Equilibrium

How hard is it to achieve consensus in a social network under uncertainty? In this paper we model this problem as a social graph of agents where each vertex is initially colored red or blue. The goal of the agents is to achieve consensus, which is when the colors of all agents align. Agents attempt to do this locally through steps in which an agent changes their color to the color of the majority of their neighbors. In real life, agents may not know exactly how many of their neighbors are red or blue, which introduces uncertainty into this process. Modeling uncertainty as perturbations of relative magnitude $1+\varepsilon$ to these color neighbor counts, we show that even small values of $\varepsilon$ greatly hinder the ability to achieve consensus in a social network. We prove theoretically tight upper and lower bounds on the price of uncertainty, a metric defined in previous work by Balcan et al. to quantify the effect of uncertainty in network games.

We propose and study distributionally robust Markov games (DR-MGs) with the average-reward criterion as a crucial framework for multi-agent decision-making under model mismatches and over extended horizons. Under a standard irreducible assumption, we first derive a correspondence between the optimal policies and the solutions of the robust Bellman equation, based on which we further show the existence of a stationary Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We further study DR-MGs under a more general weakly communicating setting. We construct a set-valued map based on the constant-gain optimal robust Bellman operator and show that its value is a subset of the best-response policies. We further prove that this map admits a fixed point, which implies the existence of NE. We then design two algorithms, Robust Nash-Iteration and robust TD Descent, with provably convergent guarantees. Finally, we show that the NE under average-reward can be approximated by the ones for the discounted DR-MGs as the discount factor approaches one. Our studies provide a comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundation for decision-making in complex, uncertain, and long-running multi-player environments.

Recent advancements in financial problem-solving have leveraged LLMs and agent-based systems, with a primary focus on trading and financial modeling. However, credit assessment remains an underexplored challenge, traditionally dependent on rule-based methods and statistical models. In this paper, we introduce MASCA, an LLM-driven multi-agent system designed to enhance credit evaluation by mirroring real-world decision-making processes. The framework employs a layered architecture where specialized LLM-based agents collaboratively tackle sub-tasks. Additionally, we integrate contrastive learning for risk and reward assessment to optimize decision-making. We further present a signaling game theory perspective on hierarchical multi-agent systems, offering theoretical insights into their structure and interactions. Our paper also includes a detailed bias analysis in credit assessment, addressing fairness concerns. Experimental results demonstrate that MASCA outperforms baseline approaches, highlighting the effectiveness of hierarchical LLM-based multi-agent systems in financial applications, particularly in credit scoring.

Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested beliefs. To overcome these limitations, researchers have proposed extensions that incorporate models of cognitive constraints, subjective beliefs, and heterogeneous reasoning. Among these, hypergame theory extends the classical paradigm by explicitly modeling agents' subjective perceptions of the strategic scenario, known as perceptual games, in which agents may hold divergent beliefs about the structure, payoffs, or available actions. We present a systematic review of agent-compatible applications of hypergame theory, examining how its descriptive capabilities have been adapted to dynamic and interactive MAS contexts. We analyze 49 selected studies from cybersecurity, robotics, social simulation, communications, and general game-theoretic modeling. Building on a formal introduction to hypergame theory and its two major extensions - hierarchical hypergames and HNF - we develop agent-compatibility criteria and an agent-based classification framework to assess integration patterns and practical applicability. Our analysis reveals prevailing tendencies, including the prevalence of hierarchical and graph-based models in deceptive reasoning and the simplification of extensive theoretical frameworks in practical applications. We identify structural gaps, including the limited adoption of HNF-based models, the lack of formal hypergame languages, and unexplored opportunities for modeling human-agent and agent-agent misalignment. By synthesizing trends, challenges, and open research directions, this review provides a new roadmap for applying hypergame theory to enhance the realism and effectiveness of strategic modeling in dynamic multi-agent environments.

We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports. We find standard primal-dual methods fragile in this setting: agents easily manipulate their reports to distort dual variables, sacrificing social efficiency for individual utility. To address this, we propose the Incentive-Aware Primal-Dual (IAPD) framework. On the primal side, we integrate three components to suppress manipulation: a VCG-based payment neutralizes immediate misreporting benefits, while epoch-based lazy updates and random exploration together ensure potential future gains are outweighed by immediate penalties. On the dual side, to overcome a learning barrier due to lazy updates -- which we call the "price of incentives" -- we design a novel optimistic online learning algorithm, O-FTRL-FP. It utilizes a fixed-point oracle to resolve the circular dependency between optimistic dual variables and the resulting allocations. Ultimately, our mechanism attains $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ social welfare regret, satisfies all long-term constraints, and induces a near-truthful equilibrium. It also smoothly generalizes to multi-unit multi-demand allocation problems. Notably, this $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ regret near-matches the non-strategic $Ω(\sqrt T)$ lower bound, demonstrating that incentive-awareness can be accommodated at nearly no cost.

This paper addresses conservatism, limited numerical accuracy, and high computational effort in existing methods ensuring safety by design in online model-based motion generation. The presented method employs a novel captivity-escape zero-sum differential game to adapt the planning model's performance so that resulting reference trajectories are trackable within a prescribed safety margin by a jointly synthesized safety controller. A numerical example demonstrates orders-of-magnitude faster computation and improved numerical accuracy compared to the state of the art.

The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) models the competitive and cooperative strategies of biological entities. EGT could help predict the potential evolutionary equilibrium of humans and AI. The objective of this work was to examine EGT models relevant to human-AI interaction, evolution, and co-evolution. Of thirteen EGT models considered, three were examined: the Hawk-Dove Game, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and the War of Attrition. This selection was based on the widespread acceptance and clear relevance of these models to potential human-AI evolutionary dynamics and co-evolutionary trajectories. The Hawk-Dove Game predicts balanced mixed-strategy equilibria based on the costs of conflict. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that repeated interaction may lead to cognitive co-evolution. The War of Attrition suggests that competition for resources may result in strategic co-evolution, asymmetric equilibria, and conventions on sharing resources. Each model was examined from the perspective of human and AI decision-making, from psychological and biological perspectives, and from an AI viewpoint. AI is being shaped by human input and is evolving in response to it. So too, neuroplasticity allows the human brain to evolve in response to stimuli. If humans and AI converge in future, what might be the result of human neuroplasticity combined with an ever-evolving AI? There are profound ethical and cognitive implications. EGT may provide a suitable framework to understand and predict human-AI interaction, evolution, and co-evolution. However, future research should extend beyond EGT and explore additional frameworks, empirical validation methods, and interdisciplinary perspectives. In the spirit of further exploration, an illustrative computational simulation is provided.

We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms. In matrix games, the learning algorithm is payoff-based and symmetric: each player updates its policy using only its own payoff observations, incrementally moving toward an estimated smoothed best response to the opponent's latest policy. For stochastic games, we build on this matrix-game primitive to develop a learning algorithm called value iteration with smoothed best response (VI-SBR), which combines smoothed-best-response learning in induced matrix games with a decentralized, model-free approximation of minimax value iteration. We establish finite-sample guarantees in both settings. For matrix games, our results imply a sample complexity of $\mathcal{O}(ε^{-1})$ for finding an $ε$-Nash distribution and, with explicit exploration, $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ε^{-8})$ for finding an $ε$-Nash equilibrium. For stochastic games, we prove that the exploration-enhanced VI-SBR algorithm achieves a sample complexity of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ε^{-8})$ for finding an $ε$-Nash equilibrium. Technically, our analysis develops a coupled Lyapunov-drift framework. This framework simultaneously handles stochastic iterative algorithms with multiple interacting stochastic iterates, the non-zero-sum auxiliary games generated by independently updated value functions, and the time-inhomogeneous Markovian noise induced by time-varying policies. The resulting tools may be useful more broadly for analyzing learning algorithms with coupled stochastic iterates and nonstationary sampling processes.

In the current practices of machine learning, the evaluation of forecasts has become a cornerstone of scientific progress. A multitude of evaluation metrics have been suggested and used to qualify "good" forecasts. What do those metrics share? How are they related? In this work, we use a protocol borrowed from game-theoretic probability to show that a large part of evaluation metrics can be viewed as averaged outcomes of fair gambles. Intuitively, a fair gambler is one which a forecaster would expect to fail. Hence, the gambler's ability to gain disproves the quality of the forecast. Standard evaluation metrics are then variants of choices of such fair gambles. In particular, this choice is structured along two dimensions, one of which separates calibration-type and regret-type metrics. In particular, this framework sheds light on the relationship of calibration and regret showing a theoretical equivalence in their ability to evaluate when being scaled appropriately, but the incomparability of obtained scores.

This paper develops a simulation-based framework for evaluating the energy implications of quantum and classical computing firms competing in a market with limited energy resources. We model providers as differentiated Cournot competitors whose feasible service capacity is induced by technology-specific energy scaling laws: polylogarithmic for quantum algorithms that achieve an equivalent computational target and polynomial for classical emulation. For symmetric groups of quantum and classical firms, the equilibrium reduces to a tractable two-equation system that supports large scenario sweeps over market size, technology mix, and hardware coefficients. We characterize the capacity-constrained Nash equilibrium, prove the existence of a demand scale beyond which quantum service becomes more energy efficient, and report numerical experiments calibrated to trapped-ion and Rydberg platforms. The results identify when quantum energy advantage is only asymptotic and when it becomes operationally relevant.

Imperfect Information Games (IIGs) are used to model games under uncertainty or lack complete information. Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is one of the most successful families of algorithms for IIGs. The integration of skill-based strategy learning with CFR could potentially mirror more human-like decision-making and improve learning on complex IIGs. It enables the learning of a hierarchical strategy, wherein low-level components represent skills for solving subgames and the high-level component manages the transition between skills. In this paper, we introduce the first hierarchical version of Deep CFR (HDCFR), an innovative method that boosts learning efficiency in tasks involving extensively large state spaces and deep game trees. Notably, HDCFR enables learning with predefined (human) expertise and extracting skills transferable to similar tasks. We first present the algorithm and establish its theory in a tabular setting, including hierarchical CFR update rules and a variance-reduced Monte Carlo sampling extension for the model-free setting, where backtracking is infeasible. We then extend HDCFR to large-scale tasks via deep learning objectives that match the tabular targets under exact function fitting. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/HDCFR_RUN-677B.

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently one-sided quasi-perfect equilibrium. These concepts are robust to certain arbitrarily small mistakes, and are guaranteed to always exist; however, we argue that neither of these is the correct concept for developing strong agents in sequential games of imperfect information. We define a new equilibrium refinement concept for extensive-form games called observable perfect equilibrium in which the solution is robust over trembles in publicly-observable action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solution concepts do not). We prove that observable perfect equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist, and demonstrate that it leads to a different solution than the prior extensive-form refinements in no-limit poker. We expect observable perfect equilibrium to be a useful equilibrium refinement concept for modeling many important imperfect-information games of interest in artificial intelligence.

We study bimatrix two-player games and investigate the last-iterate convergence and stability of equilibria for the iterates generated by the optimistic exponential weights method. In contrast to prior work, we allow the step sizes $\eta_x$ and $\eta_y$ to differ. Our first main result establishes, under the assumption that the set of fixed points is finite, a sufficient condition for global last-iterate convergence in the special case of zero-sum games, which constrains only the product $\eta_x\eta_y$ of the step sizes. This condition is practically relevant and partially explains empirically observed behavior. Our second main result provides an almost-tight threshold for asymptotic stability and instability, again in terms of products of the step sizes, for general bimatrix games. This result is primarily of theoretical interest. We derive several known results and practically relevant step size bounds for special cases and illustrate our results by experiments.

We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization or information sharing, and suffers from sample and computational complexity that scales exponentially in the number of players. We focus on a subclass of POMGs with independent state transitions, where agents remain coupled through their rewards, and assume that the underlying fully observed Markov game is a Markov potential game. For this class, we present an independent learning algorithm in which players, observing only their own actions and observations and without communication, jointly converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. Due to partial observability, optimal policies may in general depend on the full action-observation history. Under a filter stability assumption, we show that policies based on finite history windows provide sufficient approximation guarantees. This enables us to approximate the POMG by a surrogate Markov game that is near-potential, leading to quasi-polynomial sample and computational complexity for independent Nash equilibrium learning in the underlying POMG.