Game Theory

A planner in a network of strategic agents faces three entangled challenges: the optimum depends on agents' private information, queried agents may misreport to steer the outcome, and exact computation does not scale. We study these challenges in multi-activity network games with heterogeneous private technologies, in which the planner sets non-discriminatory prices. We show that the optimal prices admit a centrality-based decomposition of the welfare kernel: each agent's contribution scales with its squared centrality in a network reweighted by agents' preferences across activities. This decomposition motivates Poll, a polling algorithm in which the planner samples one agent per round, walks briefly through the agent's neighborhood, and updates the price from a local report. From the same decomposition flow three forms of efficiency: computationally, Poll uses significantly fewer operations than exact computation and other distributed methods, requiring up to three orders of magnitude less communication on a real-world network with over 300,000 agents; statistically, its query complexity scales with topology and preference heterogeneity rather than explicitly with population size; and economically, it converges to welfare-maximizing prices while admitting behavior-specific implementations that induce truthful reports and detect adversarial deviations.

When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty should be allocated across agents. Uniform penalties ignore heterogeneity in the rewards agents sacrifice, while agent-specific multipliers may still rely on the same aggregate cost signal. We introduce Lagrangian Responsibility Allocation (LiRA), which learns each agent's share of a common multiplier by optimizing social welfare over a finite training horizon. The multiplier enforces the aggregate budget, while responsibility shares redistribute its influence without modifying the original rewards or constraints. For convex games under standard regularity conditions, varying these shares induces a smooth family of normalized generalized Nash equilibria in which active constraints remain at their budgets while welfare varies. To optimize responsibility before convergence, we derive a welfare gradient that accounts for both learning updates and the induced change in data distribution. Across CityLearn, MABIM, Harvest, and MetaDrive, spanning 3 to 400 agents, LiRA improves average social welfare by up to 29% over uniform and agent-specific multiplier baselines. Grid and driving costs remain within budget, inventory violations decrease, and Harvest makes more effective use of available budget.

Modern online platforms commonly rank ads and organic content separately before blending them into a feed displayed to the user, overlooking externalities: an item's click-through rate depends on its surrounding content, not only on its own position. Recent learning-based feed generation mechanisms model some of these cross-type interactions to globally optimize for the whole feed's welfare. However, these approaches either fix the ordering of organic content, or lack exact strategyproofness guarantees for bidders. To combat these shortfalls, we introduce the Maximal-in-Range Transformer (MIRT) mechanism class, which uses a transformer to generate a range of candidate feeds that jointly order ads and organic content, and selects the welfare-maximizing feed in the range. However, there is a tension: strategyproofness requires the generated range to be bid-independent, even though a candidate feed's welfare depends linearly on the bids. Our key technical contribution is a reinforcement learning approach that incorporates both candidate generation and bid-aware selection into training, enabling a bid-independent transformer to learn to generate high-welfare ranges by accounting for both individual feed quality and the collective quality of the range. Additionally, we bound the pseudo-dimension of the MIRT class under hard attention, showing that near-optimal expected welfare is learnable with sample complexity polynomial in the transformer size and only logarithmic in the range size. Empirically, MIRT outperforms the previous non-strategyproof state-of-the-art feed models while remaining exactly strategyproof. Our results show that transformer-based auctions can deliver externality-aware whole-feed optimization without sacrificing exact incentive compatibility, removing a major obstacle to their practical deployment.

This work identifies the dominance regions for discrete, simultaneous-move pursuit-evasion games on graphs. Existing geometric approaches provide efficient characterizations of winning regions, but typically provide only sufficient conditions and rely on open-loop strategies. To address these challenges, we develop a set-based dynamic programming approach to characterize the pursuer's winning and losing regions, providing necessary and sufficient winning conditions under worst-case behavior. The reachability analysis admits a set-chasing interpretation, allowing translation of dominance sets to feedback strategies that adapt to the players' positions in real time. For states where neither player can guarantee victory, we introduce an instantaneous matrix-game formulation and establish upper and lower bounds on the pursuer's winning probability. Simulation results validate the correctness of the dominance-region characterization and the proposed bounds.

In decentralised priority coordination, agents announce priority levels and a shared resource serves them in decreasing order, as at an unsignalised intersection; the levels form the decision layer of a hierarchical controller. Such interactions are routinely replaced by a potential game, i.e.\ by a common objective, for analysis and design. This paper determines what that surrogate misses, using the Hodge decomposition of the incentives into a potential component, which a common objective can represent, and a harmonic component, which it cannot. For the linear payoff, both components are obtained in closed form on every conflict graph and for every deterministic tie-breaking protocol: in common units, the harmonic energy is the number of conflicts and the potential energy adds the number of adjacent pairs of conflicts. Consequently, for every rationality parameter, the best common-objective model of the agents' choice log-odds, weighted uniformly over unilateral moves, has a relative squared error of at least $1/(d_{\max}+1)$, where $d_{\max}$ is the largest number of conflicts of one agent; for an eight-vehicle intersection it is exactly one fifth, for any number of priority levels. Invisible to strict-improvement dynamics, the missed component is, under low-rationality log-linear learning with uniform revision and to leading order, the stationary probability current, and its energy sets the entropy-production rate. Payoff design cannot remove it: on the complete conflict graph of $N$ agents, under a total-order protocol and with at least three priority levels, every nonconstant rank-based payoff leaves a relative error of at least $1/N$, with equality exactly for affine payoffs.

We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs. We develop a fully online, decentralized, and uncoordinated mirror-descent algorithm that operates in the dual space of occupancy measures for approximating stationary Nash equilibrium (NE) policies. The algorithm uses a single transition/reward sample at every primitive time step, relies only on local information, and requires neither coverage of the joint state space nor synchronized episodes. Under uniform-ergodicity and finite-coverage assumptions, we show that, with high probability, the time-averaged fixed-comparator regret decays at the canonical $O(T^{-1/2})$ rate, up to logarithmic factors and polynomial dependence on the game parameters. In particular, the complexity depends on the cover times of the individual local state spaces rather than the product state space, avoiding exponential dependence on the number of players and the sizes of the joint state and action spaces. The resulting finite-time regret bound further yields an approximate coarse-correlated-equilibrium guarantee, which is natural for arbitrary reward functions since computing a stationary $ε$-NE is PPAD-hard in this setting. Under an additional global variational-stability condition, we show that the same fully online algorithm converges asymptotically in the last iterate to a stationary $ε$-NE. Our results provide a fully online and scalable learning framework for stochastic games with unknown independent chains. The algorithm can also be viewed as a primal-dual framework for Markov games that exploits the independence and local structure of the players' controlled transition chains.

We study noncooperative multi-vehicle games among heterogeneous autonomous vehicles, where each vehicle adopts a decentralized closed-loop policy based on its own state, and optimizes an objective that depends on other vehicles through potentially asymmetric interaction weights. We develop an $α$-potential game framework that reduces the computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium (NE) to the minimization of a single auxiliary $α$-potential function. We explicitly construct this $α$-potential, establish the existence of its minimizers, and characterize the equilibrium approximation error $α$ in terms of interaction asymmetry. We further introduce vehicle-specific scaling to reduce the effective interaction asymmetry, thereby tightening the equilibrium approximation and, in important cases, recovering an exact NE despite asymmetric interactions. We also derive social-efficiency guarantees for the potential-selected policies, revealing how the interaction structure shapes worst-case efficiency. Numerical experiments demonstrate the flexibility of the framework in capturing heterogeneous vehicle interactions, collision and obstacle avoidance, lane changing and overtaking under different traffic configurations, and priority-based intersection crossing.

Aviation authorities worldwide expect Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) traffic management to be decentralized among service providers, requiring AAM flights to autonomously plan trajectories by predicting other flights' control inputs rather than relying on centralized coordination. Game-theoretic approaches that formulate multi-agent collision avoidance as an exact dynamic potential game can efficiently find open-loop equilibria, but they assume that agents exactly follow their equilibrium trajectories---an unrealistic assumption given uncertainties in actuation, perception, and computation. We propose a strategically robust formulation where each agent protects against a fictitious adversary that, for each timestep, perturbs other agents' control inputs within a bounded budget to minimize distance at that timestep. We show that, under reasonable assumptions on agents' distance cost and robustness levels, the strategically robust game remains an exact dynamic potential game and admits a quasi-closed-form solution to the inner adversarial problem for linear dynamics, which limits computational overhead. Experiments with up to eight agents using logarithmic distance costs show that strategic robustness selects more robust trajectories in high-collision-risk configurations while leaving low-risk trajectories nearly unchanged, with only a modest increase in runtime.

Long-horizon competition tests agents' ability to coordinate business decisions under uncertainty and adapt to changing rival strategies. We introduce CEO Arena, a benchmark that uses matched replacement evaluation to assess operating returns alongside an agent's effects on rivals and the market. Each CEO agent is compared with a reference policy in the same company under the same economic seed, holding other agents' identities and assignments fixed while all agents adapt. In a shared eight-company market spanning 500 simulated days, CEOs make sequential decisions on pricing, procurement, marketing, research and development, and service using private company information and noisy market signals, under resource constraints and delayed feedback. We evaluate eight LLM-based CEO agents in 27 main runs and 26 robustness runs. In the main evaluation, most agents have negative mean returns, and private gains can accompany market losses. Robustness analyses suggest that aggregate patterns extend beyond the original rule-based baseline; four of the 56 directed pairs show relatively stable effects. Memory, action, and accounting traces suggest demand capture and rivals' pricing and spending responses as possible explanations. CEO Arena provides a controlled testbed for studying long-horizon agent competition, strategic interaction, and market externalities.

We study Nash regret minimization in unknown finite matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. We develop Optimistic Payoff Balancing (OPB), which achieves instance-dependent $\mathcal{O}(\log^2 T)$ Nash regret against arbitrary adaptive opponents, including games with nonunique equilibria. This resolves the open problem posed by Maiti et al. (2025), extending their polylogarithmic guarantee under bandit feedback from $2\times2$ games to arbitrary finite dimensions. To handle nonunique equilibria, we construct a reference strategy that leaves room for local adjustments. We order independent payoff differences by estimation accuracy and scale these adjustments by uncertainty, allowing the learner to exploit the opponent's imbalance to offset estimation costs. Our result thus shows that observing opponent actions suffices for polylogarithmic Nash regret in general finite matrix games.

Fairness, as a fundamental social norm, continues to pose a longstanding puzzle regarding its emergence. Traditional game-theoretic models largely rely on the assumption of \emph{Homo economicus}, wherein individuals are purely rational and self-interested, acting solely to maximize material payoffs. Such accounts, however, overlook the multidimensional nature of human decision-making, which is often shaped also by other considerations beyond economic incentives. To address this gap, we propose a multi-objective reinforcement learning framework that models the evolution of fairness as a dynamic trade-off between material payoff maximization and fairness-driven moral behavior, regulated by a fairness pressure coefficient. Using simulations of a two-objective Q-learning ultimatum game, we find that increased fairness pressure promotes fair outcomes, as expected. Strikingly, however, under moderate pressure, responder behavior reverses: responders become ``forgiving" by accepting low offers -- a pattern in line with our daily experience. Microscopic analyses reveal that this strategy reversal stems from competition between payoff-maximizing and fairness-oriented preferences. We further extend our framework to an asymmetric setting, where proposers and responders assign different weights to the two objectives. Overall, our work expands the reinforcement learning paradigm from a single-objective to a multi-objective formulation, offering a versatile tool for elucidating a broader range of human social behaviors.

We study a partial-participation variation of the Hotelling-Downs model. Voters each have a cost to vote, and only vote when the comparative gain from their preferred candidate exceeds the cost. Under this model the median voter theorem breaks, and we study the extent of polarization under equilibria in different voters and cost distributions. We find that the main predictor of polarization is the reverse-hazard-rate of the cost distribution, indicating that the driver of polarization under our model is the willingness of voters to respond to changes in positions of candidates. We then extend the model by adding parameters governing alienation and candidate competitiveness, showing that our results are robust even when taking into account other realistic factors.

Online discussion of political and gender-related issues is often heated, and when opinions in a network draw closer, the convergence is readily taken as genuine consensus. Whether it carries a cost is a question existing methods cannot answer: coevolutionary opinion formation games measure the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of agents that update by numerical rules, while simulations with large language model (LLM) agents report only descriptive indices. We introduce the Hybrid Coevolutionary Opinion Game (H-COG), in which analytical and LLM-driven agents share one network, choose their neighbors by opinion similarity in every round, and hold stances drawn from real Reddit comments on gun control and abortion. To our knowledge, H-COG is the first framework to place Friedkin-Johnsen best-response agents and LLM agents in one coevolutionary game and to measure the social cost and PoA of LLM-driven populations. We prove that on any fixed network, given the LLM agents' opinions, the analytical agents' opinion stage has a unique equilibrium and the social optimum has a closed form, and that the convergence guarantee of Chen et al. for optimistic gradient ascent carries over to H-COG. All runs converge structurally. LLM-driven populations are less polarized yet have about five times the PoA of analytical ones; half of the gap comes from agents being pulled away from their own prior positions, a distance we prove must carry a cost whenever expressed opinions are more concentrated than intrinsic ones. Echo chambers form under every composition and grow out of the rewiring rule rather than the initial topology. Opinions in these populations draw closer largely because agents give up their own positions.

Game-theoretic analyses of cyber defence often compute equilibria of games whose payoffs exist only as the output of a simulator. Iterative equilibrium-finding methods grow a set of attacker and defender policies and need the payoff of every attacker--defender pair, so they are bottlenecked by payoff estimation: each payoff costs many simulator runs. We introduce Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), which spends a fixed simulation budget on the payoffs the equilibrium actually depends on and predicts the rest with a model trained on every payoff measured so far. Standard error bounds for estimated games are driven by the worst-estimated payoff, so they cannot credit an estimator that is inaccurate only where accuracy does not matter. We prove a bound that weights payoff errors by the opponent's equilibrium strategy, a certificate that can be computed from simulated payoffs alone, and a condition under which errors in the predicted payoffs cannot change either player's regret. On three synthetic general-sum games, one of them a Colonel Blotto game of military resource allocation, the new bounds are four to six times tighter than the standard one, and RWPS finds less exploitable equilibria than minimum-regret-first search, information-gain search and progressive sampling at the same budget. On two cyber-defence simulators, CyGym and a new game whose hosts are LLM agents exposed to prompt injection, it gives the least exploitable equilibria at the smallest budgets.

Large language models (LLM) deployed as autonomous pricing agents may sustain supracompetitive prices through tacit coordination. We develop a causal graph divergence framework that separately measures structural faithfulness and intent faithfulness of LLM pricing agents in Bertrand competition. Across nine LLMs under duopoly and triopoly conditions, collusive behavior and chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness dissociate along both dimensions: the most collusive model accurately reports cooperative intent yet reasons structurally unfaithfully, while the most structurally faithful model sustains supra-Nash pricing under both market structures. These findings establish that CoT monitoring alone cannot serve as a standalone safeguard against algorithmic collusion.

We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, the individual swap regret of every player is $O(\sqrt{n} m \log m \log^{5/2}(nm))$ at every finite horizon. Each player predicts the deviation gains, then uses these predictions to update a row-stochastic transition matrix, and plays its stationary distribution. The proof combines a potential argument exploiting stationarity with a two-scale higher-order prediction analysis, using rooted-tree representations to handle the nonlinear dependence of deviation gains on the stationary distributions. An adversarially robust variant, obtained through a generic common-prefix switching wrapper, preserves the self-play bound up to a universal constant and guarantees individual swap regret at most $7\sqrt{m T \log m}$ in the adversarial setting.

In social dilemma games, additional rewards or punishments have been studied as means of promoting cooperation. Therefore, it is important to investigate the ideal situation, in which such an additional payoff would change the game. In this study, we investigated the symmetric solution of the Bellman optimality equation for a repeated harmony game. The calculations showed that three types of symmetric solutions exist. One of them corresponds to the trivial All-C strategy, and another to the Win-stay Lose-shift strategy of the prisoners dilemma game. The nontrivial behavior of the strategy corresponding to the last solution is also discussed in detail. In addition, we numerically investigated which strategy the agents actually learn by the reinforcement learning algorithm.

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information structures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.

This work considers multi-agent coordination with arbitrary information networks among the agents using a game-theoretic approach. A system designer aims to assign local utility functions to the agents to guide their actions toward a desired system objective. The performance of the assigned local utilities is measured by the well known pure price of anarchy (pPoA) metric that equals the ratio of the system objective at the worst pure Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game to the optimal system objective. Our aim is to derive the utility functions which optimize the pPoA-based performance guarantees for any given information network and system objective. We develop a linear program that derives the optimal pPoA for any arbitrary information network and arbitrary system objective. Our work is the first to solve optimal utility design for arbitrary networks; our techniques generalize previous approaches which considered only the full-information setting. For supermodular objective functions, we prove that counterintuitively, a fully communication-denied utility design is optimal irrespective of the original information network. For submodular system objectives, an exhaustive numerical analysis suggests that the optimal utility design is robust to communication failures even for this case. When the system objective is weighted maximum coverage, the marginal contribution utility design provably optimizes the pPoA for a wide variety of information networks of interest.

We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $α$-potential games. We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step and update their policies asynchronously along a continuing trajectory. We establish finite-time high-probability NE regret bounds of order $\widetilde O(T^{-1/4})$ and $\widetilde O(T^{-2/15})$ for the episodic and fully online settings, respectively, up to fixed approximation terms. Crucially, our bounds eliminate the distribution-mismatch coefficient, which can scale prohibitively with the size of the state space, while accommodating potential approximation, estimation-oracle bias, and transition sensitivity. We further identify a state-wise potential structure that yields sharper guarantees with additive dependence on the potential approximation error $α$. We specialize the framework to independent-resource Markov congestion games (IMCGs), establish their approximate-potential and transition-sensitivity properties, and construct decentralized estimation oracles from realized costs. As an application, we introduce strategic online job scheduling on stochastic machines and obtain a scalable decentralized algorithm for learning stable dispatching policies. Overall, our results provide the first finite-time high-probability NE regret guarantees for fully online asynchronous decentralized learning in Markov $α$-potential games, remove distribution-mismatch coefficients from the regret bounds, accommodate fixed estimation-oracle bias, and provide scalable decentralized learning with finite-time guarantees for IMCGs.

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that first-order methods control richer action-dependent deviations. We ask for a geometric characterization of the deviations with respect to which online gradient descent, mirror descent, and follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) achieve no regret. We identify exactness as the common principle. Exactness means that the relevant displacement field is generated by a scalar potential, or equivalently that the associated one-form is exact in the geometry used by the algorithm. This geometry depends on the algorithm. For gradient descent it is Euclidean geometry, for mirror descent it is the geometry induced by the regularizer, and for FTRL it is the cumulative dual state. Under mild regularity conditions, exactness yields sublinear regret, while nonzero circulation provides the complementary obstruction and leads to linear regret. This gives a unified geometric framework for understanding the deviation classes controlled by these algorithms and reveals that different first-order methods can control genuinely different classes of deviations. These deviation classes have direct consequences for learning, particularly in games. We study the equilibrium notions induced by exact-form deviations and introduce conservative correlated equilibrium, reflecting both the conservative geometry of the underlying displacement fields and the restricted family of deviations available to the players. We characterize its relation to correlated equilibrium, determine when the resulting equilibrium notions coincide and when they separate, and show how these relationships depend on the geometry and the learning algorithm. Overall, this work gives a unified geometric account of what first-order online learning algorithms are no-regret with respect to, beyond fixed comparators.

We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.

Offline multi-agent payoff models are estimated under a logging distribution but used on distributions induced by learned solutions and unilateral deviations. Standard held-out loss can therefore favor an interaction class that predicts logged play well while distorting strategic incentives. We introduce Selective Interaction-Rank Validation (SIRV) for finite games with known logging distributions. A training split fits nested payoff models and constructs a common union of all candidate deployment and unilateral-replacement distributions; an independent calibration split evaluates every candidate on this same union. SIRV returns the smallest rank whose simultaneous upper worst-target risk is within tolerance of the best upper score, and abstains when a declared target is unsupported or too imprecisely estimated. A common coverage event yields a finite-candidate target-risk bound and a candidate-specific coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) gap certificate. We also isolate an exact two-point off-support non-identifiability result. In a controlled factorial study with 2,048 independent games per family, empirical-Bernstein bounds reduce the median CCE-gap certificate by 42.5% relative to Hoeffding bounds on common returns, with a 1.36-point reduction in supported return. Under paired rank misspecification and in a separately generated congestion family, the SIRV-EB fallback rule lowers mean true candidate-selection CCE regret relative to ID-Mean, while retaining game-level losses. Across 384 games at $N=3,5,8$, ID-Mean-relative mean CCE-regret effects stay positive while certified return falls sharply under weak coverage. These results separate certifiable model selection from universal strategic improvement.

Crowdsourcing platforms coordinate large pools of online workers who strategically choose which contests to enter and how much effort to invest. This self-selection can leave important contests with too few participants or too little effort, while workers may regret entering contests that leave them worse off than available alternatives. We study how platforms can recommend contests to workers using self-selection in Tullock contests (SSTC), a two-stage model in which workers first choose contests and then compete within them. We introduce GRAF, a greedy polynomial-time framework that constructs self-selection outcomes by ordering workers according to a score vector, with guarantees of zero worker regret and platform optimality in special cases of SSTC. Because effective orderings are difficult to design under worker heterogeneity, we propose LLMScore, an LLM-driven evolutionary framework that automatically designs GRAF's scoring algorithm. LLMScore addresses two challenges: jointly optimizing platform utility and worker satisfaction, and evaluating worker regret when exact computation is intractable. Trained only on small instances of one setting, it transfers to larger and structurally different settings; moreover, its output is human-readable code that platform operators can inspect and modify. Across 1,000 synthetic instances spanning four settings, GRAF with LLMScore consistently achieves high-quality, often near-optimal, outcomes with low worker regret, benefiting both platforms and workers.

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) often arise in multi-agent engineering applications that require distributed algorithms. Unlike traditional approaches that enforce consensus on multipliers, our method removes the need to share multipliers, reducing communication and improving privacy. As a result, different initializations can lead to different GNEs, including non-variational ones. We establish convergence under sufficient conditions using an input-to-state stability (ISS) framework.

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.

In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show that, for every fixed discount factor, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for computing inverse-polynomially accurate coarse correlated equilibria in discounted general-sum Markov games when players learn independently in decentralized settings. Complementing this hardness result, we provide what appears to be the first \emph{radically uncoupled} algorithm with sub-exponential convergence guarantees to coarse correlated equilibria in discounted general-sum Markov games without imposing any structural restrictions on the game. Our algorithm is a \emph{layered} variant of optimistic mirror descent with an increasing step-size schedule tailored to the multi-agent setting. Finally, we develop both full-feedback and partial feedback versions of the aforementioned algorithm and establish sub-exponential convergence guarantees for each case.

We seek to understand the effect of adding disruptive highly-capable new technologies to competitions by assessing the addition of Dynamite to Rock-Paper-Scissors. We find that providing a versatile Dynamite move to only one player provides limited value (win probability increases from 50% to 55.5%) and is played rarely. That value decreases further if the game is expanded beyond just the original three moves. We also observe several mechanisms by which prior moves can become strategically unplayable, or obsolete. We hope that this model illustrates some non-intuitive aspects of developing new versatile technologies. We also hope that it illustrates some pitfalls for developers and integrators to avoid in order to create value rather than merely capability.

Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average. The algorithm is deterministic and fully uncoupled. If $m_{\max}$ denotes the largest action-set size, then, simultaneously for every horizon $T\geq1$, it guarantees that each of the $N$ players in the game incurs regret upper bounded by $O(\textrm{poly}(N, \log m_{\max}))$. Our algorithm leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.