Social Choice Theory

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10 papers in the last four weeks, up 233% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 31

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Collective intelligence through aggregation
Oct 5, 2026Franz Dietrich, Christian ListSocial Choice Theory
We thank two anonymous referees and an editor for very helpful comments.
Groupwise Distortion Guarantees for Preference-Based Alignment
Oct 4, 2026Jacob Brodkey, Roberto Tamez, Aaron RothPairwise Preference Learning Social Choice Theory
University of Pennsylvania
Settling the Computational Complexity of Max-Min Allocation with Ternary Valuations
Oct 4, 2026Thi Ngoc Anh Vu, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Khaled Elbassioni +1Submodular Optimization Social Choice Theory
Faculty of Computer Science, Phenikaa University, Hanoi 12116, Vietnam · DataOptLab, National Economics University, Hanoi 11616, Vietnam · Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi 127788, UAE +1
Outer Diversity of Condorcet Domains
Sep 30, 2026Piotr Faliszewski, Jan Jabrocki, Mateusz Słuszniak +3Social Choice Theory Majority Voting
AGH University, Poland · University of Geneva, Switzerland · University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Query-efficient winner prediction in district-based elections
Sep 30, 2026Koustav De, Debajyoti Kar, Swagato SanyalQuery Complexity Social Choice Theory
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India · Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science Bengaluru, India · School of Computer Science, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees
Sep 28, 2026Georgios PapasotiropoulosSocial Choice Theory Approximation Algorithms
University of Warsaw
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
Sep 28, 2026Parinaz Naghizadeh, Jingyan WangSocial Choice Theory Information Design
University of California, San Diego · Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago
Nearly Group-Separable Elections
Sep 27, 2026Piotr Faliszewski, Jan Jabrocki, Stanisław Kaźmierowski +3Social Choice Theory Parameterized Complexity
AGH University of Krakow, Poland · University of Warsaw, Poland · Charles University, Czechia +3
Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model
Sep 24, 2026Guy Wolf, Reshef MeirSocial Choice Theory Game Theory
Technion—Israel Institute of Technology
Anchored Sequential Deliberation
Sep 15, 2026Sijing Tu, Ashish GoelSocial Choice Theory
Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University
A latent dimension of Condorcet's jury theorem for multiple AI advisers
Sep 13, 2026Kazutoshi Sasahara, Aoi Naito, Ryo FujieSocial Choice Theory Multi-Agent Consensus
Institute of Science Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan · Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees
Aug 26, 2026Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak, Lirong Xia +1Social Choice Theory Fair Resource Allocation
Penn State University · Rutgers University
Characterizing Necessary Losers to Explain Tournaments Solutions
Aug 24, 2026Contet Clément, Umberto Grandi, Jérôme MenginExplainable Artificial Intelligence Social Choice Theory
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT) · Université de Toulouse · Université Toulouse Capitole
Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation
Aug 11, 2026Nicholas TehSocial Choice Theory
University of Oxford, UK
Voting Method Synthesis on an Infinite Domain: A Possibility Theorem for Positive Involvement
Aug 9, 2026Wesley H. HollidaySocial Choice Theory
University of California, Berkeley
Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules
Jul 30, 2026Alexandra Lassota, Krzysztof SornatSocial Choice Theory
TU Eindhoven, the Netherlands · AGH University, Poland
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO
Jul 25, 2026Nicholas TehSocial Choice Theory Fair Resource Allocation
University of Oxford, UK
Can LLMs Rank? A Tale of Triads and Triage
Jun 29, 2026Gaurab Pokharel, Shafkat Farabi, Patrick J. Fowler +1Pairwise Comparison Social Choice Theory
Virginia Tech Alexandria, VA · Washington University in St. Louis St. Louis, MO
Measurable Majorities Are Not Finitely Axiomatizable
Jun 24, 2026Lawrence S. Moss, Arthur Paul PedersenSocial Choice Theory Social Reasoning
(†) Dept. of Mathematics, Indiana University, Bloomington. · (‡) Dept. of Computer Science & the Intel Investigations Lab, the City College of New York; the Graduate Center & Remote Sensing Earth Systems Institute, the City University of New York.
The Measurable Majority
Jun 22, 2026Lawrence S. Moss, Arthur Paul PedersenSocial Choice Theory Majority Voting
(†) Dept. of Mathematics, Indiana University, Bloomington. · (‡) Dept. of Computer Science & the Intel Investigations Lab, the City College of New York · the Graduate Center & Remote Sensing Earth Systems Institute, the City University of New York.
Democracy on Rugged Landscapes: Phase Transitions in Optimal Voting Rules
Jun 1, 2026Joshua NunleySocial Choice Theory Phase Transitions
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA
Large Language Models Should Learn Personalized Rather Than Aggregated Human Preferences
May 30, 2026Cristina GarbaceaLLM Alignment Social Choice Theory
University of Chicago, Data Science Institute, Chicago, USA.
The Representation-Rationalizability Tradeoff in Reward Learning
May 29, 2026Jing Dong, Yaoliang Yu, Pascal PourpartPairwise Preference Learning Reward Modeling
Vector Institute · University of Waterloo & Vector Institute
The Communication Complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting
May 22, 2026Élie de Panafieu, François Durand, Jérôme LangSocial Choice Theory Communication Complexity
LAMSADE, CNRS · 1Nokia Bell Labs · 2CNRS, LAMSADE, Universit´e Paris-Dauphine, PSL, France
Arrow-Type Impossibility for Genuinely Modal Judgments
May 22, 2026Yutaka Nagai, Hirotaka OnoLogical Reasoning Social Choice Theory
Graduate School of Informatics, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464–8601, Japan
Efficient Elicitation of Collective Disagreements
May 19, 2026Mohamed Ouaguenouni, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi +2Social Choice Theory Preference Elicitation
IRIT, Université Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France · Center for Collective Learning, IAST, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France · Center for Collective Learning, CIAS, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary +2
Agreement, Diversity, and Polarization Indices for Approval Elections
May 14, 2026Piotr Faliszewski, Jitka Mertlová, Krzysztof Sornat +2Social Choice Theory Computational Social Science
AGH University of Kraków, Poland · Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic · University of Geneva, Switzerland +1
The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting
May 11, 2026Nicholas TehSocial Choice Theory
University of Oxford
Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games
May 8, 2026Ian Gemp, Crystal Qian, Marc Lanctot +1Nash Equilibrium Social Choice Theory
Google DeepMind · New York, NY, USA · New York, NY USA +2
Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations
May 4, 2026Dimitris Avramidis, Alexandra Lassota, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +1Social Choice Theory Combinatorial Optimization
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science Eindhoven University of Technology Eindhoven, Netherlands · School of Computer Science, and Department of Mathematics and Statistics McGill University Montréal, Canada

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Collective intelligence through aggregation

Franz Dietrich, Christian List

We thank two anonymous referees and an editor for very helpful comments.

Social Choice Theory

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Suppose a committee, expert panel, or other group is making judgments on some issues, where these may be not just yes/no-questions, such as whether a defendant is guilty, but also variables with many possible values, such as macroeconomic or meteorological variables or travel directions. Furthermore, there may be interconnections between different issues, as in the case of economic or climate variables. How can the group arrive at "intelligent" collective judgments, based on the group members' individual judgments? We investigate three challenges raised by this judgment-aggregation problem. First, reasonable methods of aggregation (such as defining the collective judgment for each issue as the average or median judgment) can produce inconsistent collective judgments. Secondly, many methods of aggregation are manipulable by strategic voting. Finally, not all methods of aggregation are conducive to tracking the truth on the issues in question. We prove new impossibility or possibility theorems on all three challenges, identifying what it takes to produce collective judgments in a consistent, non-manipulable, and truth-tracking manner and thereby to achieve collective intelligence through aggregation. Overall, the median method, though imperfect, performs reasonably well. We also note the relevance of our analysis for non-human group decisions.

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Latest papers 31