Automated Bidding

Bid optimization in online advertising relies on black-box machine-learning models that learn bidding decisions from historical data. However, these approaches fail to replicate human experts' adaptive, experience-driven, and globally coherent decisions. Specifically, they generalize poorly in data-sparse cases because of missing structured knowledge, make short-sighted sequential decisions that ignore long-term interdependencies, and struggle to adapt in out-of-distribution scenarios where human experts succeed. To address this, we propose KBD (Knowledge-informed Bidding with Dual-process control), a novel method for bid optimization. KBD embeds human expertise as inductive biases through the informed machine-learning paradigm, uses Decision Transformer (DT) to globally optimize multi-step bidding sequences, and implements dual-process control by combining a fast rule-based PID (System 1) with DT (System 2). Extensive experiments highlight KBD's advantage over existing methods and underscore the benefit of grounding bid optimization in human expertise and dual-process control.

Modern e-commerce platforms employ various auction mechanisms to allocate paid slots for a given item. To scale this approach to the millions of auctions, the platforms suggest promotion tools based on the autobidding algorithms. These algorithms typically depend on the Click-Through-Rate (CTR) and Conversion-Rate (CVR) estimates provided by a pre-trained machine learning model. However, the predictions of such models are uncertain and can significantly affect the performance of the autobidding algorithm. To address this issue, we propose the DenoiseBid method, which corrects the generated CTRs and CVRs to make the resulting bids more efficient in auctions. The underlying idea of our method is to employ a Bayesian approach and replace noisy CTR or CVR estimates with those from recovered distributions. To demonstrate the performance of the proposed approach, we perform extensive experiments on the synthetic, iPinYou, and BAT datasets. To evaluate the robustness of our approach to the noise scale, we use synthetic noise and noise estimated from the predictions of the pre-trained machine learning model.

This paper investigates the integration of large language models (LLMs) as reasoning agents in repeated spectrum auctions within heterogeneous networks (HetNets). While auction-based mechanisms have been widely employed for efficient resource allocation, most prior works assume one-shot auctions, static bidder behavior, and idealized conditions. In contrast to traditional formulations where base station (BS) association and power allocation are centrally optimized, we propose a distributed auction-based framework in which each BS independently conducts its own multi-channel auction, and user equipments (UEs) strategically decide both their association and bid values. Within this setting, UEs operate under budget constraints and repeated interactions, transforming resource allocation into a long-term economic decision rather than a one-shot optimization problem. The proposed framework enables the evaluation of diverse bidding behaviors -from classical myopic and greedy policies to LLM-based agents capable of reasoning over historical outcomes, anticipating competition, and adapting their bidding strategy across episodes. Simulation results reveal that the LLM-empowered UE consistently achieves higher channel access frequency and improved budget efficiency compared to benchmarks. These findings highlight the potential of reasoning-enabled agents in future decentralized wireless networks markets and pave the way for lightweight, edge-deployable LLMs to support intelligent resource allocation in next-generation HetNets.

In online advertising, the inherent complexity and dynamic nature of advertising environments necessitate the use of auto-bidding services to assist advertisers in bid optimization. This complexity is further compounded in multi-channel scenarios, where effective allocation of budgets and constraints across channels with distinct behavioral patterns becomes critical for optimizing return on investment. Current approaches predominantly rely on either optimization-based strategies or reinforcement learning techniques. However, optimization-based methods lack flexibility in adapting to dynamic market conditions, while reinforcement learning approaches often struggle to capture essential historical dependencies and observational patterns within the constraints of Markov Decision Process frameworks. To address these limitations, we propose AHBid, an Adaptable Hierarchical Bidding framework that integrates generative planning with real-time control. The framework employs a high-level generative planner based on diffusion models to dynamically allocate budgets and constraints by effectively capturing historical context and temporal patterns. We introduce a constraint enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with specified constraints, along with a trajectory refinement mechanism that enhances adaptability to environmental changes through the utilization of historical data. The system further incorporates a control-based bidding algorithm that synergistically combines historical knowledge with real-time information, significantly improving both adaptability and operational efficacy. Extensive experiments conducted on large-scale offline datasets and through online A/B tests demonstrate the effectiveness of AHBid, yielding a 13.57% increase in overall return compared to existing baselines.

We study the allocation of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) in a multi-cell wireless network, where base stations compete for control of shared RIS units deployed at the cell edges. These RISs, provided by an independent operator, are dynamically leased to the highest bidder using a simultaneously ascending auction format. Each base station estimates the utility of acquiring additional RISs based on macroscopic channel parameters, enabling a scalable and low-overhead allocation mechanism. To optimize the bidding behavior, we integrate deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents that learn to maximize performance while adhering to budget constraints. Through simulations in clustered cell-edge environments, we demonstrate that reinforcement learning (RL)-based bidding significantly outperforms heuristic strategies, achieving optimal trade-offs between cost and spectral efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce a tunable parameter that governs the bidding aggressiveness of RL agents, enabling a flexible control of the trade-off between network performance and expenditure. Our results highlight the potential of combining auction-based allocation with adaptive RL mechanisms for efficient and fair utilization of RISs in next-generation wireless networks.

Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.

We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is $O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)$, where $\mathcal W_T$ measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided $O(\sqrt{T})$ fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by $(b/2a)PlanError$. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through $PlanError$. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.