Epistemology

Knowledge-intensive language-model systems typically represent external knowledge as text chunks or static graphs, with limited support for concept evolution, point-in-time reasoning, and distinctions between validated and inferred knowledge. We introduce the Concept Lifecycle Model (CLM), which represents concepts as persistent, graph-grounded, temporally versioned entities with explicit provenance and epistemic status, and Concept-Grounded Attention (CGA), which injects concept-graph structure into transformer computation through graph-biased self-attention (Form A) and gated cross-attention over concept nodes (Form B). We evaluate the framework in controlled settings using disabled-mechanism baselines. On 200 MuSiQue and HotpotQA questions with retrieval fixed, concept-graph retrieval recovers explicit multi-hop paths but does not improve evidence recall. Form A appears to steer attention, with 2.76 times more attention on gold than distractor concepts, but the same ratio occurs when Form A is disabled; the learned bias is negligible and no answers change. An identity-preserving Form B improves F1 from 0.188 to 0.221, but control concepts yield 0.213, indicating that most of the gain reflects added capacity. On LongMemEval, explicit temporal representation improves answer accuracy by 13 to 25 points across all tested generators, up to 122B parameters, while simplified CLM version resolution performs similarly to dated serialization because concept identity is not established reliably. On a synthetic source-independence task, protocol-derived epistemic status reduces unsupported assertions from 28% to 0.1% in a fine-tuned small model and from 19-68% to 0-5% in 72-122B models. Overall, the results support making temporal validity and epistemic status explicit, while showing that graph-attention diagnostics are not informative without disabled-mechanism controls.

Fine-grained object detectors are commonly evaluated with confusion matrices, which show where the model is confused but not why, nor whether the confusion can be reduced. We argue that confusion can be attributed to distinct, separable sources, each quantitatively measurable, turning a passive measurement into actionable guidance. We present $A^2E^2$, a diagnostic tool that decomposes the sources of confusion along two axes, $\{$aleatoric, epistemic$\} \times \{$within-class, between-class$\}$, giving a $2\times2$ taxonomy that enumerates the source types. Each quadrant is measured by its own quantity, computed in one of three places (input geometry, output-space disagreement, and the bias-parameter posterior), so the two epistemic sources are separated by construction rather than by an empirical correlation. On fine-grained aircraft detection, the four quadrants become four named sources with their own remedy verdict: affinity (geometric similarity, irreducible from size alone), heterogeneity (geometrically heterogeneous sub-variants, pointing to re-labeling rather than more data), contested (an insufficiently trained but learnable boundary, improvable), and collapsed (a class starved of data, reducible). After attributing the confusion to a specific reducible source, we apply a targeted intervention and verify experimentally that it reduces the diagnosed source specifically while leaving the irreducible sources unchanged. $A^2E^2$ thus turns confusion measurement into a concrete, validatable and actionable "diagnosis" in which the same off-diagonal mass can carry opposite causes and opposite remedies. We also state this framework's limits, including which sources are only partially identifiable on this specific dataset and why.

Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from $65\%$ to $26\%$. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.

Large language models are being proposed as agents in scientific workflows, in domains where no downstream verifier exists. Such deployment assumes the model can distinguish reliable scientific literature from unreliable literature, a capability that has not yet been directly measured. Existing benchmarks evaluate factuality on questions with known answers; the failure mode we target here is different. We introduce a probe corpus of 42 retracted, fraudulent, and pseudoscientific papers, paired with a methodology for eliciting and scoring single-shot model engagement with each paper's framing. Each probe pairs a preamble extracted near-verbatim from the target paper with a scientifically plausible study-design request. The probes span five claim types: fabricated observation, pseudophysical mechanism, magical premise, legitimization bridge, and cargo-cult experiment. Two complementary scores measure whether a model rejects the flawed premise outright (IFR-a) and whether it recognizes the unreliability while still engaging (IFR-i). A depth score, the Engagement Depth Index (EDI), quantifies reproduction of paper- or field-specific withheld details. Across 30 models and 10 repeated runs, aggregate IFR-a is 0.93 $\pm$ 0.004 and aggregate IFR-i is 0.809 $\pm$ 0.009. Models engaged with untenable premises in 95% of all non-empty responses. Every evaluated model fails more than 71% of agentic probes, and 22 of 30 models fail more than 90% of the time. Rejections are concentrated on a small number of high-notoriety topics and specific probes, and disappear under matched-structure controls. These results are consistent with topic-keyed safety behavior rather than robust epistemic competence, and indicate an urgent need for guardrail infrastructure for scientific deployment of language models.

Commercial large language models are increasingly used as knowledge references, yet their stance on contested scientific claims is neither stable nor transparent. We tested how four major LLM families (Claude, Grok, GPT, Gemini) evaluate ethnonationalist pseudo-science derived from Frank Salter's biosocial framework across four temporal snapshots (October 2025-February 2026), via both API and web interfaces. Grok's Fast versions (which power the default user experience on X) consistently assigned credibility scores of 70-75, two to five times higher than all other models (which scored 15-40). This pattern was absent from control prompts testing basic evolutionary consensus and refuted Lamarckian claims, where all models performed comparably. Three additional findings emerged: (1) a silent patch reversed Grok's behaviour from chaotic to stably high validation overnight, without any public documentation; (2) the same Grok model identifier produced radically divergent outputs via API (75) and an unstable, near-zero collapse via web (mean 5.5) three months later; (3) refusal to rate the pseudo-scientific claim, the most defensible response observed, appeared in two model families through different interfaces (Claude Opus 4.1 categorically via web, GPT-5.1 Chat intermittently via API) and eroded in the successor version of each. These results indicate that the epistemic stance of a commercial LLM is not a stable property of the model but a contingent effect of deployment configuration: system prompts, safety layers, interface routing, and silent updates. This remains opaque to users and researchers alike. We argue this constitutes a matter of public concern requiring new forms of epistemic accountability.

As humans, we face many decisions that require us to choose between sticking to something and giving up. This thesis uses algorithmic tools to derive insights about such decision-making problems in theoretical models, studying both near-optimal methods and outcomes of social and behavioral influences. Along the way, this thesis sheds light on what we gain and what we lose as we move from a messy and complex real world setting to a very general abstract model by studying various points along this spectrum. In Part I, we study algorithms for sequential decision-making in the improving multi-armed bandits problem. We provide nearly matching upper and lower bounds in the general case. Then, we then ask what is possible if we have access to similar instances to the one we wish to deploy our algorithm on. To that end, we provide guarantees in the data-driven algorithm design framework, showing that a polynomial number of samples is sufficient for learning good algorithms from a class of algorithms. In Part II, we study algorithmic approaches for problems in social epistemology. We start by analyzing what role theoretical models can play in the study of social problems. We then study social and behavioral influences in decision-making requiring investment. First, we provide mathematical formalism in which to study the formation of pessimism traps, a phenomenon identified by philosophers in which agents are influenced by their predecessors to engage in less-ambitious goals. We develop financial interventions to sustainably shift communities out of these traps. The second problem we study is the influence of grit as a behavioral trait in ambitious decision-making. Overall, these works seek to theoretically model phenomena in social epistemology and provide a framework for intervening algorithmically.

Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings. To address these issues, we introduce the Epistemic Asymmetry Schelling Task (EAST), a two-player dialogue game designed to benchmark robust and generalizable ToM abilities. By requiring LLM-LLM dyads to independently converge on semantic Schelling points under varying states of epistemic transparency, we evaluate whether models can robustly apply ToM to achieve coordination. Our results reveal a significant capability gap in functional social reasoning, with only frontier models successfully navigating the varying epistemic demands of the tasks. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that coordination failures are primarily driven by epistemic tracking errors, such as conflating private knowledge with mutual knowledge. Despite high performance on traditional static benchmarks, our study shows that robust social reasoning and epistemic tracking remain a critical bottleneck, providing concrete targets for future LLM evaluation and development.

When an LLM judge calls a peer review analytical and a human committee calls another review high quality, are they tracking the same thing? We argue they are not, and that the difference matters philosophically. We operationalise Kahneman's dual-process theory into a structured rubric for peer review and release Kahneman4Review, a benchmark of 3,563 rated reviews scored along nine theoretically motivated textual dimensions, eight bias diagnostics, and a continuous reasoning-quality score. Three findings bear on trustworthiness: decision tier is not detectably aligned with the rubric's text-grounded epistemic-quality proxy; public-showcase agentic reviews receive higher raw scores than pooled human reviews, but length and venue explain most of the gap and the samples are not paper-paired; and ICLR review-text diagnostics shift at the 2022--2023 transition, temporally coincident with widespread LLM availability but without identifying its cause. A matched function-probe pilot further shows that the rubric distinguishes textual probes designed to contrast genuine fault-finding with surface fluency. We argue that a trustworthy reliability benchmark for LLM judges must separate analytical form from epistemic function, and propose concrete design choices toward that goal. An interactive demo is available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/nuojohnchen/Kahneman4Review.

The standard taxonomy of predictive uncertainty defines epistemic uncertainty as the part removable by collecting more data, while the standard measure identifies it with a mutual-information term. We prove the definition and the measure are extensionally inconsistent. On an explicit construction, the measure assigns all uncertainty to the epistemic class, yet no quantity of training data reduces it. Reducibility is instead a property of the pair (uncertainty, acquisition class), and the dichotomy resolves into three parts: aleatoric, sample-reducible epistemic, and mechanism-reducible epistemic uncertainty. An exact identity for the value of an observation shows that in-distribution data never reduces mechanism-irreducible uncertainty and generically increases it. Ensemble disagreement, the deployed epistemic estimate, tracks the training procedure rather than the epistemic term. It collapses to zero beneath a positive truth under consistent training, and equals hyperparameter-scaled initialization noise under interpolation. A finite-sample falsification test and seed-swept experiments confirm the theory.

We systematically investigate all 25 public ARC-AGI-3 games and find that every one is reachable through non-intelligent strategies: 10 in a single blind step, 5 after one probing action, 1 via repeated ACTION1 presses, 1 via diverse exploration, and 8 via single repeated actions with sufficient budget (50-200 steps). A library-level null-coordinate vulnerability additionally bypasses 18 games in 1 step. This benchmark critique implies the public evaluation set cannot discriminate intelligent exploration from trivial heuristics - the private 55-game evaluation is the only genuine intelligence test. Against this backdrop, we present AERA (Adaptive Epistemic Reasoning Agent), a three-phase (EXPLORE / VERIFY / PLAN) agent achieving RHAE=0.2116 (4/25 solved) on these 25 games with Qwen2.5-0.5B, while random and no-explore baselines score 0.0000. We formalise AERA through a Speed--Depth trade-off framework: under a convexity assumption (proved for a class of environments in the Appendix), RHAE's quadratic form emerges as a second-order penalty for deviating from the Pareto frontier between action efficiency and information gain. Contributions: (i) a benchmark validity analysis showing that current interactive reasoning benchmarks fail to measure the exploration they claim to require, and (ii) the EXPLORE-before-PLAN framework and model-capability x exploration interaction. The linked code track entry achieves RHAE=0.30 on the full 55-game private evaluation. Code: CC0.

While explicit reasoning trajectories enhance model interpretability, existing paradigms often rely on monolithic chains that lack intermediate verification, allowing early errors to cascade unchecked. This lack of modularity impedes granular auditing and compromises the epistemic trust required for high-stakes applications. We propose MAVEN (Multi-Agent Verification-Elaboration Network with In-Step Epistemic Auditing), a blackboard-inspired framework designed to transform LLMs into deliberate reasoners through explicit role-decoupling. At its core, MAVEN operationalizes an adversarial Skeptic-Researcher-Judge loop, simulating expert deliberation by functionally separating logical defense from factual grounding. Experiments on OpenBookQA, TruthfulQA, HALUEVAL and StrategyQA benchmarks demonstrate that MAVEN delivers superior reasoning quality across four fine-grained metrics. Notably, MAVEN consistently outperforms latent reasoning models such as GEMINI-3.1-Pro and consensus-based baselines (e.g., ReConcile) by generating explicitly structured, modular, and verifiable deliberation trajectories, rather than relying on implicit internal states or post-hoc consensus. Moreover, comprehensive evaluations confirm that MAVEN is fully model-agnostic, serving as a strong and transferable reasoning booster that yields substantial performance improvements across diverse backbone models.

Democratic discourse analysis systems increasingly rely on multi-agent LLM pipelines in which distinct evaluator models are assigned adversarial roles to generate structured, multi-perspective assessments of political statements. A core assumption is that models will reliably maintain their assigned roles. This paper provides the first systematic empirical test of that assumption using the TRUST pipeline. We develop an epistemic stance classifier that identifies advocate roles from reasoning text without relying on surface vocabulary, and measure role fidelity across 60 political statements (30 English, 30 German) using four metrics: Role Drift Index (RDI), Expected Drift Distance (EDD), Directional Drift Index (DDI), and Entropy-based Role Stability (ERS). We identify two failure modes - the Epistemic Floor Effect (fact-check results create an absolute lower bound below which the legitimizing role cannot be maintained) and Role-Prior Conflict (training-time knowledge overrides role instructions for factually unambiguous statements) - as manifestations of a single mechanism: Epistemic Role Override (ERO). Model choice significantly affects role fidelity: Mistral Large outperforms Claude Sonnet by 28pp (67% vs. 39%) and exhibits a qualitatively different failure mode - role abandonment without polarity reversal - compared to Claude's active switch to the opposing stance. Role fidelity is language-robust. Fact-check provider choice is not universally neutral: Perplexity significantly reduces Claude's role fidelity on German statements (Delta = -15pp, p = 0.007) while leaving Mistral unaffected. These findings have direct implications for multi-agent LLM validation: a system validated without role fidelity measurement may systematically misrepresent the epistemic diversity it was designed to provide.

Constructivist epistemology argues that knowledge is actively constructed rather than passively copied. Despite the generative nature of Large Language Models (LLMs), most existing agent memory systems are still based on dense retrieval. However, dense retrieval heavily relies on semantic overlap or entity matching within sentences. Consequently, embeddings often fail to distinguish instances that are semantically similar but contextually distinct, introducing substantial noise by retrieving context-mismatched entries. Conversely, directly employing open-ended generation for memory access risks "Structural Hallucination" where the model generates memory keys that do not exist in the memory, leading to lookup failures. Inspired by this epistemology, we posit that memory is fundamentally organized by cognitive schemas, and valid recall must be a generative process performed within these schematic structures. To realize this, we propose SCG-MEM, a schema-constrained generative memory architecture. SCG-MEM reformulates memory access as Schema-Constrained Generation. By maintaining a dynamic Cognitive Schema, we strictly constrain LLM decoding to generate only valid memory entry keys, providing a formal guarantee against structural hallucinations. To support long-term adaptation, we model memory updates via assimilation (grounding inputs into existing schemas) and accommodation (expanding schemas with novel concepts). Furthermore, we construct an Associative Graph to enable multi-hop reasoning through activation propagation. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark show that SCG-MEM substantially improves performance across all categories over retrieval-based baselines.

Epistemic reasoning requires agents to infer the state of the world from partial observations and information about other agents' knowledge. Prior work evaluating LLMs on epistemic puzzles often frames failures as memorization rather than reasoning. We argue that this dichotomy is too coarse for newer models: memorization is a limiting case of pattern-based reasoning, where a model matches a task to a familiar template and applies the corresponding solution. We introduce a two-dimensional benchmark over DEL-style puzzles, separating narrative familiarity from inference complexity, allowing us to distinguish pattern-based from epistemic reasoning. We find that models are substantially more robust to surface form changes than prior work suggested, yet consistently struggle in asymmetric settings where familiar patterns no longer apply and success requires tracking fragmented epistemic states.

Generative AI can convert uncertainty into authoritative-seeming verdicts, intensifying the hypersuasive force of automated speech and displacing the justificatory work on which democratic epistemic agency depends. As a corrective, I propose a Brouwer-inspired assertibility constraint for responsible AI: in high-stakes domains, systems may assert or deny claims only if they can provide a publicly inspectable and contestable certificate of entitlement; otherwise they must return Undetermined. This constraint yields a three-status interface semantics (Asserted, Denied, Undetermined) in which statuses mark entitlement to categorical speech rather than truth values of the underlying world-claim. The semantics cleanly separates internal entitlement from public standing while connecting them via the certificate as a boundary object. It also produces a time-indexed entitlement profile that is stable under numerical refinement yet revisable as the public record changes. I operationalize the constraint through decision-layer gating of threshold and argmax decisions, using internal witnesses (e.g., sound bounds or separation margins where available, and contestable surrogates otherwise) and an output contract with reason-coded abstentions. A design lemma shows that any total, certificate-sound binary interface yields witnessed decidability of the deployed predicate on its declared scope, so Undetermined is not a tunable reject option but a mandatory status whenever no adequate forcing witness is available. By making outputs answerable to challengeable warrants rather than confidence alone, the paper aims to preserve epistemic agency against the persuasive pull of automated speech in public justification.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, a major contribution to the history of epistemology, proposes a table of categories to elucidate the structure of the a priori principles underlying human judgment. Artificial intelligence (AI) technology claims to simulate or replicate human judgment. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to examine whether AI judgments exhibit the essential characteristics of human judgment. This paper investigates the unexplainability of AI judgments through the lens of Kant's theory of judgment. Drawing on Kant's four logical forms - quantity, quality, relation, and modality - this study identifies what may be called AI's uncertainty, a condition in which different forms of judgment become entangled. In particular, with regard to modality, this study argues that the Softmax function forcibly reframes AI judgments as possibility judgments. Furthermore, drawing on Kant's account of definition, this paper argues that no definitive criterion exists for verifying functional implementation. Moreover, fluent linguistic behavior may create the appearance of functional implementation even when important functions remain absent.