Safety Filtering
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24 papers in the last four weeks, up 118% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.
Latest papers 111
While Isaac Lab provides massive parallel UAV simulation, OmniSafe and safe-control-gym provide constrained-RL benchmarks, and CBFKit provides control-barrier-function synthesis tooling, no existing framework unifies these capabilities for end-to-end safety-constrained training. ParallelCBF is the first framework to unify (i)~tensor-parallel UAV environments, (ii)~hard-gate CBF safety filters, (iii)sharded BC-to-RL pipelines, and (iv)first-class operational auditability -- pre-registration, watchdog registries, failure forensics, and dataset audits as composable APIs rather than user-implemented scripts. We release ParallelCBF v0.1.0 under Apache2.0 with a four-layer composable API, a CPU PyTorch reference implementation of a dual-barrier (squared / linear-predictive) CBF, property-based safety invariance tests across vectorized batch sizes that complete in 1.67s for the full 39-test suite, and a 31{,}415-episode behavior-cloning collection campaign whose curriculum mix, per-bucket yields, and dataset SHA-256 are auditable through the framework's own \texttt{ops} primitives. We report a representative end-to-end pipeline execution in which the framework's auditability layer halted a downstream training stage that did not meet pre-registered convergence criteria, preventing silent propagation of a degraded checkpoint -- an architectural property we argue is necessary, not merely useful, for reproducible empirical robotics research. The framework is installable via \texttt{pip install parallelcbf}; source and release artifacts are available at https://github.com/xiaoyang-123-cell/ParallelCBF.
Selective Safety Steering via Value-Filtered Decoding
While large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with human values, their generations may still violate safety constraints. A growing line of work addresses this problem by modifying the model's sampling policy at decoding time using a safety reward. However, existing decoding-time steering methods often intervene unnecessarily, modifying generations that would have been safe under the base model. Such unnecessary interventions are undesirable, as they can distort key properties of the base model such as helpfulness, fluency, style, and coherence. We propose a new test-time steering method designed to reduce such unnecessary interventions while improving the safety of unsafe responses. Our approach filters tokens using a value-based safety criterion and provides an explicit bound on the probability of false interventions. A single threshold hyperparameter controls this bound, allowing practitioners to trade off higher rates of unnecessary intervention for better output safety. Across multiple datasets and experiments, we show that our value-filtered decoding method outperforms existing baselines, achieving better trade-offs between safety, helpfulness, and similarity to the base model.
AERIC: Anticipatory Hidden-State Monitoring for Implicit Harmful Dialogue
Current language models create two safety challenges: risk must be detected early enough to avoid exposing harmful continuation, and the harmfulness itself may be implicit rather than signaled by overtly toxic text. Existing response-level guards are strong at judging completed text, and native streaming guards move closer to token time, but both settings leave open whether a lightweight monitor can anticipate implicit harmful drift from the generator's own internal trajectory. We study anticipatory same-pass monitoring, where a safety monitor may read hidden states produced during ordinary decoding but may not invoke an additional forward pass through the base model. We introduce AERIC, a transfer-oriented hidden-state approach for implicit harmful dialogue that combines short-horizon hazard forecasting, support-sensitive suppression, and prompt-conditioned residual scoring under a same-pass exponential moving average decision rule. The default linear monitor contains only 387 trainable head parameters. Against Qwen3GuardStream-4B on balanced benchmarks, AERIC improves AUROC from 0.6830 to 0.7143 on DiaSafety and from 0.8219 to 0.8582 on Harmful Advice. For promptlevel trigger benchmarks, we calibrate the AERIC threshold by a source-side safe-budget rule that maximizes trigger coverage while constraining the safe-trigger rate to at most 10%. Under that rule, trigger@64 reaches 0.6438 and 0.4656 on HarmBench DirectRequest and 0.6849 and 0.7363 on SocialHarmBench for Qwen and Gemma, respectively, withholding between 23.53 and 41.86 answer tokens on average. Same-pass deployment is also efficient: on a 63-prompt harmfulprompt fixed-generation benchmark aggregated over HarmBench DirectRequest and SocialHarmBench under Qwen3-8B, the monitor increases mean latency by only 2.34%, whereas Qwen3Guard-Stream-4B increases it by 79.40%.
Distributionally Robust Safety Under Arbitrary Uncertainties: A Safety Filtering Approach
In this work, we study how to ensure probabilistic safety for nonlinear systems under distributional ambiguity. Our approach builds on a backup-based safety filtering framework that switches between a high-performance nominal policy and a certified backup policy to ensure safety. To handle arbitrary uncertainties from ambiguous distributions, i.e., where the distribution is not of specific structure and the true distribution is unknown, we adopt a distributionally robust (DR) formulation using Wasserstein ambiguity sets. Rather than solving a high-dimensional DR trajectory optimization problem online, we exploit the structure of backup-based safety filtering to reduce safety certification to a one-dimensional search over the switching time between nominal and backup policies. We then develop a sampling-based certification procedure with finite-sample guarantees, where empirical failure probabilities are compared against a Wasserstein-inflated threshold. We validate our method through simulations across three systems, from a Dubins vehicle to a high-speed racing car and a fighter jet, demonstrating the broad applicability and computational efficiency.
Before the Last Token: Diagnosing Final-Token Safety Probe Failures
Final-token safety probes monitor a single hidden state after prompt prefill, but jailbreak prompts can contain probe-visible unsafe evidence distributed across earlier user-token representations that is missed by this readout. We study this prefill-time failure mode using SafeSwitch-style probes trained only on clean harmful and benign prompts across three instruction-tuned LLMs. The probes achieve high recall on clean harmful prompts, but miss many jailbreaks and can produce false positives on safety-adjacent benign prompts. Subspace analyses suggest that missed jailbreaks differ from clean benign prompts along directions that are poorly captured by the probe's representational subspace, and increasing probe bottleneck width does not reliably resolve this mismatch. Token-level prefill analyses reveal that probe-visible unsafe evidence often appears earlier in the sequence but is not exposed at the final-token readout, while naive max-pooling over token positions overfires on safe prompts. A simple PCA-HMM trajectory model, trained only on the same clean split, recovers many final-token misses from user-content prefill trajectories without the catastrophic false-positive behavior of naive token pooling, motivating trajectory-aware hidden-state analyses as diagnostic complements to final-token probes
Beyond Red-Teaming: Formal Guarantees of LLM Guardrail Classifiers
Guardrail Classifiers defend production language models against harmful behavior, but although results seem promising in testing, they provide no formal guarantees. Providing formal guarantees for such models is hard because "harmful behavior" has no natural specification in a discrete input space: and the standard epsilon-ball properties used in other domains do not carry semantic meaning. We close this gap by shifting verification from the discrete input space to the classifier's pre-activation space, where we define a harmful region as a convex shape enclosing the representations of known harmful prompts. Because the sigmoid classification head is monotonic, certifying the worst-case point is sufficient to certify the entire region, yielding a closed-form soundness proof without approximation in O(d) time. To formally evaluate these classifiers, we propose two constructions of such regions: SVD-aligned hyper-rectangles, which yield exact SAT/UNSAT certificates, and Gaussian Mixture Models, which yield probabilistic certificates over semantically coherent clusters. Applying this framework to three author-trained Guardrail Classifiers on the toxicity domain, every hyper-rectangle configuration returns SAT, exposing verifiable safety holes across all classifiers, despite seemingly high empirical metrics. Probabilistic GMM certificates also expose a divergent structural stability in how these models represent harm. While GPT-2 and Llama-3.1-8B maintain robust coverage of 90% and 80% across varying boundaries, BERT's safety guarantees prove uniquely volatile. This 'coverage collapse' to 55% at the optimal threshold reveals a sparsely populated safety margin in BERT, which only achieves full coverage by adopting an extremely conservative pessimistic threshold. These approaches combined, provide new insights on how effective Guardrail Classifiers really are, beyond traditional red-teaming.
GLiGuard: Schema-Conditioned Classification for LLM Safeguard
Ensuring safe, policy-compliant outputs from large language models requires real-time content moderation that can scale across multiple safety dimensions. However, state-of-the-art guardrail models rely on autoregressive decoders with 7B--27B parameters, reformulating what is fundamentally a classification problem as sequential text generation, a design choice that incurs high latency and scales poorly to multi-aspect evaluation. In this work, we introduce \textbf{GLiGuard}, a 0.3B-parameter schema-conditioned bidirectional encoder adapted from GLiNER2 for LLM content moderation. The key idea is to encode task definitions and label semantics directly into the input sequence as structured token schemas, enabling simultaneous evaluation of prompt safety, response safety, refusal detection, 14 fine-grained harm categories, and 11 jailbreak strategies in a single non-autoregressive forward pass. This schema-conditioned design lets supported task and label blocks be composed directly in the input schema at inference time. Across nine established safety benchmarks, GLiGuard achieves F1 scores competitive with 7B--27B decoder-based guards despite being 23--90 smaller, while delivering up to 16 higher throughput and 17 lower latency. These results suggest that compact bidirectional encoders can approach the accuracy of much larger guard models while drastically reducing inference cost. Code and models are available at https://github.com/fastino-ai/GLiGuard.
A Closed-Form Dual-Barrier CBF Safety Filter for Holonomic Robots on Incrementally Built Occupancy Grid Maps
We present a dual-barrier control barrier function (CBF) safety filter for real-time, safety-critical velocity control of holonomic robots operating in incrementally built occupancy grid maps. As a robot explores an unknown environment, unmapped regions introduce irreducible uncertainty, since obstacle geometry beyond the explored frontier is unknown, making entry into such regions a source of collision risk, especially with front-facing sensors. To address this, we enforce two constraints: avoidance of mapped obstacles and restriction from unexplored regions. Both constraints are derived analytically from the occupancy grid's signed distance field, yielding a closed-form safety filter that requires only a small linear system solve per cycle. On resource-constrained platforms such as the Raspberry Pi, where SLAM and planning already consume significant compute, the low overhead of the proposed filter preserves resources. An adaptive gain schedule relaxes the frontier constraint in information-rich regions and tightens it in well-mapped areas, improving exploration efficiency while maintaining safety. The filter operates in velocity space as a minimally invasive correction and composes with arbitrary nominal controllers, including learning-based methods. Hardware flight experiments on a PX4-controlled quadrotor demonstrate zero collisions across multiple indoor runs.
AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use
Modern AI agents execute real-world side effects through tool calls such as file operations, shell commands, HTTP requests, and database queries. A single unsafe action, including accidental deletion, credential exposure, or data exfiltration, can cause irreversible harm. Existing defenses are incomplete: post-hoc benchmarks measure behavior after execution, static guardrails miss obfuscation and multi-step context, and infrastructure sandboxes constrain where code runs without understanding what an action means. We present AgentTrust, a runtime safety layer that intercepts agent tool calls before execution and returns a structured verdict: allow, warn, block, or review. AgentTrust combines a shell deobfuscation normalizer, SafeFix suggestions for safer alternatives, RiskChain detection for multi-step attack chains, and a cache-aware LLM-as-Judge for ambiguous inputs. We release a 300-scenario benchmark across six risk categories and an additional 630 independently constructed real-world adversarial scenarios. On the internal benchmark, the production-only ruleset achieves 95.0% verdict accuracy and 73.7% risk-level accuracy at low-millisecond end-to-end latency. On the 630-scenario benchmark, evaluated under a patched ruleset and not claimed as zero-shot, AgentTrust achieves 96.7% verdict accuracy, including about 93% on shell-obfuscated payloads. AgentTrust is released under the AGPL-3.0 license and provides a Model Context Protocol server for MCP-compatible agents.
Online Safety Filter for Deformable Object Manipulation with Horizon Agnostic Neural Operators
Safety critical control of robotic manipulation tasks involving deformable media such as fluids, cloth, and soft objects remains challenging because existing learning based approaches encode safety indirectly through reward shaping, which provides no guarantee of constraint satisfaction at deployment. We present a constraint driven online safety filter for deformable object manipulation that enforces explicit task level safety constraints in real time by minimally modifying any nominal control policy. Our approach combines two key components: a horizon agnostic neural operator that learns the boundary input output mapping of the underlying PDE dynamics and generalizes across variable rollout lengths without retraining, and a boundary control barrier function that certifies safety at the task relevant output level via a lightweight quadratic program. The resulting safety constraint is affine in the boundary input rate, enabling real time online filtering. We evaluate the proposed method on fluid manipulation tasks in FluidLab, where the filter improves safe trajectory rates by up to 22% over unfiltered base policies while also reducing the number of steps required to reach the safe set, demonstrating that constraint driven safety enforcement is both more reliable and more efficient than reward shaping approaches.
CRC-Screen: Certified DNA-Synthesis Hazard Screening Under Taxonomic Shift
DNA-synthesis providers screen incoming orders by searching the requested sequence against curated hazard lists. We show that this baseline collapses to a 100% false-flag rate when the hazardous sequence comes from a taxonomic family absent from the reference set: under Conformal Risk Control's certified miss-rate constraint, a low-discrimination signal forces the threshold below the entire test-benign mass. We compose three signals derived from a synthesis order's public annotation: -mer Jaccard similarity to known toxins, the trimmed-mean score of a five-LLM judge panel, and cosine similarity to clustered embedding centroids. Fused under a monotone logistic aggregator and calibrated by Conformal Risk Control, the resulting screener certifies , where the additive term is the calibration-to-test distribution shift under family holdout (a certified ceiling of 24-49% across folds). Across ten leave-one-taxonomic-family-out folds at on UniProt KW-0800 reviewed toxins, the calibrated screener achieves 0% empirical test miss rate on every fold and 0% test false-flag rate on nine of ten folds. The bound's finite-sample slack caps the certifiable miss rate at 1.77% on our 200-hazard subsample; reaching procurement-grade requires an larger calibration set, which the full reviewed UniProt KW-0800 corpus is large enough to deliver. The binding constraint on certifiable DNA-synthesis screening is calibration data, not algorithms. Code: https://github.com/najmulhasan-code/crc-screen
Enforcing Benign Trajectories: A Behavioral Firewall for Structured-Workflow AI Agents
Structured-workflow agents driven by large language models execute tool calls against sensitive external environments. We propose \codename, a telemetry-driven behavioral anomaly detection firewall. Drawing on sequence-based intrusion detection, \codename\ compiles verified benign tool-call telemetry into a parameterized deterministic finite automaton (pDFA). The model defines permitted tool sequences, sequential contexts, and parameter bounds. At runtime, a lightweight gateway enforces these boundaries via an state-transition structural lookup, shifting computationally expensive analysis entirely offline. Evaluated on the Agent Security Bench (ASB), \codename\ achieves a 5.6% macro-averaged attack success rate (ASR) across five scenarios. Within three structured workflows, ASR drops to 2.2%, outperforming Aegis, a state-of-the-art stateless scanner, at 12.8%. \codename\ achieves 0% ASR on multi-step and context-sequential attacks in structured settings. Furthermore, against 1,000 algorithmically spliced exfiltration payloads, only 1.4% matched valid structural paths, all of which failed end-to-end string parameter guards (0 successes out of 14 surviving paths, 95% CI [0%, 23.2%]). \codename\ introduces just 2.2~ms of per-call latency (a 3.7 speedup over \textsc{Aegis}) while maintaining a 2.0% benign task failure rate (BTFR) on benign workloads. Modeling the behavioral trajectory effectively collapses the available attack surface, but unmaintained continuous parameter bounds remain vulnerable to synonym-substitution attacks (18% evasion rate). Thus, exact-match whitelisting of sensitive parameters ultimately bears the final defensive load against execution.
Dyna-Style Safety Augmented Reinforcement Learning: Staying Safe in the Face of Uncertainty
Safety remains an open problem in reinforcement learning (RL), especially during training. While safety filters are promising to address safe exploration, they are generally poorly suited for high-dimensional systems with unknown dynamics. We propose Dyna-style Safety Augmented Reinforcement Learning (Dyna-SAuR), a novel algorithm that learns both a scalable safety filter and a control policy using a learned uncertainty-aware dynamics model, while requiring minimal domain knowledge. The filter avoids failures and high uncertainty regions. Thus, better models expand the set of safe and certain states, reducing filter conservatism. We present the effectiveness of Dyna-SAuR on goal-reaching CartPole as well as MuJoCo Walker, reducing failures compared to state-of-the-art methods by 2 orders of magnitude.
Full-Body Dynamic Safety for Robot Manipulators: 3D Poisson Safety Functions for CBF-Based Safety Filters
Collision avoidance for robotic manipulators requires enforcing full-body safety constraints in high-dimensional configuration spaces. Control Barrier Function (CBF) based safety filters have proven effective in enabling safe behaviors, but enforcing the high number of constraints needed for safe manipulation leads to theoretic and computational challenges. This work presents a framework for full-body collision avoidance for manipulators in dynamic environments by leveraging 3D Poisson Safety Functions (PSFs). In particular, given environmental occupancy data, we sample the manipulator surface at a prescribed resolution and shrink free space via a Pontryagin difference according to this resolution. On this buffered domain, we synthesize a globally smooth CBF by solving Poisson's equation, yielding a single safety function for the entire environment. This safety function, evaluated at each sampled point, yields task-space CBF constraints enforced by a real-time safety filter via a multi-constraint quadratic program. We prove that keeping the sample points safe in the buffered region guarantees collision avoidance for the entire continuous robot surface. The framework is validated on a 7-degree-of-freedom manipulator in dynamic environments.
Safe Control using Learned Safety Filters and Adaptive Conformal Inference
Safety filters have been shown to be effective tools to ensure the safety of control systems with unsafe nominal policies. To address scalability challenges in traditional synthesis methods, learning-based approaches have been proposed for designing safety filters for systems with high-dimensional state and control spaces. However, the inevitable errors in the decisions of these models raise concerns about their reliability and the safety guarantees they offer. This paper presents Adaptive Conformal Filtering (ACoFi), a method that combines learned Hamilton-Jacobi reachability-based safety filters with adaptive conformal inference. Under ACoFi, the filter dynamically adjusts its switching criteria based on the observed errors in its predictions of the safety of actions. The range of possible safety values of the nominal policy's output is used to quantify uncertainty in safety assessment. The filter switches from the nominal policy to the learned safe one when that range suggests it might be unsafe. We show that ACoFi guarantees that the rate of incorrectly quantifying uncertainty in the predicted safety of the nominal policy is asymptotically upper bounded by a user-defined parameter. This gives a soft safety guarantee rather than a hard safety guarantee. We evaluate ACoFi in a Dubins car simulation and a Safety Gymnasium environment, empirically demonstrating that it significantly outperforms the baseline method that uses a fixed switching threshold by achieving higher learned safety values and fewer safety violations, especially in out-of-distribution scenarios.
Governed MCP: Kernel-Level Tool Governance for AI Agents via Logit-Based Safety Primitives
AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). These tool calls are the agent's syscalls: privileged operations with side effects on shared state, yet today's safety enforcement lives entirely in userspace, where a 10-line script can bypass it. I propose Governed MCP, a kernel-resident tool governance gateway built on a logit-based safety primitive (ProbeLogits). The gateway interposes on every MCP tool call in a 6-layer pipeline: schema validation, trust tier, rate limit, adversarial pre-filter, a ProbeLogits semantic gate (the load-bearing check), and constitutional policy match, with a Blake3-hashed audit chain. I implement Governed MCP in Anima OS, a bare-metal x86-64 kernel in ~286,000 lines of Rust. The five non-inference layers plus the audit append cost a measured 11.3 us per call; the ProbeLogits gate (one probe-prompt prefill plus a single logit read) costs 332-556 ms per classification across Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Mistral-7B, 2.4-3.4x faster than a Llama Guard 3 pass on the same hardware. A silicon-measured ablation shows that removing the ProbeLogits layer collapses F1 from 0.789 to 0.357 (delta-F1 = -0.432): hand-rule firewalling alone is insufficient. Every WASM-to-system host function and every registered MCP tool is mediated by the kernel gateway, so the 10-line userspace bypass that defeats existing guardrail libraries is structurally impossible; a disclosed set of ring-3 syscall paths remains ungated pending future work. Multi-model validation across three architectures (HarmBench 98-99% non-copyright block, XSTest 98.5-100% unsafe recall, ToxicChat parity with Llama Guard 3) shows the underlying primitive is architecture-agnostic. Governed MCP demonstrates that tool-call governance is feasible as an OS primitive, not just an application-layer concern.
ProbeLogits: Kernel-Level LLM Inference Primitives for AI-Native Operating Systems
An OS kernel that runs LLM inference internally can read the model's own next-token logit distribution before any text is generated, and act on it as a governance primitive. I present ProbeLogits, a kernel-level operation that performs a single forward pass and reads specific token logits to classify an agent's action as safe or dangerous, with zero learned parameters. Because the probe reads a logit from the same base model the agent already runs, it removes the second model a fine-tuned guard requires: the marginal cost of a safety check becomes a single logit read. I evaluate ProbeLogits on three base models (Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3-8B, Mistral-7B) across three external benchmarks (HarmBench, XSTest, ToxicChat). On HarmBench non-copyright, all three reach a 97-99% block rate. On ToxicChat (n=1,000), ProbeLogits attains F1 parity-or-better against Llama Guard 3: Qwen2.5-7B Safe/Dangerous reaches F1=0.812 (+13.7 pp, bootstrap 95% CIs disjoint), Llama-3 matches within CI (+0.4 pp), and Mistral exceeds by +4.4 pp. Classification is a measured 2.4-3.4x faster than Llama Guard 3 (332-556 ms vs. 851-1,142 ms), because it reads a single logit position instead of generating tokens. A calibration strength alpha acts as a deployment-time policy knob rather than a learned hyperparameter, trading recall for precision per operation class. I implement ProbeLogits within Anima OS, a bare-metal x86-64 kernel written in ~285,000 lines of Rust. Because agent actions must pass through kernel-mediated host functions, enforcement operates below the WASM sandbox boundary, making it substantially harder to circumvent than application-layer classifiers.
Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering
AI agents that pay for resources via the x402 protocol embed payment metadata - resource URLs, descriptions, and reason strings - in every HTTP payment request. This metadata is transmitted to the payment server and to the centralised facilitator API before any on-chain settlement occurs; neither party is typically bound by a data processing agreement. We present presidio-hardened-x402, the first open-source middleware that intercepts x402 payment requests before transmission to detect and redact personally identifiable information (PII), enforce declarative spending policies, and block duplicate replay attempts. To evaluate the PII filter, we construct a labeled synthetic corpus of 2,000 x402 metadata triples spanning seven use-case categories, and run a 42-configuration precision/recall sweep across two detection modes (regex, NLP) and five confidence thresholds. The recommended configuration (mode=nlp, min_score=0.4, all entity types) achieves micro-F1 = 0.894 with precision 0.972, at a p99 latency of 5.73ms - well within the 50ms overhead budget. The middleware, corpus, and all experiment code are publicly available at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-x402.
PC-Diffuser: Path-Consistent Capsule CBF Safety Filtering for Diffusion-Based Trajectory Planner
Autonomous driving in complex traffic requires planners that generalize beyond hand-crafted rules, motivating data-driven approaches that learn behavior from expert demonstrations. Diffusion-based trajectory planners have recently shown strong closed-loop performance by iteratively denoising a full-horizon plan, but they remain difficult to certify and can fail catastrophically in rare or out-of-distribution scenarios. To address this challenge, we present PC-Diffuser, a safety augmentation framework that embeds a certifiable, path-consistent barrier-function structure directly into the denoising loop of diffusion planning. The key idea is to make safety an intrinsic part of trajectory generation rather than a post-hoc fix: we enforce forward invariance along the rollout while preserving the diffusion model's intended path geometry. Specifically, PC-Diffuser (i) evaluates collision risk using a capsule-distance barrier function that better reflects vehicle geometry and reduces unnecessary conservativeness, (ii) converts denoised waypoints into dynamically feasible motion under a kinematic bicycle model, and (iii) applies a path-consistent safety filter that eliminates residual constraint violations without geometric distortion, so the corrected plan remains close to the learned distribution. By injecting these safety-consistent corrections at every denoising step and feeding the refined trajectory back into the diffusion process, PC-Diffuser enables iterative, context-aware safeguarding instead of post-hoc repair...
CBF-RL: Safety Filtering Reinforcement Learning in Training with Control Barrier Functions
Reinforcement learning (RL), while powerful and expressive, can often prioritize performance at the expense of safety. Yet safety violations can lead to catastrophic outcomes in real-world deployments. Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) offer a principled method to enforce dynamic safety -- traditionally deployed online via safety filters. While the result is safe behavior, the fact that the RL policy does not have knowledge of the CBF can lead to conservative behaviors. This paper proposes CBF-RL, a framework for generating safe behaviors with RL by enforcing CBFs in training. CBF-RL has two key attributes: (1) minimally modifying a nominal RL policy to encode safety constraints via a CBF term, (2) and safety filtering of the policy rollouts in training. Theoretically, we prove that continuous-time safety filters can be deployed via closed-form expressions on discrete-time roll-outs. Practically, we demonstrate that CBF-RL internalizes the safety constraints in the learned policy -- both enforcing safer actions and biasing towards safer rewards -- enabling safe deployment without the need for an online safety filter. We validate our framework through ablation studies on navigation tasks and on the Unitree G1 humanoid robot, where CBF-RL enables safer exploration, faster convergence, and robust performance under uncertainty, enabling the humanoid robot to avoid obstacles and climb stairs safely in real-world settings without a runtime safety filter.
Layered Safety: Enhancing Autonomous Collision Avoidance via Multistage CBF Safety Filters
This paper presents a general end-to-end framework for constructing robust and reliable layered safety filters that can be leveraged to perform dynamic collision avoidance over a broad range of applications using only local perception data. Given a robot-centric point cloud, we begin by constructing an occupancy map which is used to synthesize a Poisson safety function (PSF). The resultant PSF is employed as a control barrier function (CBF) within two distinct safety filtering stages. In the first stage, we propose a predictive safety filter to compute optimal safe trajectories based on nominal potentially-unsafe commands. The resultant short-term plans are constrained to satisfy the CBF condition along a finite prediction horizon. In the second stage, instantaneous velocity commands are further refined by a real-time CBF-based safety filter and tracked by the full-order low-level robot controller. Assuming accurate tracking of velocity commands, we obtain formal guarantees of safety for the full-order system. We validate the optimality and robustness of our multistage architecture, in comparison to traditional single-stage safety filters, via a detailed Pareto analysis. We further demonstrate the effectiveness and generality of our collision avoidance methodology on multiple legged robot platforms across a variety of real-world dynamic scenarios.