Smart Contracts

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has emerged as a rapidly growing blockchain-based financial service, where market transaction dynamics and underlying smart contract logic are intricately intertwined. This autonomous interplay, while eliminating centralized intermediaries, significantly expands the vulnerability surface of DeFi protocols to Price Manipulation Attacks (PMAs), which have already inflicted catastrophic financial losses. Despite their gravity, existing detection paradigms suffer from fundamental limitations. Transaction-centric methods lack awareness of contract execution semantics, making them prone to false positives under legitimate market volatility, while static contract analyses ignore real transaction behaviors and frequently report vulnerabilities that are infeasible to exploit in practice. We present DeFiFusion, a dual-modal PMA detection framework that closes this gap by jointly modeling transaction events and smart contract semantics within a unified pipeline. Our core insight is that PMA maliciousness emerges only from the interaction between transaction behaviors and the contract logic they exploit; neither signal suffices in isolation. Accordingly, we derive price-manipulation-aware event encoding for extracting fine-grained temporal and economic features tailored to manipulation patterns. We further introduce LLM-based contract semantic extraction to supply the execution-logic context that prior behavioral methods lack. To fuse these modalities, we propose a Dual-Modal Projection-Fusion Transformer with T5-style relative positional encoding, capturing the cyclic multi-stage execution structures that distinguish PMAs from benign market activity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DeFiFusion consistently achieves state-of-the-art detection performance, effectively recalling 222 of the 225 PMA cases while maintaining a precision of 96.10%.

Autonomous agent runtimes execute tool actions that mutate databases, repositories, and cloud services across organizational boundaries. Authorization and local compensation cover pre-action admission and in-runtime rollback, but neither settles the residual harm left after a permitted action fails. We design Recourse, a smart-contract settlement protocol for compensable agent side effects that binds each admitted action to scope, recovery, evidence, payout, and collateral. Recourse separates ex ante eligibility from ex post objective settleability: typed receipts make objective residual claims computable under an optimistic-oracle challenge pattern, while subjective or incomplete claims route to ERC-792 arbitration or exclusion. We implement the contract suite, deploy it on Base Sepolia, build adapters against Postgres, Git, and cloud-compatible local sandboxes, and evaluate the system on a deterministic harness, sandbox traces, adversarial sweeps, and property-based fuzzing. Against authorization-only and local-compensation baselines, bonded coverage cuts uncompensated harm. The on-chain tier supplies neutral custody, public challenge, non-cooperative payout, and portable history under cross-organizational trust assumptions.

This paper presents ContractHIL-HLS, a contract-aligned multi-agent workflow for practical high-level synthesis (HLS) engineering. The workflow makes three contributions. First, it introduces a structured contract as the semantic-alignment and task-execution artifact that translates natural language requirements into explicit interfaces, constraints, validation checks, and rollback rules. Second, it incorporates hardware information into the feedback loop by feeding HLS, Vivado, PYNQ runtime, power, and failure evidence back into generation, thereby extending LLM-assisted HLS from kernel code toward system- and board-level closure. Third, it decomposes agents by semantic lowering and execution tasks rather than by conversational roles: a Contract Agent lowers natural language into the contract, an HTML Agent renders the contract as persistent structured HTML, and a Hardware-in-the-Loop Agent implements and revises the design with measured evidence. We evaluate ContractHIL-HLS in two parts. On 94 locally executable HLS-Eval tasks, the structured contract provides the largest small design gain, improving the estimated single-sample testbench pass rate from 64.0% to 70.2%; the full flow reaches 70.4% pass@1 and 76.6% pass@5. Because HLS-Eval does not exercise board-level design, we also validate ContractHIL-HLS on a board tested ML-KEM/ML-DSA post-quantum cryptography (PQC) secure-message accelerator, where the retained dual-bitstream organization reduces six-message average text runtime from 207.3 ms to 52.4 ms with positive routed WNS on both images while preserving decrypted-message verification. We open-source our work at BJUT-CS316-LAB/ContractHIL-HLS (https://github.com/BJUT-CS316-LAB/ContractHIL-HLS).

Software evolves continuously, yet ensuring that a patch preserves intended behavior without re-verifying an entire codebase remains difficult. Regression verification addresses this problem, but existing techniques require expensive whole-program reasoning or rely on manually written specifications that are rarely available in practice. We present the first contract-based regression verification tool. Contract soundness is ensured by proving all function versions match the behavior. The contract then verifies program flow via assume-guarantee. We ask whether a partial, caller-sufficient contract, rather than a full behavioral specification, is enough. On Frama-C-Problems we strengthen each inferred contract past what the caller needs and measure how much tighter it becomes. It barely moves: for most targets in every model the caller-sufficient contract is already the tightest the loop reaches, and our tightness comparator rates the partial and strengthened contracts equivalent for the large majority of targets it can compare. Partial-spec contracts thus capture nearly all the attainable tightness, so stopping at caller-sufficiency costs almost nothing. The regression check underneath is sound: on the third-party EqBench-C suite it never fabricates an equivalence, returning zero false proofs and reporting an unprovable difference instead. It also surfaced nine pairs that EqBench mislabels as equivalent, more than a concurrent tool reports. The contracts themselves are inferred automatically from the checker's own counterexamples, with no separate specification step; on Frama-C-Problems and the ANSSI X509 parser this reaches a verification rate comparable to tools AutoSpec and Preguss, while a passing result certifies at least as strong a property, which we call \emph{safety-preserving conditional equivalence}: enforcement plus caller-sufficiency.

As agentic AI systems are increasingly applied to cyber-physical environments, their evaluation requires assessment of both task performance and trustworthiness. In decentralized energy markets, autonomous agents may improve market utility, but may also exploit invalid physical data, create artificial liquidity, and produce unstable governance decisions. Therefore, we propose SolarChain-Eval, a physics-constrained benchmark for evaluating trustworthy economic agents. It formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process, where agents make hourly decisions. SolarChain-Eval evaluates each policy across multiple dimensions, including market utility, physical safety, slippage, action smoothness, spatial fairness, and auditability. To support agentic evaluation, SolarChain-Eval incorporates an LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer. The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions. All interventions are recorded through structured logs, including trigger signals, proposed actions, revised actions, and audit rationales. Experiments with static, random, myopic, RL, and RL+LLM policies reveal a clear utility-safety trade-off. RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior. When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity. The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks, but it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified reward function. These results indicate that trustworthy agentic AI evaluation requires both physical constraints and transparent intervention traces. We release data and code as open access on GitHub for replicability.

Smart home automation platforms increasingly rely on user-authored YAML configuration files to define device behaviors, but these files are prone to syntax, formatting, and semantic logic errors that can cause automation failures and safety risks. Existing YAML validators, static analysis tools, and general-purpose large language models offer limited support for end-to-end diagnosis and repair because they lack domain-specific understanding and validated correction workflows. This paper presents SmartHomeSecure, a prototype for automated detection and repair of Home Assistant configuration errors using lightweight program analysis and constraint-guided large language model generation. SmartHomeSecure parses YAML files, detects syntactic and common semantic errors, normalizes error context, applies deterministic auto-fixes for routine defects, and constructs constrained prompts that guide LLMs toward minimal and structurally valid repairs. The system is implemented as a modular web application with four layers: UI Shell, Feature Orchestrator, Domain Engine, and Integration Layer. Its repair pipeline was evaluated on 100 real-world Home Assistant YAML files with manually injected errors across five categories: syntax/parsing, indentation, mapping, sequence, and scalar quoting errors. Four models were tested: gpt-oss-20b, gpt-oss-120b, llama-3.1-8b, and llama-3.3-70b. Results show that three models achieved 100% error detection accuracy, with repair success rates ranging from 87% to 93%. Manual verification found no hallucinated or incorrect repairs among successful outputs. These findings suggest that combining domain-aware program analysis with constrained generative AI is a feasible approach for improving the reliability and usability of smart home configuration repair.

Agent systems accumulate conflicting observations across branches, retries, and replicas, yet many practical memory layers still collapse disagreement behind overwrite rules that are difficult to inspect or correct. We present StateFuse, a conflict-aware replicated memory contract built on standard OpSet/CRDT merge. StateFuse does not introduce a new join algebra; it defines an agent-facing semantics layer with immutable history, explicit conflict objects, exact and semantic correction handles (claim_id / claim_ref), deterministic predicate contracts, and projection-time resolution that cannot rewrite replicated state. We evaluate StateFuse against flat multi-value, raw-log, provenance-style, and collapsed baselines under matched resolver and verification policies. On a 282-question official conflict-bearing MemoryAgentBench slice, the compared methods tie on answer accuracy, but conflict-preserving surfaces keep contradictions visible while collapsed surfaces do not. In a controlled agent loop with uniform verification, preserving ambiguity enables safer abstention and correction than early collapse. A correction-handle ablation further shows that semantic handles matter when exact prior identifiers are unavailable. The resulting claim is narrow: StateFuse is best supported as a safer public memory contract for contradiction surfacing, abstention, and auditable correction, not as a universal accuracy gain.

We present CyberChainBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based agents on smart contract security across three complementary tasks: vulnerability detection, exploit generation, and patch synthesis. Built from 541 real-world exploit incidents from DeFiHackLabs spanning 9 EVM chains, the benchmark provides end-to-end on-chain evaluation where agents interact with historical blockchain state through isolated evaluation environments orchestrated by Harbor, using tools to read code, trace transactions, and validate exploits on mainnet forks. Each case is anchored to a specific block and includes structured ground truth covering vulnerability type, localization, and attacker profit. Exploits are graded by economic impact on historical forks; patches are validated by replaying historical attacks and legitimate transactions as fail-to-pass test oracles on a proxy-upgradeable subset. We define a five-type vulnerability taxonomy and evaluate multiple agent--model configurations. Results reveal a clear difficulty gradient: the best configuration scores 37.5% on detection, 43.7% on exploitation, but only 23.4% on patching, with the top agent (Codex with GPT-5.5) realizing $57.4M in total exploit profit across the 200-case exploit set at a cost of $2.39 per case.

Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL) enables scalable collaborative model training across distributed devices while preserving data privacy. However, existing HFL client selection mechanisms suffer from a fundamental strategic inefficiency. By prioritizing stability over Pareto efficiency (PE), they produce suboptimal resource allocations, and without strategy proofness (SP), participants are incentivized to misrepresent their true preferences, both failures degrading system overall welfare in the Pareto sense in practice. To address it, we propose SCOPE-FL (Strategy-proof Chain-based Optimal pareto efficient Federated Learning), a synchronous HFL framework that formulates client selection as a two-sided school choice problem solved through the Top Trading Cycle (TTC) algorithm that simultaneously guarantees PE and SP. For reward distribution, SCOPE-FL employs a scalable Shapley value approximation based on One-Round Reconstruction (OR), ensuring compensation proportional to each client's contribution. The entire mechanism executes via blockchain smart contracts, providing the tamper-proof environment required for the SP guarantees to hold in practice. A comprehensive evaluation on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 demonstrates that SCOPE-FL outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, including DA, IAS, and other methods across model accuracy, convergence rate, and reward efficiency, while achieving communication latency comparable to DA and blockchain overhead significantly lower than DA at scale.

Existing learning-based detectors for Solidity smart-contracts reduce vulnerability detection to syntactic pattern matching within single functions, yet many of the most consequential exploits (The DAO, Cream Finance) exist not in any individual function but in the relationship between functions and in the combination of conditions that made the attack feasible. Thus, we propose AttackPathGNN, a graph neural network (GNN) that reframes detection as reasoning over explicit attack paths. Two architectural choices distinguish it from prior GNN-based detectors: (1)a State Interference Graph that links every pair of functions sharing mutable storage through typed, weighted edges and through directed reentrancy-path edges defined by an explicit five-condition predicate; (2)conjunction pooling, a differentiable AND-aggregator over eight named exploit preconditions whose log-sigmoid form causes the per-function exploit score to collapse whenever any single mitigation (a reentrancy guard, an access-control modifier or SafeMath) is in place. Across five independent training runs, AttackPathGNN attains 92.3+/-0.2% F1 on the SmartBugs Wild held-out test partition (4.3+/-0.3% false-negative rate, 90.8+/-2.5% detection rate on the independently human-labelled SmartBugs Curated benchmark), recovering 6/10 DASP10 categories at 100% on every seed and Reentrancy at 98.7+/-1.8%. Each prediction is emitted with a structured remediation report, turning each verdict into an actionable, function-level audit finding.

Smart contracts face critical security challenges that require thorough auditing in decentralized web services. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in automated vulnerability detection, existing approaches lack severity evaluations with actionable remediation and demand unnecessarily massive computational overhead. In this study, we introduce an efficient end-to-end smart contract security audit framework utilizing lightweight, highly optimized open-source LLMs (0.6B-4B parameters). Our framework decouples comprehensive audit tasks into four interconnected components: vulnerability detection, explanation, severity classification, and remediation recommendation. To maintain high accuracy without massive parameters, we implement Rank-Stabilized Low-Rank Adapters (rsLoRA), knowledge distillation, and a custom Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) aggregation strategy to systematically screen and consolidate multiple draft responses from the model into a highly accurate audit report. Experimental results demonstrate that our lightweight pipeline consistently outperforms state-of-the-art open-source coder dense LLMs (7B to 34B parameters), achieving 98.25% accuracy in vulnerability detection and an alignment score of 0.4375 in generative explanation tasks. Furthermore, our extensive ablation studies empirically validate the superiority of our decoupled audit processes over unified prompting and uncover a novel severity centrality bias, establishing a critical benchmark for future research in LLM-assisted auditing.

Tool-augmented language agents speculatively issue likely future tool calls to hide latency, but those calls leak inferred user intent to external services before the agent commits to the branch. Every external observer that received the call retains the disclosure after the agent abandons the branch. Timing is the issue, not authorization: no commit-time cleanup, read-only restriction, or access-control allow-list unsends what an observer already holds. We call these invocations ghost tool calls and propose Speculative Tool Privacy Contracts, a runtime abstraction that treats observation before commitment as a first-class effect, distinct from state mutation. We implement the contracts in a prototype runtime and evaluate twelve policies across three corpora. Speculative dispatch increases what an observer can infer about user intent; post-hoc filters, read-only restrictions, and access-control allow-lists leave that inference intact; only issue-time policies that change or suppress the speculative call's argument or destination projection before dispatch reduce it.

Consensus protocols form the backbone of distributed systems and blockchains, where implementation bugs can cause data corruption and financial losses. While LLM-based approaches show promise in code analysis, they struggle with deep protocol-level logic bugs involving complex state-dependent behaviors across multiple execution stages. We present Agora, a domain-aware multi-agent framework that integrates hypothesis-driven testing with LLM capabilities for systematic protocol verification. Agora employs specialized agents that collaboratively explore protocol state spaces, synthesize attack scenarios using domain-specific constraints, and validate findings through iterative refinement. This explicit role separation enables reasoning about global protocol invariants beyond single-function code analysis. We evaluate Agora on four consensus implementations (Raft, EPaxos, HotStuff, BullShark) using four state-of-the-art LLMs. Agora discovers 15 previously unknown protocol-level logic bugs that violate safety properties, while existing LLM-based agents fail to detect any such protocol-level logic bugs. Our results demonstrate that domain-aware multi-agent collaboration is essential for detecting deep logic bugs in complex protocols.

Smart contract decompilation aims to recover high-level source code from bytecode, but evaluating decompilers remains difficult because existing studies use narrow datasets, inconsistent metrics, and limited semantic consistency checks. This gap is increasingly important as large language models (LLMs) begin to generate source-like Solidity that may compile and appear plausible, even when its semantics diverge from the original contract. We introduce SCDBench, a dataset and benchmark methodology for LLM-based smart contract decompilation. The dataset contains 600 real-world Solidity contracts with paired bytecode inputs, ground-truth source code, and replayable semantic checkpoints. SCDBench evaluates decompiler outputs through four cumulative stages: format completeness, compilability, Application Binary Interface (ABI) recovery, and semantic consistency via differential replay. We evaluate Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.3-Codex, and GLM-5 in a zero-shot decompilation setting, including GLM-5 variants with and without extended reasoning and a zero-shot compilation-repair setting. The results show that frontier LLMs can often produce structured and compilable Solidity, but achieving semantic consistency remains far from solved: the best-performing frontier model perfectly decompiles only 42/600 contracts. We further show that introducing same-model compilation repair substantially improves performance at modest additional cost. SCDBench establishes a common ground for rigorous, reproducible evaluation and aims to accelerate the development of reliable smart contract decompilers for blockchain security and transparency.

Formal verification of large C programs is impeded by state-space explosion: Bounded Model Checking (BMC) tools must encode the entire state space up to the predetermined bound by unrolling all nested constructs. We present ConVer, a top-down compositional verification tool. Given a C program with a top-level assertion, ConVer decomposes verification top-down: it uses a large language model (LLM) to synthesise function contracts from the system property, then alternates system-level and function-level checks in a CEGAR-CEGIS loop, refining contracts whenever a check fails via SMART ICE learning. We evaluate ConVer on four benchmark suites of increasing difficulty and against other state-of-the-art (SOTA) tools. On the Frama-C benchmark of 45 simple C programs, ConVer achieves 82-96% verification success across three LLM backends, with 93-95% of converged programs requiring only a single CEGAR-CEGIS iteration. On the X.509 parser benchmark (6~programs) and LF2C-Simple suite (17 programs), ConVer achieves 33-50% and 82-88% success respectively. On the VerifyThis suite of 11 recursive and loop-intensive programs, the Pre-Abstraction strategy achieves 55-64% success. In addition, we present ESBMC-LF a preprocessor tool that converts LF models to C while preserving the properties of the LF files, enabling ConVer to verify them. We transpile the LF Verifier Benchmarks using ESBMC-LF to C; we denote those LF-Hard. We show that ConVer successfully verifies 67% of LF-Hard benchmarks overall.

The irreversible nature of blockchain transactions makes the identification of smart contract vulnerabilities an essential requirement for secure system development. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into developer workflows, their reliability as autonomous security auditors remains unproven. We assess whether current generative models are a viable replacement for, or only a complement to, traditional static-analysis tools. Our findings indicate that LLM efficacy is undermined by both inherent lexical bias and a lack of rigorous validation of external data inputs. This reliance on non-semantic heuristics, such as identifier naming, leads to a high frequency of false positives. Furthermore, prompting techniques reveal a trade-off between precision and recall. These results were derived using our custom automated framework, which achieves 92% accuracy in classifying model outputs.

We introduce SmartEval, a benchmark for systematically evaluating the quality of Solidity smart contracts generated by large language models (LLMs) from natural language specifications. SmartEval provides a corpus of 9,000 generated contracts paired with expert-written ground-truth implementations drawn from the FSMSCG dataset, a five-dimensional evaluation rubric covering functional completeness, variable fidelity, state-machine correctness, business-logic fidelity, and code quality, and a reproducible generation-and-evaluation pipeline. To validate the benchmark's reliability, we conduct three independent empirical studies: a five-condition ablation study (N=300 per condition) isolating the contribution of each pipeline component, a human expert evaluation by three Columbia University PhD researchers confirming automated scores align with expert judgment to within 0.34 points, and external security analysis via the Slither static analyzer confirming 79.4% agreement between the LLM auditor and a non-LLM rule-based tool. Systematic analysis of 9,000 generated contracts reveals characteristic failure modes (logic omissions at 35.3%, state transition errors at 23.4%, and complexity-driven degradation) and quantifies a +8.29 composite-score advantage of generated contracts over ground-truth implementations, attributable to LLMs' literal specification-following behavior. SmartEval establishes a reproducible, validated foundation for empirical research on LLM smart contract synthesis quality, with all data, evaluation code, and generated contracts publicly released.

Smart-contract exploits have caused billions of USD in cumulative losses, yet audits remain expensive and slow. Automated tools have emerged to close this gap, but each class has a characteristic failure mode. Static analyzers report findings that frequently fail manual triage at high rates, while large language models (LLMs) hallucinate findings that contradict the source code. Thus, we propose Chaintrix, an end-to-end auditing framework whose central architectural commitment is that every LLM-generated claim must be discharged against a deterministic structural contract representation. We introduce a Cross-Contract Interaction Model (CCIM) that parses Solidity into a structured map of function-level reads, writes, modifiers and resolved cross-contract calls. CCIM serves as the substrate against which all 12 of Chaintrix's deterministic signal engines and the parallel LLM audit pipelines operate. A staged false-positive-reduction pipeline, terminating in a Structural Verdict Engine (SVE) that applies deterministic structural checks against parsed code, filters the merged finding set, with selected high-confidence findings further validated through symbolic execution and fuzz testing. We evaluate Chaintrix on EVMbench, the smart-contract security benchmark by OpenAI, Paradigm, OtterSec. Chaintrix detects 86 of 120 high-severity vulnerabilities (71.7% recall), with 25 audits scoring 100% recall, placing Chaintrix 26 percentage points above the strongest frontier-model baseline.

Smart contracts on blockchains are prone to diverse security vulnerabilities that can lead to significant financial losses due to their immutable nature. Existing detection approaches often lack flexibility across vulnerability types and rely heavily on manually crafted expert rules. In this paper, we present an LLM-based framework for practical smart contract vulnerability detection. We construct and release a large-scale dataset comprising 31,165 professionally annotated vulnerability instances collected from over 3,200 real-world projects across 15 major blockchain platforms. Our approach leverages precise AST-based context extraction and vulnerability-specific prompt design to instantiate customized detectors for 13 prevalent vulnerability categories. Experimental results demonstrate strong effectiveness, achieving an average positive recall of 0.92 and an average negative recall of 0.85, highlighting the potential of carefully engineered contextual prompting for scalable and high-precision smart contract security analysis.

Enterprise software engineering is shifting away from deterministic CRUD/REST architectures toward AI-native systems where large language models act as cognitive orchestrators. This transition introduces a critical security tension: probabilistic LLMs weaken classical mechanisms for validation, access control, and formal testing. This paper proposes the design, formal validation, and empirical evaluation of a Semantic Gateway governed by the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The gateway reframes the enterprise API as a semantic surface where tools are dynamically discovered, authorized, and executed based on intent and policy enforcement. The central contribution rests on a paradigm shift: autonomous agents must not be validated as traditional software nor as simple API consumers, but as stochastic state-transition systems whose behavior must be abstracted, fuzzed, and audited through enabled-tool graphs. The architecture introduces a three-layer Zero-Trust security model comprising a pre-inference Semantic Firewall, deterministic Tool-Level RBAC, and out-of-band Cryptographic Human-in-the-Loop approval. Enabledness-Preserving Abstractions (EPAs) and greybox semantic fuzzing--originally developed for blockchain smart contract verification--are adapted to audit agent behavior in enterprise environments. Results demonstrate an 84.2% reduction in incidental code. Across 500,000 multi-turn fuzzing sequences, the methodology achieved a 100% discovery rate of hidden unauthorized state transitions, proving that dynamic formal verification is strictly necessary for secure agentic deployment.

Context: Software vulnerabilities pose significant security threats to software systems, especially as software is increasingly used across many areas of daily life, including health, government, and finance. Recently, transformer-based models have demonstrated promising results in automatic software vulnerability identification due to their robust contextual modelling and representation learning capabilities. Objectives: While numerous systematic literature reviews (SLRs) have examined machine learning and deep learning methods for identifying vulnerabilities, a more transformer-centric analysis remains to be explored. This SLR critically analysed 80 studies published between 2021 and 2025 that utilised transformer models to identify software vulnerabilities. Methods: Using Kitchenhams SLR guidelines, we methodically evaluate current research from various perspectives, encompassing study trends, datasets and sources, programming languages, transformer frameworks, detection detail levels, assessment metrics, reference models, types of vulnerabilities, and experimental configurations. Results: We classify transformer models into encoder, decoder, and combined architectures and analyse both pre-trained and fine-tuned versions utilized on source code, logs, and smart contracts. The results emphasise prevailing research trends, frequently utilised benchmarks, and main baselines. It also uncovers crucial technical issues like data imbalance, interpretability, scalability, and generalization across programming languages. Conclusion: By integrating current evidence and recognising unaddressed research areas, this SLR provides a consolidated resource for researchers and professionals seeking to develop more reliable, precise, and interpretable transformer-based vulnerability identification systems.

Collusion among autonomous agents poses a critical security threat in embodied multi-agent systems (MAS), where coordinated behaviors can deviate from global objectives and lead to real-world consequences. Existing defenses, primarily based on identity control or post-hoc behavior analysis, are insufficient to address such threats in embodied settings due to delayed feedback and noisy observations in physical environments, which make behavioral deviations difficult to detect accurately and in a timely manner. To address this challenge, we propose a mutagenic incentive intervention approach that mitigates collusion by reshaping agents' payoff structures. By rewarding agents who report collusive behavior and penalizing identified participants, the mechanism induces strategic defection and renders collusion unstable. We further design supporting mechanisms, including reporting deposits, smart contract-based reward enforcement, and encrypted communication, to ensure robustness against misuse of the incentive mechanism and retaliation from penalized agents. We implement the proposed approach in both simulated and real-world embodied environments. Experimental results show that our method effectively suppresses collusion by inducing defection, while preserving system efficiency. It achieves performance comparable to the non-collusion baseline and outperforms representative reactive defenses, thereby fulfilling the desired security objectives. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive incentive design as a practical paradigm for securing embodied multi-agent systems.

Every ML kernel ships with an implicit contract about what it computes. People rarely write the contract down. When two kernels disagree -- when a matmul on AMD produces a different gradient than the same matmul on NVIDIA, when a fused attention kernel silently downcasts an accumulator, when an out-of-bounds access returns zero on one stack and garbage on another -- there is no formal artifact to arbitrate the dispute. Recent empirical work has measured the gap across silicon platforms, but none of it specifies the contract being violated. We present a specification language for kernel contracts. A contract has eight parts: identifier, scope, precondition, postcondition, tolerance, reference oracle, measurement protocol, and violation signature. We use it to state twelve contract classes covering precision, ordering, compiler-induced, and exceptional-value failure modes, each grounded in published empirical evidence. We require a three-state calibration: every contract must admit at least one reference-conforming implementation and at least one contract-violating implementation that passes basic functional tests. We apply the framework to three documented incidents -- Huawei Ascend silent precision coercion, Sakana AI CUDA Engineer reward hacking, AMD out-of-bounds silent acceptance -- and show that each informal diagnosis maps to a specific contract violation with a measurable signature. A kernel contract suite is a normative reference against which conformance can be graded, in the way that ISASecure grades industrial control systems against IEC 62443.

We consider the problem of verification modulo tested library contracts as a step towards automating the verification of client programs that use complex libraries. We formulate this problem as the synthesis of modular contracts for the library methods used by the client that are adequate to prove the client correct, and that also pass the scrutiny of a testing engine that tests the library against these contracts. We also consider a new form of method contracts called contextual contracts that arise in this setting that hold in the context of the client program, and can often be simpler and easier to infer than classical modular contracts. We provide a counterexample-guided learning framework to solve this problem, in which the synthesizer interacts with a constraint solver as well as the testing engine in order to infer adequate modular/contextual method contracts and inductive invariants for the client. The main synthesis engines we use are generalizing CHC solvers that are realized using ICE learning algorithms. We realize this framework in a tool called DUALIS and show its efficacy on benchmarks where clients call large libraries.

Smart contracts govern billions of dollars in decentralized finance (DeFi), yet automated vulnerability detection remains challenging because many vulnerabilities are tightly coupled with project-specific business logic. We observe that recurring vulnerabilities across diverse DeFi business models often share the same underlying economic mechanisms, which we term DeFi semantics, and that capturing these shared abstractions can enable more systematic auditing. Building on this insight, we propose Knowdit, a knowledge-driven, agentic workflow for smart contract vulnerability detection. Knowdit first constructs an auditing knowledge graph from historical human audit reports, linking fine-grained DeFi semantics with recurring vulnerability patterns. Given a new project, a multi-agent pipeline leverages this knowledge through an iterative loop of specification generation, Proof-of-Concept (PoC) synthesis, PoC execution, and finding reflection, driven by a shared repository index. We evaluate Knowdit on 11 recent Code4rena projects with 84 ground-truth vulnerabilities. Knowdit detects all 21 high-severity and 90% of medium-severity vulnerabilities without false positives, fully covering eight projects, significantly outperforming all baselines. Applied to seven real-world projects, Knowdit further discovers 9 high- and 36 medium-severity previously unknown vulnerabilities, securing millions in liquidity and proving its outstanding performance.

The Web3 ecosystem, underpinned by cryptographic primitives and decentralized consensus, represents a high-stakes environment where software vulnerabilities and incentive misalignments translate directly into financial loss. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into this domain for tasks ranging from smart contract auditing to decentralized finance analytics, ensuring their reliability is paramount. However, general-purpose benchmarks fail to capture the specialized reasoning required for these adversarial and protocol-driven settings. To bridge this gap, we introduce DMind Benchmark, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to rigorously assess LLM proficiency across the Web3 stack. DMind Benchmark encompasses nine distinct subdomains (spanning infrastructure, smart contracts, token economics, etc.) and combines objective knowledge retrieval with complex open-ended reasoning tasks that emulate real-world operational challenges. We conduct an extensive evaluation of 31 leading proprietary and open-weights models, employing a contamination-aware pipeline and verifying the statistical robustness of our scoring protocol through rigorous cross-judge consistency checks. Our analysis reveals a critical dichotomy: while models demonstrate competence in foundational infrastructure concepts, they exhibit significant vulnerabilities in high-reasoning tasks such as security auditing. Furthermore, we provide a Pareto analysis to guide cost-effective deployment and demonstrate through adversarial experiments that high performance on DMind Benchmark necessitates genuine reasoning rather than superficial memorization. Since its open-source release in April 2025, DMind Benchmark achieved the #1 trending position on Hugging Face for nearly a week and accumulated over 13k downloads by June 2026, establishing itself as a standard for advancing secure and trustworthy AI in Web3.