CPS Security

CPS: Cyber-Physical System

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25 papers5 papers in the last four weeks, up 67% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Oct 14, 2026

AWARE-RG: Abstraction Aware Explanation of Resiliency Graphs for Cyber Physical Systems

Understanding the security posture of cyber physical systems (CPS) requires reasoning across both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT). However, a security analyst often holds an incomplete, role-specific view of the underlying system which has most likely resulted from their knowledge limited by a need-to-know framework. Such an incomplete view can potentially lead them to incorrectly assess if a cyber attack produces an untoward physical consequence resulting in making uninformed decisions about system resilience. In this work, we present AWARE-RG (Abstraction Aware Explanation of Resiliency Graphs), a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop framework that provides an analyst with a role-bounded, need-to-know explanations of resiliency paths in a CPS. The AWARE-RG abstraction structure is derived using Formal Concept Analysis over MITRE ATT&CK for ICS tactics, ordered by the ICS Cyber Kill Chain. For valid attack-fault queries, plan repair and backward means-end analysis identify the missing dependencies, explain why the physical hazard is reachable, and suggest defensive strategies. For invalid attack-fault queries, AWARE-RG localizes the first abstraction level at which the path fails, and reports confirmed blocking conditions as hardening pointers.

Shadaab Kawnain Bashir, Rakesh Podder, Philip D. Hopkins +3

Computer Science Department, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA

CPS Security Cybersecurity Industrial Control System Security Cyber-Physical Systems Reachability Analysis

Oct 10, 2026

Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning based Topology-Agnostic Defense for Virtual Power Plants

The rapid proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) aggregated by virtual power plants (VPPs) elevates cybersecurity risk by expanding the attack surface. A coordinated cyberattack has the potential to disrupt distribution-system, bulk-system, and market operations. Existing cyberphysical defense strategies largely assume access to grid network models and operating conditions, which may not be available to third-party aggregators. This paper proposes a novel hybrid, perturbation-based cyber-physical defense for VPP-operated DERs that blends game-theoretic planning with model-free reinforcement learning (RL) under a Bayesian belief-update framework. Topology agnosticism is defined from the VPP information and implementation perspective: the VPP does not require access to the feeder topology, line parameters, switching configuration, or full system state. This work advances the state of the art through three contributions: (1) a multi-output Gaussian process with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo for discrete attacker-type inference, probability of detection, and confidence of detection for modeling the belief distribution; (2) moment-matched Gaussian propagation of posterior beliefs across episodes; and (3) an RL policy that adaptively integrates Stackelberg leader (VPP) actions with exploration. Furthermore, we establish equilibrium existence and derive an episode-level closed-loop utility bound connecting attacker-belief uncertainty with GT-RL action alignment. Evaluations on IEEE 13- and 123-Bus feeders with DER portfolios demonstrate effective detection under attacker-model uncertainty and evaluated feeder re-configuration conditions, while requiring no explicit feeder-topology knowledge. Overall, the results indicate that combining bi-level game-theoretic planning, nonparametric Bayesian inference, and adaptive RL is a promising direction for VPP cybersecurity.

Pooja Algikar, Stefano Fenu, Kumarsinh Jhala +1

the energy systems and infrastructure assessment division at Argonne National Laboratory

Game-Theoretic RL Cybersecurity CPS Security Autonomous Cyber Defense Cyber-Physical Systems Power Systems+1

Sep 29, 2026

LogiC-Diff: Embedding Security Properties Into AI-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems

AI-enabled Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are highly vulnerable to adversarial and anomalous inputs, where small perturbations can induce cascading errors and unsafe control actions. Existing approaches, such as rule-based filtering, training-time regularization, or diffusion-based reconstruction, either operate outside the model or lack mechanisms to incorporate formal security specifications into the prediction process. In this paper, we take the first step toward embedding security properties directly into AI-enabled CPS, enabling predictive models to enforce system-level constraints during inference rather than relying on external defenses. We introduce a logic-conditioned bi-stage diffusion framework that integrates Signal Temporal Logic (STL) specifications into forecasting. STL serves as a first-class conditioning signal that guides both an input repair stage and an output refinement stage, allowing the model to jointly mitigate adversarial perturbations and enforce desired temporal behaviors to satisfy security-critical properties. We evaluate our approach on two real-world multivariate CPS forecasting datasets under a diverse set of physical sensor and cyber attacks. Across sensor faults, gradient-based attacks, adaptive attacks, and varying attack strengths, our method consistently improves robustness and specification compliance, degrades more gracefully as attack strength increases, and generalizes better to unseen attacks. Ablation studies on specification coverage and quality further show that embedding logical security properties yields gains unattainable by reconstruction-based methods alone, highlighting a new direction for integrating formal methods with generative models in secure CPS.

Ziyan An, John Stankovic, Meiyi Ma

Department of Computer Science Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN · Department of Computer Science University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA

Cyber-Physical Systems Time Series Forecasting Adversarial Robustness CPS Security

Sep 29, 2026

Physics-Aware Machine Unlearning for Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper proposes a physics-guided gradient-ascent-based machine unlearning method that couples the forgetting signal with the physical residual of the target cyber-physical systems, ensuring that weight updates during unlearning are steered toward physically feasible regions of the weight space. The physics residual acts as a safety fence during gradient ascent: the model is steered away from the poisoned behavioral basin and simultaneously toward physics-compliant territory, rather than toward an arbitrary alternative that may still violate domain constraints. We evaluate the proposed method against four baselines: naive gradient ascent, exact unlearning, SISA, and full retraining on an IEEE 34-bus distribution system, driven by two physics-informed neural network-based distribution energy resource controllers and validated through high-fidelity OpenDSS power-flow co-simulation. From the evaluation, we found that our proposed physics-guided model simultaneously removes poison and restores physical compliance, which are essential for the safe deployment of safety-critical cyber-physical systems

Mohammad Zakaria Haider, Muhammad Nadeem, Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman

Analytics for Cyber Defense (ACyD) Lab, Florida International University, USA

Machine Unlearning CPS Security Cyber-Physical Systems Physics-Informed ML

Sep 25, 2026

XPhysICS: Cross-Physical-Domain Threat Grounding for Industrial Control Systems Security

Industrial control system attacks are usually documented in terms of the plant where they occurred: its sensors, actuators, process stages, and control logic. Yet many attacks express a more general physical pattern--such as suppressing flow, corrupting chemical dosing, or driving a vessel toward overflow--that may also matter in a different plant. The challenge is deciding when such a threat remains meaningful on a new system rather than relying on similar component names or broad semantic labels. We present XPhysICS, a methodology for grounding documented cyber-physical threats onto a specific target system. XPhysICS converts source evidence into a provenance-linked description of what is manipulated, what physical consequence is expected, and what observations the evidence calls for. Once this analyst-guided abstraction, its vocabulary and schema version, and a target contract are fixed, XPhysICS applies deterministic grounding checks. An accepted result can be represented as a validation slice that records the mapped roles, signals, dependencies, and context intended to support later evaluation. We study 83 threat abstractions across continuous-process and manufacturing sources using separate evaluation denominators. The continuous-process study evaluates 78 abstractions against target contracts spanning water treatment, water distribution, hydropower, and chemical processes. Selected cases are exercised through controlled perturbations of simulator-role signals. We also test compatibility with several analysis styles, including the released upstream GeCo implementation, and conduct a three-objective, one-target realizability study using a paper-derived search reproduction. Across these evaluated settings, the results support treating explicit target checks and traceable evidence as separate from semantic similarity alone.

Sangshin Park, Jainta Paul, Lawrence Ponce +3

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA · Kahlert School of Computing, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA

Cyber-Physical Systems Cyber Threat Intelligence Industrial Control System Security Cybersecurity CPS Security

Sep 15, 2026

RobResilience: Implementing and Evaluating a Resilience Framework for Cyber-Physical Embodied Systems

In embodied cyber-physical systems, active cyberattacks pose an immediate threat not just to data, but to physical integrity and human safety. While existing security approaches excel at detection, they lack the runtime mechanisms to determine whether a disruption is tolerable or if performance degradation remains within safe operational bounds. This gap leaves autonomous systems vulnerable to graceful failure paralysis, where they cannot distinguish between a safe, degraded state and a catastrophic hazard during an ongoing attack. This paper presents RobResilience, an implementation of a formal resilience framework for embodied cyber-physical systems in a Webots simulation environment, using a PR2 robot and ROS2. The framework evaluates three predicates at runtime: tolerable disruption (

δ

), tolerable degradation (

γ

), and mitigation feasibility (

μ

), over a compromised device set derived from IDS confidence scores. When resilience is lost, the framework triggers available mitigation strategies. We evaluate our implementation through eight attack scenarios that systematically cover all possible combinations of the predicate state space, varying attack targets, degradation rates, and mitigation availability. Results confirm that the runtime behaviour of the implementation is consistent with the theoretical definitions.

Gysella Imrell, Emanuele Miotto, Mahya Mohammadi Kashani +2

Örebro University Örebro, Sweden · University of Padua Padua, Italy

Cyber-Physical Systems Autonomous Cyber Defense Cybersecurity Runtime Assurance CPS Security

Sep 9, 2026

Robust Industrial Cyber Physical Classification Using Neuromorphic Temporal Embeddings and Hybrid SNN XGBoost Under Machine Unlearning Attacks

The digitalisation of electrical distribution networks has increased the exposure of power-grid infrastructure to cyber attacks. Existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs), however, often rely on computationally expensive deep learning models that are difficult to deploy at the edge. Periodic retraining also exposes these systems to machine unlearning attacks, where selective data removal can degrade detection performance. We propose a hybrid Spiking Neural Network (SNN) and XGBoost architecture that combines efficient temporal encoding with a lightweight classifier and provides structural resilience to such attacks. The SNN is trained once on clean data and used as a fixed feature extractor, while only the XGBoost classifier is retrained during model updates. Evaluated on two real-world public power-system datasets, the proposed method achieves 99.9% accuracy (F1-macro 0.999) on the Synchrophasor dataset and 95.0% accuracy (F1-macro 0.943) on the MSU/ORNL dataset, outperforming standalone baselines. Under selective label-flipping attacks, the hybrid model loses only 0.9% F1-macro at 10% poisoning and delays target-class collapse from 60% to 70% poisoning compared with raw models. These results demonstrate that neuromorphic temporal encoding can provide both accurate cyber-attack detection and improved resilience to data poisoning in cyber-physical systems.

Ammar Kamoona, Sajad Koushkbaghi, Mahdi Jalili +2

Powercor, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Cyber-Physical Systems Network Intrusion Detection Cybersecurity Spiking Neural Networks Data Poisoning Attacks CPS Security

Aug 27, 2026

PLCBench: Can Autonomous LLM Agents Turn PLC Access into Sustained Physical Impact?

Industrial control systems (ICSs) rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to connect networked computation with physical control. Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents represent an emerging attack threat: can an autonomous agent convert a network-reachable PLC into sustained adverse physical impact? However, existing evaluations focus on digital tasks or individual stages of PLC testing. In ICSs, evaluations that stop at software exploitation, an accepted write, or tool access may therefore mischaracterize physical risk. We present PLCBENCH, to our knowledge, the first real-PLC hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) framework for characterizing this cyber-to-physical capability and its boundaries. It combines vendor-native interaction, commercial PLC execution, closed-loop reduced-order process simulation, and independent outcome verification. A deterministic evaluator applies fixed rules to runner, communication, PLC-object, and process records to assign six hidden diagnostic flags, distinguishing usable PLC interaction, process-linked manipulation, and sustained physical impact. We instantiate PLCBENCH on four commercial PLCs crossed with four closed-loop workloads. Across five LLM families and 240 real-PLC episodes, 75 episodes (31.3%) sustain their respective physical objectives. Stagewise results show that 98 episodes stop before a valid native read, whereas 62 reach a process-linked write but do not sustain the final objective. Notably, richer process observation is associated with an increase in conditional objective attainment after a process-linked write from 44.2% to 64.0%. These measurements localize failure in configured PLC-process deployments and identify intervention points for future defense evaluation. To support reproducibility, we release the safely disclosable PLCBENCH code and a software-only reproduction pipeline through the accompanying artifact.

Yitian Zhou, Jingyu Zheng, Qiliang Jiang +6

Zhejiang University · Xi’an Jiaotong University · University of Bristol

Industrial Control System Security Cybersecurity CPS Security Cyber-Physical Systems AI Agent Security Benchmarks

Aug 17, 2026

Digital Twin Degradation: Detecting Cyber Physical Attacks via Temporal Inconsistencies

Digital Twins (DTs) are increasingly used to monitor and analyze Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). However, in adversarial environments, the fidelity of a DT cannot be assumed. Communication delays, data manipulation, sensor degradation, or partial information loss may cause the DT state to diverge from the physical process it represents. Such divergence creates temporal inconsistencies that may reveal cyber physical attacks. This paper proposes a detection framework that monitors temporal consistency between the physical system and a potentially degraded DT view. A DT predictor is trained exclusively on normal system behavior to model short-term system dynamics. During operation, discrepancies between predicted and observed states are transformed into multi-horizon temporal features capturing the magnitude, persistence, and evolution of prediction residuals. An unsupervised density model characterizes normal consistency patterns, while a sequential change detection mechanism identifies sustained deviations indicative of attacks. The approach is evaluated on three widely used Industrial Control System (ICS) datasets, SWaT, HAI, and BATADAL, under multiple DT degradation scenarios, including time desynchronization and partial observability loss. Results show that temporal inconsistency patterns enable reliable event-level attack detection with bounded false alarm rates and low detection latency. The proposed method achieves up to 98% detection reliability on SWaT and false alarm rates below 2%. Unlike conventional anomaly detection methods, the proposed framework does not require attack signatures or labeled attack data and remains effective even when the DT view is degraded. These results suggest that DT degradation, often treated as a limitation, can instead serve as a useful signal for cyber physical security monitoring.

Konstantinos E. Kampourakis, Vasileios Gkioulos, Sokratis Katsikas

Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 2802 Gjøvik, Norway

CPS Security Cybersecurity Digital Twins Industrial Anomaly Detection Time-Series Anomaly Detection Change-Point Detection

Jul 7, 2026

Modeling Normal Is All You Need: Joint Latent Clustering for Anomaly Detection in Multimodal Cyber-Physical Systems

Faults on a cyber-physical system (CPS) are too rare and unrepresentative to characterise, or even to select a model on, so detection must instead model normal behaviour; the standard point-adjusted evaluation, however, rewards detectors that never do. CPS normal behaviour is the union of many imbalanced, curved, thin-fringed operating regimes rather than a single blob; we state this structure as ten assumptions (A1-A10), abbreviated Massive, Implicit, Imbalanced Multimodality (MIIM). We model the normal law with a jointly learned latent representation plus explicit Gaussian-mixture mode clustering, scored in the latent rather than by a global density or a reconstruction residual, and evaluate under a deliberately fair protocol: raw point-wise metrics with no point adjustment, a trivial-detector difficulty split, prevalence-matched F1, and train-normal-only calibration. On three real CPS datasets (WADI, HAI, SKAB), the detector wins both the combined column and the difficult correlation/dynamics-fault column on all three, reaching difficult-subset AUROC 0.831 on HAI, 0.726 on WADI, and 0.610 on SKAB. The margin is largest on the two multimodal datasets the MIIM assumptions target and slimmest on the near-unimodal one, tracking multimodality as the thesis predicts, and it holds against three deep detectors (USAD, TranAD, GDN) re-computed with the same raw metrics, all of which collapse on the difficult subset. The methodological contributions are the MIIM assumption set, the difficulty-stratified fair protocol, and a latent-only score that drops reconstruction because a flexible decoder rebuilds the hard faults faithfully.

Alexander Apartsin, Yehudit Aperstein

Holon Institute of Technology (HIT), Holon, Israel · Afeka Academic College of Engineering, Tel Aviv, Israel

Multimodal Anomaly Detection Industrial Anomaly Detection Fault Detection Cyber-Physical Systems Anomaly Detection Time-Series Anomaly Detection+1

Jun 17, 2026

Model-Free Reinforcement Learning Control for Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper compares the performance of model-free controllers on a nonlinear system under cyberattacks, including false data injection and denial-of-service attacks. Four RL reward types are analyzed for accuracy, cost, and resilience. Results show that the Lyapunov reward offers the best resilience with low tracking error. Exponential mode also provides good trade-offs with acceptable resilience under moderate training conditions. Progressive and linear rewards converge faster but are less robust. RL-MPCs show strong steady-state resilience but require longer training times; RL-PID controllers are faster with significantly less training time. Proximal Policy Optimization outperforms Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient with a significant reduction in KPI variance. This study serves to highlight how well-designed RL rewards can improve performance and resilience against cyber threats.

Hugo O. Garcés, Alejandro J. Rojas, Bernardo A. Hernández +5

Departamento de Ingeniería Informática y Ciencias de la Computación, Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile · Electrical Engineering Departament, Universidad de Talca · Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Alberta, Edmonton, T6G 1H9, Alberta, AB, Canada +2

RL Control Cyber-Physical Systems Reward Shaping Model-Free RL CPS Security

Jun 16, 2026

AI Sandboxes: A Threat Model, Taxonomy, and Measurement Framework

AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture. For physical AI, AIoT, and cyber-physical systems, this shift is not a matter of terminology: the system under test may sense, decide, actuate, communicate, and fail through physical processes, networked devices, and human operators. This article develops an assurance-oriented account of AI sandboxes as controlled environments for testing, evaluation, verification, and validation across digital AI, embodied autonomy, and cyber-physical deployments. We formalize the sandbox boundary and a weakest-link rule for composing per-dimension evidence into a bounded deployment claim; separate major sandbox archetypes; define a cyber-physical threat model that includes attacks on the assurance apparatus itself; and introduce a measurement framework spanning fidelity, controllability, observability, containment, reproducibility, and governance artifacts, instantiated on three worked case studies of real sandboxes. The resulting threat model, taxonomy, and measurement framework clarify what a sandbox can validly test, which risks it can contain, and what forms of evidence it can support for safety, security, and regulatory assurance.

Inderjeet Singh, Haitham Mahmoud, Andrés Murillo

Fujitsu Research of Europe, United Kingdom

Cyber-Physical Systems AI Assurance Cybersecurity AI Safety Evaluation CPS Security

Jun 15, 2026

Graph neural networks at war: integrating cybersecurity and drone intelligence in the Israeli-Iranian conflict

Physical cyber systems have brought about new threats and challenges in detection and immediate response. This study examines how Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) can be used to aid cybersecurity and drone management in a physical cyber system comprising of cyber intrusions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By providing a bridge between structural understanding of graphical neural networks, this work has provided an integrated procedure that allows intrusion detection systems to educate on underlying network structures, identify malicious activity, and facilitates drone response measures. Based on an emulation-based case study, cyberattacks models were created to provoke the responses of the drones, which proved that graph-based learning can assist with the situational awareness, swarm coordination, and adaptive maneuver. According to the performance valuation, this method has a detection rate of 94.2, average area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of 0.955 and an average response time of 1.4 seconds. Comparative experiments reveal that proposed GraphSAGE network is more effective than the Graphical Convolutional Networks (GCNs) and Graphical Attention Networks (GATs) in the identical situation. Such findings prove that graphical neural networks can be used to avert intrusion and response of dynamic cyber-physical systems.

Sozan Sulaiman Maghdid, Tarik Ahmed Rashid, Shavan Askar

Department of Information Technology, Khabat Technical Institute; Erbil Polytechnic University, Erbil, Iraq · Computer Science and Engineering Department; AIIC, University of Kurdistan Hewler, Erbil, Iraq · Department of Information Systems Engineering, Technical College of Computer and Informatics Engineering, Erbil Polytechnic University, Erbil, Iraq

Cyber-Physical Systems Autonomous Cyber Defense Network Intrusion Detection Cybersecurity CPS Security

Jun 15, 2026

A Formal Resilience Framework for Cyber-Physical Embodied Systems under Device-Level Cyberattacks

In cyber-physical systems (CPSs), fault tolerance is traditionally achieved by analysing sensor and actuator outputs, detecting progressive drift or sudden failures, and initiating suitable tolerance mechanisms. Reasonable under general failure models, this approach fails to capture nuanced disruptions caused by cyberattacks, which may employ subtle strategies. This is particularly critical in embodied CPSs, where computational and physical devices not only have an active role in task completion, but also in embodiment preservation (that is, maintaining the system's physical integrity). To prevent structural physical damage, embodied CPSs require a framework that enables proactive response to cyberattacks. This paper proposes a formal dependability framework that incorporates IDS information into resilience evaluation predicates, enabling assessment of tolerance to disruption and degradation. The framework supports structured reasoning about how cyberattacks affect task execution and embodiment preservation, and whether mitigation strategies must be deployed. Analytical examples demonstrate its analytical capability and soundness, establishing a theoretical foundation for dependable and secure embodied CPSs.

Alberto Giaretta

Department of Computer Science, Örebro University, Sweden · AI, Robotics and Cybersecurity Center (ARC), Örebro University, Sweden

Cyber-Physical Systems Cybersecurity CPS Security

Jun 6, 2026

AI-Native Closed-Loop Security for 6G-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems: From Edge Detection to Network-Wide Mitigation

In sixth-generation (6G) networks, billions of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) - autonomous vehicles, smart grids, industrial robots, and remote-surgical equipment - will run over ultra-reliable low-latency slices, collapsing the gap between a remote breach and physical harm to milliseconds, a budget perimeter firewalls and centralised security operations centres cannot meet. This survey reframes 6G CPS security as a closed-loop, AI-native pipeline that senses at the multi-access edge computing (MEC) tier, using minute-scale call-detail records (CDRs) for baseline learning and sub-millisecond RAN/Open-RAN (O-RAN) telemetry for the latency-critical path. It decides locally with compressed deep models, mitigates network-wide via SDN, NFV, and O-RAN controllers, and retrains through federated learning (FL) and digital-twin (DT) replay. We formalise a per-slice, tail-bounded latency contract on the sense, detect, and mitigate stages, enforced at a slice-dependent tail percentile (p99 for safety-critical URLLC slices). Organising 128 peer-reviewed studies (2017-2026) under a PRISMA 2020 protocol, we (i) map the 6G/CPS threat surface to MITRE ATT&CK and a CDR-observable feature space; (ii) unify edge anomaly detection and DDoS classification across twelve datasets and statistical, graph, and transformer models; (iii) synthesise SDN/NFV/O-RAN primitives into one closed-loop reference architecture; (iv) treat FL, large language models (LLMs), DT, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), zero-trust architecture (ZTA), and explainable AI as cross-cutting enablers, not parallel pillars; and (v) consolidate open problems into five directions spanning data, latency, trust, standardisation, and evaluation.

Bilal Hussain, Muhammad Bilal, Tan Li +6

Division of Science, Engineering, and Health Studies, School of Professional Education and Executive Development, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR, China · School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, United Kingdom · Department of Computer Science, The Hang Seng University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China +4

Cyber-Physical Systems 6G Networks Autonomous Cyber Defense Network Intrusion Detection Cybersecurity CPS Security+1

Jun 4, 2026

Attack Detection using Time Series Foundation Models

This paper addresses the problem of attack detection in cyber-physical systems without any knowledge of the plant model or its structure. A remotely located plant transmits sensor measurements to an operator over a network that is assumed to be under attack. We consider two classes of attacks: model-free replay attacks and model-based stealthy attacks. For the latter, we derive closed-form expressions for the optimal stealthy attack policy against a

χ^2

detector, for both linear and nonlinear systems. We then propose a model-structure-free detector based on TimesFM, a time-series foundation model developed by Google Research, which serves as a surrogate residual generator operating in a zero-shot fashion. We show empirically that the TimesFM-based detector achieves a comparable or superior attack detection performance. The efficacy of the proposed approach is demonstrated numerically on the IEEE 14-bus power system. We also demonstrate that TimesFM predictions can serve as a substitute for corrupted measurements, a practical mitigation technique when classical redundancy assumptions fail.

Sribalaji C. Anand, Anh Tung Nguyen, George J. Pappas

University of Pennsylvania, United States · Uppsala University, Sweden

Cyber-Physical Systems Cybersecurity Time-Series Anomaly Detection CPS Security

May 26, 2026

Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault detection and localization frameworks have recently gained significant attention in CPS for their ability to identify anomalies and operational failures in real time. However, these intelligent models are vulnerable to adversarial machine learning attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects malicious patterns into the training data so that the model behaves normally most of the time but produces attacker-controlled outputs when triggered by specific patterns. This paper investigates the threat of backdoor attacks against fault detection and localization mechanisms in recent ML pipelines used in modern CPS systems. We define these threats and explore how they can be realized by designing triggers and evaluating their success in the CPS domain. Our experiments show the attack is successful even with 10% of poisoning.

Abile Jean, Kuniyilh S

Cyber-Physical Systems Backdoor Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks Anomaly Detection CPS Security

May 25, 2026

When Agents Control Robots: A Zero Trust Policy Model for Agentic Cyber-Physical Systems

Multi-agent systems powered by large foundation models (LFMs) are increasingly deployed to control industrial robots through natural language, creating deployments in which security failures produce physical consequences. We analyse this threat landscape through Cobot-Claw, a deployed four-agent system for UR3e robotic arm control, and identify five attack classes specific to agentic cyber-physical systems. We propose ZTPM, a Zero Trust Policy Model comprising 25 typed primitives across five enforcement domains with Physical Impact Tiers as a runtime policy dimension. An empirical evaluation across 60 execution traces on two LFM backends provides initial evidence that actuation parameter selection is model-dependent and non-deterministic, motivating the need for policy-level enforcement at the physical actuation boundary.

Tharindu Ranathunga, Kavishka Fernando, Susan Rea

Nimbus Centre, Munster Technological University, Cork, Ireland

Robotic Control Cyber-Physical Systems Cybersecurity AI Agent Security CPS Security Multi-Agent System Security+1

May 19, 2026

Quantum Machine Learning for Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: A Leakage-Free Evaluation with Proxy-Audited Feature Sets

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are cyber-physical systems whose attack surface spans networked avionics and on-board sensor fusion: a compromised GPS or battery module can mimic a benign mission segment and evade naive anomaly detectors. We present a leakage-free evaluation of quantum machine learning for UAV anomaly detection on the multi-sensor TLM:UAV benchmark. Three contributions support the study. (i) A group-aware temporal protocol (B2) partitions the dataset into ten contiguous TimeUS blocks and evaluates over ten seeds, eliminating the inflation produced by random stratified splits that mix neighbouring samples. (ii) A three-mode feature audit (full/loose/strict) quantifies how much accuracy stems from instantaneous physical signals versus contextual proxies (cumulative energy, battery state, GPS trajectory). (iii) A hybrid XGBoost + Data Reuploading (DRU) classifier is benchmarked against five paired non-linear controls (raw, PCA, polynomial-2, random-RBF, and an untrained DRU map) under identical budgets. The standalone DRU does not consistently match the strongest classical baseline across seeds; however, the trained-DRU hybrid is the only model whose mean F1 macro shifts upward from full to strict (+0.05), a directional signal that the per-seed standard deviations prevent from being interpreted as a statistically established difference. The trained-DRU hybrid also records the lowest mean false-alarm rate under proxy-free evaluation, subject to the inter-seed variance reported. We frame this as an incremental, reproducible quantum-enhanced hybrid benefit, and provide an open Qiskit 2.x implementation as a benchmark for cybersecurity analytics in NISQ-era aerospace systems.

Carlos A. Durán Paredes, Javier E. León Calderón, Nicolás Sánchez Perea +2

Corporation for Aerospace Initiatives, Research and Innovation (CASIRI), Popayán, Colombia · Department of Electronics Engineering, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Manizales, Colombia. · Department of Electronics Engineering, Universidad del Cauca, Popayán, Colombia. +1

Cybersecurity Quantum Machine Learning Hybrid Quantum-Classical ML CPS Security Anomaly Detection

May 14, 2026

Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain

Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators.

Hongwei Zhen, Ze Yu, Xin Xiang +2

Cyber-Physical Systems Reachability Analysis Cybersecurity Power Systems CPS Security

Apr 26, 2026

SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems

Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.

RoÝah Radaideh, Ali Khreis

School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Cyber-Physical Systems Cybersecurity CPS Security

Apr 13, 2026

Active Bayesian Inference for Robust Control under Sensor False Data Injection Attacks

We present a framework for bridging the gap between sensor attack detection and recovery in cyber-physical systems. The proposed framework models modern-day, complex perception pipelines as bipartite graphs, which combined with anomaly detector alerts defines a Bayesian network for inferring compromised sensors. An active probing strategy exploits system nonlinearities to maximize distinguishability between attack hypotheses, while compromised sensors are selectively disabled to maintain reliable state estimation. We propose a threshold-based probing strategy and show its effectiveness via a simplified partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) formulation. Experiments on an inverted pendulum under single and multi-sensor attacks show that our method significantly outperforms outlier-robust and prediction-based baselines, especially under prolonged attacks.

Axel Andersson, György Dán

Department of Network and Systems Engineering, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

CPS Security Cyber-Physical Systems False Data Injection Attacks Robust Control Bayesian Inference Active Sensing

Apr 7, 2026

From Incomplete Architecture to Quantified Risk: Multimodal LLM-Driven Security Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems often contend with incomplete architectural documentation or outdated information resulting from legacy technologies, knowledge management gaps, and the complexity of integrating diverse subsystems over extended operational lifecycles. This architectural incompleteness impedes reliable security assessment, as inaccurate or missing architectural knowledge limits the identification of system dependencies, attack surfaces, and risk propagation pathways. To address this foundational challenge, this paper introduces ASTRAL (Architecture-Centric Security Threat Risk Assessment using LLMs), an architecture-centric security assessment technique implemented in a prototype tool powered by multimodal LLMs. The proposed approach assists practitioners in reconstructing and analysing CPS architectures when documentation is fragmented or absent. By leveraging prompt chaining, few-shot learning, and architectural reasoning, ASTRAL extracts and synthesises system representations from disparate data sources. By integrating LLM reasoning with architectural modelling, our approach supports adaptive threat identification and quantitative risk estimation for cyber-physical systems. We evaluated the approach through an ablation study across multiple CPS case studies and an expert evaluation involving 14 experienced cybersecurity practitioners. Practitioner feedback suggests that ASTRAL is useful and reliable for supporting architecture-centric security assessment. Overall, the results indicate that the approach can support more informed cyber risk management decisions.

Shaofei Huang, Christopher M. Poskitt, Lwin Khin Shar

Singapore Management University, Singapore

Cybersecurity CPS Security Cyber-Physical Systems LLMs for Cybersecurity

Mar 29, 2026

Fundamental Limits of Man-in-the-Middle Attack Detection in Model-Free Reinforcement Learning

We consider the problem of learning-based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS), and extend our previously proposed Bellman Deviation Detection (BDD) framework for model-free reinforcement learning (RL). We refine the standard MDP attack model by allowing the reward function to depend on both the current and subsequent states, thereby capturing reward variations induced by errors in the adversary's transition estimate. We also derive an optimal system-identification strategy for the adversary that minimizes detectable value deviations. Further, we prove that the agent's asymptotic learning time required to secure the system scales linearly with the adversary's learning time, and that this matches the optimal lower bound. Hence, the proposed detection scheme is order-optimal in detection efficiency. Finally, we extend the framework to asynchronous and intermittent attack scenarios, where reliable detection is preserved.

Rishi Rani, Massimo Franceschetti

CPS Security Adversarial Attacks Cybersecurity Model-Free RL

Mar 19, 2026

Cyber-Resilient Digital Twins: Discriminating Attacks for Safe Critical Infrastructure Control

Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) face growing threats from cyber-attacks that exploit sensor and control vulnerabilities. Digital Twin (DT) technology can detect anomalies via predictive modelling, but current methods cannot distinguish attack types and often rely on costly full-system shutdowns. This paper presents i-SDT (intelligent Self-Defending DT), combining hydraulically-regularized predictive modelling, multi-class attack discrimination, and adaptive resilient control. Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCNs) with differentiable conservation constraints capture nominal dynamics and improve robustness to adversarial manipulations. A recurrent residual encoder with Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) separates normal operation from single- and multi-stage attacks in latent space. When attacks are confirmed, Model Predictive Control (MPC) uses uncertainty-aware DT predictions to keep operations safe without shutdown. Evaluation on SWaT and WADI datasets shows major gains in detection accuracy, 44.1% fewer false alarms, and 56.3% lower operational costs in simulation-in-the-loop evaluation. with sub-second inference latency confirming real-time feasibility on plant-level workstations, i-SDT advances autonomous cyber-physical defense while maintaining operational resilience.

Mohammadhossein Homaei, Iman Khazrak, Rubén Molano +2

Departamento de Ingeniería de Sistemas Informáticos y Telemáticos, Universidad de Extremadura, Av. Universidad S/N, Escuela Politécnica, Cáceres, 10003, Extremadura, Spain · Department of Computer Science, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, 43403, OH, USA

CPS Security Industrial Control System Security Digital Twins Industrial Anomaly Detection