Assurance

Embedding an intelligent agent in an existing application creates a persistent coordination problem: users can revise goals and manipulate shared objects while delegated execution continues. We argue that dependable integration requires an explicit correspondence between task-level interaction and application behavior. We introduce Agent-Integrated Software (AIS) as a software pattern combining a conventional core, direct interaction, and a built-in agent, and Intent-Level Interaction Abstraction (IIA) as the task semantics through which users inspect and control delegated work. An open transition-system model relates AIS execution to IIA states and events. Interaction contracts constrain this relation through task bindings, role-specific authority, control transitions, and outcome evidence; continuous assurance maintains scoped claims as their dependencies change. A compact disclosure contract and conditional propositions illustrate why local component validity is insufficient and how selected admission invariants can be separated from planning. Contrasting software domains expose the framework's assumptions and limits. This perspective develops a research agenda spanning application abstraction, development support, controlled execution, quality assessment, and human supervision, with the aim of making agent integration a maintainable software engineering discipline.

Additional inference compute can increase the number of correctly resolved security-assurance tasks, but repeated success, unique coverage, accepted evidence, and operational protection are different quantities. We develop a resource-constrained framework that separates them. For repeated conditionally independent attempts with latent success probability $\Theta$, coverage is $C_n = 1 - E[(1-\Theta)^n]$, and its limiting value is $1 - P(\Theta = 0)$. Positive pairwise outcome correlation does not by itself imply a ceiling below one: we construct two models with the same mean success and pairwise correlation but different limiting coverage. We distinguish this result from the effective sample size used to estimate a mean, and show why finite-budget observations cannot generally identify an asymptotic support ceiling. We then connect coverage to fallible evidence checking, proper scoring of factual grounding, complete resource accounting, service capacity, and a response model that includes mitigation delay. A conceptual defensive architecture separates evidence analysis, adjudication, and operational authority. An evaluation protocol specifies held-out tasks, paired comparisons, negative cases, and uncertainty reporting. The contribution is a consistent theoretical synthesis and a set of counterexamples to invalid extrapolations, rather than an empirical scaling law. All numerical illustrations are analytic; no model-parity result, hardware benchmark, or general attacker-defender equilibrium is claimed.

Hardware assurance relies on scanning electron microscopy (SEM) to verify nanoscale structures, but assembling the large, high-quality datasets required for automated analysis is impeded by time-intensive acquisition and strict intellectual property (IP) constraints on proprietary designs. We propose a privacy-preserving pipeline that secures IP by heavily distorting the functional design while generating a visually realistic synthetic dataset from a small set of initial examples. A StyleGAN first learns the distribution of hardware layout masks to generate novel, macroscopically varied structures. Subsequently, a conditional GAN (Pix2PixHD) translates these masks into realistic SEM images that preserve authentic textures and noise. The primary finding of this work is that a segmentation model trained exclusively on this synthetic data not only demonstrates a successful "sim-to-real" transfer to real images but also outperforms a baseline model trained on the limited real dataset. Because the underlying synthetic layouts are demonstrably novel and reproduce none of the specific proprietary routing of the original design, deploying the final segmentation model mitigates the risk of exposing sensitive IP to attacks like gradient inversion and membership inference, providing a highly secure, high-performance solution for hardware assurance.

The AI-Native Manifesto envisions large-scale agile software development in which humans increasingly govern intent, risk, and exceptions while agents execute more of the engineering process. Realizing that end-state requires more than better code generation: it requires assurance closure, meaning that the system can establish what must be true, determine and obtain appropriate evidence, judge the credibility of that evidence, preserve its validity through change, and use the resulting uncertainty to bound agent authority. Existing work already provides many of the necessary mechanisms across formal methods, testing, simulation, assurance cases, digital twins, and runtime assurance. We identify six residual gaps in making the surrounding assurance reasoning sufficiently machine-operable, propose a high-level architecture with six corresponding capabilities built on a shared semantic assurance layer, and formulate four research questions to turn that architecture into dependable, human-on-the-loop, AI-native R&D.

AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments. This democratization enables rapid local innovation, but it also creates a reliability gap: agents that appear to users as simple productivity artifacts may depend on changing models, tools, retrieval sources, permissions, prompts, schedules, and external services. These dependencies can cause silent degradation long after deployment, even when no user directly modifies the agent. This paper identifies the reliability challenge created by democratized AI agent creation and proposes a lightweight continuous-assurance framework for citizen-created organizational agents. The framework combines dependency mapping, readiness contracts, scheduled checks, diagnostics, and lifecycle governance to assess whether an agent remains operationally ready under expected conditions. We also present an initial prototype auditor and scenario-based assessment showing how the proposed taxonomy can be translated into practical checks and actionable remediation guidance.

Enterprises will not deploy AI agents they cannot trust, and the most-cited reason for distrust is hallucination: confident, fluent output that is simply not true. The common response is to wait for a model that does not hallucinate. We argue that this is the wrong target. Large language models are, by construction, capable of generating unsupported text, and no amount of scale removes the possibility; a faithfulness judge bolted onto a raw model catches some errors but still ships others, and even well-curated retrieval pipelines have been shown to fabricate citations. We reframe the goal: "zero hallucination" is not a property a model possesses but a property a system enforces. We present HALO (Hallucination-Aware Layered Oversight), an assurance architecture which treats hallucination as a containable failure mode rather than an eliminable one. HALO composes six layers of defense: grounded generation over retrieved, approved content; constrained, deterministic execution that bounds where the model can err; multi-signal verification that scores every output for groundedness and hallucination using both an LLM judge and evidence-based checks against the source text; calibrated abstention, so the system declines rather than guesses when grounding is insufficient; total traceability of every retrieval, tool call, and generation; and continuous oversight that detects drift, alerts on threshold breaches, and closes the loop by regenerating and statistically validating improved agents. We detail each layer, give particular attention to evidence-based confidence (which verifies extractions against the source document rather than trusting the model's self-reported certainty), and illustrate the architecture on a regulated claims-extraction workload.

Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from experimentation into operational workflows. Early programs focused on model access and retrieval-augmented generation, but enterprises are now beginning to deploy agents that plan, retrieve, remember, call tools, update systems, and coordinate work across applications. This changes the evaluation problem. Leaders are no longer asking only whether an answer is accurate or fluent. They need to know who authorized an action, which policy applied, whether evidence was current, whether memory was valid, whether a tool call was permitted, whether the decision can be replayed, and whether the agent can be stopped before it creates business impact. This paper introduces CAGE-1: Control, Assurance, and Governance Evaluation for Enterprise Agentic AI. CAGE-1 is an evaluation framework for deciding whether enterprise agents are ready for deployment. It evaluates authority, policy enforcement, retrieval quality, memory integrity, tool safety, auditability, human oversight, conflict handling, safe failure, Prebind Assurance, operational readiness, and business fitness. CAGE-1 introduces Prebind Assurance to describe the evaluated ability to prove that an agentic action is controlled before it becomes binding, effective, or operationally consequential. The framework tests whether a proposed action is admitted, held, narrowed, refused, escalated, quarantined, or made non-effective before protected consequence forms.

The NIS-2 Directive mandates robust Risk Management from thousands of small and medium enterprises. To ensure compliance, companies rely on established standards such as the German IT-Grundschutz (IT-GS) of the Federal Office for Information Security. However, IT-GS certification is resource-intensive and requires a high level of manual effort for documentation, validation, and revision, making scalable implementation difficult and expensive. Building upon our previous conceptual framework, this paper presents the technical implementation and empirical evaluation of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) architecture combined with Hybrid Retrieval Augmented Generation (HybridRAG) for the partial automation of IT-GS certification. We introduce two novel technical contributions to the MAS architecture to enforce the compliance rigor. The Hypothesis-Verification Loop in the Structural Analysis (SA) phase that cross-references agent-inferred dependencies against the Knowledge Graph to reduce hallucinations, and a Decoupled Reasoning Pipeline that separates agent-driven semantic extraction from the deterministic protection need inheritance. We utilize the BSI's "RecPlast GmbH" case study as a human expert-generated reference data set for end-to-end evaluation of the architecture and to quantify Precision, Recall, and F1-scores. The performance of the system is investigated across the phases of SA, Protection Needs Assessment (PNA), Modeling, and IT-GS Check. The empirical results reveal noticeable differences throughout the different steps of IT-GS. While the MAS demonstrates high efficacy in semantic tasks (SA and Modeling), significantly reducing manual effort through automated information extraction, quantitative results reveal limitations in logical reasoning phases (PNA and IT-GS Check) as the probabilistic nature of current LLMs struggles to meet the deterministic rigor required by IT-GS.

Engineering reliable autonomous systems is an important and growing topic in computer science. As autonomous systems become more prevalent, easy-to-use techniques for building them reliably are increasingly important. This workshop report captures and expands on the discussions at the Lorentz Center Workshop "Engineering Reliable Autonomous Systems" (ERAS), held from 10 to 14 June 2024. The workshop was co-organised by the organisers of the Workshop on Formal Methods for Autonomous Systems (FMAS) and the Workshop on Agents and Robots for reliable Engineered Autonomy (AREA). It brought together members of the FMAS and AREA communities, industry practitioners, and representatives from sectors where autonomous systems pose distinctive engineering challenges. The workshop focused on three main research topics: techniques for verification and validation of autonomous systems; engineering real-world autonomous systems; and software architectures for safe autonomous systems. Its main outcome is a catalogue of challenges in these areas and, most importantly, a pathway to solutions. Some challenges can already be tackled by techniques that are well known in academia but have not yet become regularly used in practice. Other challenges remain unresolved and require further research. This roadmap is intended to support future research and industrial collaboration.

Surgical outcomes depend not only on patient factors and postoperative care but are also strongly influenced by the quality of the operation itself. Yet, for much of mod-ern surgery, intraoperative quality has been assessed indirectly through outcomes and operative reports. The increase in minimally invasive procedures inherently guided by endoscopic video, together with advances in artificial intelligence, creates an unprecedented opportunity to systematically observe, measure, and improve surgi-cal care. This chapter introduces AI-enabled Surgical Quality Assurance as a frame-work for using surgical data to support continuous assessment and improvement in the operating room. We first review existing approaches to surgical safety, from sys-tem-level interventions to procedure-specific standards. We then describe how AI can transform intraoperative video into clinically meaningful information, including recog-nition of anatomy, instruments, workflow, surgical actions, quality criteria, adverse events, and critical moments. Finally, we outline the major challenges that must be addressed before these systems can deliver routine clinical value, including representa-tive data collection, robust validation, workflow integration, regulation, liability, pri-vacy, and equitable access. Rather than replacing surgical judgment, AI for quality assurance should be understood as a set of tools for augmenting the surgical team, scaling expert review, and helping surgery evolve toward a learning system in which intraoperative care is continuously observed, assessed, and improved.

As large language model (LLM) agents are integrated into autonomous cloud operations, distributed systems face a semantic reliability problem: proposer agents can generate production mutations, such as modifying IAM policies, opening firewall security groups, or executing data exports, that are syntactically valid and statically authorized but operationally unsafe. Classical distributed consensus protocols replicate deterministic state transitions but do not evaluate the safety of the proposed intent. To address this gap, we introduce Semantic Quorum Assurance (SQA), a control-plane primitive for governing non-deterministic agentic infrastructure. SQA represents proposals as declarative execution contracts bound to cryptographic evidence chains and routes them to a diverse panel of read-only, sandboxed validator agents. SQA aggregates their judgments under a risk-adaptive quorum predicate that enforces model and archetype diversity, adjusts weights based on calibrated assurance scores, and respects archetype-specific vetoes. Admitted proposals execute only through a sovereign execution gate. We instantiate SQA in a cloud-native control plane and formalize a correlated cognitive failure model for non-deterministic validators. On 500 infrastructure-inspired mutation scenarios, with safety results reported on held-out safe/unsafe trials excluding ambiguous scenarios, SQA reduces unsafe approval from 18.5% for single-agent validation to 0.3% while adding median validation latency of 1.45--4.12 seconds across the studied risk buckets.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

AI-native software development is often evaluated at the level of individual models, prompts, or generated artifacts. This framing is insufficient for production environments where software must be continuously produced, verified, deployed, maintained, and adapted across many operational contexts and long time horizons. We present a meta-engineering harness: a software-production architecture that transforms operational and product feature requirements into explicit contracts, routes work through role-specialized AI agents, performs independent and adversarial verification, and continuously improves itself through structured failure classification and outer-loop calibration. The harness is designed for settings in which software delivery is not a one-time project but an ongoing operating function. In our motivating application, CTO-as-a-service for small service firms, the system manages websites, booking flows, payment systems, backoffice workflow automations, and AI-agent interfaces as continuously evolving technical infrastructure rather than one-off deliverables. We describe the layered architecture, including two-pass contract compilation, persistent markdown memory with specialization records, attention-based and independence-based verifications, a four-way failure arbiter, and outer-loop calibration. We report results from an early production deployment spanning 17 features over several weeks, including a detailed in-app payments case study that revealed contract incompleteness and verification-boundary issues. These observations directly drove targeted improvements to the harness. The contribution is an implemented, measurable, and extensible verification architecture for making AI-native service-as-a-software production reliable, auditable, and improvable over time.

Assurance arguments provide a clear and structured way to explain why stakeholders should trust that a system satisfies certain properties, yet widely used notations, e.g.Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), typically lack an operational semantics for deriving assurance confidence. Existing approaches address structure and soundness but largely reason over truth values, not over confidence in the justification of claims. Subjective Logic (SL) offers a calculus of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty with operators for combining opinions, enabling confidence propagation under incomplete, conflicting, or subjective evidence. However, existing SL-based approaches do not provide a uniform, compositional semantics that covers all argument elements and relations to enable overall confidence assessment. We propose a confidence semantics that represents argument elements as SL opinions and maps relations between elements to SL operators modelling how confidence flows, effectively turning the argument into an analyzable confidence network. The approach provides explicit warrants, principled handling of context, preserved provenance, and compatibility with GSN, along with practical guidance using an exemplary assurance confidence assessment.

This position paper argues that behavioural assurance, even when carefully designed, is being asked to carry safety claims it cannot verify. AI governance frameworks enacted between 2019 and early 2026 require reviewable evidence of properties such as the absence of hidden objectives, resistance to loss-of-control precursors, and bounded catastrophic capability; current assurance methodologies (primarily behavioural evaluations and red-teaming) are epistemically limited to observable model outputs and cannot verify the latent representations or long-horizon agentic behaviours these frameworks presume to regulate. We formalize this structural mismatch as the audit gap, the divergence between required and achievable verification access, and introduce the concept of fragile assurance to describe cases where the evidential structure does not support the asserted safety claim. Through an analysis of a 21-instrument inventory, we identify an incentive gradient where geopolitical and industrial pressures systematically reward surface-level behavioral proxies over deep structural verification. Finally, we propose a technical pivot: bounding the weight of behavioral evidence in legal text and extending voluntary pre-deployment access with mechanistic-evidence classes, specifically linear probes, activation patching, and before/after-training comparisons.

The continual assurance of safety and performance of automated driving systems (ADSs) poses significant challenges. ADSs operate in complex, dynamic, open-world environments allowing a wide range of scenarios, including ones that are rare or not foreseen during initial development. While the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technology allows ADSs to learn from data gathered during operation and thus enables them to adapt over time, these approaches come with their own challenges. A key advantage of ADSs compared to human drivers is their greater ability to gather data collectively across a fleet of vehicles, or even across multiple fleets operated by different entities, and to learn from this data collectively. Vehicles can share and combine their data to identify additional learning opportunities otherwise missed by individual vehicles. This creates new opportunities to tackle the challenges of continual assurance of safety and performance, but requires the implementation of architectures that leverage the collective learning potential. Based on established MLOps principles and existing work in the field of connected automated driving, this paper presents a five-layer architecture for collective learning-enabled MLOps processes for ADSs. The goal of this architecture is to provide a conceptual blueprint for the design and implementation of MLOps processes by fleet operators and other relevant stakeholders. The paper describes the main responsibilities of each layer, their interactions, and how multi-level self-assessments enabled by the architecture can support the detection and reduction of edge cases including black swan events.

Safe reinforcement learning (RL) typically asks $\textit{what}$ an agent should do. We ask $\textit{when}$ it needs to act, and show that a single policy can jointly learn control inputs and communication-efficient timing decisions under a pointwise Lyapunov safety shield. We focus on stabilization around a known equilibrium, where CARE-based LQR backups, Lyapunov certificates, and classical Lyapunov-STC are well defined, enabling clean comparison against analytical baselines. A run-time assurance (RTA) layer overrides the policy via a one-step-ahead Lyapunov prediction and a precomputed LQR backup, providing a strictly stronger guarantee than constrained MDP methods that enforce safety only in expectation. On an inverted pendulum, cart--pole, and planar quadrotor, the learned policy achieves $1.91\times$, $1.45\times$, and $3.51\times$ higher mean inter-sample interval (MSI) than a Lyapunov-triggered baseline; a fixed LQR controller at the same average rate is unstable on all three plants, showing that adaptive timing, not a lower average rate, makes sparsity safe. A CARE-derived Lyapunov reward transfers across environments without redesign, with a single weight $w_c$ controlling the stability--communication tradeoff; ablations confirm the RTA shield is essential, with its removal reducing MSI by $1.27$--$1.84\times$ and degrading state norms. A preference-conditioned extension recovers the full tradeoff frontier from one model at $\tfrac{2}{11}$ of training compute, and SAC experiments show the results are algorithm-agnostic across discrete and continuous domains. A 12-state 3D quadrotor case study extends the framework to higher-dimensional systems where classical STC is intractable, and robustness to $\pm30\%$ mass variation and disturbances shows graceful degradation, with the RTA absorbing what the learned policy cannot.

This paper presents CPEMH, an agentic framework designed to evaluate prompt-driven behavior in foundation-model systems operating on transcript-based datasets for mental-health screening. CPEMH serves as an engineering methodology for behavioral assurance in large-scale language systems, introducing an orchestrated architecture that autonomously performs the design, evaluation, and selection of prompt strategies, enabling systematic control of behavioral variability across contexts. Its modular agentic design, combining orchestrator, inference, and evaluation agents, ensures traceability, reproducibility, and robustness throughout the prompting lifecycle. A case study on automated depression screening from interview transcripts demonstrates the framework's capacity to stabilize and audit foundation-model behavior in conversational and clinically sensitive domains. Lessons learned emphasize the role of modular orchestration in behavioral assurance, the prioritization of stability over architectural complexity, and the integration of F1, bias, and robustness as core acceptance criteria.

Scientific knowledge on the Web is published as passive assertions and cannot decide when to validate evidence, reconcile contradictions, or update confidence as findings accumulate. Curation depends on centralised middleware and institutional continuity, but when registries close, active stewardship stops even when data remain online. We advance the concept of Autonomous FAIR Digital Objects (aFDOs) from an abstract idea to an operational model, to offer a route from passive scientific publication toward accountable, standards-aligned automation that can outlive its publishing institutions. aFDO augments FDOs with three capabilities anchored in Semantic Web standards, namely 1) a policy layer over RDF-star aligned with PROV-O, SHACL, and ODRL for portable condition-action rules, 2) an announcement layer over ActivityStreams 2.0 that bounds per-announcement evaluation cost, and 3) an agreement layer that resolves multi-source contradictions through reputation and confidence weighted agreement under a bounded adversarial model. We provide a formal definition that distinguishes policy specifications, event handlers, and communication interfaces. We evaluate an open reference implementation on 4,305 FDOs grounded in rare-disease ontologies, namely ClinVar, HPO, and Orphanet, combined with controlled synthetic observations. The consensus mechanism resolves 56.3% of 3,914 naturally occurring ClinVar conflicts where multiple submitters disagree and an expert panel has subsequently adjudicated. Under Sybil, collusion, and poisoning attacks, the mechanism degrades gracefully within its design Byzantine-tolerance bound (f < n/5), and fails as predicted beyond that bound.

This report describes ARIS (Auto-Research-in-sleep), an open-source research harness for autonomous research, including its architecture, assurance mechanisms, and early deployment experience. The performance of agent systems built on LLMs depends on both the model weights and the harness around them, which governs what information to store, retrieve, and present to the model. For long-horizon research workflows, the central failure mode is not a visible breakdown but a plausible unsupported success: a long-running agent can produce claims whose evidential support is incomplete, misreported, or silently inherited from the executor's framing. Therefore, we present ARIS as a research harness that coordinates machine-learning research workflows through cross-model adversarial collaboration as a default configuration: an executor model drives forward progress while a reviewer from a different model family is recommended to critique intermediate artifacts and request revisions. ARIS has three architectural layers. The execution layer provides more than 65 reusable Markdown-defined skills, model integrations via MCP, a persistent research wiki for iterative reuse of prior findings, and deterministic figure generation. The orchestration layer coordinates five end-to-end workflows with adjustable effort settings and configurable routing to reviewer models. The assurance layer includes a three-stage process for checking whether experimental claims are supported by evidence: integrity verification, result-to-claim mapping, and claim auditing that cross-checks manuscript statements against the claim ledger and raw evidence, as well as a five-pass scientific-editing pipeline, mathematical-proof checks, and visual inspection of the rendered PDF. A prototype self-improvement loop records research traces and proposes harness improvements that are adopted only after reviewer approval.

Software engineering increasingly involves making high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, using signals from code, field data, and socio-technical processes. Recent AI-driven support (e.g., anomaly detection, predictive analytics, AIOps, as well as LLM-based agents) has amplified engineers' ability to detect patterns and synthesize content and recommendations, but many critical questions are interventional or counterfactual: What is the expected impact of changing a load-balancing strategy? Would an outage have been avoided under a different release plan? Correlational models answer "what tends to co-occur"; they struggle to answer "what would happen if we act." We propose Causal Software Engineering (CSE) as a future paradigm in which causal models and causal reasoning systematically inform activities across the software lifecycle, augmenting existing practices with explicit assumptions, uncertainty-aware effect estimates, and counterfactual diagnosis. We outline (i) a causal-first workflow view spanning development and operations, (ii) a staged roadmap for tools and organizational adoption, and (iii) an evaluation and benchmark agenda for measuring progress.

The rapid collapse of decentralized game economies, often characterized by the \textit{death spiral,} remains the most formidable barrier to the mass adoption of Web3 gaming. This paper proposes that the sustainability of an open game economy is predicated on three necessary and sufficient conditions: Anti-Sybil Resilience, Anti-Capital Dominance, and Anti-Inflationary Saturation. The first section establishes a theoretical proof of these conditions, arguing that the absence of any single dimension leads to systemic failure. The second section explores the dialectical relationship between these dimensions, illustrating how unchecked automation and capital-driven monopolies accelerate asset hyperinflation. In the third section, we introduce the Identity-Bound Asset Integrity Model (IBAIM) as a comprehensive technical solution. IBAIM utilizes Zero-Knowledge (ZK) biometric hashing and Account Abstraction (AA) to anchor asset utility to unique human identities through a privacy-preserving and regulatory-compliant architecture. By exogenizing biometric verification to trusted local environments and utilizing Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity (zk-PoI), the model ensures absolute user privacy. Furthermore, by implementing an Asymmetric Utility Decay (AUD) engine-whereby assets suffer a vertical 50% utility cliff upon secondary transfer-and an entropy-driven thermodynamic degradation mechanism., the model successfully decouples financial speculation from in-game merit. Finally, we apply this framework to analyze prominent historical failures in the GameFi sector, demonstrating that their collapse was an inevitable consequence of violating these core economic constraints. Our findings suggest that trading a degree of asset liquidity for system integrity is the only viable path toward long-term economic viability in decentralized virtual worlds.

An assurance case is a structured argument document that justifies claims about a system's requirements or properties, which are supported by evidence. In regulated domains, these are crucial for meeting compliance and safety requirements to industry standards. We propose a graph diagnostic framework for analysing the structure and provenance of assurance cases. We focus on two main tasks: (1) link prediction, to learn and identify connections between argument elements, and (2) graph classification, to differentiate between assurance cases created by a state-of-the-art large language model and those created by humans, aiming to detect bias. We compiled a publicly available dataset of assurance cases, represented as graphs with nodes and edges, supporting both link prediction and provenance analysis. Experiments show that graph neural networks (GNNs) achieve strong link prediction performance (ROC-AUC 0.760) on real assurance cases and generalise well across domains and semi-supervised settings. For provenance detection, GNNs effectively distinguish human-authored from LLM-generated cases (F1 0.94). We observed that LLM-generated assurance cases have different hierarchical linking patterns compared to human-authored cases. Furthermore, existing GNN explanation methods show only moderate faithfulness, revealing a gap between predicted reasoning and the true argument structure.