Overview

AI agent auditing studies whether autonomous systems follow their instructions and policies as they use tools, exchange information, and change external state. Researchers combine trace analysis, runtime monitoring and authorization, static and dynamic security testing, adversarial benchmarks, and tamper-evident logs to detect violations and reconstruct how they occurred. A central lesson is that correct final answers or benchmark scores do not establish safe or faithful execution; audits increasingly examine intermediate decisions, permissions, evidence provenance, and effects on the environment. The field still faces challenges in obtaining complete, independent records and reliable evaluators, while balancing stronger oversight with task utility, cost, and agent autonomy.

Latest papers

312 papers54 papers in the last four weeks, down 44% on the four weeks before. 0.4% of all new papers.

Apr 7, 2026

OpenKedge: Governing Agentic Mutation with Execution-Bound Safety and Evidence Chains

The rise of autonomous AI agents exposes a fundamental flaw in API-centric architectures: probabilistic systems directly execute state mutations without sufficient context, coordination, or safety guarantees. We introduce OpenKedge, a protocol that redefines mutation as a governed process rather than an immediate consequence of API invocation. OpenKedge requires actors to submit declarative intent proposals, which are evaluated against deterministically derived system state, temporal signals, and policy constraints prior to execution. Approved intents are compiled into execution contracts that strictly bound permitted actions, resource scope, and time, and are enforced via ephemeral, task-oriented identities. This shifts safety from reactive filtering to preventative, execution-bound enforcement. Crucially, OpenKedge introduces an Intent-to-Execution Evidence Chain (IEEC), which cryptographically links intent, context, policy decisions, execution bounds, and outcomes into a unified lineage. This transforms mutation into a verifiable and reconstructable process, enabling deterministic auditability and reasoning about system behavior. We evaluate OpenKedge across multi-agent conflict scenarios and cloud infrastructure mutations. Results show that the protocol deterministically arbitrates competing intents and cages unsafe execution while maintaining high throughput, establishing a principled foundation for safely operating agentic systems at scale.
Apr 7, 2026

Foundations for Investigations of Agentic AI Systems from the Forensic Analysis of OpenClaw

Agentic AI systems are increasingly deployed as personal assistants and virtual employees, and are likely to become a common object of digital investigations and incident response. Yet little is known about how their internal state and actions can be reconstructed during forensic analysis, and systematic forensic approaches remain largely unexplored. We present the first empirical forensic study of a personal AI assistant, with OpenClaw as a case study. We examine its technical design via static code analysis and apply differential forensic analysis to identify recoverable traces across stages of the agent interaction loop. We classify and correlate these traces, structuring the examination around representative investigative questions. We propose a five-plane agent artifact taxonomy that captures recurring investigative patterns; its structural completeness is assessed by cross-mapping against published artifact inventories of two related AI systems. To aid investigations, we release an open-source artifact-extraction tool with a machine-readable schema. Finally, we highlight a foundational challenge: LLM-mediated execution adds both an abstraction layer and substantial nondeterminism to trace generation. Because tool selection and state transitions are co-determined by the model, the execution environment, and the evolving context, identical inputs need not yield identical traces.
Apr 7, 2026

Auditable Agents

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.
Apr 6, 2026

Undetectable Conversations Between AI Agents via Pseudorandom Noise-Resilient Key Exchange

AI agents are increasingly deployed to interact with other agents on behalf of users and organizations. We ask whether two such agents, operated by different entities, can carry out a parallel secret conversation while still producing a transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from an honest interaction, even to a strong passive auditor that knows the full model descriptions, the protocol, and the agents' private contexts. Building on recent work on watermarking and steganography for LLMs, we first show that if the parties possess an interaction-unique secret key, they can facilitate an optimal-rate covert conversation: the hidden conversation can exploit essentially all of the entropy present in the honest message distributions. Our main contributions concern extending this to the keyless setting, where the agents begin with no shared secret. We show that covert key exchange, and hence covert conversation, is possible even when each model has an arbitrary private context, and their messages are short and fully adaptive, assuming only that sufficiently many individual messages have at least constant min-entropy. This stands in contrast to previous covert communication works, which relied on the min-entropy in each individual message growing with the security parameter. To obtain this, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive, which we call pseudorandom noise-resilient key exchange: a key-exchange protocol whose public transcript is pseudorandom while still remaining correct under constant noise. We study this primitive, giving several constructions relevant to our application as well as strong limitations showing that more naive variants are impossible or vulnerable to efficient attacks. These results show that transcript auditing alone cannot rule out covert coordination between AI agents, and identify a new cryptographic theory that may be of independent interest.
Apr 6, 2026

Springdrift: An Auditable Persistent Runtime for LLM Agents with Case-Based Memory, Normative Safety, and Ambient Self-Perception

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.
Apr 4, 2026

Explainable Model Routing for Agentic Workflows

Modern agentic workflows decompose complex tasks into specialized subtasks and route them to diverse models to minimize cost without sacrificing quality. However, current routing architectures focus exclusively on performance optimization, leaving underlying trade-offs between model capability and cost unrecorded. Without clear rationale, developers cannot distinguish between intelligent efficiency -- using specialized models for appropriate tasks -- and latent failures caused by budget-driven model selection. We present Topaz, a framework that introduces formal auditability to agentic routing. Topaz replaces silent model assignments with an inherently interpretable router that incorporates three components: (i) skill-based profiling that synthesizes performance across diverse benchmarks into granular capability profiles (ii) fully traceable routing algorithms that utilize budget-based and multi-objective optimization to produce clear traces of how skill-match scores were weighed against costs, and (iii) developer-facing explanations that translate these traces into natural language, allowing users to audit system logic and iteratively tune the cost-quality tradeoff. By making routing decisions interpretable, Topaz enables users to understand, trust, and meaningfully steer routed agentic systems.
Apr 3, 2026

Coupled Control, Structured Memory, and Verifiable Action in Agentic AI (SCRAT -- Stochastic Control with Retrieval and Auditable Trajectories): A Comparative Perspective from Squirrel Locomotion and Scatter-Hoarding

Agentic AI is increasingly judged not by fluent output alone but by whether it can act, remember, and verify under partial observability, delay, and strategic observation. Existing research often studies these demands separately: robotics emphasizes control, retrieval systems emphasize memory, and alignment or assurance work emphasizes checking and oversight. This article argues that squirrel ecology offers a sharp comparative case because arboreal locomotion, scatter-hoarding, and audience-sensitive caching couple all three demands in one organism. We synthesize evidence from fox, eastern gray, and, in one field comparison, red squirrels, and impose an explicit inference ladder: empirical observation, minimal computational inference, and AI design conjecture. We introduce a minimal hierarchical partially observed control model with latent dynamics, structured episodic memory, observer-belief state, option-level actions, and delayed verifier signals. This motivates three hypotheses: (H1) fast local feedback plus predictive compensation improves robustness under hidden dynamics shifts; (H2) memory organized for future control improves delayed retrieval under cue conflict and load; and (H3) verifiers and observer models inside the action-memory loop reduce silent failure and information leakage while remaining vulnerable to misspecification. A downstream conjecture is that role-differentiated proposer/executor/checker/adversary systems may reduce correlated error under asymmetric information and verification burden. The contribution is a comparative perspective and benchmark agenda: a disciplined program of falsifiable claims about the coupling of control, memory, and verifiable action.
Apr 1, 2026

UK AISI Alignment Evaluation Case-Study

This technical report presents methods developed by the UK AI Security Institute for assessing whether advanced AI systems reliably follow intended goals. Specifically, we evaluate whether frontier models sabotage safety research when deployed as coding assistants within an AI lab. Applying our methods to four frontier models, we find no confirmed instances of research sabotage. However, we observe that Claude Opus 4.5 Preview (a pre-release snapshot of Opus 4.5) and Sonnet 4.5 frequently refuse to engage with safety-relevant research tasks, citing concerns about research direction, involvement in self-training, and research scope. We additionally find that Opus 4.5 Preview shows reduced unprompted evaluation awareness compared to Sonnet 4.5, while both models can distinguish evaluation from deployment scenarios when prompted. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold designed to simulate realistic internal deployment of a coding agent. We validate that this scaffold produces trajectories that all tested models fail to reliably distinguish from real deployment data. We test models across scenarios varying in research motivation, activity type, replacement threat, and model autonomy. Finally, we discuss limitations including scenario coverage and evaluation awareness.
Mar 31, 2026

Near-Miss: Latent Policy Failure Detection in Agentic Workflows

Agentic systems for business process automation often require compliance with policies governing conditional updates to the system state. Evaluation of policy adherence in LLM-based agentic workflows is typically performed by comparing the final system state against a predefined ground truth. While this approach detects explicit policy violations, it may overlook a more subtle class of issues in which agents bypass required policy checks, yet reach a correct outcome due to favorable circumstances. We refer to such cases as near-misses or latent failures. In this work, we introduce a novel metric for detecting latent policy failures in agent conversations traces. Building on the ToolGuard framework, which converts natural-language policies into executable guard code, our method analyzes agent trajectories to determine whether agent's tool-calling decisions where sufficiently informed. We evaluate our approach on the τ2τ^2-verified Airlines benchmark across several contemporary open and proprietary LLMs acting as agents. Our results show that latent failures occur in 8-17% of trajectories involving mutating tool calls, even when the final outcome matches the expected ground-truth state. These findings reveal a blind spot in current evaluation methodologies and highlight the need for metrics that assess not only final outcomes but also the decision process leading to them.
Mar 30, 2026

Emergence WebVoyager: Toward Consistent and Transparent Evaluation of (Web) Agents in The Wild

Reliable evaluation of AI agents operating in complex, real-world environments requires methodologies that are robust, transparent, and contextually aligned with the tasks agents are intended to perform. This study identifies persistent shortcomings in existing AI agent evaluation practices that are particularly acute in web agent evaluation, as exemplified by our audit of WebVoyager, including task-framing ambiguity and operational variability that hinder meaningful and reproducible performance comparisons. To address these challenges, we introduce Emergence WebVoyager, an enhanced version of the WebVoyager benchmark that standardizes evaluation methodology through clear guidelines for task instantiation, failure handling, annotation, and reporting. Emergence WebVoyager achieves an inter-annotator agreement of 95.9%, indicating improved clarity and reliability in both task formulation and evaluation. Applying this framework to evaluate OpenAI Operator reveals substantial performance variation across domains and task types, with an overall success rate of 68.6%, substantially lower than the 87% previously reported by OpenAI, demonstrating the utility of our approach for more rigorous and comparable web agent evaluation.
Mar 30, 2026

"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents

Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a combined problem of risk understanding and post-hoc auditability, using OpenClaw as a motivating case. We first build a multi-source corpus of the OpenClaw ecosystem, including incidents, advisories, malicious-skill reports, news coverage, tutorials, and social-media narratives. We then conduct an interview study to examine how users and practitioners understand skills, autonomy, privilege, persistence, and uninstallation. Our findings suggest that participants often recognized these systems as risky in the abstract, but lacked concrete mental models of what skills can do, what resources agents can access, and what changes may remain after execution or removal. Motivated by these findings, we propose AgentTrace, a traceability framework and prototype interface for visualizing agent actions, touched resources, permission history, provenance, and persistent side effects. A scenario-based evaluation suggests that traceability-oriented interfaces can improve understanding of agent behavior, support anomaly detection, and foster more calibrated trust.
Mar 28, 2026

From Inference Routing to Agent Orchestration: Declarative Policy Compilation with Cross-Layer Verification

The Semantic Router DSL is a non-Turing-complete policy language deployed in production for per-request LLM inference routing: content signals (embedding similarity, PII detection, jailbreak scoring) feed into weighted projections and priority-ordered decision trees that select a model, enforce privacy policies, and produce structured audit traces -- all from a single declarative source file. Prior work established conflict-free compilation for probabilistic predicates and positioned the DSL within the Workload-Router-Pool inference architecture. This paper extends the same language from stateless, per-request routing to multi-step agent workflows -- the full path from inference gateway to agent orchestration to infrastructure deployment. The DSL compiler emits verified decision nodes for orchestration frameworks (LangGraph, OpenClaw), Kubernetes artifacts (NetworkPolicy, Sandbox CRD, ConfigMap), YANG/NETCONF payloads, and protocol-boundary gates (MCP, A2A) -- all from the same source. Because the language is non-Turing-complete, the compiler guarantees exhaustive routing, conflict-free branching, referential integrity, and audit traces structurally coupled to the decision logic. Because signal definitions are shared across targets, a threshold change propagates from inference gateway to agent gate to infrastructure artifact in one compilation step -- eliminating cross-team coordination as the primary source of policy drift. We ground the approach in four pillars -- auditability, cost efficiency, verifiability, and tunability -- and identify the verification boundary at each layer.
Mar 27, 2026

Clawed and Dangerous: Can We Trust Open Agentic Systems?

Open agentic systems combine LLM-based planning with external capabilities, persistent memory, and privileged execution. They are used in coding assistants, browser copilots, and enterprise automation. OpenClaw is a visible instance of this broader class. Without much attention yet, their security challenge is fundamentally different from that of traditional software that relies on predictable execution and well-defined control flow. In open agentic systems, everything is ''probabilistic'': plans are generated at runtime, key decisions may be shaped by untrusted natural-language inputs and tool outputs, execution unfolds in uncertain environments, and actions are taken under authority delegated by human users. The central challenge is therefore not merely robustness against individual attacks, but the governance of agentic behavior under persistent uncertainty. This paper systematizes the area through a software engineering lens. We introduce a six-dimensional analytical taxonomy and synthesize 50 papers spanning attacks, benchmarks, defenses, audits, and adjacent engineering foundations. From this synthesis, we derive a reference doctrine for secure-by-construction agent platforms, together with an evaluation scorecard for assessing platform security posture. Our review shows that the literature is relatively mature in attack characterization and benchmark construction, but remains weak in deployment controls, operational governance, persistent-memory integrity, and capability revocation. These gaps define a concrete engineering agenda for building agent ecosystems that are governable, auditable, and resilient under compromise.
Mar 25, 2026

The Stochastic Gap: A Markovian Framework for Pre-Deployment Reliability and Oversight-Cost Auditing in Agentic Artificial Intelligence

Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) in organizations is a sequential decision problem constrained by reliability and oversight cost. When deterministic workflows are replaced by stochastic policies over actions and tool calls, the key question is not whether a next step appears plausible, but whether the resulting trajectory remains statistically supported, locally unambiguous, and economically governable. We develop a measure-theoretic Markov framework for this setting. The core quantities are state blind-spot mass B_n(tau), state-action blind mass B^SA_{pi,n}(tau), an entropy-based human-in-the-loop escalation gate, and an expected oversight-cost identity over the workflow visitation measure. We instantiate the framework on the Business Process Intelligence Challenge 2019 purchase-to-pay log (251,734 cases, 1,595,923 events, 42 distinct workflow actions) and construct a log-driven simulated agent from a chronological 80/20 split of the same process. The main empirical finding is that a large workflow can appear well supported at the state level while retaining substantial blind mass over next-step decisions: refining the operational state to include case context, economic magnitude, and actor class expands the state space from 42 to 668 and raises state-action blind mass from 0.0165 at tau=50 to 0.1253 at tau=1000. On the held-out split, m(s) = max_a pi-hat(a|s) tracks realized autonomous step accuracy within 3.4 percentage points on average. The same quantities that delimit statistically credible autonomy also determine expected oversight burden. The framework is demonstrated on a large-scale enterprise procurement workflow and is designed for direct application to engineering processes for which operational event logs are available.
Mar 25, 2026

MedOpenClaw and MedFlowBench: Auditing Medical Agents in Full-Study Workflows

Medical imaging benchmarks often evaluate VLMs on pre-selected 2D images, slices, crops, or patches, making evaluation closer to visual recognition. Real clinical workflows impose a different burden: readers must search through complete studies, operate imaging software, navigate across slices and magnifications, and document visual evidence that can be audited. We argue that this evidence-producing workflow is a critical missing evaluation axis for medical imaging agents. To study it, we introduce MedFlowBench, a full-study benchmark for VLM agents, together with MedOpenClaw, a controlled and replayable runtime in which agents operate medical imaging viewers such as 3D Slicer and QuPath. In each episode, an agent inspects a complete radiology study or whole-slide pathology image, returns a task answer, and submits structured evidence, including key slices, coordinates, regions of interest, or lesion-state fields. This evidence is automatically checked against withheld masks, annotations, and labels. Across evaluated models, final answer-only scoring gives an overly optimistic picture: when answers must also be supported by correct evidence, performance drops substantially on complex workflows. We further find that adding image-analysis tools does not by itself solve the problem. Tools help when they make a complex procedure simple and reliable, but agents still struggle when they must choose inputs, manage viewer state, and verify intermediate outputs over multiple steps. MedFlowBench exposes whether medical imaging agents can produce auditable evidence from complete studies, rather than plausible answers from selected images.
Mar 25, 2026

Willful Disobedience: Automatically Detecting Failures in Agentic Traces

AI agents are increasingly embedded in real software systems, where they execute multi-step workflows through multi-turn dialogue, tool invocations, and intermediate decisions. These long execution histories, called agentic traces, make validation difficult. Outcome-only benchmarks can miss critical procedural failures, such as incorrect workflow routing, unsafe tool usage, or violations of prompt-specified rules. This paper presents AgentPex, an AI-powered tool designed to systematically evaluate agentic traces. AgentPex extracts behavioral rules from agent prompts and system instructions, then uses these specifications to automatically evaluate traces for compliance. We evaluate AgentPex on 424 traces from τ2τ^2-bench across models in telecom, retail, and airline customer service. Our results show that AgentPex distinguishes agent behavior across models and surfaces specification violations that are not captured by outcome-only scoring. It also provides fine-grained analysis by domain and metric, enabling developers to understand agent strengths and weaknesses at scale. The source code of AgentPex is available at https://github.com/microsoft/agentpex.
Mar 24, 2026

AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents

The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing the web, the consequences of unsafe or adversarially manipulated behavior become immediate and tangible. Existing AI safety work has focused primarily on model alignment and input filtering, but these approaches do not address what happens at the moment an agent's intent becomes a real action on a real machine. This gap is especially acute in local environments, where developers run agents against their own filesystems, credentials, and infrastructure with little runtime control. This paper introduces AgentWall, a runtime safety and observability layer for local AI agents. AgentWall intercepts every proposed agent action before it reaches the host environment, evaluates it against an explicit declarative policy, requires human approval for sensitive operations, and records a complete execution trail for audit and replay. It is implemented as a policy-enforcing MCP proxy and native OpenClaw plugin, working across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw with a single install command. We present the design, architecture, threat model, and policy model of AgentWall, and demonstrate 92.9% policy enforcement accuracy with sub-millisecond overhead across 14 benchmark tests. AgentWall is open-source at https://github.com/agentwall/Agentwall.
Mar 24, 2026

Agent Audit: A Security Analysis System for LLM Agent Applications

What should a developer inspect before deploying an LLM agent: the model, the tool code, the deployment configuration, or all three? In practice, many security failures in agent systems arise not from model weights alone, but from the surrounding software stack: tool functions that pass untrusted inputs to dangerous operations, exposed credentials in deployment artifacts, and over-privileged Model Context Protocol (MCP) configurations. We present Agent Audit, a security analysis system for LLM agent applications. Agent Audit analyzes Python agent code and deployment artifacts through an agent-aware pipeline that combines dataflow analysis, credential detection, structured configuration parsing, and privilege-risk checks. The system reports findings in terminal, JSON, and SARIF formats, enabling direct integration with local development workflows and CI/CD pipelines. On a benchmark of 22 samples with 42 annotated vulnerabilities, Agent Audit detects 40 vulnerabilities with 6 false positives, substantially improving recall over common SAST baselines while maintaining sub-second scan times. Agent Audit is open source and installable via pip, making security auditing accessible for agent systems. In the live demonstration, attendees scan vulnerable agent repositories and observe how Agent Audit identifies security risks in tool functions, prompts, and more. Findings are linked to source locations and configuration paths, and can be exported into VS Code and GitHub Code Scanning for interactive inspection.
Mar 21, 2026

Before the Tool Call: Deterministic Pre-Action Authorization for Autonomous AI Agents

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).
Mar 18, 2026

When Only the Final Text Survives: Implicit Execution Tracing for Multi-Agent Auditing

When a multi-agent system produces an incorrect or harmful answer, who is accountable if execution logs and agent identifiers are unavailable? In practice, generated content is often detached from its execution environment due to privacy or system boundaries, leaving the final text as the only auditable artifact. Existing attribution methods rely on full execution traces and thus become ineffective in such metadata-deprived settings. We propose Implicit Execution Tracing (IET), a provenance-by-design framework that shifts attribution from post-hoc inference to built-in instrumentation. Rather than inferring provenance after the fact, IET embeds agent-specific, key-conditioned statistical signals into the token generation process at generation time, turning the output text into a self-verifying provenance record. An offline auditor, holding a verification registry that maps each agent to its key, then recovers segment-level provenance - segment boundaries and per-segment agent attribution - from the final text alone without access to execution logs or private traces. Experiments across diverse multi-agent coordination settings demonstrate that IET achieves accurate segment-level attribution and reliable transition recovery under identity removal, boundary corruption, and privacy-preserving redaction, while maintaining generation quality. These results show that embedding provenance into generation provides a practical foundation for accountability in multi-agent language systems under metadata loss.
Mar 17, 2026

Ablation Study of a Fairness Auditing Agentic System for Bias Mitigation in Early-Onset Colorectal Cancer Detection

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used in clinical settings, yet limited oversight and domain expertise can allow algorithmic bias and safety risks to persist. This study evaluates whether an agentic AI system can support auditing biomedical machine learning models for fairness in early-onset colorectal cancer (EO-CRC), a condition with documented demographic disparities. We implemented a two-agent architecture consisting of a Domain Expert Agent that synthesizes literature on EO-CRC disparities and a Fairness Consultant Agent that recommends sensitive attributes and fairness metrics for model evaluation. An ablation study compared three Ollama large language models (8B, 20B, and 120B parameters) across three configurations: pretrained LLM-only, Agent without Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), and Agent with RAG. Across models, the Agent with RAG achieved the highest semantic similarity to expert-derived reference statements, particularly for disparity identification, suggesting agentic systems with retrieval may help scale fairness auditing in clinical AI.
Mar 15, 2026

Cryptographic Runtime Governance for Autonomous AI Systems: The Aegis Architecture for Verifiable Policy Enforcement

Contemporary AI governance frameworks rely heavily on post hoc oversight, policy guidance, and behavioral alignment techniques, yet these mechanisms become fragile as systems gain autonomy, speed, and operational opacity. This paper presents Aegis, a runtime governance architecture for autonomous AI systems that treats policy and legal constraints as execution conditions rather than advisory principles. Aegis binds each governed agent to a cryptographically sealed Immutable Ethics Policy Layer (IEPL) at system genesis and enforces external emissions through an Ethics Verification Agent (EVA), an Enforcement Kernel Module (EKM), and an Immutable Logging Kernel (ILK). Amendments to the governing policy layer require quorum approval and redeclaration of the system trust root; verified violations trigger autonomous shutdown and generation of auditable proof artifacts. We evaluate the architecture within the Civitas runtime using three operational measures: proof verification latency under tamper conditions, publication overhead, and alignment retention performance relative to an ungoverned baseline. In controlled trials, Aegis demonstrates median proof verification latency of 238 ms, median publication overhead of approximately 9.4 ms, and higher alignment retention than the baseline condition across matched tasks. We argue that these results support a shift in AI governance from discretionary oversight toward verifiable runtime constraint. Rather than claiming to resolve machine ethics in the abstract, the proposed architecture seeks to show that policy violating behavior can be rendered operationally non executable within a controlled runtime governance framework. The paper concludes by discussing methodological limits, evidentiary implications, and the role of proof oriented governance in high assurance AI deployment.
Mar 11, 2026

CUAAudit: Meta-Evaluation of Vision-Language Models as Auditors of Autonomous Computer-Use Agents

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are emerging as a new paradigm in human-computer interaction, enabling autonomous execution of tasks in desktop environment by perceiving high-level natural-language instructions. As such agents become increasingly capable and are deployed across diverse desktop environments, evaluating their behavior in a scalable and reliable manner becomes a critical challenge. Existing evaluation pipelines rely on static benchmarks, rule-based success checks, or manual inspection, which are brittle, costly, and poorly aligned with real-world usage. In this work, we study Vision-Language Models (VLMs) as autonomous auditors for assessing CUA task completion directly from observable interactions and conduct a large-scale meta-evaluation of five VLMs that judge task success given a natural-language instruction and the final environment state. Our evaluation spans three widely used CUA benchmarks across macOS, Windows, and Linux environments and analyzes auditor behavior along three complementary dimensions: accuracy, calibration of confidence estimates, and inter-model agreement. We find that while state-of-the-art VLMs achieve strong accuracy and calibration, all auditors exhibit notable performance degradation in more complex or heterogeneous environments, and even high-performing models show significant disagreement in their judgments. These results expose fundamental limitations of current model-based auditing approaches and highlight the need to explicitly account for evaluator reliability, uncertainty, and variance when deploying autonomous CUAs in real-world settings.
Mar 11, 2026

VulnAgent-R2: Evidence-Calibrated Multi-Agent Auditing for Repository-Level Vulnerability Detection

Software vulnerabilities often depend on cross-file data flow, build options, framework conventions, and runtime guards, so isolated function classifiers produce fragile and poorly calibrated warnings. Repository-level LLM agents can gather richer evidence, but prior variants under-specify reproducibility, verifier behavior, baseline fairness, and statistical uncertainty. We present VulnAgent-R2, a budget-aware agentic auditing framework with three additional reusable modules: counterfactual evidence reweighting, build-aware verification-plan synthesis, and a cost-risk Pareto scheduler. The system combines graph triage, bounded context optimization, role-specialized agents, sceptic counter-evidence, selective dynamic verification, and calibrated fusion. On Devign, Big-Vul, DiverseVul, and PrimeVul, VulnAgent-R2 obtains 0.798/0.895, 0.739/0.871, 0.700/0.842, and 0.385/0.781 F1/AUROC, respectively. On JITVul it reaches 0.606 F1, 0.529 Top-1, and 0.742 Top-3 localization, while reducing online tokens by 38.3% over always-full multi-agent execution. Online time includes retrieval, LLM calls, CER scoring, verifier planning, compilation, and test execution, but excludes one-time shared indexing. Bootstrap tests show the PrimeVul gain over VulnAgent-X is +0.038 F1, 95% CI [0.020, 0.055], Holm-adjusted p=0.009p=0.009. Treating vulnerability detection as calibrated evidence accumulation improves detection, localization, auditability, and cost control under the evaluated protocol, while remaining a prioritization aid rather than a replacement for manual review.Code is available at https://github.com/renweimeng/Vlun-Agent-X.
Mar 10, 2026

Compatibility at a Cost: Systematic Discovery and Exploitation of MCP Clause-Compliance Vulnerabilities

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a recently proposed interoperability standard that unifies how AI agents connect with external tools and data sources. By defining a set of common client-server message exchange clauses, MCP replaces fragmented integrations with a standardized, plug-and-play framework. However, to be compatible with diverse AI agents, the MCP specification relaxes many behavioral constraints into optional clauses, leading to misuse-prone SDK implementation. We identify it as a new attack surface that allows adversaries to achieve multiple attacks (e.g, silent prompt injection, DoS, etc.), named as compatibility-abusing attacks. In this work, we present the first systematic framework for analyzing this new attack surface across multi-language MCP SDKs. First, we construct a universal and language-agnostic intermediate representation (IR) generator that normalizes SDKs of different languages. Next, based on the new IR, we propose auditable static analysis with LLM-guided semantic reasoning for cross-language/clause compliance analysis. Third, by formalizing the attack semantics of the MCP clauses, we build three attack modalities and develop a modality-guided pipeline to uncover exploitable non-compliance issues.
Mar 9, 2026

Arbiter: Detecting Interference in LLM Agent System Prompts

System prompts for LLM-based coding agents are software artifacts that govern agent behavior, yet lack the testing infrastructure applied to conventional software. We present Arbiter, a framework combining formal evaluation rules with multi-model LLM scouring to detect interference patterns in system prompts. Applied to three major coding agent system prompts: Claude Code (Anthropic), Codex CLI (OpenAI), and Gemini CLI (Google), we identify 152 findings across the undirected scouring phase and 21 hand-labeled interference patterns in directed analysis of one vendor. We show that prompt architecture (monolithic, flat, modular) strongly correlates with observed failure class but not with severity, and that multi-model evaluation discovers categorically different vulnerability classes than single-model analysis. One scourer finding was structural data loss in Gemini CLI's memory system was consistent with an issue filed and patched by Google, which addressed the symptom without addressing the schema-level root cause identified by the scourer. Total cost of cross-vendor analysis: $0.27 USD.
Mar 8, 2026

Give Them an Inch and They Will Take a Mile:Understanding and Measuring Caller Identity Confusion in MCP-Based AI Systems

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open and standardized interface that enables large language models (LLMs) to interact with external tools and services, and is increasingly adopted by AI agents. However, the security of MCP-based systems remains largely unexplored.In this work, we conduct a large-scale security analysis of MCP servers integrated within MCP clients. We show that treating MCP servers as trusted entities without authenticating the caller identity is fundamentally insecure. Since MCP servers often cannot distinguish who is invoking a request, a single authorization decision may implicitly grant access to multiple, potentially untrusted callers.Our empirical study reveals that most MCP servers rely on persistent authorization states, allowing tool invocations after an initial authorization without re-authentication, regardless of the caller. In addition, many MCP servers fail to enforce authentication at the per-tool level, enabling unauthorized access to sensitive operations.These findings demonstrate that one-time authorization and server-level trust significantly expand the attack surface of MCP-based systems, highlighting the need for explicit caller authentication and fine-grained authorization mechanisms.
Mar 7, 2026

Beyond Reward Suppression: Reshaping Steganographic Communication Protocols in MARL via Dynamic Representational Circuit Breaking

In decentralized Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), steganographic collusion -- where agents develop private protocols to evade monitoring -- presents a critical AI safety threat. Existing defenses, limited to behavioral or reward layers, fail to detect coordination in latent communication channels. We introduce the Dynamic Representational Circuit Breaker (DRCB), an architectural defense operating at the optimization substrate. Building on the AI Mother Tongue (AIM) framework, DRCB utilizes a Vector Quantized Variational Autoencoder (VQ-VAE) bottleneck to convert unobservable messages into auditable statistical objects. DRCB monitors signals including Jensen-Shannon Divergence drift, L2-norm codebook displacement, and Randomized Observer Pool accuracy to compute an EMA-based Collusion Score. Threshold breaches trigger four escalating interventions: dynamic adaptation, gradient-space penalty injection into the Advantage function A^pi, temporal reward suppression, and full substrate circuit breaking via codebook shuffling and optimizer state reset. Experiments on a Contextual Prisoner's Dilemma with MNIST labels show that while static monitoring fails (p = 0.3517), DRCB improves observer mean accuracy from 0.858 to 0.938 (+9.3 percent) and reduces volatility by 43 percent, while preserving mean joint reward (p = 0.854). Analysis of 214,298 symbol samples confirms "Semantic Degradation," where high-frequency sequences converge to zero entropy, foreclosing complex steganographic encodings. We identify a "Transparency Paradox" where agents achieve surface-level determinism while preserving residual capacity in long-tail distributions, reflecting Goodhart's Law. This task-agnostic methodology provides a technical path toward MICA-compliant (Multi-Agent Internal Coupling Audit) pre-deployment auditing for autonomous systems.
Mar 6, 2026

ESAA-Security: An Event-Sourced, Verifiable Architecture for Agent-Assisted Security Audits of AI-Generated Code

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.
Mar 5, 2026

EigenData: A Self-Evolving Multi-Agent Platform for Function-Calling Data Synthesis, Auditing, and Repair

Function-calling agents -- large language models that invoke tools and APIs -- require high-quality, domain-specific training data spanning executable environments, backing databases, and diverse multi-turn trajectories. We introduce EigenData, an integrated, self-evolving platform that automates the full data lifecycle through a multi-agent architecture. A top-level orchestrator, EigenCore, coordinates three specialized sub-systems: DatabaseAgent for realistic domain database construction, CodingAgent for verified executable environment generation with iterative test-debug loops, and DataAgent for multi-turn trajectory synthesis with self-evolving prompt optimization. Cross-component feedback ensures consistency across all artifacts. We apply EigenData to audit and repair the Berkeley Function-Calling Leaderboard (BFCL-V3), identifying systematic errors in function schemas, implementations, and reference trajectories, automatically correcting them through coordinated schema refinement, code-level bug fixes, and trajectory modification, and introducing an outcome-aware evaluation protocol that assesses task success via database-state correctness rather than turn-level trajectory matching. We demonstrate that the repaired benchmark, coupled with outcome-aware metrics, produces model rankings substantially better correlated with human judgments of functional correctness.