Equilibrium

Opinion formation in online networks involves changes in both beliefs and social ties. Analytical models make it possible to study equilibrium and social cost, but usually represent communication as a fixed numerical update. LLM-driven agents offer a language-based alternative, yet their convergence and collective efficiency remain unclear. We develop the Hybrid Coevolutionary Opinion Game (H-COG), combining cost-minimizing Friedkin-Johnsen agents (Type-C) and Phi-4 language agents (Type-L) in a dynamically rewired K-nearest-neighbor network. We initialize 50 agents with opinions drawn from 5,199 Reddit comments on gun control and abortion. The comments are scored on a continuous [-1,+1] scale using a fine-tuned RoBERTa regressor, and a mixing parameter sets the proportion of each agent type. The experiments cover nine population compositions, three initial network topologies, and two topics. All 540 runs meet the convergence criterion within the simulation horizon. Under Type-L updating, the coevolving network reaches an attractor as reliably as it does under the analytical update rule, making an equilibrium-based efficiency comparison possible. The pooled Price of Anarchy is $5.558 \pm 0.309$ for purely Type-L populations, compared with $1.139 \pm 0.005$ for purely Type-C populations. A decomposition of social cost attributes most of this gap to language agents moving away from their intrinsic opinions, rather than to greater disagreement with their neighbors. The main findings are consistent across the three initial network topologies.

Two-timescale stochastic approximation (TTSA) is a fundamental tool for analyzing coupled iterative algorithms in reinforcement learning, optimization, and stochastic control. However, finite-time guarantees for nonlinear two-timescale schemes remain difficult to obtain, especially under constant step-sizes. In this paper, we study nonlinear TTSA with step-sizes $α\ggβ$. Under standard stability, regularity, and Markovian noise assumptions, we upper bound the mean-squared error and the bias of both iterates around their limiting equilibria. Our bounds scale as $O(α+β^2/α^2)$, which we prove to be tight when $β\leα^{3/2}$. The analysis separates the contributions of initial conditions, fast-timescale tracking error, Markovian dependence, and timescale coupling, thereby clarifying the origin of the $β^2/α^2$ term. Our results reveal qualitative differences from the linear TTSA setting previously studied, showing that nonlinear dynamics introduce additional finite-time effects that are absent in the linear case.

Regularized self-play -- the family behind DeepNash's Stratego play -- drives a two-player zero-sum policy to a Nash equilibrium by best-responding to a slowly moving, entropy-regularized reference policy $ρ$. When the game has a polytope of value-equivalent equilibria, the regularizer silently breaks the tie: with a uniform reference it selects the maximum-entropy member, the I-projection of $ρ$ onto the Nash set. Can the reference be used to choose the equilibrium on purpose? On five exactly solvable games plus a 2-D polytope, with exact best responses and equivalence tests over independent seeds, anchoring the reference at a target member and refining steers self-play to that member with mean coordinate error 0.007 at median exploitability $5\times10^{-5}$, TOST-equivalent to the request within $\pm0.05$; the anchoring persists through refinement and follows the reference, not the initialization. Selection follows the reach-weighted I-projection (slope 0.969 [0.950, 0.987]). We report with equal emphasis where the story breaks: fixed off-manifold references cost 0.08-0.25 exploitability; stiff or flat families require a smaller mirror step, set by a pre-registered rule; boundary targets undershoot; curvature predicts where boundary saturation bites (rank correlation 0.90, p=0.037) while interior precision is curvature-independent. Table and MLP steering maps are equivalent within $\pm0.03$ at every target (30 seeds); matched control arms show attention's robust signature is excess seed variance, any systematic shift bounded at 0.018 and not significant. Against a best response the selection-robustness trade-off is degenerate: steering matters only against fixed, non-equilibrium opponents. The recipe -- anchor the reference at the desired member and refine -- reinterprets the KL anchor of RLHF-style RL as a selection knob, not only a stability leash.

Game-theoretic analyses of cyber defence often compute equilibria of games whose payoffs exist only as the output of a simulator. Iterative equilibrium-finding methods grow a set of attacker and defender policies and need the payoff of every attacker--defender pair, so they are bottlenecked by payoff estimation: each payoff costs many simulator runs. We introduce Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), which spends a fixed simulation budget on the payoffs the equilibrium actually depends on and predicts the rest with a model trained on every payoff measured so far. Standard error bounds for estimated games are driven by the worst-estimated payoff, so they cannot credit an estimator that is inaccurate only where accuracy does not matter. We prove a bound that weights payoff errors by the opponent's equilibrium strategy, a certificate that can be computed from simulated payoffs alone, and a condition under which errors in the predicted payoffs cannot change either player's regret. On three synthetic general-sum games, one of them a Colonel Blotto game of military resource allocation, the new bounds are four to six times tighter than the standard one, and RWPS finds less exploitable equilibria than minimum-regret-first search, information-gain search and progressive sampling at the same budget. On two cyber-defence simulators, CyGym and a new game whose hosts are LLM agents exposed to prompt injection, it gives the least exploitable equilibria at the smallest budgets.

In multi-agent environments, coordinating agents to prevent interference and ensure robust individual performance is a critical challenge. Previous research on social laws for multi-agent systems has primarily focused on deterministic, goal-based settings. This paper extends the concept of social laws to stochastic, reward-based environments, proposing a formalism for defining and verifying their robustness under various conditions. We introduce the notion of $α$-robustness, a measure of the guaranteed utility each agent retains while pursuing its optimal single agent policy, assuming all agents obey the social law. We then present an approach for robustness verification of social laws in stochastic settings, based on a reduction to solving a series of Markov decision processes. Empirical evaluations on toy environments illustrate the potential of our framework.

We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, the individual swap regret of every player is $O(\sqrt{n} m \log m \log^{5/2}(nm))$ at every finite horizon. Each player predicts the deviation gains, then uses these predictions to update a row-stochastic transition matrix, and plays its stationary distribution. The proof combines a potential argument exploiting stationarity with a two-scale higher-order prediction analysis, using rooted-tree representations to handle the nonlinear dependence of deviation gains on the stationary distributions. An adversarially robust variant, obtained through a generic common-prefix switching wrapper, preserves the self-play bound up to a universal constant and guarantees individual swap regret at most $7\sqrt{m T \log m}$ in the adversarial setting.

We develop a certified continuation framework for inference and training in deep equilibrium networks (DEQs), with training posed as interpolation to accuracy $2^{-b}$. For inference, input homotopy selects an equilibrium branch from a supplied start root, and a rounded tracker follows it under quantitative conditioning, derivative, boundary, and tube-radius certificates. The framework includes structured factorized certificates, sequential block elimination, inheritance of contraction guarantees in adapted coordinates, and bordered continuation through simple folds. For smooth multidimensional DEQs, including tanh networks, rational local tests can construct and validate oriented continuation charts under explicit geometric promises. For training, programmable dormant bilinear rank-one channels provide output-preserving residual-aligned repairs. Loaded Tikhonov solves diagnose insufficient parameter-to-output directions, while certified gate realization, column stability, well-posed inference, and finite-update error budgets control each pass. Under polynomially bounded certificate, encoding, precision, and backend costs, both inference and training have bit complexity $O(\mathrm{poly}(L+b))$, where $L$ is the encoded instance length; training uses $O(b+\ell)$ passes and reserve channels from an initial residual bounded by $2^\ell$. A budgeted implementation returns either certified success or inconclusive termination. The quantitative core and local certificate machinery are machine-checked in Lean 4, while numerical experiments illustrate the training mechanism.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents, making the persistence of their action policies across repeated interaction critical for reliable multi-agent operation. We investigate whether and how agent-generated, non-binding pre-play communication ("cheap talk") increases such persistence in four open-weight 7-9B-parameter LLMs. Our experiments span four repeated two-player games -- Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt, and Harmony -- with incentive structures ranging from strategic conflict to alignment, each presented in six contexts. We observe unstable trajectories in all four games, although their prevalence and magnitude depend strongly on model and context. Across models, games, and contexts, cheap talk is predominantly stabilizing, with five corrected reversals concentrated in social or team framings; effects vary substantially by model and context. Controlled current-message interventions identify two separable output-level channels in Qwen: reduced action uncertainty and less between-round drift in action probabilities. Matched history-by-message counterfactuals further show that recent partner behavior conditions how mutual-benefit versus self-prioritizing language affects policy persistence. Finally, in Prisoner's Dilemma, we identify in Qwen and Falcon a history-balanced policy-content direction in late transformer layers; projecting out this direction increases realized switching during closed-loop play, demonstrating that complete trajectories are causally sensitive to this component. Together, these findings show that cheap talk can make individual trajectories more persistent across diverse incentive structures, while revealing that the magnitude and mechanisms of stabilization are model- and history-dependent.

This paper extends the fixed-point bundle framework for finite-dimensional variational inequalities (VIs) from the simplex domain to the product-of-simplex domain, which is directly applicable to solving Nash equilibria. The fixed-point bundle for VIs on the product-of-simplex domain reveals a composite fiber bundle structure. The key innovation is to construct an equivalent VI on the simplex domain and establish the equivalence between the two fixed-point bundle frameworks via a fiber bundle isomorphism. Exploiting this geometric equivalence, the predictor-corrector path-following algorithm for the VI on the product-of-simplex domain is shown to inherit the convergence guarantee of the simplex-domain framework, namely, global convergence with linear gap reduction near solutions. Numerical experiments on 5600 randomly generated instances with dimensions ranging from 2-player 128-action to 128-player 2-action demonstrate robust performance. The algorithm converges in every tested instance.

As artificial intelligence systems increasingly rely on distributed and collaborative training, the energy footprint of these processes becomes a shared responsibility. Modern AI training often unfolds across heterogeneous compute nodes-ranging from cloud clusters to edge devices-whose energy availability is spatially and temporally variable. At the same time, renewable energy grids experience growing levels of excess generation, creating opportunities to align computational workloads with low-carbon energy supply. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model of carbon-aware AI training in which autonomous agents strategically choose whether to participate and how intensively to train under limited renewable energy availability. Each agent balances diminishing learning returns, rewards for remaining within green-energy budgets, and penalties for grid consumption. While our framework applies broadly to distributed AI training, we examine Federated Learning as a representative case study due to its decentralized structure and flexible scheduling. We analyze equilibrium existence, efficiency, and adaptive dynamics, and provide simulation evidence that appropriately designed incentives can eliminate grid-based energy usage while preserving model performance. Our findings demonstrate how incentive-compatible training mechanisms can enhance energy efficiency and sharply reduce carbon emissions under renewable-energy constraints.

Artificial intelligence threatens to outrun human understanding and control. New mathematics is needed to design AI that is legible, steerable, and cooperative with humanity. I organize this invitation by mathematical field, so you can turn straight to your own: logic and game theory for cooperation; probability for agency and world-models; algebra and representation theory for learned features; analysis and geometry for generalization and training dynamics. Each section ends with an open problem that is accessible to a working mathematician with no prior experience in AI safety.

This work considers multi-agent coordination with arbitrary information networks among the agents using a game-theoretic approach. A system designer aims to assign local utility functions to the agents to guide their actions toward a desired system objective. The performance of the assigned local utilities is measured by the well known pure price of anarchy (pPoA) metric that equals the ratio of the system objective at the worst pure Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game to the optimal system objective. Our aim is to derive the utility functions which optimize the pPoA-based performance guarantees for any given information network and system objective. We develop a linear program that derives the optimal pPoA for any arbitrary information network and arbitrary system objective. Our work is the first to solve optimal utility design for arbitrary networks; our techniques generalize previous approaches which considered only the full-information setting. For supermodular objective functions, we prove that counterintuitively, a fully communication-denied utility design is optimal irrespective of the original information network. For submodular system objectives, an exhaustive numerical analysis suggests that the optimal utility design is robust to communication failures even for this case. When the system objective is weighted maximum coverage, the marginal contribution utility design provably optimizes the pPoA for a wide variety of information networks of interest.

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information structures in symmetric linear-quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.

The deployment of Federated Learning (FL) in multi-center clinical networks faces the challenge of "knowledge dominance," where high-volume hubs naturally overwhelm minority community nodes, implicitly treating the distinct clinical patterns of smaller cohorts as outliers. Existing geometric defenses provide a security baseline but leave this efficiency-fairness dilemma unresolved. To bridge this gap, we propose Fed-Equilibrium, a framework that advances the paradigm from simple defense to topological equilibrium. Unlike traditional aggregators, Fed-Equilibrium implements a sequential architectural synergy. It utilizes a two-stage gradient control cascade: Stage I (geometric quality assurance) enforces directional consistency via a cosine similarity funnel to filter malicious noise, creating a stabilized manifold; Stage II (topological Pareto control) then actively modulates verified contributions by identifying the optimal Pareto knee point. We validated this framework on a bi-national simulation integrating Canadian (CNODES) and U.S. (SyntheticMass) registries. Experimental results demonstrate that the system simultaneously secures the network against adversarial divergence while accommodating underrepresented signals. Notably, the minority U.S. spoke (representing less than 3% of data volume) achieved deep convergence comparable to the data-rich Canadian hub. This confirms that Fed-Equilibrium effectively counters "knowledge dominance," establishing a true "knowledge commons" where global generalizability does not come at the cost of local clinical representation.

We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $α$-potential games. We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step and update their policies asynchronously along a continuing trajectory. We establish finite-time high-probability NE regret bounds of order $\widetilde O(T^{-1/4})$ and $\widetilde O(T^{-2/15})$ for the episodic and fully online settings, respectively, up to fixed approximation terms. Crucially, our bounds eliminate the distribution-mismatch coefficient, which can scale prohibitively with the size of the state space, while accommodating potential approximation, estimation-oracle bias, and transition sensitivity. We further identify a state-wise potential structure that yields sharper guarantees with additive dependence on the potential approximation error $α$. We specialize the framework to independent-resource Markov congestion games (IMCGs), establish their approximate-potential and transition-sensitivity properties, and construct decentralized estimation oracles from realized costs. As an application, we introduce strategic online job scheduling on stochastic machines and obtain a scalable decentralized algorithm for learning stable dispatching policies. Overall, our results provide the first finite-time high-probability NE regret guarantees for fully online asynchronous decentralized learning in Markov $α$-potential games, remove distribution-mismatch coefficients from the regret bounds, accommodate fixed estimation-oracle bias, and provide scalable decentralized learning with finite-time guarantees for IMCGs.

How does cooperation evolve in complex agentic systems? Prior work in evolutionary game theory studies why individuals are incentivized to cooperate by isolating social interactions from the physical costs of behavior, while artificial life models traditionally study emergent self-replication without formalizing the dilemma between acquiring resources and preserving the shared energy needed to reproduce. In contrast, we introduce Autopoietic Game Theory, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving. We study these dynamics using a computational substrate of randomly initialized programs in Z80 machine code, showing empirically, and motivating with a simplified theoretical model, that embedding a social dilemma directly into the physics of computation can favor the emergence of self-replicating, cooperative strategies. When resources are scarce, our analysis shows that defection can become self-limiting even in well-mixed populations: parasitic stealing destroys shared energy, slows execution, and can prevent reliable replication. Empirically, evolved programs suppress stealing across several Z80 environments, while spatial assortment further supports structural complexity and task performance. We further show that the framework can incorporate exogenous pressures, such as math tasks structured as sequential social dilemmas, when rewards are tied to computation budgets. These results suggest that coupling an agent's capacity for computation to its available energy transforms cooperation into a dominant scaffolding for building sustainable, self-organizing systems.

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

Additional inference compute can increase the number of correctly resolved security-assurance tasks, but repeated success, unique coverage, accepted evidence, and operational protection are different quantities. We develop a resource-constrained framework that separates them. For repeated conditionally independent attempts with latent success probability $\Theta$, coverage is $C_n = 1 - E[(1-\Theta)^n]$, and its limiting value is $1 - P(\Theta = 0)$. Positive pairwise outcome correlation does not by itself imply a ceiling below one: we construct two models with the same mean success and pairwise correlation but different limiting coverage. We distinguish this result from the effective sample size used to estimate a mean, and show why finite-budget observations cannot generally identify an asymptotic support ceiling. We then connect coverage to fallible evidence checking, proper scoring of factual grounding, complete resource accounting, service capacity, and a response model that includes mitigation delay. A conceptual defensive architecture separates evidence analysis, adjudication, and operational authority. An evaluation protocol specifies held-out tasks, paired comparisons, negative cases, and uncertainty reporting. The contribution is a consistent theoretical synthesis and a set of counterexamples to invalid extrapolations, rather than an empirical scaling law. All numerical illustrations are analytic; no model-parity result, hardware benchmark, or general attacker-defender equilibrium is claimed.

Many learning systems return a single point estimate even when admissible outputs form disconnected or non-convex sets. Under squared loss, an ambiguous conditional distribution can therefore have a Bayes-optimal conditional mean that is invalid. We formalize this failure as conditional mean collapse and introduce Settling, an equilibrium-based inference operator that separates proposal generation, consistency evaluation, and test-time equilibrium selection. The operator treats a mean-seeking proposal as an initialization and refines it toward a locally stable configuration; conditional on initialization, refinement is deterministic. We establish exact-gradient descent, local convergence, and an inexact-gradient robustness condition relevant to learned consistency critics. In a reproducible 100-context geometric diagnostic, the mean-seeking baseline succeeds in 0/100 contexts, stochastic denoising in 100/100, and Settling in 99/100 while producing substantially lower trajectory roughness. A 1,200-run sensitivity study yields 97-100% success across obstacle-jitter ranges up to 0.20 and 94-100% across one-time initialization perturbations from 0.05 to 0.50. Cross-domain panels remain mechanism illustrations; learned high-dimensional validation remains an open empirical test.

Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that first-order methods control richer action-dependent deviations. We ask for a geometric characterization of the deviations with respect to which online gradient descent, mirror descent, and follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) achieve no regret. We identify exactness as the common principle. Exactness means that the relevant displacement field is generated by a scalar potential, or equivalently that the associated one-form is exact in the geometry used by the algorithm. This geometry depends on the algorithm. For gradient descent it is Euclidean geometry, for mirror descent it is the geometry induced by the regularizer, and for FTRL it is the cumulative dual state. Under mild regularity conditions, exactness yields sublinear regret, while nonzero circulation provides the complementary obstruction and leads to linear regret. This gives a unified geometric framework for understanding the deviation classes controlled by these algorithms and reveals that different first-order methods can control genuinely different classes of deviations. These deviation classes have direct consequences for learning, particularly in games. We study the equilibrium notions induced by exact-form deviations and introduce conservative correlated equilibrium, reflecting both the conservative geometry of the underlying displacement fields and the restricted family of deviations available to the players. We characterize its relation to correlated equilibrium, determine when the resulting equilibrium notions coincide and when they separate, and show how these relationships depend on the geometry and the learning algorithm. Overall, this work gives a unified geometric account of what first-order online learning algorithms are no-regret with respect to, beyond fixed comparators.

We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.

The evolution of DNA sequences can be viewed as stochastic dynamics on a high-dimensional discrete space, but it is unclear when empirical transition biases reduce to an effective energy landscape versus retain irreducible non-equilibrium circulation. Human context-dependent mutation probabilities offer a direct test: every single-nucleotide substitution in a local context has a reverse substitution, so the logarithm of the forward-to-reverse probability ratio defines an antisymmetric field-the human mutation field. We show this field has a dominant gradient component and a smaller but reproducible curl component. Using seven-base human germline substitution probabilities, we infer an effective mutational landscape with a Siamese neural network constrained to predict only energy differences. This model predicts forward-to-reverse log-ratios for held-out mutations with a correlation of about 0.93, close to both an unconstrained predictive reference (0.948) and the empirical reversible ceiling from Hodge projection (about 0.96). Although trained only on mutation probabilities, the inferred landscape largely recovers short-word genomic composition and Chargaff reverse-complement symmetry for sequences up to length four. Deviations from equilibrium structure reveal a small but detectable nonequilibrium component: a residual irreversible circulation violating the Kolmogorov cycle condition for detailed balance, reproducible across African, Asian, and European populations, and strongest in CpG-linked cycles and CpG-transition edges, consistent with methylcytosine deamination. These results give a thermodynamic decomposition of the human mutation field: most mutation bias is organized by a local equilibrium-like energy landscape aligned with genome composition, while the residual circulation points to specific directional mutational mechanisms.

Quantum game theory is an extension of classical game theory that uses quantum principles in game theory. The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) quantum game is an early example of the two-player classical Prisoner's Dilemma transformed into a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. In the EWL game, the players choose pure quantum strategies represented by unitary matrices. This extension can resolve the classical dilemma by enabling cooperative equilibrium with higher payoff. In this paper, we first discuss the Extended EWL (EEWL) for multiplayer quantum games with mixed strategies. In EEWL, each player controls a set of unitary operators as quantum actions and uses a classical mixed strategy over these actions. The payoffs are defined as expectation values of Hermitian reward operators acting on a shared quantum state, which is generated and measured according to the EEWL protocol. We then propose the Unitary Strategy Matrix Exponential Algorithm (USMEA), a geometry-aware sequential algorithm for the EEWL mixed-strategy setting, in which each player jointly learns a trainable set of local unitary actions and the associated classical mixing probabilities. Thereby it acts as a learning-and-control layer for multi-agent quantum decision systems. We analyze the convergence properties of USMEA under standard smoothness and step-size conditions and validate the theory with numerical experiments. These results show how classical optimization methods can be systematically integrated into the design and analysis of engineered quantum strategic interactions.

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.

We introduce an uncoupled learning algorithm which, when employed by all players of an arbitrary $N$-player normal form game with up to $K$ actions per player, guarantees $O(N^3\log^2 K)$ individual regret, uniformly over the horizon of play. The proposed algorithm - which we call higher-order optimism with discounting (HOOD) is a variant of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OptFTRL) that combines a discounted $(N+1)$-th order predictor with entropic regularization over a suitable "lifting" of the game's strategy space. This combination of ingredients is purposefully designed to dampen large oscillations of the induced sequence of play in a controlled manner, removing in this way a key stumbling block of previous attempts to achieve constant regret in general games. Our approach bears several striking similarities to the concurrent - and completely independent - work of Liu, Farina, and Ozdaglar (arXiv:2608.31166), who very recently derived an $O(N^{21}\log^{4} K)$ regret bound through the use of higher-order optimism and an exponential moving average estimator.

We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW). Since every maximum-NSW allocation is EF1 under additive valuations, the associated threshold problem inherits the known strong NP-hardness of NSW maximization under identical additive valuations and is strongly NP-complete. We therefore focus on welfare guarantees satisfied by arbitrary EF1 allocations. Although every such allocation is known to achieve an $e^{-1/e}$-approximation to the unrestricted optimal NSW, we identify conditions yielding stronger guarantees. Under uniform valuations, every EF1 allocation is NSW-optimal. Under an $\varepsilon$-small-item condition, every EF1 allocation achieves an explicit approximation ratio $ρ_n(\varepsilon)$ satisfying $ρ_n(\varepsilon) = 1-O(\varepsilon^2)$ as $\varepsilon\to 0$ for fixed $n$. We further consider the stronger sequential requirement that $\operatorname{EF1}$ be maintained after every item assignment. For this setting, we introduce \emph{PriorityNet}, a deep reinforcement learning framework trained with Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and equipped with prospective $\operatorname{EF1}$ action masking, which guarantees prefix-wise $\operatorname{EF1}$ by construction. Across 3,000 test instances in each of the offline full-information and random-order online regimes ($n\in[2,20]$, $m\in[5,100]$), PriorityNet achieves mean normalized $\operatorname{NSW}$ values of $0.9911$ and $0.9701$, respectively. Relative to the offline Longest Processing Time (LPT) heuristic and the online least-valued-bundle rule, it attains instance-wise win-minus-loss rates of $+27.10\%$ and $+17.87\%$. Its aggregate welfare matches the offline LPT baseline to four decimal places and modestly improves upon the online baseline, from $0.9694$ to $0.9701$.

The dominance of Neural Networks (NNs) in RL is partially due to their incremental learning capability, which naturally suits the online, non-stationary nature of self-play training. However, gradient-boosted trees like LightGBM are widely recognised as the state of the art for tabular data in supervised learning, often outperforming NNs in accuracy and efficiency. Game states are inherently tabular---discrete actions, categorical card identities, structured board positions---which makes them an ideal candidate for tree-based methods. We introduce LUGL (Local Updates, Global Learning), a framework that decouples data collection from model fitting, enabling non-incremental learners such as GBTs to operate in RL settings where they would otherwise fail due to distributional shift. LUGL alternates between a local updates phase, where the agent plays self-play games and accumulates tabular updates (Q-values, V-values, policies, or regret values) in a finite table, and a global learning phase, where the table is used to train a function approximator that generalises to unseen states before the table is reset. We test our approach in four standard perfect-information games (Tic-tac-toe, Connect-4, Othello, and Hex) and five imperfect-information games (Kuhn's poker, Leduc Hold'em, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, and Flop5 Hold'em), and show that our results are competitive with or superior to DQN and DeepCFR. Our experiments demonstrate that the community's strong bias towards NNs in game-playing may be unwarranted, since LightGBM-based agents achieve competitive or superior performance across all tested benchmarks.

We use tools from nonlinear algebra to study the equilibria of small linear translational spring networks. Specifically we use the techniques of homotopy continuation, monodromy, and parameter homotopy (a.k.a. cheater homotopy) to solve all rigid linear translational spring networks up to $5$ nodes in both $2$ and $3$ dimensions. We describe a method of implementing parameter homotopy that arises naturally from the physical structure of the system. We give precise total degree bounds on the maximum number of solutions for general planar spring networks. We discuss further efficiency gains obtained from polyhedral homotopy methods. We compare the computation efficiency of these techniques against a baseline of Newton's method.

We introduce a novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems. The proposed framework associates each control objective with a virtual input and establishes a non-cooperative, finite or infinite horizon differential game among representative players. Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function tailored to its specific goal, the full system state, and the other virtual inputs, while accounting for the remaining players' optimal policies. By establishing a Nash Equilibrium for this game, we synthesize a composite controller that achieves a stable balance across competing objectives, providing control engineers with an intuitive and modular framework for parameter re-tuning throughout the design cycle. We provide formal mathematical derivations for both continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable. To demonstrate the methodology, we developed an open-source Python package implementing a novel numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations arising in infinite-horizon differential games. We evaluate the approach on two benchmark case studies: an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor. The resulting closed-loop performance is compared against the classical Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) across various transient and steady-state control metrics, demonstrating superior trajectory tracking and robust multi-objective regulation.

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) has achieved remarkable results in single-agent domains, yet its extension to competitive imperfect information games (IIGs) remains underexplored. In multi-agent settings, opponent-induced non-stationarity complicates the learning process, and decentralized model learning faces severe identifiability barriers, which we argue make centralized model learning a mathematical necessity. Building on this analysis, we propose NashDreamer, a principled MBRL framework for two-player zero-sum IIGs. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model (MARSSM) that decouples environment dynamics from the effect of players' strategies on their individual observations. NashDreamer is designed to use arbitrary policy gradient algorithms and inherits their convergence guarantees towards Nash equilibria under an idealized model. Empirical evaluations across four benchmark games demonstrate that NashDreamer substantially improves sample efficiency over model-free baselines early in the training. Finally, we theoretically analyze the architecture's optimization landscape, identifying the vulnerability of the Dreamer family of algorithms to posterior collapse in stochastic environments. We leave it as an open challenge.

This paper introduces a structural taxonomy for constrained non-convex optimization based on the signature of Lagrange multipliers at KKT stationary points. Leveraging a unified game-theoretic interpretation of eight classical algorithm families--including block coordinate descent, ADMM, generalized Benders decomposition, successive convex approximation, interior-point methods, mirror descent, Frank-Wolfe, and Riemannian gradient descent--we show that the normalized multiplier vector carries an algorithm-independent structural fingerprint. Four scale-free shape features of this vector partition the dual space into five operational regimes: Unconstrained, Resource-Limited, Saturation, Strongly-Coupled, and Hybrid. We establish four structural theorems characterizing the partition: invariance under natural KKT symmetries, local stability under data perturbation with explicit Lipschitz margins from Robinson's strong regularity, codimension-one regime transitions, and the topological identification of the Hybrid regime as the Lebesgue-null boundary of the core regimes. A linear-time classifier is proposed with provable guarantees on correctness, iteration stabilization, sample complexity, and online tracking under data drift. Numerical experiments on 104 mixed-integer nonlinear programs and a downlink beamforming instance validate the theoretical predictions. The framework provides a foundational tool for regime-aware algorithm design and robustness analysis in non-convex optimization.

Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average. The algorithm is deterministic and fully uncoupled. If $m_{\max}$ denotes the largest action-set size, then, simultaneously for every horizon $T\geq1$, it guarantees that each of the $N$ players in the game incurs regret upper bounded by $O(\textrm{poly}(N, \log m_{\max}))$. Our algorithm leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.

As large language models and increasingly capable AI agents are deployed in high-risk settings, aligning them with complex human values has become a central challenge. Existing alignment methods, while effective in improving helpfulness, harmlessness, and controllability, often struggle to capture real-world preferences that are context-dependent, non-transitive, and shaped by dynamic multi-party interactions. This survey reviews AI alignment through a game-theoretic lens. Specifically, it organizes recent progress around key game-theoretic elements and synthesizes the literature along three challenges: preference diversity, alignment priority, and temporal dynamics. This perspective clarifies where current alignment methods genuinely benefit from game-theoretic analysis, where the framework is looser, and what challenges remain in building robust, adaptive, and verifiable AI systems.

We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize the allocation, or exit. Larger allocations can improve accuracy but increase token cost and latency. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive the user's unique optimal customized allocation in closed form. For any price, the acceptable defaults form either an empty set or a compact interval. We characterize the provider's optimal default through a three-regime rule, reduce equilibrium computation to a one-dimensional price optimization, and prove the existence of the equilibrium. We further show that defaults affect the implemented reasoning allocation only when users value the convenience of avoiding customization; otherwise, every service-providing outcome implements the user's optimal customized allocation. Experiments with two compact open-weight reasoning models on five mathematics and science benchmarks support the accuracy-token model and show how model and task characteristics determine equilibrium prices, defaults, and reasoning allocations.

As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes. Prior literature has argued that cooperation problems such as the Prisoner's Dilemma are resolvable in settings where agents know they follow very similar decision making patterns, as for example in monocultural AI ecosystems. Following that line of work, this paper introduces the first framework for evaluating LLM decision making when agents are provided with graded similarity signals. Among our findings, we establish that different LLM models vary drastically in how they navigate similarity signals, with some modern models showing consistent behavior across cooperation problems, payoff structures, and prompt framing. Perhaps surprisingly, our experiments also show that the dataset based on which the similarity signal is computed has small to no impact on induced cooperation, and that LLM models systematically self-identify as highly similar when asked to evaluate another model's chain-of-thought reasoning by themselves. Finally, we develop an LLM-behavioral-game-theoretic model that captures some of their reasoning rationale, and show that it can support cooperative outcomes in equilibrium under sufficiently high similarity scores.

We present a robust safety-filtering framework for input-constrained underactuated linear systems subject to unknown disturbances. A baseline H-$\infty$ input is derived from a zero-sum differential game, while a disturbance observer supplies an estimate and a transient error bound. The baseline input is adjusted using the disturbance estimate, while the estimate and its error bound are used to define robust high-order control barrier function constraints; forward invariance holds as long as the admissible-input set remains nonempty. For scalar-input systems, pointwise feasibility is determined from an exact input interval, and the interval width defines the feasibility margin. A finite-horizon H-$\infty$ performance balance accounts for the accumulated deviation of the applied input from the baseline H-$\infty$ policy. Simulations on a linearized two-wheeled balancing robot show how position and body-pitch constraints compete for the same bounded wheel-torque input.

Inspired by possible future markets of autonomous routing and driving (ARAD), we introduce competitive mediator games and their equilibria which generalize the (coarse) correlated equilibria, which have become a popular research area recently as they not only can be more socially efficient than Nash equilibria but also are limits of algorithmic no-regret multi-agent learning dynamics. We discuss the basic properties of competitive mediator games and prove that in the generic setting of anonymous congestion(routing) games with market-share maximizing mediators all competitive mediator equilibria are monopolies whenever one of the mediators is weakly preferred to other mediators by all users. We apply and interpret these results in the context of new markets of competing ARAD service providers. We also provide a comprehensive overview of these markets and discuss the future mechanism design thereof.

The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts tournament chips into reference prize equity, and policies are routinely constructed against those values. Because ICM reads only stack sizes, it omits action order, blind obligations, and seat rotation, and it does not price the elimination pressure a big stack puts on the short stacks it can bust. Those omissions can alter the successor-state contrasts that determine a move. We introduce Strategic-Continuation Optimization (SCO), a policy-construction method that enumerates current-hand outcomes, maps them to successor states, prices those states with continuation values computed from the finite tournament model, and optimizes and freezes the resulting current-hand policy. The fixed-ICM comparison policy changes one thing only: the same optimizer solves the same game with successor states priced by analytic ICM, so the two policies differ only through that pricing. We evaluate the resulting policies in a three-player jam/fold tournament with a $1M prize pool. Relative to the frozen strategic-continuation benchmark, analytic ICM has $9{,}036 mean absolute value error across all 2,838 state--seat entries. That value error rewrites the ranges it prices: measured against each decision point's own fixed-ICM jam range, SCO moves the jam frequency by an average of 14.08%. To price those different moves, we compare all 946 states and three policy owners while changing only the focal policy and holding both opponents and the continuation evaluator fixed. The policy produced by SCO earns $214.33 more prize equity per hand on average and is favored in 2,433 of 2,838 matched units. The ordering survives replacing the solver-built opponent with two LLMs and with a family of non-modeling threshold players. This value-to-policy-to-cost chain shows directly when ICM becomes an inadequate objective for tournament strategy construction.

LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16%$\to$100%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.

We consider the extensive-form bandit problem where on each trial the learner plays an extensive-form game against an oblivious adversary. We focus on the notion of switching regret, which measures the expected performance of the learner against that of any switching sequence of mixed strategies in retrospect. Our algorithm takes a parameter $ρ>0$ and achieves a switching regret of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}((1/ρ+ρK)\sqrt{H A T})$ where $K$ is the number of switches in the comparator sequence, $H$ is the maximum number of the learner's information sets that can be traversed during a play of the game and $A$ is the number of actions that the learner can possibly take. Our algorithm is extremely efficient, taking a per trial time of only $\mathcal{O}(H B)$ where $B$ is the maximum number of actions available to the learner at any of its information sets.

This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond. Our presentation is structured around two complementary viewpoints: We first consider a single agent -- the learner -- engaged in a sequential decision process in an unknown, non-stationary, and possibly adversarial environment. We then examine what happens when the environment is shaped by the decisions of several interacting agents, not necessarily aware of each other's actions or goals, and all seeking to improve their individual rewards. In this general context, we examine a family of regularized learning policies based on best-responding to the past history of play, up to a regularization penalty intended to encourage exploration and prevent over-commitment to suboptimal choices. In the single-agent setting, we present some basic regret bounds for regularized learning in adversarial multi-armed bandits; in the multi-agent setting, we describe an ergodic equilibrium convergence result for zero-sum games in the spirit of classical results on fictitious play, as well as a "folk theorem" linking strategic and dynamic notions of stability -- Nash equilibria and attracting points of regularized learning, respectively. We pay special attention to the information available to the players and, through a unified analysis framework, we study both oracle- and payoff-based (bandit) methods. Our goal is to provide a coherent and comprehensible -- albeit, by necessity, not comprehensive -- account of some recent ideas in the field, and to discuss their implications for the study of rationality.

On unlabeled test data, reinforcement learning lacks a ground-truth reward; test-time RL methods derive one from the model's own roll-outs, rewarding those that match the majority vote over $N$ sampled answers. That vote discards a correct answer whenever it is a minority and scores every majority-matching roll-out identically. We replace it with \emph{CoRE} (Consensus Rewards via Equilibrium): the $N$ roll-outs form a graph whose edges combine answer agreement, reasoning similarity, and generation confidence, and replicator dynamics extract its dominant set, yielding a refined pseudo-label, a graded per-roll-out reward, and a per-question cohesiveness gate. CoRE strictly generalizes voting: majority voting is recovered as a special case; a block-value analysis gives a sharp threshold for when consensus recovers a correct minority against a larger wrong plurality; and confidence calibration provably lowers that threshold multiplicatively. Across seven backbones and five benchmarks (42 model--benchmark cells, three seeds each), \emph{CoRE} improves the untrained base by $+21.7$ points on average versus $+20.4$ for majority-vote TTRL, wins wherever agreement is contestable with margins over the vote of up to $+7.5$ points, and reaches the voting baseline's plateau accuracy in $54$--$70$% fewer steps. Consensus, not counting: treating the roll-out group as a graph rather than a ballot box turns a brittle vote into a calibrated, graded, self-supervised reward at no extra roll-out cost.

In this paper, we study zero-sum potential team games with a supervisor network, where agents rely on supervisor-provided belief information rather than accurate common beliefs. The main challenge is that such belief information can be inaccurate because of supervisors' belief-estimation errors and the misreporting of joint actions by Byzantine teams. We propose the distributed team-orchestrating algorithm (DTOA), which combines team fictitious play with supervisor-based distributed belief learning. We prove the convergence of supervisors' belief estimates and establish that the induced learning dynamics converge to a near team-Nash equilibrium (TNE) in terms of the team-Nash gap (TNG). In the Byzantine setting, we consider a misreporting attack model and develop a Byzantine-resilient DTOA. We further provide probabilistic guarantees for Byzantine-team identification and establish an asymptotic bound on the honest TNG. Numerical experiments illustrate the theoretical findings, compare DTOA with baseline learning methods, and evaluate its performance in a Markov decision process setting.

As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics. This paper studies learning in infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic games under a radically uncoupled information structure, where players are either unaware of opponents or strategically oblivious, observing only a common state and their own action history. Under this minimal information, we analyze an asynchronous decentralized learning process in which each player independently runs a single-agent $ε$-greedy iterated least-squares algorithm. We prove that, despite being unable to identify the system parameters, players' learning dynamics converge almost surely to the complete-information Nash equilibrium and characterize the convergence rate. We then apply the framework to a dynamic Cournot competition with sticky prices. Numerical experiments validate the theoretical results and show that learning under limited information reduces firm profits under both low and high price stickiness, while total surplus declines and market concentration increases when price stickiness is high. Publicly revealing aggregate market output substantially accelerates convergence and mitigates these welfare losses.

We develop a formal framework for analyzing indirect geoeconomic influence. The influencing state (sender) does not attempt to change a target nation's policy directly. Instead, the sender restructures the target's internal political economy so that its own citizens, firms, and institutions generate the compliance pressure. The framework rests on a switching dynamical system (SDS) in which a target's political economy evolves under mode-dependent rules. We analyze two modes: a permissive mode, in which a mechanism transmits pressure toward the sender's preferred policy, and a contested mode, entered naturally once the target detects and attributes the mechanism. Crucially, the sender's mechanism design shapes the transition into the contested mode rather than paying a static toll for legibility. This inverts the usual regime-switching problem: rather than estimating a latent transition kernel from data, the designer engineers the kernel to steer regime occupancy over a planning horizon. A structured switch vector decomposes any mechanism along discrete design dimensions, and a combinatorial optimizer searches this space for high-performing archetypes scored on compliance, time-to-threshold, and a durability ratio. We characterize mode-conditional equilibria and derive comparative statics on credibility and legibility, showing that the legibility penalty is scaled by the salience of the government channel and therefore interacts with the mechanism's cost incidence. We illustrate the framework with two stylized mechanisms, report a proof-of-concept simulation over a reduced switch space, and report a small blind-audit study of the pipeline's optional language-model generation stage.

Simulating complex fluid flows requires capturing full equilibrium distributions rather than just mean trajectories, yet high-fidelity solvers remain computationally prohibitive. Recent advances, such as Diffusion Graph Networks (DGNs), have combined diffusion models with graph neural networks to sample equilibrium states directly from unstructured meshes, enabling distributional accuracy even from short simulations. However, graph-based diffusion approaches suffer from hand-crafted architectural constraints, limited receptive fields in message passing, and costly multi-scale designs, which restrict scalability to larger and more complex domains. We propose Fluid-DiT, a Graph-Free Diffusion Transformer that replaces graph message passing with attention-based denoising, eliminating explicit graph design while preserving the ability to model distributions of chaotic flows. Our framework introduces a latent-space formulation that disentangles geometric fidelity from distributional learning, reducing high-frequency artifacts and accelerating sampling. By leveraging the transformer's global receptive field, Fluid-DiT naturally captures both local flow structures and long-range correlations without requiring hierarchical graph coarsening. On canonical benchmarks including laminar cylinder wakes, ellipse-flow systems, and turbulent 3D wing experiments, Fluid-DiT consistently outperforms graph-based diffusion baselines in both sample quality and distributional accuracy, achieving higher $R^2$ correlations and lower Wasserstein distances. Moreover, it generalizes robustly from short, incomplete trajectories to unseen Reynolds numbers and geometries, demonstrating strong scalability.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over \textbf{250 million mixed-strategy decisions}; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the $\ell_1$ distance to the equilibrium by $52.6\%$} across $8$ different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.

Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time. Since the number of games needed is unknown, fixed-budget evaluations either keep paying after the result is settled or stop before the agents can be told apart, while naive optional stopping with an ordinary confidence interval invalidates the stated level. We make such an evaluation stop as soon as its evidence suffices, with the guarantee intact. The Action-Informed Value Assessment Tool (AIVAT) reduces variance in imperfect-information games through conditional mean-zero corrections, by a median $54\times$ across 15 LLM agent configurations spanning 71,439 paired Heads-Up No-Limit Hold'em (HUNL) hands, but does not say when to stop. We combine AIVAT with continuously monitored Confidence Sequences (CSs) into anytime-valid AIVAT (AV-AIVAT), whose online value model learns only from past games so that no game scores its own correction. At the nominal 95% level and a target precision of $\pm1$ Big Blind, raw outcomes need a median $74\times$ as many hands as AIVAT-corrected outcomes to stop under the Asymptotic CS (AsympCS). Exact finite-sample certification uses the Empirical-Bernstein CS (EB-CS), which needs an independently justified bound on corrected payoffs. We establish such a bound structurally for Leduc hold'em and characterize a width floor set by the CS's bet cap and that bound, which governs how much of a variance gain becomes earlier stopping; the descriptive HUNL EB-CS runs show a median $1.37\times$ stopping-time ratio. AV-AIVAT turns variance reduction into efficient, auditable early stopping while separating asymptotic screening from exact certification, so an evaluation can stop the moment its evidence suffices and hand a third party everything needed to recheck the verdict at that very stopping time.

While many algorithms blend reinforcement learning (RL) with counterfactual regret (CFR) methods to leverage tradeoffs in computational speed and performance, there are fewer investigations into generative sampling frameworks in game theoretic applications in incomplete information games. We extend a generative flow network framework, Adversarial Flow Networks (AFlowNets), to incomplete information games, called Information Flow Networks (IFNs). We prove that previously established constraints for generative flow networks in complete information games are inadmissible for obtaining valid densities (corresponding to player strategies) and a valid training objective. We show that our proposed generalization, IFlowNets, alleviates this issue and strictly generalizes AFlowNets. In preliminary results for three standard game environments, IFlowNets perform comparably to or better than Outcome Sampling Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret (OSMCCFR) and standard RL-based methods in performance and speed.

Swap regret governs the rate at which uncoupled learning dynamics converge to correlated equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games. Under full-information feedback, the best previous guarantee when every player follows the same dynamics grows logarithmically in the horizon $T$. We construct uncoupled dynamics under which every player incurs only $O(nm^2\sqrt{\log m\log T})$ swap regret, where $n$ is the number of players and $m$ bounds the number of actions per player. To our knowledge, this is the first sublogarithmic individual guarantee in this setting, and it implies that the time-averaged product distribution of play is an $O(nm^2\sqrt{\log m\log T}/T)$-approximate correlated equilibrium. The key algorithmic choice is to combine the Blum--Mansour reduction with optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader using a hybrid regularizer that separately weights negative Shannon entropy and the log-barrier: the entropy controls the optimistic prediction error, whereas the log-barrier controls the transition-matrix movement through its Bregman divergence. A new sensitivity theorem for stationary distributions of Markov chains, which involves neither mixing parameters nor the smallest transition probability, transfers this control to the played strategies and yields a simpler analysis without local-norm or self-concordance arguments. The guarantee is preserved by an adversarially robust variant that additionally ensures $O(nm^2\sqrt{\log m\log T}+\sqrt{mT\log m})$ swap regret against arbitrary utility sequences, and by a horizon-free variant that requires no prior knowledge of $T$.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Large language models have improved substantially on single-shot reasoning tasks, but their performance in sequential decision-making is less well understood. We study this on fully-observable two-player zero-sum games, which provide ground-truth evaluation: outcomes are determined by the rules, and optimality of individual moves can be computed or approximated, without relying on a judge model. Across model tiers, LLMs play suboptimally in simple games such as tic-tac-toe or Connect Four, and lose to MCTS opponents. Obfuscations that preserve the game tree but rewrite its surface form leave performance largely unchanged, indicating the gap is not fully explained by recall of memorized strategies. Motivated by this performance gap, we introduce an agentic framework enhanced with an experience memory designed for the sequential setting and addressing common challenges of sequential decision-making such as credit assignment. We show that post-game reflection and rule extraction yield measurable improvements on tic-tac-toe without modifying the model weights.

Attention-only dynamical theories model Transformer residual directions as particles aggregating on a sphere. We extend this framework by incorporating the feed-forward network (FFN) term as a local steering field acting on each token state. The resulting theory predicts that the tangential component of the FFN field is necessary for motion in residual-direction space, that critical residual directions correspond to nonlinear projective equilibria, and that a commutator defect determines when a finite attention--FFN block can be accurately approximated by a parallel, additive flow. Across GPT-2, Pythia, Mistral, and Llama models, the extended theory improves one-step angular prediction relative to an attention-only baseline, with the contribution of the FFN increasing from GPT-2 to Llama-3-8B. Intervention experiments show that retaining only the tangential FFN component preserves most model quality, whereas retaining only the radial component causes performance to collapse. The tangential component also preserves output diversity under aggregation pressure. As a practical application, layers with small commutator defects can be approximately parallelized with only a modest increase in loss, whereas layers with large defects degrade rapidly. These findings support the interpretation of FFN layers as directional steering fields that shape Transformer residual geometry and govern the feasibility of block-level interventions.

This paper studies feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) seeking for multi-agent trajectory planning in nonlinear dynamical systems with unknown agents' objectives and state-dependent inter-agent coupling. While dynamic game theory provides a principled framework for such problems, existing approaches typically assume fully rational agents with known objectives or rely on fixed regularization, limiting their ability to capture bounded rationality and spatially varying interaction intensity in safety-critical settings. To this end, we propose a KL-regularized dynamic game with a state-dependent weight that adaptively balances optimality and behavioral priors. To infer unknown cost parameters from demonstrated behaviors, we develop a context-aware inverse game module based on maximum-entropy inverse reinforcement learning with physics-informed regularization, ensuring structural consistency with the forward game. We establish per-iteration well-posedness of the regularized local game and show that the adaptive weighting function remains Lipschitz continuous under bounded nominal-trajectory updates. Numerical simulations and multi-robot experiments on cooperative navigation and merging scenarios validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Stage-one stellarator design searches a high-dimensional family of three-dimensional plasma boundaries and fixed-boundary MHD equilibria for configurations that jointly meet requirements on confinement, field-line topology, force balance, stability proxies, and geometry. These specifications do not provide a general constructive map to a validated finite-beta equilibrium. High-quality targets are commonly developed through iterative numerical optimization whose outcome depends on the initial configuration, active Fourier resolution, objective priorities, and local solver budget. Coordinating this process is computationally costly and expert-intensive, limiting both design throughput and the production of consistently evaluated data. We present a proof of concept for \emph{agentic} stage-one optimization. A bounded language-model agent diagnoses the current equilibrium and selects the next local optimization experiment, while deterministic DESC execution owns prescribed profiles and flux, symmetry, metric evaluation, solver validity, and acceptance. On a common-budget subset from an expanding finite-beta campaign, the number of gate-valid configurations increases from five inputs to nineteen outputs; median Boozer QS RMS decreases from $2.39\times10^{-4}$ to $1.07\times10^{-4}$, and median maximum principal curvature decreases from $62.56$ to $33.00\,\mathrm{m}^{-1}$. A complementary long route achieves a $9.10\times$ QS reduction while repairing magnetic-well and curvature defects. The system also records every attempted local action as transition evidence, yielding 734 structured parent--action--outcome records in the reported experiments. These results show that agentic outer-loop control can sustain finite-beta, multi-objective search and turn repeated optimization into a scalable source of improved equilibria and reusable decision data.

Traditional distributed consensus protocols classify nodes as either honest-but-faulty or actively malicious (Byzantine). However, in organizational structures, departmental agents rarely fit this binary. Instead, they exhibit bounded rationality and self-interested preferences while operating under asymmetric information. This paper presents the Organizational Consensus Algorithm (OCA), a mechanism design framework tailored for internal negotiation and decision coordination. OCA models inter-departmental conflict as an incomplete information dynamic game, integrating internal token staking, an exception-triggered challenge mechanism, and confidence-weighted consensus rules. Rather than enforcing instantaneous total ordering, OCA leverages a retrospective penalty system driven by delayed verifiable outcomes to deter structural bias and reduce exhaustive coordination overhead. A Python simulation prototype was developed to evaluate OCA. Across independent trials with varying organizational scales, OCA reports lower coordination overhead, higher informative reporting rates, and bounded welfare loss in noisy environments. Crucially, these results remain conditional on the stated simulation model and do not by themselves establish a general truthful equilibrium.

An agent playing a Nash-equilibrium strategy in a two-player zero-sum imperfect-information game secures the game value but forfeits the additional value offered by a flawed opponent. Diffuse deviations pose a particular challenge: binary release rules may gather too little evidence to act, while a full best response to an incomplete opponent model can be highly exploitable. We introduce \emph{budget-constrained confidence-scheduled restricted responses} (CS-RNR), the first opponent-exploitation method whose safety guarantee is a certificate the agent computes on the strategy it actually deploys, so that every exploit it commits to is one it has audited itself. The method tracks pooled action frequencies with anytime-valid confidence sequences and treats a frequency as exploitable only once its interval separates from an equilibrium reference. The confirmed deviations define a conservative opponent model, which a restricted-response solve turns into candidate counter-strategies over a grid of pin levels. Before deployment, each complete candidate is evaluated by a full-tree best response. The resulting certificate is compared with a user-specified budget and committed atomically with the strategy. Because this check is performed on the played strategy, model quality determines the exploitation achieved while the certificate controls reference-relative expected loss. In Leduc hold'em, CS-RNR obtains $6.2\times$ the steady-state gain of a money-verified binary gate while keeping every deployed strategy within budget. A trajectory mixture using the same estimator reaches $13.6\times$ the budget. Across Leduc, Liar's Dice, and 5-rank Leduc, all $36{,}000$ audited hands satisfy the reported certificate tolerance.

Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another. Understanding and predicting this transfer of strategic capabilities, however, remains a key challenge for large language models (LLMs). Normal-form games provide an ideal testbed for analyzing this phenomenon, as they feature explicitly defined payoffs and well-characterized equilibrium behaviours. In this work, we investigate whether game embeddings can explain and predict changes in LLM strategic capabilities following fine-tuning across different games. We propose a lightweight two-feature embedding that captures fundamental behavioural demands: the entropy of the Nash equilibrium and the sensitivity of optimal responses to an opponent's action. We show that while existing published structural embeddings primarily memorize game identities and fail to generalize, our behavioural embedding reliably predicts performance changes on held-out games. These results demonstrate that the transfer of strategic capabilities in LLMs is not dictated by the payoff geometry of a game, but by the underlying structure of the decision-making behaviour it requires.

Writing and communication are increasingly mediated by large language models (LLMs) that are being used to draft, revise and polish text. Although such assistance can improve clarity and help authors meet institutional expectations, widespread reliance on shared models may reduce population-level variation in linguistic form, a phenomenon we refer to as linguistic monoculture. We develop a mathematical framework in which authors and LLMs are represented as distributions over linguistic features and coevolve through repeated interaction. We analyze three interaction mechanisms: a shared model with a fixed linguistic distribution, a shared model recursively updated from author outputs, and personalized models updated through author-specific and population-level feedback. We characterize the resulting equilibria and convergence rates, showing that, shared models can drive authors toward a common norm, recursive feedback relocates the shared norm without altering pairwise spread under common conformity, and personalization can preserve a family of distinct author-model equilibria with nonzero linguistic diversity. We then endogenize conformity as a strategic choice trading off private benefits from clarity, legibility, and perceived fluency against distinctive style. Within this utility model, individually rational authors may conform more than is socially optimal because they do not internalize the value their distinctiveness provides to others, creating a negative externality and a price of monoculture that is finite for each fixed instance but can grow without bound when distinctiveness dominates authenticity. Synthetic simulations illustrate how fixed shared assistance, recursive feedback, and personalization produce different long-run diversity outcomes.

Energy-Based Models (EBMs) provide an interpretable framework for generative modeling of scientific data, but poor Markov Chain Monte Carlo mixing often limits their reliability. We introduce a training algorithm based on Parallel Trajectory Tempering (PTT), which exploits the continuity of the optimization path to maintain equilibrium sampling throughout learning. This enables stable and fast training on highly multimodal and data-scarce scientific datasets. Combined with reservoir sampling and adaptive optimization, PTT has a computational cost comparable to Persistent Contrastive Divergence, making it a practical replacement for standard training methods. It also provides direct estimates of thermalization times, equilibrium samples from trained models, and accurate log-likelihoods at essentially no additional cost. Experiments on Restricted Boltzmann Machines show that PTT consistently outperforms existing EBM training approaches. On discrete tabular data, it also surpasses state-of-the-art deep generative models, yielding higher-quality samples and greater robustness to overfitting and limited data. Our results make equilibrium maximum-likelihood training of EBMs practical and computationally efficient.