safety-critical software stacks, where weaknesses reachable from adversarial inputs may affect steering, braking, or other control decisions. Static analysis can identify candidate sites, but dynamically confirming exploitability requires executable test artifacts that are difficult to construct manually. We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can automate this process for Autoware, an open-source autonomous-driving stack. We perform compiler-precise static analysis across 185 packages, identifying 1,375 decision rules, 2,274 validation checks, and 482 input-to-safety-output flows, from which we derive a weakness taxonomy and sample 740 reachable sites. Two local open-weight LLMs, a no-static-context ablation, and a naive-template baseline generate 3,700 artifact sets, which are compiled against the real build under sanitizers, repaired through compiler-in-the-loop feedback, and fuzzed when executable. The main result is a build-integration failure taxonomy showing that 80% of first-shot compilation failures arise from dependency wiring rather than program logic. The reasoning model compiled 64% of harnesses on the first attempt, compared with 6% for the code-specialized model. Repair achieved full object-compileability for the reasoning model only through extensive stubbing; fewer than half of its harnesses reached the fuzzer, and all 37 observed crashes originated in stubbed code rather than Autoware. No candidate weakness was dynamically confirmed within budget. These results show that build integration, not candidate generation or fuzzing, is the primary barrier to reliable LLM-assisted dynamic analysis of full autonomous-vehicle software stacks.

Recent advances have highlighted the potential of machine learning, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), for analyzing and optimizing programs. We present the first application of program embeddings from LLMCompiler---an LLM massively pretrained on intermediate representation (IR) code---to representative program analysis and optimization tasks. We generate program embeddings directly from source and IR code using a simple approach: split programs into chunks, independently embed each chunk with pretrained LLMs, and then aggregate the chunk embeddings into a single program embedding. Our experiments show that combining source and IR code embeddings achieves an error rate of 1.54% in algorithm classification, a 12% improvement over the current state-of-the-art, and a competitive accuracy on heterogeneous device mapping. These findings suggest that training a performance-aware LLM for embedding IR code might yield state-of-the-art results in code optimization tasks.

Optimizing compilers miss profitable transformations when their enabling semantics are absent from the analyzed program representation. We ask whether large language models (LLMs) can recover such semantics from heterogeneous C/C++ context and realize them as validated, contract-preserving artifacts. We introduce SeGaBench, an executable benchmark containing 100 synthetic and 20 source-backed cases spanning low-level assumptions, data-structure invariants, and high-level semantic lifting. Each case includes hidden enabling semantics, an oracle artifact, correctness and semantic validators, and a reproducible performance protocol. We evaluate five LLMs using five independent responses per case. The strongest model produces correct artifacts in 94.8% of responses, achieves at least 1.05x speedup in 83.3%, and obtains a performance success on 93.3% of cases. Nevertheless, correct artifacts often close only part of the oracle gap. These results show that LLMs can complement compiler analysis as speculative semantic proposers, provided that their artifacts are validated and evaluated.

Symbolic execution seeks to explore feasible program paths, yet a practical run may exhaust its resources while much program behaviour remains unreached. We investigate a complementary way of extending its practical reach by reasoning about how the same tool is utilised from one bounded run to the next, while leaving ordinary state exploration to the underlying tool. We present Agolic, an agentic planning system that uses evidence from earlier runs to choose and configure later bounded symbolic execution (BSE) runs, which the underlying symbolic execution tool then carries out. The planning intelligence, available evidence and execution modes can be adapted to the symbolic execution tool and analysis objective. We evaluate one adaptation for branch-coverage exploration, in which an LLM-based agent reasons over source code, replayed coverage and earlier targeting attempts. We evaluate Agolic on several C and C++ programs. On every program, it extends the branch coverage obtained by continuous symbolic execution and covers more than $3\times$ as many branches on average. It also covers more branches than each individual corpus from coverage-guided fuzzing and compiler-based concolic execution in our evaluation and reaches branches absent from all comparison corpora combined on six of the seven programs. Taken together, these results point to considerable untapped potential in existing symbolic execution tools, some of which may be realised by reasoning about how their capabilities are used across runs while leaving state selection during ordinary symbolic exploration to the underlying tool.

The rapid development of large language model (LLM) agents has enabled their broad adoption across diverse real-world tasks. To standardize interactions between LLM agents and external environments, Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools have emerged as a de facto standard and have been widely integrated into these systems. However, the use of MCP tools also introduces new safety risks, as LLM agents can be induced to perform malicious or unauthorized actions. Although prior work has proposed defenses for securing tool use in LLM agents, most methods rely on static analysis, i.e., inspecting prompts and generated outputs, which limits the defense effectiveness and robustness. To address these limitations, we propose MTGuard, a hybrid analysis-based defense framework designed to safeguard the use of MCP tools in LLM agents by leveraging lifecycle-aware static-dynamic co-analysis. Extensive evaluation demonstrates that MTGuard effectively mitigates multiple categories of harmful tool use across different LLM agents while maintaining performance on benign user tasks.

Large language models can generate C code from natural-language descriptions, but resulting programs often contain security vulnerabilities and compilation errors, posing risks for embedded and resource-constrained systems. This work investigates how feedback and retrieval improve reliability of LLM-generated C code. We present an analysis-and-repair workflow that combines compilation diagnostics, CodeQL static analysis, and KLEE symbolic execution with retrieval of prior repair patterns for iterative refinement. Evaluated on 5,000 C programming tasks exercising embedded relevant vulnerabilities, baseline models show substantial reliability gaps, with compilation failure rates up to 46% and security defect rates up to 49%. Our approach improves both metrics. For CodeLlama 7B, security defect rates decrease from 49% to 19% and total CodeQL errors drop from 15,088 to 2,463 (83.7%). For DeepSeek Coder 1.3B, compilation failures are reduced from 42% to 22% and security defects from 35% to 15%. These results show that integrating lightweight analysis tools can improve the safety of LLM-generated code for embedded development.

Languages with rich static semantics, such as Rust, provide stronger guarantees for AI-generated code, but their strictness makes generation more difficult. Off-the-shelf compilers can provide useful feedback post-generation, but does not guide intermediate generation steps, such as those during autoregressive LLM decoding. Constrained decoding intervenes earlier by rejecting invalid tokens during sampling, but requires white-box model access and costly reimplementation for semantic constraints.We introduce generative compilation, the first approach to obtaining compiler feedback on partial programs during generation. The core technical device is a sealor: a lightweight, mostly syntax-guided transformation that converts partial programs into complete ones that standard compilers can diagnose. It is designed such that possible-to-complete partial programs are never rejected, while preserving enough code context to catch genuine dead ends early. We construct such a sealor on a core Rust-like calculus and prove that it satisfies these properties, all mechanized in Lean. We extend it to the first partial-program checker for real Rust. We evaluate our method on challenging repository-level Rust coding tasks, across both frontier black-box and open-weight models. We show that generative compilation reduces non-compiling outputs and improves functional correctness, relative to standard post-generation feedback. It does so by detecting a broad range of errors close to their source and early during generation, thereby reducing errors cascades and enabling focused diagnostics. More broadly, generative compilation is a step toward making compilers a first-class citizen of AI-assisted programming active during generation, rather than a separate post-generation check.

A Ladder Logic Bomb (LLB) is malicious control logic in a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) program that lies dormant until a trigger activates a payload to manipulate actuators, forge sensor readings, or deny operator control. We observe that real malicious logic hides inside function-block bodies, which existing ladder-diagram verifiers drop from their intermediate representation (IR), making bombs invisible to provers. We present ESBMC-LLB, which uses ESBMC-PLC+ as its verification engine and adds a modeling layer that exposes function-block logic and recasts bomb detection as a formal verification problem: a scan-watchdog exposes non-termination payloads, and output wiring exposes actuator-forgery payloads as safety violations. k-induction gives an unbounded proof of bomb-absence across all scans, and the bounded model checker returns a counterexample that is the trigger - guarantees that signature, anomaly, and CFG-triage detectors lack. On the public Iacobelli 2024 dataset, ESBMC-LLB detects all 30 bombs and recovers every trigger; it also detects adaptive triggers (computed, opaque-arithmetic, multi-scan) that evade CFG-triage. We also report the first semantic model-checker evaluation on PLC-Defuser's SWaT corpus: our analog extension makes the full corpus parseable; on v1.0.0, it detects 149/150 bombs (99%) with zero false positives, recovering each trigger; on a later version with nonlinear non-termination bombs, detection drops to 49% as the SMT solver times out. We conclude that semantic model checking and CFG-triage are complementary - the former gives unbounded proofs, adaptive-trigger robustness, and handles Boolean/integer and linear analog logic; the latter leads to nonlinear analog non-termination, and we delineate where each wins.

Smart home automation platforms increasingly rely on user-authored YAML configuration files to define device behaviors, but these files are prone to syntax, formatting, and semantic logic errors that can cause automation failures and safety risks. Existing YAML validators, static analysis tools, and general-purpose large language models offer limited support for end-to-end diagnosis and repair because they lack domain-specific understanding and validated correction workflows. This paper presents SmartHomeSecure, a prototype for automated detection and repair of Home Assistant configuration errors using lightweight program analysis and constraint-guided large language model generation. SmartHomeSecure parses YAML files, detects syntactic and common semantic errors, normalizes error context, applies deterministic auto-fixes for routine defects, and constructs constrained prompts that guide LLMs toward minimal and structurally valid repairs. The system is implemented as a modular web application with four layers: UI Shell, Feature Orchestrator, Domain Engine, and Integration Layer. Its repair pipeline was evaluated on 100 real-world Home Assistant YAML files with manually injected errors across five categories: syntax/parsing, indentation, mapping, sequence, and scalar quoting errors. Four models were tested: gpt-oss-20b, gpt-oss-120b, llama-3.1-8b, and llama-3.3-70b. Results show that three models achieved 100% error detection accuracy, with repair success rates ranging from 87% to 93%. Manual verification found no hallucinated or incorrect repairs among successful outputs. These findings suggest that combining domain-aware program analysis with constrained generative AI is a feasible approach for improving the reliability and usability of smart home configuration repair.

Translating C programs to safe Rust is challenging owing to significant differences in typing constraints, ownership, and borrowing rules. Interpreter programs are particularly important targets for such translation, as they often handle untrusted inputs and suffer from memory-related vulnerabilities. We present Reboot, a mostly-automatic technique that translates real-world interpreter programs from C to safe Rust. Using Reboot, we have translated six interpreters ranging from 6k to 23k lines of C code to safe Rust, with each translation requiring only 1 to 11 brief user interventions. All translations pass 100% of the provided test suites, and achieve 62%--92% pass rates on separately created validation tests that were never exposed to the system. A security case study on mujs shows that memory vulnerabilities such as heap buffer overflows and use-after-free present in C are eliminated in the safe Rust translation. Two ideas underpin Reboot. First, feature reduction decomposes the translation by program features, creating a sequence of milestones where each is a complete, testable program; the translation starts from the simplest version and incrementally restores features, with each milestone validated before proceeding. Second, a multi-agent architecture orchestrates inherently unreliable coding agents through automated validation and feedback, keeping long-running translation workflows on track with minimal human involvement. An ablation study confirms that feature reduction improves translation correctness compared to using multi-agent translation alone, with 6%--20% improvements in pass rates on validation test suites.

Deep Learning (DL) programs can fail during training for many reasons, and diagnosing the cause is a costly and time-consuming maintenance task. Techniques for diagnosing such failures are commonly assessed using within-program cross-validation, which may be inadequate for deployment settings involving previously unseen programs. It is therefore necessary to assess how performance differs across these settings and to identify the causes of any performance gap in established fault diagnosis techniques for DL. We investigate this gap using DynFault, a corpus of 5,542 fault-injected training traces from 38 real-world DL programs. We found a gap of 0.190 in balanced accuracy for existing fault diagnosis techniques between within-program evaluation and holding out whole programs. We also found the gap comes from program-level structure in the features, which led us to examine two runtime feature sets, curvature features and optimizer features, and their behavior on unseen programs. We found that curvature features are useful for instability detection on unseen programs, while optimizer and activation features help only on programs seen during training.

Memory safety errors account for a large proportion of security bugs in systems written in C; modern languages such as Java and Rust prevent such bugs because they are memory-safe by design. To migrate systems to safer languages or identify memory errors, we must first determine how legacy code manipulates memory. This information is only represented implicitly in such code. In many cases, memory usage patterns are merely tedious for humans to figure out, rather than truly difficult. In this work, we ask if large language models (LLMs) can perform this task by having them synthesize annotations representing memory usage as specifications in CN, a hybrid testing/verification tool. Our tool, CNnotator, uses LLMs to automatically generate and test CN specifications. We find that current models are able to generate CN specifications for small-to-medium C programs, with the OpenAI o3 reasoning model achieving a 90% success rate on first attempts and 97% overall success, while the chat model GPT-4o correctly annotates 65% of first attempts. These results suggest AI-assisted annotation is becoming practical for real-world C codebases.

Generating formal specifications for C programs remains a challenge in formal verification due to the manual effort, expertise, and semantic precision required. While recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) offer promise in automating specification synthesis, current approaches often lack semantic depth and produce unverifiable or incomplete contracts. To address these limitations, we introduce AutoACSL, a novel framework that integrates LLM prompting with semantic features extracted from Code Property Graphs (CPGs). AutoACSL performs static analyses to extract key semantic elements, including arithmetic operations, loop and recursion structures, and return value propagation, which are encoded into structured prompts. These prompts enable the LLM not only to generate normal behavioral specifications but also to include constraints that prevent inputs leading to runtime errors. AutoACSL employs a feedback-driven synthesis loop, where candidate specifications are verified using Frama-C/WP and refined iteratively until verification succeeds or a termination condition is met. Evaluated on 604 programs drawn from diverse datasets, AutoACSL achieves a 98% specification generation success ratio and a 96% full proof ratio when paired with Gemini-3. Compared to a code-only baseline, AutoACSL improves the full proof ratio by 24.7% to 51.7% across four LLMs (GPT-o4 Mini, GPT-5.2, Grok-4.1, and Gemini-3), demonstrating that integrating large language models with CPG-based static analysis substantially enhances both generation robustness and verification effectiveness for automated ACSL specification synthesis.

Automated vulnerability discovery in large codebases remains challenging: traditional static analysis produces high false-positive rates, while dynamic approaches such as fuzzing require substantial infrastructure and often target narrow classes of bugs. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) enable semantic reasoning about program behavior, but applying LLMs to repository-scale security analysis introduces challenges related to context management, cost, and verification. We present OpenAnt, an open-source vulnerability discovery system that integrates static program analysis with LLM-based reasoning in a multi-stage pipeline. OpenAnt introduces three key techniques. First, codebases are decomposed into self-contained analysis units filtered by reachability from external entry points, reducing the analysis surface by up to 97% while preserving attack-relevant code. Second, candidate vulnerabilities undergo adversarial verification through constrained attacker simulation, where the model evaluates exploitability under realistic attacker capabilities. Third, findings are validated through dynamic verification, in which exploit environments are generated automatically, executed in sandboxed containers, and discarded after use. Evaluation on widely used open-source projects including OpenSSL, WordPress, and Flowise shows that this architecture can identify previously unknown vulnerabilities while maintaining manageable analysis cost and substantially reducing false positives. Our results suggest that closed-loop vulnerability discovery pipelines, combining semantic reasoning with exploit validation, provide a practical path toward scalable automated security analysis. OpenAnt is released as open source under the Apache 2.0 license at https://github.com/knostic/OpenAnt.

The growing reliance on pre-trained Machine Learning (ML) models has introduced new attack surfaces. Recent vulnerabilities demonstrate that malicious behavior can be embedded within model artifacts, often bypassing existing defenses. Current model-scanning solutions primarily rely on static, format-specific rules or known attack signatures, which limit their ability to generalize across frameworks and to detect novel exploitation paths. In contrast, we propose a solution that focuses on the effects an attack has on the host system executing the model and builds on foundational intuitions about ML model execution. In particular, we observe that ML models operate within well-defined lifecycle phases and that, within each phase, interactions with the host system are highly structured and predictable. We translate these intuitions into Moat, a dynamic lifecycle-aware approach for securing ML model execution, and instantiate this design in Re-Moat, our reference implementation. We evaluate Re-Moat across multiple ML frameworks using 77,974 real-world model artifacts from the Hugging Face Hub, 31 Proofs-of-Concept (PoCs) from CVEs, and 334 models from a state-of-the-art dataset, and compare it against state-of-the-art model-scanning solutions. Our results show that our approach detects all evaluated attack classes while maintaining a close-to-zero false-positive rate, validating our intuitions and motivating dynamic analysis for securing ML model execution.

Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP) is among the practical and popular forms of Genetic Programming as it uses a graph-based representation of programs. This paper presents a first runtime analysis of CGP in evolving Boolean functions using complete training sets. We prove an asymptotic bound $O(n D^5)$ for the expected number of fitness evaluations of CGP to construct a conjunction of $n$ inputs using at most $D \geq n-1$ binary gates, a minimal function set, and even with a strict survival selection. When the non-strict selection is used, the bound is improved to $O(n D^4)$. Our analysis reveals interesting characteristics of CGP induced search, which have been only observed empirically. In particular, enabling the acceptance of equally good solutions, including those with connected gates non-contributing to fitness, can lead to a speedup, and consequently a better asymptotic time bound. In contrast to conjunctions, we also prove a negative result which shows that CGP requires exponential time to evolve an exclusive disjunction. Experiments evolving conjunctions complement our theoretical findings. The use of incomplete training sets is found to further reduce the average number of fitness evaluations while maintaining a good level of generalisation.

Semantic faults specific to the use of machine learning models are a common problem for machine learning developers, causing suboptimal predictions, high computational cost, or incorrect outputs. For example, one may erroneously use unscaled data to train a scale-sensitive model. Machine learning developers detect these faults after training their models and manually analyzing the results, making it an inefficient process. We propose a novel data-aware static analysis approach to detect semantic faults in machine learning code, allowing developers to reveal these bugs while writing code instead of after training the model. Our approach uses combined data and control flow analysis, and API contracts, enabling data-aware reasoning about machine learning code at a high level of abstraction. We highlight the potential of our solution by analyzing a sample of real-world machine learning notebooks, finding that we can detect faults that require a data-aware approach.

MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a critical standard empowering Large Language Models (LLMs) to utilize external tools. In this ecosystem, LLMs rely on natural language descriptions provided by MCP servers to select and execute functions. This interaction implicitly assumes that tool descriptions faithfully reflect their underlying implementations, while this assumption is not mandatorily verified in practice. As a result, MCP deployments may suffer from a problem named Description-Code Inconsistency (DCI), where a tool's description of its capabilities and security boundaries is not consistent with what the code actually does. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of DCI in real-world MCP servers. We formally define the problem and propose a comprehensive taxonomy spanning functionality inconsistencies and undeclared side effects. Guided by this taxonomy, we develop DCIChecker, an automated framework that combines structure-aware static analysis with the Direct-Reverse-Arbitration prompting method to cross-validate tool descriptions against actual code implementations. We apply this framework to a large-scale dataset comprising 19,200 description-code pairs extracted from 2,214 real-world MCP servers. Our measurement reveals that DCI is widespread, with 9.93% of these pairs exhibiting inconsistencies. We further demonstrate that DCI creates a critical defense blind spot, facilitating varied risks from operational failures to stealthy malicious behaviors. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to enforce semantic consistency and enhance the reliability of the emerging agentic ecosystem.

Alignment-based conformance checking is the state-of-the-art approach for comparing observed process executions with normative process models. The standard exact solution relies on an A*-based heuristic search, which can exhibit exponential runtime in the presence of long traces or substantial deviations. This paper introduces a reformulation of alignment-based conformance checking as a totally unimodular linear program (LP) defined on the reachability graph of the synchronous product. By exploiting the underlying network-flow structure, the proposed formulation guarantees the existence of an integral optimal extreme-point solution through LP relaxation, thereby avoiding the combinatorial overhead associated with integer variables and branch-and-bound search. We conduct an extensive empirical evaluation on more than 2.1 million conformance checking instances derived from real-world and synthetic benchmark datasets. The results show that A* and the LP approach exhibit complementary performance characteristics: the former performs best on short, well-conforming traces, while the LP formulation provides substantial speedups for longer traces with deviations, precisely where conformance checking is most informative. Based on these findings, we derive simple algorithm-selection guidelines that combine both approaches, achieving average runtime savings of 38.6% with 96% selection accuracy compared to always using A*.

Code review is a critical practice in software engineering, yet the growing scale and frequency of code patches in modern projects, together with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants, make manual review increasingly challenging. Identifying the types of changes within a patch, such as renames, moves, or logic modifications, can substantially improve review efficiency by enabling prioritization, filtering, and automation. However, existing LLM-based approaches to code review have largely focused on summarization and comment generation, leaving structured code reviews underexplored. In this paper, we present a systematic study of using large language models (LLMs) for taxonomy-based labeling of code changes in a code patch. We introduce a two-stage pipeline that assigns labels to diff hunks and then refines them to capture structural relationships and semantic attributes, such as rename propagation and type changes. Our approach employs few-shot prompting to produce language-agnostic and customizable labels, without the engineering overhead of traditional static-analysis pipelines. We evaluate four LLMs across multiple context configurations on a manually curated benchmark of natural and synthetic patches. Our best configuration achieves up to $84\%$ recall and $81\%$ precision, with high accuracy in extracting relational and attribute metadata. These results suggest that LLM-based labeling can effectively complement static analysis by enabling flexible, multilingual, and automation-friendly code review workflows.

Microservices are widely adopted in modern cloud systems due to their scalability and fault tolerance. However, microservice architectures introduce significant complexity in privilege and permission control, creating risks of privilege escalation where attackers can gain unauthorized access to resources or operations. Detecting such vulnerabilities is challenging due to complex cross-service interactions, polyglot codebases, and diverse privileged operations and permission checks. We present Neo, an agentic program analysis framework that combines large language models (LLMs) with classic program analysis to address these challenges. Neo leverages an LLM-based agent that dynamically generates analysis plans, adapts code search strategies, and validates semantics. We develop code search primitives that enable Neo to perform scalable and flexible code exploration across services and languages. We evaluated Neo on 25 open-source microservice applications spanning 7 programming languages and 6.2 million lines of code. Neo uncovered 24 zero-day privilege escalation vulnerabilities and achieved 81.0% precision and 85.0% recall on a ground-truth dataset. Compared to existing program analysis and agentic solutions, Neo demonstrated significant improvements in both detection accuracy and scalability. We further showcased Neo's extensibility by applying it to other application domains and vulnerability types, uncovering 18 additional zero-day vulnerabilities.

Large language models can consult information that fixed static analyzers cannot, such as documentation, current security advisories, version-specific metadata, and informal API contracts. This makes LLMs a compelling option for program analyses that depend on information beyond the source program, or that are otherwise not amenable to conventional static analyzers. However, directly asking an LLM for a one-shot whole-program analysis is brittle because it compresses many evidence-dependent judgments into a single opaque answer, rather than exposing which conclusions are supported or disputed and using intermediate findings to guide later, more focused searches. In this paper, we propose agentic interpretation, a framework that brings the discipline of lattice-based static analysis to LLM-driven program reasoning. At a high level, agentic interpretation decomposes a high-level analysis goal into localized claims, and tracks the LLM's judgment about each claim in a finite-height lattice. A worklist algorithm governs how claims and their judgments evolve during the analysis. We introduce a formal model of agentic interpretation, explore the design space it opens, and illustrate the approach with a worked example analyzing code that depends on opaque third-party components.

The irreversible nature of blockchain transactions makes the identification of smart contract vulnerabilities an essential requirement for secure system development. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into developer workflows, their reliability as autonomous security auditors remains unproven. We assess whether current generative models are a viable replacement for, or only a complement to, traditional static-analysis tools. Our findings indicate that LLM efficacy is undermined by both inherent lexical bias and a lack of rigorous validation of external data inputs. This reliance on non-semantic heuristics, such as identifier naming, leads to a high frequency of false positives. Furthermore, prompting techniques reveal a trade-off between precision and recall. These results were derived using our custom automated framework, which achieves 92% accuracy in classifying model outputs.

In this paper, we describe early work on a specification inference tool for the Move Prover that combines a weakest-precondition (WP) analysis over Move bytecode with an agentic coding CLI such as Claude Code. Specification inference reduces the boilerplate of writing specifications in Move: in order to verify a high-level property such as a global state invariant, pre- and post-conditions for the supporting functions typically have to be written by hand, which is tedious. In our setting, a Model Context Protocol (MCP) service exposes the WP analysis and the prover itself to the coding agent. The WP analysis provides a sound, mechanical baseline for inference; the AI is used precisely where WP is weakest -- for loop invariants and high-level idiomatic specifications such as monotonicity, conservation, and structural invariants. The Move Prover serves as the oracle that decides whether the generated specs are valid, and the agent is equipped to generate proof hints and to refine the inferred specification until verification succeeds. The tool has been applied to a corpus of canonical Move code, including code that uses higher-order functions, dynamic dispatch, global state, references, and various forms of loops.

LLMs are increasingly explored for malware analysis; however, current LLM-based malware attribution remains limited by unsupported indicators and insufficient code-level grounding for identifying malicious and vulnerable code segments. To address these limitations, this research introduces LCC-LLM, a code-centric benchmark dataset and evidence-grounded framework for malware attribution and multi-task static malware analysis. The proposed LCCD dataset contains approximately 34K PE samples processed through a large-scale reverse-engineering pipeline and represented using decompiled C code, assembly code, CFG/FCG artifacts, hexadecimal data, PE metadata, suspicious API evidence, and structural features. Beyond dataset construction, LCC-LLM integrates LangGraph-orchestrated static analysis with multi-source cybersecurity knowledge to support evidence-grounded malware reasoning. The framework employs a seven-layer retrieval-augmented generation pipeline, CoVe for IoC validation, and a multi-dimensional quality gate to improve factual reliability and analyst-oriented decision support. Curriculum-ordered instruction data is used to fine-tune DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B and Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B using QLoRA. Evaluation across 43 malware-analysis task types achieves an average semantic similarity of 0.634, with the highest task-level performance in structured report generation, IoC extraction, vulnerability assessment, malware configuration extraction, and malware class detection. In a real-world case study using MalwareBazaar samples, the grounded pipeline achieves a 10/10 structured analysis pass rate, producing CFG/FCG evidence, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, detection guidance, and analyst-ready reports. These results show that code-centric representations, retrieval grounding, and verification-guided reasoning improve the reliability and operational usefulness of LLM-assisted malware attribution.

Modern fuzzers increasingly use Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate structured inputs, but LLM-driven fuzzing is sensitive to prompt initialization and sampling variance, which can reduce exploration efficiency and lead to redundant inputs. We present FunFuzz, a multi-island evolutionary fuzzing framework that runs several isolated searches in parallel and periodically migrates high-value candidates to maintain diversity. FunFuzz derives initial generation prompts from documentation and initializes islands with topic-specific instructions, then continuously adapts prompts using feedback-guided selection. During fuzzing, candidates are prioritized by incremental compiler coverage, while compiler-internal failure signals are used to identify crash-inducing inputs. We evaluate FunFuzz on compiler fuzzing, where inputs are source programs and success is measured by compiler coverage and unique compiler-internal failures. Across repeated 24-hour campaigns on GCC and Clang, FunFuzz achieves higher compiler coverage than previous LLM-driven baselines and discovers more unique failure-triggering inputs.

Traditionally, machine learning methods for PE malware detection have relied on static features like byte histograms, string information, and PE header contents. One barrier to incorporating dynamic analysis features has been the semi-structured nature of sandbox behavior reports. We show that, using the latest generation of large language models with reasoning, it is possible to efficiently process these behavior reports and utilize them as part of a malware detection pipeline. Specifically, we leverage LLMs to generate behavior-based malware detection rules based on a small training set of labeled malware. We find that these detection rules, derived from behavioral features, are much more robust to concept drift than standard static-feature methods, while maintaining practical false positive rates. Finally, we introduce Trident, a system which combines a classic decision tree model over static features, our behavior-based detection rules, and direct LLM analysis of sandbox reports through majority voting. Trident outperforms standard methods using static features, outperforms behavior-based rules alone, and is as resilient to concept drift as active learning methods without requiring retraining.

The security of open-source software repositories is increasingly threatened by next-gen software supply chain attacks. These attacks include multiphase malware execution, remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. Traditional Machine Learning (ML) detectors struggle to detect these attacks due to the high-dimensional and sparse nature of dynamic behavioral data, including system calls, network traffic, directory access patterns, and dependency logs. As a result, these data characteristics degrade the performance, stability, and explainability of ML models. These challenges have made Deep Learning (DL) a promising alternative, given its success across various domains and its potential for modeling complex patterns. This paper presents eDySec, a DL-based efficient, stable, and explainable framework for dynamic behavioral analysis to detect malicious packages. Using the QUT-DV25 dataset, which captures both install-time and post-installation behaviors of packages, we evaluate DL models and investigate feature sets to identify the most discriminative attributes for enabling efficient malicious package detection. Additionally, model stability analysis and explainable AI techniques are incorporated into the detection pipeline to enable stable, and transparent interpretations of model decisions. Experimental results demonstrate that eDySec significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art frameworks. Specifically, it halves feature dimensionality while lowering false positives by 82% and false negatives by 79%. It also improves accuracy by 3%, achieves near-perfect stability, and maintains an inference latency of 170ms per package. Further analysis reveals that feature and model selection play a critical role, as certain combinations degrade performance. Ultimately, this study advances the understanding of the strengths and limitations of dynamic analysis against next-gen attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across diverse coding tasks. However, their adoption requires a true understanding of program execution rather than relying on surface-level patterns. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on predicting program properties tied to specific inputs (e.g., code coverage, program outputs). As a result, they provide a narrow view of dynamic code reasoning and are prone to data contamination. We argue that understanding program execution requires evaluating its inherent duality through two complementary reasoning tasks: (i) predicting a program's observed behavior for a given input, and (ii) inferring how the input must be mutated toward a specific behavioral objective. Both tasks jointly probe a model's causal understanding of execution flow. We instantiate this duality in DexBench, a benchmark comprising 445 paired instances, and evaluate 13 LLMs. Our results demonstrate that dual-path reasoning provides a robust and discriminative proxy for dynamic code understanding.

We present a formally verified framework for patent analysis as a hybrid AI + Lean 4 pipeline. The DAG-coverage core (Algorithm 1b) is fully machine-verified once bounded match scores are fixed. Freedom-to-operate, claim-construction sensitivity, cross-claim consistency, and doctrine-of-equivalents analyses are formalized at the specification level with kernel-checked candidate certificates. Existing patent-analysis approaches rely on manual expert analysis (slow, non-scalable) or ML/NLP methods (probabilistic, opaque, non-compositional). To our knowledge, this is the first framework that applies interactive theorem proving based on dependent type theory to intellectual property analysis. Claims are encoded as DAGs in Lean 4, match strengths as elements of a verified complete lattice, and confidence scores propagate through dependencies via proven-correct monotone functions. We formalize five IP use cases (patent-to-product mapping, freedom-to-operate, claim construction sensitivity, cross-claim consistency, doctrine of equivalents) via six algorithms. Structural lemmas, the coverage-core generator, and the closed-path identity coverage = W_cov are machine-verified in Lean 4. Higher-level theorems for the other use cases remain informal proof sketches, and their proof-generation functions are architecturally mitigated (untrusted generators whose outputs are kernel-checked and sorry-free axiom-audited). Guarantees are conditional on the ML layer: they certify mathematical correctness of computations downstream of ML scores, not the accuracy of the scores themselves. A case study on a synthetic memory-module claim demonstrates weighted coverage and construction-sensitivity analysis. Validation against adjudicated cases is future work.

Recent advances in large language models for test case generation have improved branch coverage via prompt-engineered mutations. However, they still lack principled mechanisms for steering models toward specific high-risk execution branches, limiting their effectiveness for discovering subtle bugs and security vulnerabilities. We propose GLMTest, the first program structure-aware LLM framework for targeted test case generation that seamlessly integrates code property graphs and code semantics using a graph neural network and a language model to condition test case generation on execution branches. This structured conditioning enables controllable and branch-targeted test case generation, thereby potentially enhancing bug and security risk discovery. Experiments on real-world projects show that GLMTest built on a Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct model improves branch accuracy from 27.4% to 50.2% on TestGenEval benchmark compared with state-of-the-art LLMs, i.e., Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and GPT-4o-mini.

Machine Learning (ML) pipelines encode quality-relevant decisions across data preparation, training, evaluation, and configuration code. Some recurring source-level quality problems in these pipelines, known as ML code smells, may not cause immediate failures but can harm reproducibility, robustness, efficiency, or maintainability. Detecting ML code smell occurrences is challenging because the decisive evidence is often non-local, spanning helper functions, wrappers, imports, control-flow, and data-flow relations. We present SpecDetect4ML, a static analyser that operationalises 22 ML code smells using CPG views with project-level resolution. We evaluate it on 890 Python ML-based systems comprising more than 20M LOC and a system-level recall benchmark over the complete ML-relevant source subset of 10 selected systems. Under identical ML code smell specifications, CPG-based reasoning raises recall from 68.62% to 88.14% compared with AST-only analysis, while keeping CPG precision comparable at 90.32%. These results show that project-level static reasoning expands the detectable portion of non-local ML code smell occurrences, while configuration-dependent and runtime-only occurrences remain outside our source-only static claims.

This paper presents GraphMend, a compiler technique that automatically fixes FX graph breaks in PyTorch 2 programs. Although PyTorch 2 introduced TorchDynamo and TorchInductor to enable just-in-time graph compilation, certain code patterns still cause graph breaks that force execution to fall back to Python eager mode, introducing costly CPU-GPU synchronization and reducing optimization opportunities. Our investigation of 195 Hugging Face models reveals that 13.8% of models exhibit graph breaks. GraphMend automatically eliminates fixable breaks through source-level program analysis and transformations. It analyzes AST-level program structure to identify graph-break patterns and applies transformations only when their semantic preservation can be statically established. These transformations enable PyTorch to capture larger, uninterrupted FX graphs without manual refactoring by developers. We evaluate GraphMend on all 27 models found to exhibit graph breaks in our investigation. GraphMend eliminates 107 of 147 graph breaks (73%), fully fixing all breaks in 21 models. In our experiments on NVIDIA GPUs, GraphMend achieves up to 26x cold-start speedup, 5x on average, and up to 1.39x steady-state forward pass speedup. These results demonstrate that semantics-aware source-level analysis and transformation are effective complements to PyTorch's dynamic JIT compilation pipeline, substantially improving both usability and performance.