Automated Bidding

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2 papers in the last four weeks, with none the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 21

Oct 5, 2026cs.GT

Parallelism or Concession? Concurrency-Aware Procurement Negotiation for Agentic Commerce

Agentic buyers can cheaply fork a procurement task into many parallel negotiations, but concurrency is not free: every thread consumes resources, and simultaneous agreements create cancellation and commitment risk. We study a one-unit post-order sourcing problem with a single hard-deadline negotiation window, in which a planner jointly chooses the number of seller-facing negotiators and a common procurement price cap. The model combines a product-specific acceptance curve with fulfillment loss, per-thread cost, and excess-commitment cost. We establish three structural results. First, holding the per-thread acceptance target fixed, the marginal value of another negotiator decays geometrically, yielding a conditional concurrency threshold. Second, under a convex quantile curve, parallelism substitutes for concession: more concurrent negotiators imply a weakly lower per-thread acceptance target and price cap. Third, when prices are more dispersed, Agentic buyers benefit by searching harder for bargains, but suffer when they instead try to guarantee procurement by offering higher prices. We operationalize these results in the Concurrency-Aware Negotiation Optimizer (CANO), a deterministic optimizer that jointly determines the optimal negotiation concurrency and procurement price cap for an agentic procurement system. Across different analytic market configurations and extensive Monte Carlo, finite-data, non-Gaussian, and correlated-seller stress tests, CANO consistently outperforms common heuristic policies while validating the predicted structural properties.

Xiaolin Xu, Donghao Zhu

School of Business Nanjing University Nanjing, Jiangsu, China · Institute of Business Sciences University of Tsukuba Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan · University of Tokyo Market Design Center Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan

Multi-Agent System Optimization Automated Negotiation Automated Bidding Agentic Commerce

Sep 30, 2026cs.LG

Inference Auctions

When inference demand exceeds available compute capacity, model providers must decide which requests should be served first. Users have different tolerances for delay from an LLM API, but current priority pricing schemes compress these differences into coarse fixed-price service tiers. We design an inference auction that allows users to bid for faster service. Our auction allocates priority in an economically efficient way without sacrificing latency, and we develop fast algorithms for implementing prices that incentivize truthful bidding. We also design an autobidding agent for our inference auction, where users specify an inference budget and the autobidder dynamically adjusts its bids over time to maximize user utility subject to the budget constraint. Experiments validate the practicality of our auction: it increases system welfare while maintaining the cache utilization and latency advantages of SGLang, a state-of-the-art inference serving framework.

Keegan Harris, Siddharth Prasad, Asher Trockman +2

University of California, Berkeley · Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago · Google Research +1

Mechanism Design Automated Bidding LLM Inference Scheduling LLM Inference Serving

Sep 27, 2026cs.GT

When Privacy Moves ML-Mediated Decisions On Device: Information and Incentive Misalignment in Auctions

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

Dipankar Sarkar

Skelf Research

Automated Bidding Real-Time Bidding

Jul 29, 2026cs.LG

PlatformBid: An Auto-Bidding Benchmark from a Unified Advertising Platform's Perspective

Real-time bidding is central to computational advertising, comprising three elements: Supply Side Platform (SSP) selling ad impressions, Demand Side Platform (DSP) bidding for advertisers, and Ad Exchange conducting auctions between them. Traditional auto-bidding algorithms focus solely on the DSP side, maximizing advertiser conversions by adjusting bids against competitors. However, current big ad platforms, such as social media and e-commerce companies, now integrate SSP, DSP, and Ad Exchange functions internally. From such ad platforms' perspective, the goal of the auto-bidding algorithms is not only to maximize the advertisers' conversions, but also the total revenue of the platform. Given the lack of platform-centric evaluation frameworks and the pressing need to advance auto-bidding research, we propose PlatformBid - the first comprehensive benchmark designed from a unified ad platform's perspective. To accurately reflect the real-world auto-bidding scenarios, we define three representative settings: (1) homogeneous competition with identical algorithms across advertisers, (2) heterogeneous competition with diverse algorithmic strategies, and (3) promotional competition where some advertisers surge budgets for boosting sales during promotional events like Black Friday. We systematically evaluate a broad spectrum of existing auto-bidding methods across these settings, encompassing classical control methods, RL-based methods, and recent generative methods. Besides these methods, we further propose a novel auto-bidding method based on flow-matching, termed BidFlow, which leverages the flow-matching method's expressive policy representation to effectively handle dynamic competitive environments. Online experiments on Kuaishou further show a +0.68% improvement in target cost, providing deployment evidence for the offline-online consistency of PlatformBid.

Shengtian Yang, Yewen Li, Peng Jiang +5

Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore

Benchmark Design Automated Bidding Online Advertising Real-Time Bidding

Jul 29, 2026cs.GT

Collusion with Competitive Marginals: Price-Level Audits Are Blind by Construction

Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid law exactly at the competitive law. Any test whose input is a single agent's price or bid history then has power exactly equal to its false-positive rate, for every coupling strength up to comonotonicity. The published detection methodology is therefore blind to this conduct by construction rather than underpowered, and no sample size repairs it. Three empirical results follow. First, the mechanism appears in real language-model agents: twenty models from nineteen independent developers, three deployment prompts each, show residual correlation of

+0.053

between two deployments of one model against

+0.0001

across models, with a 95% interval clustered by developer of

[0.030, 0.078]

, under an auditor that sees every order feature and is fitted out of sample. Second, the coupling falls monotonically as sampling temperature rises (

p=0.002

), turning a deployment parameter into a candidate mitigation. Third, on 24 days of Ethereum block-building auction data covering 77,684 bids from 39 bidders, the honest population of bidder pairs is itself so dependent that a screen held at a 5% false-positive rate must sit above a floor of

+0.50

to

+0.81

, which is 20 to 32 times the family-wise sampling threshold and does not fall as the audit window grows. Since lawful multi-identity operation and conspiracy are behaviourally indistinguishable here, the tractable regulatory target is not detection but counting: resolving 40 bidding identities into 23 operators raises the Herfindahl index by 247.5%, and adding behavioural clusters from public bid streams reaches 324.5%.

Xin Xu, Chengrui Wu, Jiayu Lu +3

Carnegie Mellon University · Zhejiang University

Algorithmic Auditing Automated Bidding Algorithmic Collusion

Jul 28, 2026cs.LG

Beyond Single-Episode Optimization: Sliding-Window Aware Generative Auto-Bidding for Long-Term Advertising Effectiveness

Auto-bidding systems optimize bids to maximize value under efficiency constraints such as Cost-Per-Action (CPA). Existing methods treat each day as an independent episode. However, many advertisers produce value so sparsely that per-day efficiency ratios become statistically unreliable, undermining advertiser retention. Platforms therefore evaluate window-level efficiency over sliding windows of

W{=}7

days, ensuring fair evaluation and long-term advertising effectiveness. This creates cross-episode coupling: each day's bidding decisions affect up to

W

overlapping windows, so setting daily targets requires anticipating future market conditions. We propose SWAG-Bid (Sliding-Window Aware Generative Auto-Bidding), a hierarchical framework decomposing this challenge into episode-level planning and step-level execution. The planner uses a Masked Trajectory Model to forecast markets and generate candidate plans, scored across all overlapping windows by Multi-Window Model Predictive Control Sampling (MWMS) with exponential confidence decay. The controller adjusts reliance on this guidance through a state-adaptive gate, Per-Step Gated Adaptive Layer Normalization (PSG-AdaLN), complemented by Return-to-Go and Cost-to-Go channels carrying budget and constraint information. Experiments on AuctionNet-Sparse and online A/B tests on AliExpress show that SWAG-Bid achieves competitive constraint satisfaction and value acquisition under sliding-window evaluation.

Binglin Wu, Chuan Yue, Yingyi Zhang +4

Dalian University of Technology Dalian, China · Alibaba International Digital Commerce Group Hangzhou, China · Dalian University of Technology & City University of Hong Kong Dalian, China

Automated Bidding Online Advertising Constrained Optimization

Jul 19, 2026cs.LG

AIGB-R1: Self-Evolving Generative Auto-Bidding via Hierarchical Planner-Executor Optimization

Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, automatically adjusting bids for advertisers to optimize their commercial goals. The emerging AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB) paradigm widely adopts generative modeling to optimize bidding strategies, yet suffers from the limited mode coverage of offline datasets and inadequate task-state understanding, hindering effective exploration of optimal strategies. Large Language Models (LLMs), with prior world knowledge and reasoning capabilities, offer a promising approach to overcome these limitations. However, directly applying LLMs to auto-bidding tasks faces inherent challenges in limited numerical precision, hallucinations, and inference latency. To address these limitations, we propose AIGB-R1, a hierarchical self-evolving auto-bidding framework aiming to enhance AI-Generated Bidding via LLMs' Reasoning capabilities, comprising a high-level Planner module for macro-level strategy planning and a low-level Executor module for fine-grained decision-making. Building upon this, we design an experience-driven self-evolving loop, enabling autonomous strategy exploration and optimization from accumulated experience. We adopt a two-stage pipeline of offline pre-training and post-training alignment, and build an interactive bidding simulation environment for strategy rollout. Furthermore, we propose Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (D-GRPO) to achieve end-to-end optimization via advantage decoupling. Experimental results on a large-scale public dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of AIGB-R1.

Yuejia Dou, Hesong Wang, Xinyu Zhang +6

Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China Beijing, China · Alibaba Group Beijing, China

Automated Bidding Large Language Model-Guided Optimization Online Advertising Self-Improving Agents RL for LLM Agents

Jun 28, 2026cs.LG

Learning to Bid in Discriminatory Auctions with Budget Constraints

We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus

α

times payment, where

α\in[0,1]

is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over

T

rounds subject to a total budget

B

. The problem is challenging even without budgets: the action space is exponential in

M

, the maximum demand of the bidder and the valuation vector (context) varies over time. Exploiting a decomposition of utility across units, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on shortest paths in a directed acyclic graph, obtaining sublinear regret under both full-information and bandit feedback. In the bandit setting, the regret is independent of the number of contexts due to complete cross-learning: observing the utility of the chosen action under the realized context reveals the utility for the same action under all counterfactual contexts. With budget constraints, when the average normalized per-round budget

ρ=\frac{B}{MT}<1

, we design a coupled primal-dual algorithm in which the DAG-based procedure uses dual-adjusted edge weights for primal updates, while online gradient descent updates the dual variable, yielding

ρ

-approximate sublinear regret. Finally, we give implementations whose per-round time and space are independent of the number of contexts, enabling scalability to large or even infinite context spaces.

Negin Golrezaei, Sourav Sahoo

Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Game Theory Automated Bidding Contextual Bandits Online Resource Allocation

Jun 27, 2026cs.CL

A3M: Adaptive, Adversarial and Multi-Objective Learning for Strategic Bidding in Repeated Auctions

Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge. Existing methods often rely on rigid explore-then-exploit schedules, assume stationary adversaries, and optimize solely for bidder utility, thereby limiting adaptability and strategic robustness. To address these limitations, we introduce the A3M framework, which integrates adaptive deep reinforcement learning (DRL), explicit adversarial reasoning, and principled multi-objective reward design for online auction strategy optimization. A3M employs an actor-critic DRL backbone to dynamically balance exploration and exploitation, an opponent model for fictitious play against non-stationary adversaries, and a composite reward function to jointly maximize utility, auctioneer revenue, and fairness. We provide the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of this integrated approach against established baselines in both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Results show that A3M reduces final regret by 30--40% in standard settings, maintains robust performance against adversarial strategy shifts, scales favorably with the number of units

K

, and enables tunable multi-objective trade-offs. An extensive ablation study confirms the necessity of each core component. Our work establishes A3M as a powerful and flexible framework for learning in complex auction environments.

Junhan Li, Yuxin Zhang, Haoran Wang +1

Department of Computer Science Nanjing University

Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning Game Theory Automated Bidding Reward Design for RL

Jun 12, 2026cs.LG

DRIVE: Distributional and Retrieval-Augmented Bidding with Value Evaluation

Auto-bidding is a core component of real-time advertising systems, where decisions must optimize long-term performance under budget and cost constraints, while online exploration is prohibitively risky. Offline reinforcement learning and, more recently, Transformer-based sequence modeling have shown promise for learning bidding policies from logged data, but their unimodal and purely parametric formulations often collapse multiple effective bidding strategies into suboptimal averaged actions and perform unreliably under sparse or long-tail traffic. To mitigate these limitations, we propose DRIVE (Distributional and Retrieval-Augmented Bidding with Value Evaluation), a unified Transformer-based framework that decouples candidate action generation from decision making for offline auto-bidding. DRIVE combines distributional action modeling, retrieval-augmented candidate generation from high-quality historical decisions, and value-based evaluation to select the most promising bid at inference time. Extensive experiments on AuctionNet and additional offline reinforcement learning benchmarks demonstrate that DRIVE consistently improves bidding performance and generalizes well across multiple Transformer-based methods.

Miduo Cui, Haochen Wang, Shangqin Mao +6

Shandong University, Jinan, China · Meituan, Beijing, China

Distributional RL Automated Bidding Offline RL Real-Time Bidding

Jun 4, 2026cs.GT

DNQ: Deep Nash Q-Network for Partially Observable n-Player Games

Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.

Qintong Xie, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet +1

Nash Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Imperfect-Information Games Game Theory Automated Bidding Repeated Games+2

May 29, 2026cs.LG

Learning to Bid in FCR Markets: A Best-of-Both-Worlds Approach

Bidding in the European Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) market is challenging for flexibility providers because competing offers are hidden and bidders observe only partial feedback form the market, such as, clearing price and awarded quantity. For a participant active in a single country, we show that the multi-country FCR clearing problem can be recast as a repeated multi-unit uniform-price auction against an endogenous vector of opposing bids. This reformulation yields an online learning problem and allows us to adapt a Best-of-Both-Worlds combinatorial semi-bandit algorithm implementable from this standard market feedback. The resulting bidder achieves logarithmic pseudo-regret in stochastic environments and

\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})

regret in adversarial ones. Synthetic experiments confirm the expected scaling, and backtests on historical European FCR data show competitive performance in practice: the method performs especially well on stable products, while EXP3-type baselines can be safer under stronger non-stationarity. Overall, the results show that learning-based bidding in FCR markets is theoretically grounded and practically useful when the learning rule matches product-level market stability.

Marius Potfer, Cheng Wan, Pierre Gruet

ENSAE, CREST (Fairplay joint team), 5 Av. Le Chatelier, 91120, Palaiseau, France · EDF Lab Paris-Saclay, FiME (Laboratoire de Finance des Marchés de l’Énergie), 7 Bd Gaspard Monge, 91120, Palaiseau, France

Automated Bidding Power Systems

May 29, 2026cs.GT

Model Monotonicity in Autobidding Auctions: When Do Better Predictions Lead to Better Outcomes?

Online advertising platforms rely on machine learning models to predict click-through rates (pCTR) and conversion rates (pCVR) for auction mechanisms. We introduce a novel framework to study the interaction between recommender system model quality, auction format, and autobidder behavior. We formalize when model improvements -- defined via a refinement relation inspired by filtrations in probability theory -- lead to improvements in platform-level Evaluation Criteria Metrics (ECM) such as revenue, welfare, or liquid welfare. Our main contributions are: (1) a formal definition of model improvement based on cluster refinement, and (2) a systematic characterization of ECM monotonicity across different combinations of bidder types (tCPA, max-CPA), auction formats (first-price, second-price, VCG), and budget constraints. We show that first-price auctions with uniform bidding guarantee revenue monotonicity for tCPA bidders without budgets (via Jensen's inequality), while second-price auctions and budget constraints can break this property. We provide full numerical constructions for the non-monotonicity results. Our findings have practical implications for advertising platforms seeking to align model improvements with business outcomes.

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru

Uber Technologies, Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA.

Game Theory Automated Bidding Online Advertising

May 27, 2026cs.LG

Learning to Bid in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Dynamic Values and Aggregated Feedback

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of

\widetilde{O}(\log N)

for piecewise linear primitives, and

\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})

for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.

Benjamin Heymann, Otmane Sakhi

Criteo AI Lab

Game Theory Automated Bidding

May 27, 2026cs.AI

Constrained Auto-Bidding via Generative Response Modeling

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

Eunseok Yang, Xingdong Zuo, Kyung-Min Kim

NAVER Corporation Seongnam-si, Republic of Korea

Automated Bidding Online Advertising Constrained Optimization

May 21, 2026stat.ML

Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions

Shilling is the use of artificial bids to make competition appear stronger and push prices upward. We study repeated first-price auctions in which shilling affects feedback but not allocation: the learner wins or loses against the real competing bid, but after a loss observes the maximum of the real bid and an independent shill bid. Thus the manipulation changes what the learner observes and hence how it learns to bid, without changing the outcome of the current auction. We analyze regret with respect to the best bid benchmark, assuming that the shill-bid distribution is known. Even then, shilling can mask the real bid, while useful side information appears only through intermittent low-shill events. Our algorithm combines a robust interval-elimination branch, which ignores the shilled report and achieves the dynamic-pricing rate

\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})

, with an optimistic branch that debiases losing-side reports and exploits the resulting suffix information when it is reliable and achieves the first-price auctions rate

\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})

. A validation and racing procedure lets the algorithm use these optimistic updates without knowing the right scale or feedback geometry in advance. We complement the upper bounds with a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors, in the single-active-region case. Overall, the results show that even feedback-only shilling can sharply alter the statistical difficulty of repeated bidding.

Luigi Foscari, Matilde Tullii, Vianney Perchet

LAILA, Università degli Studi di Milano · Fairplay Team, Crest-Ensae, IP Paris · Fairplay Team, Crest-Ensae, IP Paris, CRITEO AI Team, Paris

Game Theory Automated Bidding

May 19, 2026cs.AI

Generative Auto-Bidding with Unified Modeling and Exploration

Automated bidding is central to modern digital advertising. Early rule-based methods lacked adaptability, while subsequent Reinforcement Learning approaches modeled bidding as a Markov Decision Process but struggled with long-term dependencies. Recent generative models show promise, yet they lack explicit mechanisms to balance exploration and safety, relying solely on action perturbations or trajectory guidance without a safety fallback. This results in inefficient exploration and elevated financial risk for advertising platforms. To address this gap, we propose GUIDE (Generative Auto-Bidding with Unified Modeling and Exploration), a framework that synergistically integrates directed exploration with a safe fallback mechanism. GUIDE employs a Decision Transformer (DT) to jointly model historical bidding actions and environmental state transitions. A Q-value module guides the DT's exploration via regularization constraints, while an Inverse Dynamics Module (IDM) leverages DT-predicted future states to infer robust, behaviorally consistent actions as a safe policy fallback. The Q-value module then adaptively selects the final action between these two options, balancing exploration and safety. Together, these components form an integrated "explore-safeguard-select" pipeline that unifies efficiency and safety. We conduct extensive experiments on public datasets, in simulated auction environments, and through large-scale online deployment on Taobao, a leading Chinese advertising platform. Results show GUIDE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines across all scenarios. In real-world deployment, GUIDE achieves notable gains: +4.10% ad GMV, +1.40% ad clicks, +1.66% ad cost, and +3.52% ad ROI, demonstrating its effectiveness and strong industrial applicability.

Mingming Zhang, Feiqing Zhuang, Na Li +7

Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University · Taobao & Tmall Group of Alibaba

Automated Bidding Online Advertising Decision Transformer RL Exploration RL for Generative Models Safe RL

May 7, 2026cs.AI

On the Role of Language Representations in Auto-Bidding: Findings and Implications

Auto-bidding is a crucial task in real-time advertising markets, where policies must optimize long-horizon value under delivery constraints (e.g., budget and CPA). Existing methods for auto-bidding rely on compact numerical state representations: while they can implicitly capture delivery dynamics, they offer limited support for explicitly representing and controlling high-level intent, evolving feedback, and operator-style strategic guidance in real campaigns. Meanwhile, Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a powerful method for encoding semantic information, it remains unclear when LLMs help and how to integrate them without sacrificing numerical precision. Through systematic preliminary studies, we find that (1) LLM embeddings contain bidding-relevant cues yet cannot replace numerical features, and (2) gains emerge only with careful semantic--numeric integration rather than naive concatenation. Motivated by these findings, we propose \textit{SemBid}, a novel auto-bidding framework that injects LLM-encoded semantics into offline bidding trajectories at the token level. SemBid introduces three semantic inputs: \textit{Task}, \textit{History}, and \textit{Strategy}. It injects these semantics as tokens alongside numerical trajectory tokens and uses self-attention to integrate them, improving controllability and generalization across objectives. Across diverse scenarios and budget regimes, SemBid outperforms competitive baselines from offline RL and generative sequence modeling, with more consistent gains in overall performance, constraint satisfaction, and robustness. Our code is available at: \href{https://github.com/AlanYu04/SemBid-KDD2026}{\textcolor{blue}{here}}.

Guanyu Zhu, Jining Luan, Hanwen Du +11

City University of Hong Kong · South China Agricultural University · University of Electronic Science and Technology of China +11

Automated Bidding Online Advertising

May 3, 2026cs.GT

The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad: An Online Causal Framework for Repeated Second-price Auctions

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Yuxiao Wen, Zihao Hu, Yanjun Han +2

Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University · Department of Mathematics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences and the Center for Data Science, New York University +2

Causal Effect Estimation Automated Bidding Online Advertising Online Learning

Oct 17, 2025cs.GT

HOB: A Holistically Optimized Bidding Strategy under Heterogeneous Bidding Environments

Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.

Qi Li, Wendong Huang, Qichen Ye +9

Alibaba Group Beijing, China · Tsinghua University Beijing, China

Automated Bidding Online Advertising Real-Time Bidding

May 5, 2025cs.GT

Plan-Driven Adaptive Bidding for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Nonstationarity

We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is

O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)

, where

\mathcal W_T

measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided

O(\sqrt{T})

fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by

(b/2a)PlanError

. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through

PlanError

. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.

Yige Wang, Jiashuo Jiang

Department of Industrial Engineering & Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Primal-Dual Optimization Automated Bidding Online Advertising Constrained Optimization Online Learning Decision-Making under Uncertainty